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CHAPTER ONE
INTRODUCTION
“A set of principles necessarily includes a political attitude,” Henri said. “And 
on the other hand, politics is itself a living thing.”
“I don’t think so,” Lambert replied. “In politics, all you’re concerned with are 
abstract things that don’t exist -- the future, masses of people. But what is really 
concrete is the actual present moment, and people as separate and single 
individuals.”
“But each individual is affected by collective history,” Henri said.
“The trouble is that in politics you never come down form the high plateau of 
history to the problem of the lowly individual,” Lambert said. “You get lost in 
generalities and no one gives a damn about particular cases.”
-Simone de Beauvoir, The Mandarins
This dissertation is about the relationship between the Porgera gold mine and the 
Ipili-speaking people on whose land the mine is located. In 1939 the Ipili were one of the 
last major ethnic groups to be contacted by the Australian administration of what was 
then the Trust Territory of New Guinea. Gold was discovered on that initial patrol, and 
just fifty years later the third largest gold mine in the world opened in the valley. Thus 
Porgerans have gone from a world without metal or textiles to one in which trucks 
carrying literally hundreds of tons of rock operate nonstop in a huge open pit that was 
once their mountain. Since its establishment in 1962, the Porgera government station has 
been transformed from a remote airstrip to a bustling ‘wild west’ boom-town with – if the 
census can be believed -- roughly 20,000 inhabitants (Government of Papua New Guinea 
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2002). The valley’s past is littered with spectacular industrial accidents, large scale civil 
unrest, and one particularly well-remembered beheading. While many would expect the 
intersection of a world-class gold mine and a relatively naïve indigenous people to result 
in a ‘fatal impact’ (Moorehead 1966), in fact the Ipili have been very successful at 
extracting concessions from the mine and government. In fact, senior management of the 
mine consider that they, rather than the Ipili, ought to be sympathetically considered as 
the victims in this scenario, since their billion dollar investment is held hostage by an 
ethnic group that can, by blocking a road or downing a power line, halt their operations 
altogether. 
In sum, Porgera fulfills every stereotype of Papua New Guineans living ‘10,000 
years in a lifetime’ (Kiki 1968) or going ‘from stone to steel’ (Salisbury 1962) or ‘from 
the stone age to the jet age’ (Biersack 1992). The danger of a study of Porgera, then, is 
not that it will be too dull, but rather that it will give in to an urge to sensationalize. Yet 
despite this potential pitfall it is worth approaching Porgera seriously, because it is 
important in many ways to many different people.
 To Ipili people, of course, the mine and its operation are of major concern. The 
mine is literally the biggest thing that has happened to the valley in its admittedly brief 
history. Understanding the relationship between the Ipili and the mine is thus obviously 
something in which they are keenly interested. The government of Papua New Guinea is 
also interested in Porgera. Papua New Guinea is a country where most of the population 
is removed from a money economy and basic services such as roads, schools, and 
hospitals remain an unfilled promise due to the government’s lack of capacity. Thus 
policy elites in Port Moresby fund a good deal of the government’s operations with 
royalties, taxes, and other revenue derived from a handful of mining and hydrocarbon 
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projects operated by transnational companies. Finally, at the global level, the majority 
share holder and operator of the mine, Placer Dome, hopes that Porgera will continue to 
be a profitable investment. Concerns with its continued operation run from the mine 
manager on the property in Porgera, to the managing director of Placer Niu Gini in Port 
Moresby, to the head of Placer Dome Asia Pacific in Australia, all the way up to Placer 
Dome’s corporate offices in Vancouver, British Columbia.
In addition to this ‘real world’ interest, Porgera is of interest to an academic 
audience. An understanding of the relationship between the mine and the Ipili provides a 
genuine contribution to the ethnography of postcolonial highlands Papua New Guinea. 
Porgera is also of interest more generally for the way in which it helps us understand 
contemporary debates in anthropology theory. This dissertation thus aims to contribute to 
the Melanesianist literature, as well as scholarly discussions of indigenous identity, land 
tenure and common property, the mediation of social groups by individuals, and 
governance in weak states.  Understanding how Ipili identity circulates, how action is 
coordinated across time and space in Porgera, and how Papua New Guinea’s colonial past 
affects its post-colonial present, I will argue, helps clarify several issues regarding the 
construction of ‘globality’ and ‘locality’ as they operate today. 
This chapter introduces the dissertation as a whole. I begin by sketching out very 
briefly the ethnographic context of the study and the three main players who shape public 
life in Porgera: the mine, the Ipili themselves, and the elite in Port Moresby. I next move 
on to discuss the central theoretical problematic of the dissertation: how is the complex 
logistical, social, and legal task of keeping the mine in operation achieved? I focus not on 
‘cultural’ (as opposed to some distinct ‘technical’) aspect of operating the mine, but 
rather the way in which engineering and meaning are intertwined in narratives of the Ipili 
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as ‘local’ people and the mine as a ‘global’ institution. These narratives underwrite the 
coordination of action across space and time that constitutes ‘keeping the mine open’.  In 
the conclusion of the chapter I formulate the principle problems of the dissertation and 
discuss the organization of the work’s chapters. 
The Mine, the Ipili, and Port Moresby
The Porgera goldmine is located in Porgera district, Enga province, Papua New 
Guinea. Porgera district is in the extreme west end of Enga, and is composed of two 
valley which run roughly north and south, and which drain into the Lagaip river, itself a 
tributary of the Fly.  The more western of the two valleys, Paiela, is the source of most 
ethnographic knowledge about the Ipili, since it was the location of  Aletta Biersack’s 
Ph.D. fieldwork (Biersack 1980) and has been the topic of many of her subsequent 
publications. Paiela is at a lower altitude than Porgera, and has a more temperate climate 
as a result, and was probably the more populous of the two valleys prehistorically. The 
Porgera valley -- which lays at an altitude of over 2,000 meters -- is the administrative 
center of the district and, of course, the location of the mine (for more on Porgera’s 
physical environment see Jacka 2003:49-93). Thus despite its less hospitable climate, the 
presence of gold in Porgera has made it the center of life for Ipili in the historic era.
Porgera is a ‘world-class’, open-cut goldmine.  In 1992 – its second year of 
production - it produced 1,485,077 ounces of gold, making it the third most productive 
gold mine on the planet and the most productive outside of South Africa (Banks 
1997:121). In 2000 – the ethnographic present of this study -- the mine produced 910,434 
ounces of gold from 106,520,077 tons of ore milled (Placer Dome Asia Pacific 2001:1). 
The mine is owned by the Porgera Joint Venture (PJV), an unincorporated joint venture 
which is not publicly traded. Equity partners include Place Dome Inc. (50%), Goldfields 
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Limited (25%), Orogen Minerals (20%), and Yuwai No. 65 Limited (5%) (Placer Dome 
Asia Pacific 2001:1). Placer Dome and Goldfields are both international mining 
companies. Orogen is a state-controlled company designed to hold the government’s 
equity in mining and hydrocarbon projects, and Yuwai No. 65 Limited is a shelf company 
whose ownership is split between Mineral Resources Enga and Kupiane Yu Anduane, 
holding companies for the Enga Provincial government and the Porgera landowners 
respectively. Thus a quarter of the equity in the Porgera gold mine is held by Papua New 
Guinean institutions including, in some sense, the Ipili themselves.
As these numbers suggest, the key player in the PJV is Placer Dome Asia Pacific, 
a subsidiary of Placer Dome Inc., a Vancouver-based mining transnational that describes 
itself as “the world’s gold leader” that employs 12,000 people at fifteen mining 
operations in six countries on five continents and whose shares are traded on the Toronto, 
New York, Swiss and Australian stock exchanges (Placer Dome 2001:1-2). Placer has a 
long history in Papua New Guinea that goes back to the 1930s (Healy 1967). In 2000 
Placer owned two properties in Papua New Guinea, the Misima and Porgera gold mines. 
Placer has been involved with the Porgera project for over twenty years – it was the key 
partner during the prospecting stage of the mine, and today it operates the mine on behalf 
of the joint venture partners. Thus although employees of the Porgera Joint Venture wear 
PJV uniforms, the management and operation of the mine is essentially done by Placer 
and in minds of most Porgerans “PJV” and “Placer” are synonymous.
In 2000 the PJV employed 1,972 people, 1,724 of whom were citizens of Papua 
New Guinea and 248 of whom were expatriates. Of the ‘nationals’ roughly half (1,000) 
are drawn from points of hire within Porgera itself, 200 from Enga province, and 400 
from other areas of Papua New Guinea. The result is a multiethnic, if stratified, 
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workforce. Senior management (including the mine manager) and highly specialized 
technical positions are held by white expatriates (typically from Europe, Australia, or 
other Commonwealth countries) while most mid-level positions that require education 
and expertise are filled by Papua New Guineans from outside of Enga – typically people 
with experience working in other mines in the country. Finally, the bulk of the staff who 
operate equipment and provide custodial services are hired in Porgera although, as we 
shall see, whether this means they are ‘Porgeran’ or not is a constant topic of debate 
(Placer Dome Asia Pacific 2001:12).
The person most centrally responsible for the mine is the mine manager. The mine 
manager was the top employee at the mine and was, like the captain of an eighteenth 
century ship, given considerable latitude by his distant superiors in managing his 
operations. The mine manager was thus single-handedly responsible for the lives and 
safety of thousands of employees and drew up operating budgets that ran into the 
hundreds of millions of dollars. The position of mine manager is often a leaping-off point 
for senior management at the national, regional, or even international level. This seems to 
be particularly the case for Porgera. Four of the nineteen members of Placer Dome’s 
senior management in Vancouver have been involved in Porgera, and two have them 
have been mine managers.  As one member of senior management told me, there was a 
strong informal sense in the company that “if you could survive Porgera you were ready 
for anything.” In the case of the mine manager who lived through the Yakatabari 
negotiations described in the next chapter – a Dutch man trained as a mining engineer – 
this seemed to be particularly prescient. He is now the Executive Vice-President of 
Operations for Placer Dome – essentially the second most powerful person in the 
company’s global organization.
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As the senior official living on-site in Porgera, the mine manager reports to Placer 
Niugini, the branch of Placer Dome incorporated in Papua New Guinea whose offices are 
located in a suite in downtown Port Moresby. As the central coordinating point for 
Misima and Porgera, the Placer Niugini office represented the highest level of 
management in Papua New Guinea. The office is headed up by the Managing Director, 
who is responsible for the country at the national level. Two other senior executives – 
chosen for their experience and connections – specialize in relationships with industry 
and government representatives. These people report back to both Placer Asia-Pacific 
(whose headquarters is in Sydney) as well as to the international headquarters in 
Vancouver. Thus these executives in Port Moresby – basically, three people – serve to 
represent the mine at a national level even though they are not on site, and hence at a 
remove from the day-to-day operations.
Back at the mine, a small group of senior managers occupy the position in the 
mine’s hierarchy directly below the mine manager and are in charge overseeing different 
aspects of the mine’s operations. Most of these people had jobs dealing with aspect’s of 
the mine’s operations in which they did not directly deal with the Ipili except in their 
capacity as employees. The two branches of the mine that dealt with the Ipili most often 
were Loss Control, which operates site security and thus had to deal with trespassers, and 
Community Affairs, whose job is to be the interface between the mine and the Ipili.
Community Affairs was managed by the Director of Community Affairs. Beneath 
the head of community affairs was a small pool of roughly five men who are in charge of 
individual units. These units are fluid and responded to change over time. One man, for 
instance, is in charge of community affairs with the groups downstream of the mine, 
which he visits by helicopter. Another is in charge of the lands claims office where Ipili 
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complaints about land and compensation were handled. Unlike the head of community 
affairs – whose office is in the administration building, which requires a security 
clearance to enter – these men have publicly accessible offices and are thus the most 
important people that the average Porgeran can see.
Mining in the third world often evokes memories of Sebastiao Salgado’s haunting 
photos of sulfur mining in Indonesia and gold rushes in Brazil: stark portraits of 
primitive, dangerous conditions and third-worlders whose lives are shaped by the 
backbreaking labor of mining (Salgado 1993). Porgera has absolutely nothing in common 
with this picture. The Porgera gold mine is an enormous, technologically sophisticated, 
highly mechanized open cut operation. The mine moves roughly 220,000 tons of earth 
every day, some of which is milled immediately and some of which is stockpiled for 
future use. Enormous earthmoving machines in the open pit shovel ore into the backs of a 
fleet of  777 dump trucks, each of which has a payload of over 200 tons. These trucks 
then deliver ore to the primary crusher. To maximize the efficiency of the milling 
process, the proportions of rock to ore coming out of the pit must be precisely mixed. 
Directing the proper combination of trucks to bring ore of varying richness from different 
sites around the pit requires the operator – who is something like a cross between a 
bartender and an air traffic controller –  to do the equivalent of mixing a one hundred 
thousand ton cocktail by remote control.
After primary crushing, ore is further processed in ball mills and centrifuges at a 
plant near the open cut. The ore slurry that results from this process is then piped down to 
the main refinery. Because the gold in Porgera’s ore is bound up with sulfur, it must be 
processed with large autoclaves, which use high pressure and high heat to essentially 
burn the sulfur off of the gold. The ore is then sent to flotation tanks where the gold is 
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freed through the application of cyanide. The cyanide-filled trailings that result are 
neutralized with lime and are then flushed into the Porgera river. The gold-rich mixture 
that remains is siphoned off to be refined further and eventually poured into gold bars and 
removed from the mine by undisclosed means. 
The construction of the Porgera gold mine in 1988 and 1989 was a technological 
triumph which many considered impossible (for an institutional history see Jackson and 
Banks 2002). Like most large-scale mines the capital outlay was enormous -- the joint 
venture partners spent roughly one billion US dollars on the property at Porgera. But the 
achievement of the Porgera mine is more than just financially impressive. Simply 
creating and maintaining the facilities in Porgera is a challenge because the geology of 
the area where the mine is built is inherently unstable. The use of autoclaves to process 
ore was revolutionary when it was first accomplished, and at the time was a daring and 
ingenious feat of engineering. Using an autoclave requires an enormous amount of 
oxygen, and creating oxygen requires an enormous amount of power. Porgera’s solution 
to this problem was to build a chain of guy-wired electricity pylons and stretch them 80 
kilometers away across a mountain range to a large natural gas plant which generates the 
mine’s power – yet another formidable feat. The mine requires more than just electricity 
to run, of course. During construction the Porgera Joint Venture completed the first all-
weather road into the Porgera valley in order to keep the mine supplied. All of the 
supplies for the mine must come up this road from Lae, Papua New Guinea’s largest port, 
which is a three day drive away. 
While supplies are brought up the highlands highway, non-local employees are 
flown into the valley. The result is a ‘fly-in-fly-out’ arrangement in which employees are 
accommodated in on-site housing during their shifts (exact schedules vary based on 
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employee). Today, the Kairik airstrip in Porgera features daily landings of de Haviland 
Twin Otters, while huge transport helicopters leased from Air Vladivostok crewed by 
Russian pilots and trained Papua New Guinean translators land on the helipad within the 
mine site itself. Fly-in-fly-out arrangements are one of the most contentious aspects of the 
mine’s operation in Porgera today, since Ipili want the work force to dwell permanently 
in the valley. 
In sum, the Porgera gold mine is an enormously complex operation that has 
carved out an enclave for itself in an extremely remote area of Papua New Guinea. Its 
two ‘lifelines’ – the power line and the road – must remain operational or the mine’s 
work will grind to a halt and the thousands of employees working and living there would 
be left without supplies or power. Mine management estimates that keeping the lights on 
in Porgera – maintaining power and housing employees – without keeping the mine in 
production costs US$1,000,000 dollars a day.
The Ipili
The people known collectively to the scholarly literature as ‘the Ipili’ (book 
length monographs include Banks 1997, Biersack 1980, Filer ed 1999, Golub 2001, Jacka 
2003, Jackson and Banks 2002) are possessed of an identity that is as nebulous as it is 
important. Although the bulk of this dissertation will work to complicate notions of what 
it means for someone to be ‘the Ipili’, it is appropriate here to say a few words by way or 
orientation. Linguistically and culturally, the Ipili are part of the much wider ethnic 
galaxy which includes the Huli (to the south) and Enga (to the west), both of which are 
larger in population than the Ipili by an order of magnitude or more (for regional 
overviews see Biersack 1995 and Wiessner and Tumu 1998). Ipili are thus a ‘hinge’ or 
‘intermediate’ group wedged between the two much larger groups on either side of them. 
22
Like their neighbors, they prefer to live in dispersed homesteads and practice mounded 
sweet potato agriculture. Their religion and ritual focused on fertility, and one of the most 
well-known symbols of Ipili identity is the large bull-horn shaped wigs that young men 
made out of their own hair as part of an initiation ritual which focused on furthering the 
growth of men through their separation from the polluting influence of women (for more 
on fertility, ritual, and beautification amongst Ipili see Biersack 1998b). Very roughly, we 
can say that their kinship system resembles that of the Huli described by Glasse (1968) 
and the Garia described by Lawrence (1984), in that it is cognatic. As opposed to the 
more corporate-minded Enga or the Hagen people of Western Highlands, Ipili believe 
that anyone with a single Ipili grandparent has a good claim to affiliate with the cognatic 
stock with which that grandparent is affiliated as long as they demonstrate some sort of 
solidarity with other members of the stock through work and consociation. As in other 
areas in Papua New Guinea, affines and nonconsanguines are often incorporated into 
local groups which are theoretically based on descent (Langness 1964). 
As we shall see in more detail in chapter five, it is tempting, but inaccurate, to 
portray the Ipili, Enga, and Huli as distinct ethnicities separated by clear and bright 
boundaries. The term ‘Enga’ and ‘Ipili’ are neologisms that resulted from contact with 
Australians and are not indigenous ethnonyms. It is true that the Huli have an 
extraordinarily acute sense of their own ethnic uniqueness and superiority. However, they 
also have a folk theory that the groups surrounding them are descendants, albeit degraded 
and inferior ones, of ancestral Huli stock, blurring any clear division between the Huli 
and their neighbors. Similarly, despite now-vociferous assertions of province-wide unity 
made by Engans, they recognize neighboring groups such as the Ipili as related by 
ancestral clan ties. Finally, one of the most striking traits of Ipili social organization is its 
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attempts to adopt and co-opt powerful outsiders into its communities – a tendency that 
makes it hard to figure out where ‘the Ipili’ end and ‘the outsiders’ begin. To be sure, 
there are certainly distinctions between the Ipili and their neighbors, but these distinctions 
are more one of degree than absolute difference. The ease and fluidity of migration and 
ethnic affiliation in this area of highland is clearly evinced in the population figures given 
above. Ipili identity, then, is not clearly externally bounded.
Neither is it internally homogenous. Due to Biersack’s early publications, the 
people of Paiela have come to stand for ‘the Ipili’ in the minds of those familiar with the 
scholarly literature of this area. However in fact Paielans today are the most ‘bush’ of the 
Ipili. More familiar with Huli than with Engan, Paielans today live in an area that even 
Porgerans consider more ‘remote’ and ‘unsullied’ – when rich landowning Ipili just want 
to get away from it all, it’s not unusual for them to spend a few days in Paiela. While 
Paiela has seen some benefits from the Porgera gold mine – most notably the rough road 
which Porgeran landowners use to get to their vacation spots – its lack of access to any 
direct benefit from the Porgera gold mine is often a source of resentment. It is the large 
and as-yet unproven Mt. Kare prospect to the south of Paiela rather than Porgera that is a 
source of hopes and dreams by people who live in this area. After a large indigenous gold 
rush in the late 1980s (Ryan 1991) Kare continues to be an attractive but elusive resource, 
and Paielans could one day themselves become ‘landowners’ – a fact that keeps them on 
the political radar of Porgeran landowners, who maintain ties with Paielan kin and kith in 
anticipation of the day when the tables are turned, the Porgera mine is exhausted, and 
Kare becomes the center of life for the Ipili.
Paielans are not the only people “on the outside looking in” (Jacka 2001) at the 
relationship between ‘the Ipili’ and the mine. To the east of Porgera, near the road that 
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runs out of the valley, are the people known as the ‘East Ipili’ studied by Jerry Jacka 
(2003). This group is in many ways transitional between the Ipili speakers of Porgera 
proper and the ‘western Engans’ from the area around Laiagam. They speak a slightly 
different dialect of Ipili from people in Porgera, and intermarriage with Engans is high. In 
fact no better example of the fluidity of identity between Ipili and other seemingly 
discrete ethnic groups could be found than in Jacka’s community at Tipinini. 
As one of the outlying communities in Porgera, eastern Ipili receive a number of 
spin-off benefits from the Porgera mine. Paiyam Town, a multicultural township 
constructed by the mine at the insistence of the Ipili to house mine workers, is in this 
area. So is Suyan, the gated and barbed-wired compound where flown-in workers live 
during their shifts, and Kairik, the airstrip that serves the valley. Overall, though, these 
benefits are seen by Eastern Ipili less as perks and more as bitter reminders of the mine-
derived affluence which an arbitrary fluke of geography has visited upon their relatives 
further west.
The main area of the Porgera valley is ‘the station’, the ‘wild-west’ township that 
is the center of life in Porgera. Built around the valley’s original – and now disused – 
airstrip, this area is the location of the bank, the government offices, a string of stores, as 
well as the small neighborhood of houses where a large number of immigrants and 
government employees live. From the station a small road runs west into the Special 
Mining Lease, the roughly 2,000 hectare area that is home to the mine itself. Within the 
Special Mining Lease, the road branches both north and south. To the north it ends at the 
Kaiya river, on the other side of which is the lower Porgera, an area that played a 
prominent role in Porgera’s history in the early 1950s but which is now peripheral to life 
in the valley.
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If one follows the branch of the road south, however, one comes to those 
communities of people who live within the special mining lease and constituted the ‘true 
landowners of the Porgera gold mine’ – the seven landowning clans of the Tuanda, 
Tiyini, Waiwa, Pulumaini, Angalaini, Mamai and Anga. These are the people on whose 
land the mine’s physical plant and offices are located, and whose mountain is being 
ground down into an enormous pit. It is these people – the “Special Mining Lease 
Landowners” – with whom I conducted fieldwork and who I shall refer to here when I 
speak of ‘the Ipili.’ To tell people in Tipinini and Paiela today that the ‘Special Mining 
Lease Landowners’ have come to stand for all Ipili would strike them as unfair and, 
frankly, inaccurate. While benefits from the mine’s presence have been distributed 
throughout the Porgera valley, there is no doubt that Special Mining Lease landowners 
have received the vast majority of them, and resentment is both widespread and 
justifiable sentiment throughout the valley. Moreover, because of ‘the landowners’ long 
experience with outsiders, they are often seen as the farthest from ‘genuine Ipili culture’ 
– when I first arrived in the valley in 1998, for instance, I was told that I should go to 
Tipinini, rather than the Special Mining Lease, since in Tipinini they ‘still had their 
culture’. From the point of view of the Ipili, Special Mining Lease landowners are the 
richest, the luckiest, and the most corrupt – a feeling that is partially sour grapes and 
partially accurate. These people are at the center of Porgera’s historical development – it 
was on their land that gold was discovered in 1938 and where white miners returned 
again and again, eventually building the Porgera gold mine in 1989. In sum, it is this 
community that I refer to as ‘the Ipili’ in what follows. 
It is difficult to judge the population of Porgera district because government 
statistics are notoriously unreliable. Nonetheless, it is useful to note that the 2000 Papua 
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New Guinea census lists the population of and Porgera at 22,809 people while Paiela is 
home to 11,084 people (Government of Papua New Guinea 2002:14-16). Even if these 
figures are inaccurate to some degree, they reinforce my anecdotal experience of the two 
valleys: Paiela is a sparsely populated area considered rural even by Papua New Guinean 
standards, while Porgera is a more heavily settled area with a ‘boom town’ that has 
grown up around the mine. How many of the people living in Porgera and Paiela are 
‘Ipili’ is anyone’s guess – no accurate statistics exist, and even if they did the fluidity of 
Ipili identity would cast grave doubts on the methods used to gather them. People 
familiar with Porgera estimate that there are 6,000 to 7,000 ethnic Ipili in the Porgera 
valley today given a reasonably strict definition of that term. Roughly a two-thirds of the 
population of the valley, then, are immigrants.
Just as the stereotypes of mud-smeared miners emerging from a rough-hewn pit 
fail to capture the sophistication of the Porgera mine’s engineering, preconceptions of the 
Ipili as ecologically noble savages (Buege 1996) trampled on and degraded by global 
capitalism do not capture the complexity of Porgera’s politics. The Porgera mine came on 
line in the late 1980s shortly after the closure of the Bougainville copper mine. The loss 
of revenue from Bougainville left a massive hole in the government’s budget, and 
Porgera was quickly seized upon as a solution. At the same time, the failure of the Papua 
New Guinea Defense Force and police to keep Bougainville open demonstrated that the 
government lacked the capacity to force a mine on local populations. These two factors 
created a moment of opportunity which the Ipili – who are nothing if not ready to 
negotiation -- seized and became one of the most active and successful fourth world 
people in the world today in terms of pressing claims against the state and transnational 
capitalism. Indeed, so thorough-going are Ipili attempts to extract benefits from the mine 
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that Timothy Andambo, a Porgeran mining engineer, has described the tangle of trust 
funds, equity companies, and committees that manage the Ipili’s numerous investments 
as “social technology to extract rent from the Porgera lode” (Andambo 2002). And while 
the benefits package the Ipili negotiated with the government and the company has now 
been exceeded by other landowning groups in Papua New Guinea, it was the Ipili who set 
the precedent for the success of future groups.
Legally, subsoil resources – in this case, gold – are the property of the national 
government of Papua New Guinea. Under the Land Act, however, the land itself beneath 
which the gold is located is under the ‘native title’ of the seven landowning clans, 
although the privilege of leasing it is reserved for the government. Thus the mine 
operates on a lease granted to it by the government, the lessor of which are the 
landowning clans. The relationship between the mine and the government is regulated by 
a Mining Development Contract, while the relationship between the mine and the Ipili is 
based on three foundational documents: the Relocation Agreement, the Compensation 
Agreement, and the ‘Porgera Agreements.’ All of these documents, signed in the late 
1980s, form a charter which regulates how life should be carried out in Porgera today. 
Under the Mining Act, miners and local people must sign a compensation agreement 
specify what sort of recompense will be made to landowners when their property is 
damaged as a precondition of the government’s issuance of a lease. Porgera’s 
Compensation Agreement specifies the costs of each individual plant of various species 
destroyed by the mine. In practice, counting each plant on a property is extremely 
difficult, and these prices have been used to generate an average price per hectare of land 
based on a typology of land uses ranging from virgin bush to cultivated garden. 
While the Compensation Agreement had strong precedents, the Relocation 
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Agreement was a novel innovation, although it was soon adopted in future mining 
developments in Papua New Guinea (for relocation in Papua New Guinea generally, see 
Asian Development Bank 2000:55-73). The future site of the Porgera gold mine was 
inhabited by the landowners prior to the issuance of the lease – indeed, when it became 
clear where the mine would be located, people quickly moved there and built houses and 
gardens in anticipation of future compensation. As a result the mine undertook a 
relocation program which was without precedent in modern mining history – roughly 
3,400 people were moved off needed land and into 420 new houses (Bonnell 1999, Banks 
1999, Robinson 1988). For many people, new tin and timber relocation houses replaced 
those based on traditional ‘bush’ materials, and receiving a relocation house was often the 
greatest benefit a Porgera landowner would receive from the mine. 
While people opted to be relocated to many locations, the majority moved to the 
new nucleated ‘relocation communities’ built inside the Special Mining Lease. Thus 
‘villages’ based on ‘clan ties’ were created: Apalaka (for the Tuanda), Yarik (Tiyini), 
Kulapi (Pulumaini), and so forth.  These villages are located outside of major areas of 
operation but within the SML itself, and while some of the operation is shielded by 
fencing much is not. In order to enter the open pit itself, for instance, Ipili landowners 
need only walk up the ridge on which their houses are built, cross to the other side, and 
then descend into the pit. 
Finally, there are the Porgera Agreements. These tripartite agreements between 
the Enga Provincial Government, the Ipili landowners, and the National Government 
obliged the state to include certain clauses in the Mineral Development Contract which 
regulated relationship between the government and the mine. Thus they effectively 
represent concessions made by the mine and national government to the Enga Provincial 
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Government and the Ipili, even though the mine is not party to them. These agreements 
were without precedent and arose largely from the initiative of the Porgera landowners 
and the Enga Provincial Government. The Porgera Agreements were not necessary, but 
the strength of the Ipili position, along with the government’s desire to do the right thing 
by local people created a situation in which for the first time that the state signed an 
agreement in which landowners permitted them to issue a Special Mining Lease to a 
developer. They Porgera Agreements were thus at once illegal and and extremely 
lucrative, and are the source of many of the most important benefits that the SML 
Landowners receive: quarterly royalty checks for landowners, equity in the mine, a new 
airstrip, schools, hospitals, and so forth.
 Measuring exactly how much the Ipili have received from the mine is difficult 
because of the variety of benefit streams that affect the Ipili – everything from direct 
compensation for damaged land to indirect economic activity generated from the mine’s 
presence to the market value of the Ipili equity in the mine might be included under the 
rubric of ‘benefit.’ According to mine statistics, Ipili have received K66,000,000 in 
compensation for land lost during the mine’s life time. This is a difficult figure to 
appreciate due to the kina’s fluctuation in value – in the late 1980s it was work US$1 
while by the end of my study it was worth less than US$00.25. In 2000 the mine 
estimates it spent roughly K20,000,000 on donations to groups within the valley, 
education, and community infrastructure and K113,700,000 in wages and salary – 
although what percentage of those wages went to ethnic Ipili is difficult to say. In 
addition, Ipili own 2.5% equity in the PJV (Banks 2003:226-229). They receive quarterly 
royalties from gold sales, and they a have a multitude of new services provided to them 
by the government including a hospital, new roads, and a variety of other amenities. 
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Indeed, Ipili are not only the lessors of the special mining lease on which Placer operates 
the Porgera gold mine, they own the high rise building in Port Moresby where Placer 
Niuguini has its corporate headquarters! 
This money is not distributed equally, however. An emergent elite of ‘big men’ 
has grown up in Porgera. It is composed of the people appointed to positions of power of 
the various boards of directors and those who receive lucrative contracts from the mine to 
provide security, sewage, and other services. When people speak of ‘landowners’ it is 
really these people who they have in mind – large, well-fed men in Toyota Land Cruisers 
with opaque windows of tinted glass. They have, like all landowners, a reputation for 
being incredibly prodigal – stories of landowners abandoning vehicles when they have a 
flat tire and purchasing new ones are, if not true, at least indicative of how wasteful and 
imprudent outsiders consider landowners to be. Sean Dorney paints an evocative picture 
of the dark-glass landowners ‘corruption’ and political involvement in his description of 
one of my next-door neighbors, Sole Taro, and his engagement provincial politics:
Sol Taro has benefited  from the member’s largess even though he is not in 
need. Sol gets royalties from the gold mine, owns two shops and has four wives. 
“Members [of Parliament] hold the key to the money,” Sol says sitting on the 
doorstep to  his  house in  the township above the mine.  “They guarantee  our 
business ventures and support us. I supported Anton last time and he brought me 
a truck. It’s over there,  a big Dyna.” Anton also gave Sol $10,000 from the 
public purse to start up another business but it never got going. “So, after I failed 
to get my proposals through,” he shrugs, “I used up the money buying drink, 
buying beer, buying food. I have a big family and that ten thousand – I couldn’t 
hold onto it.” (Dorney 2000:44-45).
In sum, the picture of the SML is a curious one. Aging relocation communities 
and the shanty towns that have sprung up around them teem with Ipili landowners and the 
immigrants who have come to live with them. These communities exist inside a special 
mining lease, perched between wastedumps and haul roads, the center of a growing 
community of people struggling to move “from the outside” and towards the center, 
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where opportunities for excitement and compensation lay for those who manage to be 
labeled ‘landowners.’
The Nation
Papua New Guinea has a long history of gold mining that stretches back for over 
a century (for a very brief account see Banks 2001:12-14) and both colonial and post-
colonial regimes in what is today Papua New Guinea have relied on royalties, export 
duties, taxation, and other forms of resource rent to fund government activities (for an 
overview see O’Faircheallaigh 1982). Today, mining and hydrocarbon developments 
continue to be of primary importance to the nation, which has relied on taxes and 
royalties from extractive industry to prop up its sagging budget. In 1995, for instance, 
Papua New Guinea’s mineral exports were worth US$1.83 billion dollars, constituted 
71.6% of all domestic exports, and accounted for between a quarter and a third of the 
national government’s non-grant revenue (Filer 1997). In 2001, this amount was K2.57 
billion, which accounted for 46% of all exports (Banks 2001:27), a decrease which Banks 
notes is a result of the growth of the hydrocarbon and logging industries rather than 
declining output in the mineral resources sector. Between 1972 and 2000, the mining 
sector has annually been between 10% (a low set in 1984 and 1997) and 33% (in 1973 
and 1974) of the country’s total GDP (for these and other figures see Banks 2001:29). In 
other words, this government has a strong incentive to make sure that mines like Porgera 
remains in operation – even if this is against the best interests of it citizens. It also means 
that the government is keenly interested in ‘what is going on up there’ in Porgera, 
although news about the local scene only circulates down into Port Moresby in bits and 
pieces. 
At the same time, Papua New Guinea is a clasically ‘weak state’ (on Papua New 
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Guinea see Dinnen 2001, Larmour ed 1996, on weak states in general see Migdal 2001). 
Indeed, given the government’s chronic lack of capacity, the government is often more 
noticeable for its absence rather than its presence in Porgera, and senior mine 
management often complain bitterly about the fact that the mine must assume the role of 
the state in Porgera. Indeed, against the backdrop of decaying government capacity, Filer 
claims that “the mining industry to be one of the last bastions of bureaucratic rationality 
in the State of Papua New Guinea” (Filer 1997:174). Throughout this thesis I will 
approach issues of governance and state capacity not in terms of discussing the state’s 
‘weakness’ or ‘strength’ but how it manages to appear as an actor in people’s narratives 
about the country at all.
Feelings amongst Papua New Guinea’s elite regarding resource development are 
thus ambiguous. Many of the people who wield influence in the country came of age 
during the Independence period, and this experience has clearly left its mark. Many 
members of the elite are extremely sensitive to criticism of government activities by non-
Papua New Guineans. NGOs and foreign governments critical of the choices that the 
state makes regarding mining are often reviled – as for instance was the case during the 
Ok Tedi case, when the government worked to prevent foreign lawyers from entering the 
country in order to pursue legal action against a mine (Ballard and Banks 1997). Thus the 
government can be antagonistic to external NGO pressure if it feels that that pressure is 
an infringement on its own autonomy. In some sense, then, most members of the elite 
recognize how crucial mining developments are for the country, and appreciate the fact 
that Papua New Guinea would be worse off if mines like Porgera did not exist. When an 
external critique is lacking, however, much of this suspicion and unhappiness with 
foreign intervention is focused on the industry itself, which can be seen as predatory, 
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untrustworthy, and focused on pursuing its own profit at the expense of the nation.
The expatriate elite have a slightly different set of agendas. Most notable is the 
fact that many of them have a long history in Papua New Guinea. Much of the mining 
industry today is staffed by former colonial officers. These officers see working in the 
private sector as a way to improve the country in the postcolonial age. Often, this desire 
to continue service to Papua New Guinea is compounded by a bitter sense of 
disappointment with what they see as the ‘failure’ of the Papua New Guinea state in the 
post-independence period. Although sometimes reviled for their role in a ‘colonial 
occupation’ these aging men labor on, attempting to do their best for the country and 
hence justify and recuperate their own biographies.
Amongst the white elite who came to Papua New Guinea specifically from work, 
there is a strong commitment to the ‘triple bottom line’ of sustainable economic 
development, environmental stewardship, and financial accountability to their 
shareholders (Elkington 1998). There is also a strong sense of the inevitability of a ‘win-
win’ situation in resource development. Both of these feelings are the result of  the 
distinct and globalized corporate culture of the mining industry. In my experience the 
employees of reputable mining companies such as Placer Dome firmly believe that they 
can do good by doing well, and behave ethically most of the time. In fact many 
executives would agree with Colin Filer’s quote above and consider themselves to be the 
last bastion of bureaucratic rationality and ethical accountability in a country with a failed 
government, corrupt officials, and fickle and violent landowners. It is important to stress 
at the outset, then, that these expatriates are not fly-by-night confidence tricksters. They 
are professionals in a global industry that focuses on resource projects that take decades, 
not years, to run their course. At the same time, it will be important to interrogate the 
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rhetorical work, often labored, which equates the mine’s best interests with those of the 
state and local peoples. 
National elites, long-term expatriates, and career-focused mine employees all 
share a similar vision of the indigenous peoples who are the landowners of the resource 
projects located far from Moresby. While sympathetic to landowners in principle, this 
sympathy relies on a highly idealized view of rural Papua New Guineans that is in many 
ways similar to that of the European ‘noble savage.’ But in fact cosmopolitans have quite 
a bit of difficulty locating landowners to be sympathetic with. The litigiousness and 
instability of landowner politics has combined with this idealized view of rural Papua 
New Guineans to create a demonized version of indigenous peoples which the elite use to 
explain away the difference between their fantasies of the authentic rural “stakeholders” 
they seek to partner with and the people who come barging into their offices demanding 
compensation. The result is the ‘corrupt landowner’: the greedy rural rube who has been 
corrupted from their former pristine state into one of moral torpor because of the impact 
that money from mining projects has or could have on them.
While many landowners are vilified at the national level, few seem to have as 
strongly disliked for as long as the Ipili. The word generally used is ‘truculent’. John 
Black remarked in an interview that he “found the people on the Porgera to be very 
truculent and cheeky” when he first discovered the area in 1938 (Davis 1994). In a 1964 
patrol report a patrol officer wrote that “the Porgera have a long history of truculence” 
(Porgera #2, 64/65). Mervyn Meggitt records them as being “a truculent and difficult 
people” (Meggitt 1957:32). Even Father Philip Gibbs, a Catholic priest with many years 
experience in Porgera, wrote that “the Ipili are not the most co-operative people to work 
with. At times I was prepared to agree with Meggitt” (Gibbs 1975:23). Contemporary 
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opinion is much the same, as I found out one day when I was introduced around the 
Department of Mines in Port Moresby by the Porgera Mining Coordinator. “Everyone, 
this is Alex Golub,” he said, “he’s an anthropologist studying the Porgera landowners  – 
he actually lives with them!” The overall view was summarized with epigrammatic flair 
by one of the senior officials of the mine who said to me simply “they’re a fucked 
culture.”
In sum, the community of elites in Port Moresby are keenly interested in Porgera, 
but hear new of what is happening ‘up there’ in dribs and drabs. Although the national 
and expatriate communities might vary in their understanding of why mining is 
important, they share the basic understanding that resource extraction, when properly 
managed, is something that everyone will benefit from. They also share a sympathy for 
local people in theory which is often transformed into exasperation when they deal with 
‘corrupt landowners’ who they feel ought to be grateful (and pliant) for the benefits that 
they receive from the mining taking place on their land.
Engineering and Semiosis: Keeping the Mine Open
By now a large literature on mining and indigenous people in Papua New Guinea 
and the southwest Pacific has developed (collected volumes and review articles include 
Ballard and Banks 2003; Brown and Ploeg 1997; Connell and Howitt 1991; Howitt, 
Connell, and Hirsch 1996; Rumsey and Weiner 2001). In this section of the thesis I 
sketch out my own approach to mining in Porgera and the general theoretical models that 
might be used to make sense of it. I begin with a central problem of this dissertation: how 
is the mine kept open, and what conditions permit it to operate?
It is tempting to describe two sets of conditions. On the one hand there is ‘pure’ 
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logistics: At base, mountains are insensible to our words, and there is no way to convince 
them to yield up their riches. Thus there is a ‘purely engineering’ aspect of the mine 
dealing with brute material fact of a mountain. Lying at the back of the machines that dig 
rock out of the open cut and shovel it into dump trucks is an enormous network dedicated 
to moving materiel into place so that the mine can operate. On the other hand there is 
what we might want to call the ‘semiotic’ work of making a mine – the creation and 
maintenance of the complex set of financial, legal, moral, and epistemological 
understandings that must be brought into place for a single bar of poured in Porgera to be 
turned into a positive mark on Placer’s balance sheet. Will the National Government 
acquiesce? How will share floats be managed? How will royalties be shared? What 
standards of environmental degradation are acceptable? These are strikingly incorporeal 
problems, solved in a world where millions of dollars are budgeted and spent with a 
single keystroke and global corporations commit to agreements with a single signature. 
All of this must be worked out if a social context for mining will be established.
Keeping the mine open thus seems at first to rely on an ability to mobilize and 
deploy both meaning and material in two distinct moments. Thus there seems to be a 
clear ethnographic difference between the negotiation process by which the legal and 
contractual regime for the mine was created on the one hand, and the ‘merely technical’ 
implementation of those plans in the construction and operation of the mine.
Which one of these two conditions seem more fundamental will depend on who 
you are. To the engineers and surveyors I met in Porgera, making a mine work meant 
getting down to the nitty-gritty of grading haul roads and monitoring autoclaves. For 
them, ‘the creation and maintenance of financial, legal, and epistemological 
understandings’ was an occult process undertaken by over-paid point-headed lawyers that 
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had to be patiently endured before the real work of mining could get underway. 
Anthropologists, on the other hand, would insist that no matter how technical the 
requirements of mining, it would not take place at all without contract and agreements in 
place and without a complex set of cultural assumptions about, for instance, the value of 
gold, which motivated it.
But mining, like cannibalism, “is always ‘symbolic,’ even when it is ‘real’” 
(Sahlins 1983:88). It is important to realize that both the semiotic and technical aspects of 
mining are flip sides of the same coin, not discrete and unrelated processes. As the 
“pragmatic-poetic turn” of contemporary linguistic anthropology (the term is from 
Silverstein 2004:623; other prominent statements can be found in Silverstein and Urban 
1996 and Baumann and  Briggs 1990) has demonstrated, all human interaction requires 
the deployment of a shared set of sociocultural concepts in order to ensure that interaction 
coheres to create “a coherent, intersubjectively accomplished interactional text, the 
interpersonal achievement of a ‘doing’ of something – an instance of some generically 
understood social act – to which more than one individual has contributed” (Silverstein 
1998:270). This is true even of perilinguistic interactions such as those that occur in 
Porgera’s open pit, where the operators of, say, a Catepillar 769 haul truck and an O&K 
RH8 excavator must work together to dislodge material from the mountain’s face and 
transfer it from the bucket of the excavator to the back of the 769 without either of the 
operators being killed -- a remarkably easy thing to do in a line of work where the tires of 
your vehicle are taller than you are. While the complex figuration of text in context in the 
course of the linguistically mediated interaction of Mr. A and Mr. B described by 
Silverstein (2004:623-625) may be poetically more complex than the ‘doing-something’ 
of shoveling ore into the back of a truck, it is none the less true that even miners must 
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invoke sociocultural conceptions, inhabit roles, and share a set ‘standard operating 
procedures’ that will regiment action if the most elemental aspect of mining is to occur 
without mishap. This “mutual tuning-in relationship,” as Schutz (1964:161) called it, is 
always metapragmatically regimented, regardless of the antintellectualism inherent in the 
ethnometapragmatics of any single miner who is engaged in the improvisational 
performance of ‘mining’ in realtime discursive practice. 
The question of how to keep the mine open, then, is shot through with two distinct 
orientations to action which are interrelated rather than opposed. Looked at from the 
point of view of engineering – moving the physical materials which are insensible to the 
semiotics of our lives – the logistics involved in keeping the mine open requires 
‘practical’ and ‘real’ action: you can not talk the gold out of a mine and, modulo the 
inevitably culturally shaped means and ends that determine what ought to be mined and 
how, the physical nature of the resource creates technical imperatives which must be met 
and simply a non-negotiable part of the world. At the same time, every human being who 
is part of the complex chain of logistics that runs from machine operators in the open pit 
to people signing checks in Vancouver deploys some sort of narrative about who they are 
and what they are doing. This narrative underwrites the technically complex coordination 
of action of thousands of individuals that results in the creation of bars of pure gold – 
indeed, it is nothing less than a regimenting description of this coordination. Keeping the 
mine open is thus shot through with both engineering and signification.
The fundamental subject of this study is, then, the circulation of texts – both 
artifactual and non – which make mining possible. This study focuses on ‘globalization,’ 
in the sense of the coordination of action across an extended sector of space and time – 
literally the organization of action across the face of the globe. How do both consociates 
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(people who share “temporal and spatial immediacy” (Schutz and Luckmann 1973:62)) 
and contemporaries (who are merely temporally immediate but “not bodily present” 
(Schutz and Luckmann 1973: 73)  work together to coordinate the complex action that 
keeps the mine, and how do understandings and people move across space and time to 
marshal the complex logical and logistic feats which are necessary to ensure that it stays 
open? I am particularly interested in how identity and representation are handled in this 
process. Thus the more mundane meaning of ‘globalization’ – in the sense of movement 
across or exceeding international boundaries – is not of overwhelming importance for this 
study.
In the next three sections of this chapter I take up the wider issue of ‘keeping the 
mine open’ by focusing on three particular issues that will be considered at length 
throughout the more substantive ethnographic and analytic portions of this thesis. First, I 
will examine the way in which ‘the Ipili’ arises as a category that enables the work of the 
mine by providing it with a legally and physically quiescent indigenous partner. Second, I 
turn my attention to the phenomenon of globalization to examine how ‘the mine’ itself 
becomes an actor to whom the actions of thousands of individual people becomes 
attributable. In both cases, I argue that what is at stake is a third more general problem of 
subsumption: how does one particular person come to be seen as a representative of a 
general institution. The chapter closes with an outline of the general structural order of 
life in the Porgera that results from the intersection of the work of making both ‘the Ipili’ 
and ‘the company’ appear.
Imagining Local Actors: Making the Ipili Feasible
‘Feasibility’ is the word the mining industry uses to describe a prospective ore 
body that will cost less to mine than its product will fetch on the market. Whether ‘there 
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is a lot of gold in a mountain’ is only one variable in the complex set of calculations that 
make a mine ‘feasible.’ The cost of supplying a mine, refining the ore and, of course, the 
going price of gold on the market all play their part in an entire galaxy of variables that, if 
added up correctly, are sufficient to trigger the massive organization of human labor 
which transforms an exploration camp into a fully functioning mine – a set of actions that 
range from from obtaining capital from the international financial market to blasting 
away the overburden surrounding an ore body. It took decades for these pieces to fall into 
place and for Porgera prospect to become feasible and transform itself into the Porgera 
mine. Gold was discovered by the 1938 government patrol which initially discovered and 
mapped the valley, but Porgera was too removed from transportation infrastructure, and 
the geology of Porgera too poorly understood, for the valley to merit the attention of 
more than a few old-time New Guinea hands. Desultory exploitation of alluvial gold 
continued for decades, and formal large-scale exploration began in the 1960s. But it was 
not until the 1980s, when Placer joined the joint venture prospecting Porgera, that  the 
funds and expertise necessary to discover Porgera’s high-grade zones of gold and to solve 
logistical problems in working them made the Porgera gold mine became feasible.
Just as the gold in a mountain requires refining if it is to take a form suitable for 
circulation in national and international financial markets, so too the identities of Ipili 
people had to be refined and transformed in order to circulate in the national and 
international circuits of law, policy, and ideas that accompany and buttress transnational 
capitalism – as we have seen, the government expects there to be a group ready to sign on 
the dotted line before it will issue a mining lease. Just as the history of mining is the 
history of exerting control over a mountain to make it ‘feasible,’ so to is the history of the 
valley a story of outsiders attempting – and usually failing – to turn the indigenous 
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inhabitants of Porgera into an ethnic group called ‘the Ipili’  and to make the Ipili behave 
feasibly whether they wanted to or not. Thus, in this dissertation I focus on the way in 
which the Ipili were themselves made ‘feasible’ in order to facilitate the creation and 
operation of the Porgera gold mine.
Making ‘the Ipili’ feasible is one species of that much larger process of the 
‘construction of locality’ or ‘the creation of indigeneity’ that has been the subject of a 
good deal of recent anthropological literature (Marcus 1989, Gupta and Ferguson 1997a, 
Gupta and Ferguson 1997b, Conklin and Graham 1995, Li 2000, Povinelli 2002, Carneiro 
da Cunha and Almeida 2001). But of course concerns about the ‘entification’ (Ernst 
2001) or ‘substantivization’ (Thomas 1992) of indigenous ethnic groups and identities 
has a long history in anthropology. We have known since Leacock (1954) that traditional 
land boundaries become more sharply delineated rather than less when outsiders value 
the things that lie within them, just as Terence Ranger (1983) and (in a different way) 
Morton Fried (1975) have examined the ways in which it is imposition by, rather than 
absence of, larger polities that creates tribes and their associated ethnic identities and 
‘tribal’ zones (Ferguson and Whitehead 1992). Thus although my use of the term 
‘feasibility’ is novel, it should understood that in using it I reference a topic long-
discussed in the literature. 
There are three levels at which the Ipili must be made feasible if the mine is to 
stay open. At its first and most obvious level, ‘feasibility’ involves a certain politics of 
representation as it occurs ‘on paper’ and hence in the capital of Port Moresby. Both the 
PJV and government has legal obligations to ‘landowners’ which must be met if the law 
is to be assuaged. Thus ‘the Ipili’ needed to exist and have certain features if the legal and 
ethical requirements of the government and mine were to be met. By Papua New Guinea 
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law, all land in the country is owned by ‘native’ (a legal term inherited from colonial law) 
peoples and cannot be alienated to non-citizens, although it may change hands through 
‘traditional’ means (for a more in-depth review of land tenure in Papua New Guinea see 
Sack 1974; Rynkiewich 2001; Larmour 1991; Curtin, Holzknecht, and Larmour 2003). 
As we have seen, activities such as mining are accommodated through a lease 
arrangement whereby the mining company becomes the lessee and the natives the lessor. 
Thus a distinct ethnic group known as ‘the Ipili’ had to exist. 
Since landownership in Papua New Guinea is tied to traditional tenure, ‘the Ipili’ 
not only have to exist, but have to own land in such a way that only a certain subset of the 
Ipili – the ‘landowning clans’ – could make claim to the future home of the Special 
Mining Lease. This required a form of indigenous sociality composed of clearly 
delineated ‘traditional’ units with clear ties to demarcated areas of land and rules for 
affiliation that resulted in unambiguous group membership. Only in this way could clans 
be mapped to land and a list of individual ‘clan members’ be created. These same 
principles could also be used to exclude individuals and groups from the category of 
‘landowner.’ Thus both Porgera’s engineering and significance involved a solidification 
of the terrain they covered: the (sometimes literal) concretization of the unstable semiotic 
and geophysical resources of the valley in the 1980s marked an important turning point in 
Porgera’s history.
An ethnic group with certain features was a necessary but not sufficient subject of 
governance. In order to interact with the government, the Ipili needed not only to be 
identified, they needed to be represented by someone who was willing to put their 
signature (or, more typically, thumbprint) on a document stating that they agreed to the 
compensation that the mine was willing to pay them. Thus the Ipili needed to be 
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represented in both a semiotic and political sense (Kelly and Kaplan 2001:22) – not just 
created on paper as governed subjects, but imagined as a group whose collective 
acquiescence would be signaled by the consent of agents who could sign agreements on 
their behalf. This need for delegation of authority in landowner communities produced 
‘the twenty three’ – the twenty three members of the Landowner Negotiating Committee 
who, authorized by their clansmen, capture the consensus of their community and 
represent this collective will in an official capacity. At least in theory. In order for the 
Ipili to be made feasible, then, individual people need to be subsumed under two labels. 
First, ordinary Porgerans need to be classified as ‘Ipili’ or ‘non-Ipili’ and particularly as 
‘landowner’ or ‘nonlandowner’ Ipili. Second, individuals needed to be able to fill the role 
of ‘landowner representative’ so that they could negotiate with officials from the mine 
and government.
While legal and ethical requirements created a situation in which the mine and 
government needed an ‘Ipili’ partner, the facts of life on the ground in Porgera 
necessitated that the Ipili be made feasible in a second, much more incarnate way: the 
Ipili needed to be made feasible in the sense of physically docile if the mine was going to 
function. Facilities such as workers’ camps did not only need to be legally zoned and 
built, they needed to be defended: at a very basic level, the mine is in danger of being 
physically over-run and destroyed by the Ipili. This is not likely to happen as the result of 
a highly coordinated military campaign carefully designed to bring the mine to its knees 
and force it to acquiesce to the demands of Ipili leadership – this would require more 
discipline than most Ipili are capable of. Ipili culture is not particularly martial, and while 
fighting was common in the pre-contact period, it typically took the form of simmering, 
long-term feuds maintained by sudden outbursts of emotions and violence. It is more the 
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case that Ipili are noted for their flamboyant, unpredictable, and extreme emotional shifts 
which lead to unpredictable and dramatic action. What mine really fears is some sort of 
spontaneous outburst that could disrupt its very complex operation. For while Ipili 
organizational ability is remarkably low, the fragile complexity of the mine’s operations 
means that even a relatively small amount of disturbance can be crippling. Rolling a few 
logs across the road supplying the mine, or cutting down the wires which support the 
pylons that funnel electricity into the valley can be accomplished by anyone with an axe, 
and these actions result in massive financial loss for the PJV.
Even more dramatic things could happen. In 1988, while negotiations for the 
existence of the mine were going on, a handful of people broke into the exploration camp 
and stole the safe containing the camp’s entire cash supply as well as the passports of 
every expatriate employee at the mine (see chapter three). In 1993 Porgerans rioted after 
police officers believed to be in the mine’s pocket killed a young boy. Local people 
stormed the mine’s barracks, over turned cars, and destroyed millions of dollars worth of 
improvements (Banks 1997:260-265). Despite the presence of a well-maintained airstrip 
and an enormous market of cash-rich customers, no commercial airline has operated in 
Porgera since a pilot embroiled in a disagreement with customers was pulled out of his 
plane and chopped to death with machetes and axes. As we shall see in the next chapter, 
during my own fieldwork the mine’s operations were nearly crippled when a group of 
five or six people refused to let the mine drill a tunnel to drain waste water from the open 
pit – a tunnel located on land whose occupant had given permission for the tunnel to be 
constructed! In sum, while outbursts are not numerous, they have occurred and Ipili 
leaders have often suggested to mine officials that more could be arranged in the future if 
necessary. 
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Finally, a third and more fascinating form of feasibility has arisen from the 
conjunction of these representational and pacificatory requirements. For the semiotic 
requirements of national actors have mixed with the valley’s unpredictable nature to 
make ‘the Ipili’ feasible political actors at the national level. As we have seen, the closing 
of Bougainville copper mine during the period immediately proceeding the creation of 
the Porgera gold mine left the government desperate for money while simultaneously 
demonstrating their inability to use their military to coerce local land owners into 
accepting a mine. The Ipili were in the right place at the right time, and were not afraid to 
seize the opportunity. Today Ipili continue to use their position to effect change at a 
national level. Ironically, then, attempts to make the Ipili compliant have ended up 
making them politically efficacious.
Imagining Global Actors: Who Are ‘the Global’?
The concept of imagining local actors will seem familiar to many readers – as we 
have seen, there is a large and venerable literature on the subject. But the concept of 
imagining global actors may be less intuitive. While we examine how this or that 
swidden horticulturalist in Kalimantan becomes ‘indigenous’ and ‘local,’ we rarely 
question how this or that Nebraskan living in the East Village becomes ‘the UN’ when he 
sits down at his desk in the morning on the Lower East Side. The mechanisms by which 
indigenous identities are created and people come to be identified with them are easier for 
us to see because they are contested and uncertain – their achieved nature cannot be taken 
for granted, and thus the work that goes into that achievement is visible. 
Entities such as governments and large international corporations, on the other 
hand, recruit people to roles routinely and people act on their behalf constantly. When 
France signs an agreement with Russia, for instance, we never doubt what has happened 
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despite the fact that neither of these entities, strictly speaking, has hands. But it is 
important to remember that simply because this kind of semiosis goes unnoticed to 
anthropologists who have grown up with it does not mean that it does not occur. That it 
does, and that there is something remarkable about it, can be made clear to us by how 
mysterious it seems to people for whom it is not de rigeur. One is reminded here of Levi-
Strauss’s quotation of Jenness’s quotation of an Indian explaining totemism:
There is no single boss for every species of an animal or plant, but a boss in each 
locality... Now and then Indians see and kill them, but generally they keep out of 
sight of human beings. They are like the government in Ottawa, an old Indian 
remarked. An ordinary Indian can never see the ‘government.’ He is sent from 
one  office  to  another,  is  introduced  to  this  man and  to  that,  each  of  whom 
sometimes claims to be the ‘boss,’ but he never sees the real government, who 
keeps himself hidden” (Levi-Strauss 1966:239).
In this dissertation I argue that Porgera’s classically fraught situation provides a 
particular opportunity for  us to understand how ‘global’ actors like ‘the mine’ or ‘the 
government’ become taken for granted as ‘collective subjects’ (Sahlins 2004b) and 
represented. Classically ‘weak’ states such as Papua New Guinea provide us an 
opportunity to see the work necessary to make them appear because it is often 
unsuccessful. Placer Dome’s presence in Porgera provides a local point of articulation 
with a global organization that allows us to examine exactly how a grafting of ‘global’ 
identity onto a discrete – indeed, physically isolated – social network: the men and 
women on-site who work for (and hence in some sense are) ‘the mine’. Finally, the Ipili 
themselves, like Jenness’s Indian, have lived through unique historic circumstances that 
make them particularly cynical when approaching issues of representation and power and 
do not consider ‘being Ipili’ something that happens automatically. All three of these 
actors, then, provide us an opportunity for us to examine what makes global identities 
stick to local actors.
Accounts which accept ‘globalization’ or ‘the state’ as taken-for-granted actors 
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are in danger of what one might want to call a “naive phenomenology of globalization.” 
Such an approach takes as true and unproblematic the narratives of the particular people 
who consider themselves representatives of ‘globalization’ or ‘global institutions.’ In 
doing so they render globalization ‘sublime’ in John Kelly’s sense: “so hard to ground 
and so easy to float, in this guise increasingly, even exponentially... still undefined and 
undefinable” (Kelly 2002: 258). Such a sublime, however attractive, results in “the 
occlusion, by sublimation, of the specificities of recent global history” (Kelly 2002:279). 
Globalization and capitalism thereby become elusive forces, everywhere and nowhere at 
once. This or that ethnic group do not encounter this or that government representative, 
they encounter ‘globalization’ or ‘capitalism.’ As a result the specific history and 
sociology of narratives of group identity and role inhabitance are occulted and we are no 
longer able to interrogate how they knit together groups of people to produce the concrete 
coordinated action across time and space that we call “global change.” 
Just as we must question how ‘the Ipili’ are created as a collective subject and 
then represented by particular people, so too we must question how ‘global’ institutions 
such as ‘Placer Dome Inc’ effect change in time and space by coordinating action 
between both consociates and contemporaries through their claims to span space and 
time. Indeed, what is so interesting about institutions such as Placer Dome is how much 
of this coordination of action occurs between non-consociates. Organizations with a truly 
international scope and complex logistics must coordinate complex acts of finance and 
engineering between people who have very little shared background. It is this that I call 
‘global’ here (doing only a little bit of violence to the term): entities who are mediated by 
people who are non-consociates and generally share little background knowledge. How 
do global actors maintain these complex chains of action across space and time that are 
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so central to keeping the mine open? In order to understand this, we must come to grips 
with how individual people come to speak for (or represent, or mediate) a particular 
institution. 
From Simplification to Subsumption
My approach is thus very different from that of authors who take for granted ‘the 
state’ or ‘the mine’ as a reified actor, and particularly those approaches which examine in 
detail the political ramifications of representing grass-roots people while rendering 
invisible the ways in which the state itself is achieved. Consider, for instance, James C. 
Scott’s work Seeing Like a State (1998). Scott’s vision here is of a hubristic and misled 
high-modernist state imposing its centrally planned schemes to ‘improve the human 
condition’ onto a reality more complex than its narrow gaze allows it to see. States, he 
argues, gather information about local people in order to make them ‘legible’ or visible. It 
is only after this happens that they can be controlled and manipulated. 
On Scott’s account, this imposition of groupness to pre-existing, authentic local 
people is essentially pathological and procrustean, and this misrecognition has 
catastrophic consequences. It seems to me that there are two difficulties with this 
position.
The first we might call ‘analytic reification’. Ironically, Scott’s gaze is as myopic 
as that of the regimes he criticizes. His vision of the nature of governance in the high-
modernist mode gives too much credit to the state itself. By seeing modernist governance 
as monolithic and totalistic he ignores the reality of rule as it is practiced on the ground. 
While Scott disaggregates what he considers pathological and inaccurate ‘state 
representations’ of local peoples, he does not examine the work the has gone into making 
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‘the State’ legible to him. The question of who concretely is producing the planning 
reports or conducting poorly-run censuses never arises. By assuming the ontological 
existence of the state in the same way that ‘the State’ assumes the ontological existence 
of local groups Scott’s account fails to provide any account of the network of civil 
servants and politicians who make and implement policy in practice. As a result, he 
misses the ways governance, even the kind with pretensions to high-modernity, is as 
much about the the disorganized, improvisational work of daily life as are the lives of the 
subjects it governs. As a result he remains within the constricting confines of a 
framework which revolves around terms such as state, local people, legibility, and 
control.
In his hypostasization of ‘the state’ as an actor, Scott is like Jenness’s Indian, 
except he has not turned up at the government offices in order to be disabused of his 
notions. As a result we have in Scott’s account no ethnography of the people who make 
up or mediate the state, merely assertions of its cognitive and sensory shortcomings. The 
result is an account which is strangely mentalistic and lacks the fine-grained institutional 
and ethnographic detail for which Scott’s earlier monographs are rightly admired. Rather 
than remain within the constricting confines of a framework which can only understand 
the State as nearsighted and local people as ‘resistant,’ I suggest we see governing as a 
species of semiosis with all its twists and turns. What we need is an account of how both 
‘local’ as well as ‘global’ actors are concretely mediated – as they must be – in particular 
contexts.
The second problem is more wide-ranging, and will become a trope for much of 
the rest of this chapter. Scott writes that “certain forms of knowledge and control require 
a narrowing of vision” and that this ‘tunnel vision’ “brings into sharp focus certain 
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limited aspects of an otherwise far more complex and unwieldy reality” (1989:11). The 
result are ‘simplifications’ that are “parasitic on informal processes” (1989:6) and do not 
“successfully represent the actual activity of the society they depicted” (1989:3). What 
Scott misses here is that all forms of knowledge, not just pathological ones, require a 
‘selective narrowing of vision.’ This is certainly true for anyone adhering to a pragmatic-
poetic approach to interaction, according to which people must decide on one account of 
what they are doing and thus leave other alternative narratives to one side. But it is also 
true of classification more generally, at least according to the Neokantian perspective that 
drives most contemporary social science and which posits a hiatus irrationalis between 
concepts and reality (Oakes 1988:19-21). On Kant’s account, sensuous intuition – the raw 
material of perception – is always subsumed by the subject’s categories of perception. It 
is for this reason that Neokantians speak of perception as a ‘cognitive accomplishment of 
the subject.’ In fact thinking consists in just this subsumption particular intuitions within 
the general categories of the understanding. Nineteenth-century readings of Kant 
produced a variety of influential thinkers who are foundational to theory as practiced in 
anthropology, including Boas (Bunzl 1996), Bakhtin (Holquist and Clark1984), 
Durkheim (Barberis 2001), Peirce (Brent 1998:52-67), and Weber (Oakes 1988). Indeed, 
the modern culture concept depends on the idea that perception is underdetermined by 
reality, thus providing a point of leverage at which different cultural logics can exercise 
their structuring influence on perception (Sahlins 1976). 
At what level of specificity the subsumption of individual people and things ought 
to be made – to use Strathern’s (2004) terms, at what ‘scale’ we shall allow ‘complexity’ 
to appear – will be an issue throughout this thesis. Windelband famously distinguished 
between ‘nomothetic’ and ‘idiographic’ approaches to phenomenon, approaches which 
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Boas (1887) believed to be exemplified in the disciplines of physics and geography. On 
this account nomothetic approaches such as physics  “analyze facts only from the 
viewpoint and for the purpose of understanding the general nomological relationship to 
which these facts are subject” (Windelband 1980:174) while idiographic disciplines such 
as geography seek “to reproduce and understand in its full facticity an artifact of human 
life to which unique ontological status is ascribed” (Windelband 1980:175). One focuses 
on the general, and the other the particular.
I do not bring this up not because I believe any attempt at governance will fail if it 
fails to immerse itself in the transcendental doctrine of elements. Nor do I suggest that 
states have never made catastrophically wrong decisions – that the destruction of the 
Russian peasantry, for instance, didn’t actually happen or could have been avoided. My 
point is that all knowledge is partial, and setting a standard of objectivity as Scott does is 
unrealistic – something like flunking Boas for producing a dissertation which failed to 
come up with the true color of seawater. On the contrary, any particular person or thing 
can be understood from a generalizing or a particularizing point of view. As we shall see, 
determining where the analyst should situate their analysis on this scale, and how 
different agents in Porgera use this scale will be an issue that will recur throughout this 
thesis. 
Indeed, as Tanya Murray Li has pointed out in the case of community based 
natural resource management schemes in Indonesia, “the ‘state simplifications’ embodied 
in the new forest law do not in fact simplify, nor do they necessarily prevail, rather they 
open up new arena within which state-society relations can be reworked” (Li 2002:276). 
It is not merely the case that states make simplifications. All sorts of actors do so. As we 
shall see, Ipili are not the least local attempts to control the physical and social world use 
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strategies of ‘legibility’ and ‘control’ themselves. Ipili had no scruples about about using 
“state power backed by records and court” – as long as they got to construe the nature of 
that state power for their own ends. Moreover, they actively challenge not only the 
authority of the state, but the authority of people to represent the state. The question then 
shifts not so much from ‘getting the simplifications of indigenous people right’ to 
examining strategies of subsumption of both ‘global’ and ‘local’ actors under more 
general categories. “Politics,” as Silverstein and Urban put it, is “the struggle to 
entextualize authoritatively” (1996:11). 
Personation and Impersonation
Understanding how ‘the Ipili’ are made feasible, I’ve argued, involves 
understanding how individual people come to be seen as representatives of collective 
subjects. I’ve claimed that such understanding must be symmetrical – we must ask not 
only how certain people come to be labeled as ‘the Ipili’ but how they come to be labeled 
‘the State.’ Understanding the process of representation or mediation of larger collective 
groups is key to understanding the way that action is coordinated at a the macro level, 
and the solidity and givenness of the way that a person represents a global actor is key to 
making sure that action is coordinated successfully. 
The literature on this topic is a long one, since political representation has been 
the idée fixe of Western Europe and its settler colonies for five hundred years or so. One 
particularly clear discussion of the relationship between effective organization and group 
identity can be drawn from Hobbes. Hobbes, drawing on precedents from antiquity, 
spoke of this as “personating”: “to act, or represent himselfe, or an other; and he that 
acteth another is said to bear his person, or act in his name” (Hobbes  1991:112). Thus 
Hobbes claims that individual actors became ‘the state’ by virtue of their personation of 
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Leviathan, the ‘artificial person’ created by (but not a subject to) the covenant of people 
who impart sovereignty to it in order to escape the perils of a state of nature and enter the 
happier realm of civil society. It is interesting to note the practical rational that Hobbes 
gives for people entering into a social contract. The maintenance of law and order – what 
we today call the ‘capacity’ of governments – depends on a kind and quantity of 
coordination of action that does not emerge spontaneously. At the center of Hobbes’s 
theory of social contract, then, lies the ability of people to act in concert across space and 
time. This superior form or organization provides a force so much more effective than the 
disorganized factions found in the state of nature that its punitive capacity acts as a 
disincentive for free riders. Indeed, it is just this overwhelming retaliatory potential which 
inspires Hobbes’s biblical imagery.
At the same time, the power of people’s commitment to these global groups lies 
not just in a raw calculus of power. Often times people as so committed to their causes 
that they manage to pull things off which any ‘rational’ actor would recognize was 
untenable – government that is only impossible until its representatives became 
impossibly committed to it. A good example of this comes from Furnivall’s discussion of 
the establishment of the British ‘Leviathan’ in Burma (for a lovely little Leviathan-
focused piece of Leachiana that explores the colonial history of Burma see Leach 1977). 
As John Furnivall astutely notes, the Leviathan is a mortal god with a mythic origin:
Hobbes was driven to myth, because Leviathan has this at least in common with 
the immortal gods: that we know little or nothing of his childhood. That is not 
strange; for no god is quite immune to ridicule... A god must feel secure in his 
divinity to let himself be laughed at, and Leviathan is not sufficiently at home in 
heaven to allow it (Furnivall 1991:1). 
In the context of his study of the beginning of British rule in Burma, Furnivall’s 
point is simply that the personation of global actors such as the British empire is a 
contingent one. In his account - a sort of Fawlty Towers (Cleese and Booth 2001) version 
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of colonialism -  the local population not only refuses to ‘buy in’ to the existence of 
‘Empire,’ but the colonial officials struggling to keep order have precious little capacity 
to enforce it. Thus the colonial agents struggling to produce official documentation of 
their governance to London even as they are ineffective on the ground end up not 
personating leviathan, but impersonating it. 
Like the representatives of the state and company that we shall meet in this thesis, 
they struggled to maintain some semblance of order in both their ‘practical’ 
administration of their territory as well as their personation of a big actor. Indeed (and 
this is the point) the two acts of personation and ‘practical’ action are not discrete 
activities but different sides of the same coin. The tragic part of Furnivall’s ironic tale is 
that this faith in personation pays off eventually – the British did proceed to establish 
control over Burma. From the humble tragi-comedy of British administrators trying to 
fulfill the most basic of tasks to the creation of a fully organized colonial states, 
Leviathan in Burma managed its apotheosis through a commitment to role on the part of 
its representatives that was unrealistic by the standards of realpolitik but rational within a 
cultural framework in which imagined themselves as local instantiations of global 
powers. 
Taking Big Actors Seriously: Synopticism and Irreduction
Thus these leviathans, these ‘global actors,’ become more powerful when they 
become leviathans in the sense used by Callon and Latour. They have famously argued 
that the power and existence of ‘macro-actors’ comes from their ability to ‘translate’ “all 
the negotiations intrigues, calculations, acts of persuasion and violence, thanks to which 
an actor or force takes, or causes to be conferred on itself authority to speak or act on 
behalf of another actor or force” and use them to present themselves as ‘macro-actors’ 
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(Callon and Latour 1981:279). The fact that the network of actors involved “conceals its 
associations” gives it ‘potency’ (Latour 1983:213) to act and, as they say, to put things in 
‘black boxes.’ “A black box,” they write, “contains that which no longer needs to be 
reconsidered, those things whose contents have become a matter of indifference. The 
more elements one can place in black boxes – modes of thoughts, habits, forces and 
objects – the broader the construction one can raise” (Callon and Latour 1981: 285). 
We need not embrace Callon and Latour’s ontological agnosticism – a mixture of 
Serres’s denial of metanarrative and Garfinkel’s ethnomethodological indifference – in 
order to appreciate their more general point. The capacity of big actors to act is tied to 
their ability to be taken for granted, to put the facts of their existence in ‘black boxes’ 
which are, as Callon and Latour remind us, are always ‘leaky.’ Thus even big actors that 
seem intuitively ‘real’ to us are in fact available for examination as construed and 
construable.
Thus ‘collective subjects’ are made to appear (or ‘purified’) through the 
mediating instrument of the people who represent them. On this account,  ‘the Ipili,’ ‘the 
State,’ and ‘the Company’ are abstract entities which are always represented – ‘mediated’ 
– by particular people in particular places since institutions always subsume particular 
actors within a more general role. As global as Globalization may be, it always ultimately 
happens in a particular place. As a result particular actorss must always come to represent 
or ‘mediate’ global actors – to become, as Peirce might put it, ‘local tokens of global 
types.’ At issue in Porgera, then, is the question of how individuals can become 
efficacious – how they and others come to see them as representatives of larger entities. 
How, in doing so, do they mediate different large-scale structures and perpetuate the 
coordination of action that is necessary to keep the mine going? What are the particular 
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ways this works institutionally? What are the dynamics at play?  It is to these questions 
that I now turn.
On Latour and Callon’s account – or at least the sociological version I am 
describing here, with much of the ontological weirdness taken out – sociologists such as 
Scott who take for granted the existence of ‘the State’ are actually ‘helping actors macro-
structure reality.’ It is thus interesting to note that while both Latour and Bourdieu agree 
that the act of subsumption and authoritative entextualization always occur in practice 
and never happen completely automatically, Bourdieu argues that the ‘synoptic’ picture 
of human life introduced by the analyst is the result of “a radical discontinuity between 
theoretical knowledge and practical knowledge” (Bourdieu 1990) due to the fact that the 
anthropologist’s relation to his informants’ life is merely ‘cognitive’ or ‘theoretical’ and 
hence fundamentally different  from their ‘practical’ comportment. Latour and Callon 
would argue that the synoptic,  ‘purified’ view in which people see ‘the UN’ rather than 
‘Dan Smith’ acting is a result of the analyst’s connection to and belief in the stories of 
their informants. This accords well with how the contributors of Natural Histories of 
Discourse imagine their own academic articles which are, as Judith Irvine puts it, part of 
“a chain if discourse relations extending into the future – all the way, gentle reader, to 
you” (Irvine 1996:156). “We do,” as Silverstein puts it, “just what the ‘natives’ do, 
schematically speaking, and we should not ever forget that”(Silverstein 2003:203).
In the case of Porgera, the relationship one takes to the validity claims of one’s 
informants is particularly fraught – who ‘the Ipili’ are, what it means ‘the hold land in 
accordance with native custom,’ and so forth are the sorts of questions which 
anthropologists are supposed to speak on authoritatively. Throughout this dissertation one 
of the main themes will be the way that anthropological knowledge is connected at every 
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level with life in the valley today. Here I merely point out that no study of the way 
macro-actors (or, as I shall call them ‘big actors’) are taken for granted or problematized 
is a constant issue when both you and your informants consider it to be your job to 
produce just such authoritative entextualizations of them.
Conflicting Structures of Agency
In order to keep the mine open, large scale action must be coordinated. For large 
scale action to be coordinated, people who are not consociates must share a common 
understanding of who they are and what they are doing. On the one hand, the Ipili must 
be made feasible – imagined as suitable partners for the mine and (more 
straightforwardly) pacified. On the other hand, entities such as ‘the mine’ must be 
imagined and people must come to personate them. As we shall see in this section, life in 
Porgera is (somewhat tragically) stuck between two different ways of coordinating 
action. For while ‘the mine’ depends on one way of imagining actors, ‘the Ipili’ use a 
very different one, and much of the action in the valley can be explained as a result of 
this conflict that arises from these two different methods of ordering social life. Keeping 
the mine open involves managing this friction very, very carefully. Finally, at the back of 
both the Ipili and the mine, the government must also be satisfied, and a narrative of life 
in the valley created which is suitable to the state.
The most fruitful point of departure for elucidating this conflict comes from 
Marshall Sahlins’s work on the interaction of structure in history, and in particular his 
accounts of the way that individual agency is amplified by an actor’s structural position. 
While Sahlins’s problematic has been discussed as ‘historical’ it is clear his work is 
applicable to understanding the coordination of action in the present. Napoleon’s 
logistics, after all, became Tolstoy’s history.
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While Levi-Strauss’s Savage Mind responded to Sartre’s Critique of Dialectical 
Reason (1976), Sahlins focused on its methodological propadeutic, Search for a Method 
(Sartre 1963). In this volume, Sartre accuses Marxist authors such as Lukacs of “the 
terrorist practice of ‘liquidating the particularity’” (Sartre 1963: 28). Their analysis is 
flawed, he claims, because of their tendency to be overly nomothetic. Like the physicist 
described by Boas, these authors search for general patterns in data rather than 
understanding, as a cosmographer might, the details of particular situations. But while 
Windelband and Boas sees the distinction between these two approaches as one of 
emphasis rather than in terms of right or wrong, Sartre understands his opponents’ 
subsumption of particular phenomenon under general labels as essentially pathological:
There is no longer any question of studying facts within the general perspective 
of Marxism so as to enrich our understanding and to clarify action. Analysis [on 
their account] consists solely of getting rid of detail, in forcing the signification 
of certain events, in denaturing facts or even inventing a nature for them in order 
to discover it later underneath them, as their substance. (Sartre 1963: 27).
Thus, they replace the fine detail of history with ‘general particularities’ which 
are “made to pass for particular, historical realities when we ought not to see in them 
anything more than the purely formal unity of abstract, universal relations” (Sartre 
1963:24). Overall, the essay is an exercise in brand management in which Sartre attempts 
to position himself as more authentically ‘Marxist’ than other authors. Whether Sartre or 
Lukacs is the true inheritor of Marxism is not particularly relevant here, of course, and 
the success of Sartre’s proposed program of ‘existential psychoanalysis’ is perhaps best 
judged by its current popularity. What is relevant is that Sartre’s own project involved 
developing a method for analyzing history which sought to rectify Marxist analysis by 
supplementing it with sociological and psychoanalytic approaches which analyzed how 
the Marxist economic base was ‘mediated’ to individual people and the particularities of 
their historic existence. 
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While Sartre was searching for a method, Sahlins was searching for an object – a 
culture concept sufficiently robust as to escape from the “practical theories” which 
reduced culture to “the social realization of a gainful ratio of material benefits to cost” 
(Sahlins 1977:15). Sahlins saw in Sartre’s mediation a way to talk about culture. As is 
well known, Sahlins famously introduced the term ‘structure of the conjuncture’ in 1976, 
shortly before the publication of Culture and Practical Reason (Sahlins 1977:30) in order 
to clear structuralism from the charges that it could not account for the deployment of 
structure in practice and culture change more generally. In response to Sartre’s question - 
“Do we have today the means to constitute a structural, historical anthropology?” (Sartre 
1963:xxxiv) – Sahlins’s answer was a firm ‘yes,’ “le jour est arrivée” (1985:72).
While the reception of this article and the string of publications after (Sahlins 
1981, 1985) has focused on the political and empirical acceptability of Sahlins’s account 
of Captain Cook’s landing in Hawaii in 1789, it is clear that Sahlins intended his model 
to extend beyond an account of Hawaiian historicity and to serve as a more general 
account of the relationship between individual agency and cultural constraint, synchronic 
structure and diachronic process. According to Sahlins, general cultural structures always 
realize themselves in particular situations whose very uniqueness offers a surfeit of 
reality which exceeds the generality of the cultural category which subsumes them. The 
stretching of these categories in practice then feeds back into the more general structures, 
altering them. In this way the innovative use of structures in particular situations modifies 
cultural structure at a general level – the ‘historical metaphors’ feeding back on the ‘real’ 
structural-cum-mythical types of which they were tokens. This was part of a wide-
ranging conversation occurring at the time -- on the ‘fundamental metaphoricity of 
language’ see Gadamer (1991:429), for a theory of ‘metaphoric innovation’ with a 
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similar intellectual genealogy see Ricoeur (1977), on culture and history see  Valeri 
(1990), on metaphor in anthropology more generally see Fernandez (ed 1986, 1991) and 
so forth. 
It was in another longish essay on structural history, The Return of the Event,  
Again (1991), that Sahlins made good his promissory note in Islands of History (1985) . 
While that earlier work had focused on ‘exogenous’ events “emanating from natural or 
foreign causes” (1991: 45) such as Captain Cook, Return of the Event focuses on 
‘endogenous’ events caused by the relationship “between an incident and a structure” 
(1991:45). Through an analysis of nineteenth-century Fijian political feuding, Sahlins 
considers how “a higher order of structure – the relations between kingdoms – 
momentarily devolves upon certain circumstantial relations between particular chiefs” 
(1991:47). Here “the heroic capacity of Ratu Qara [a chief] to signify Rewa [his 
kingdom] and so incarnate its fate” results in a “symbolic magnification of the person” 
(1991:63). People so endowed – who Sahlins refers to as ‘sociohistorical individuals’ -- 
“engage social totalities” (1991:63). More recently this has been posed as a series of 
questions about the “structural-cum-symbolic amplification of minor differences” and 
thus how “small-scale, interpersonal or factional disputes are turned into large-scale 
struggles between nations, kingdoms, or their totalized like” (Sahlins 2004b:5). In other 
words, the way that “micro-actors” structure “macro-history” (Sahlins 2004a, 2004b).
This discussion of Sahlins’s thought allows us to see that what is at issue is not 
merely the subsumption of a particular person under a general identity, but the way that 
that identity is embdedded in a wider cultural structure that enables individuals to affect 
change at a large level through their action. Thus Ipili landowner representatives and 
senior mine management are sociohistorical individuals in Sahlins’s sense – people 
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whose actions are located in a wider structure which amplified their agency. The question 
then becomes the nature of the structures in which they are situated. For this I return to 
Sahlins and Levi-Strauss.
Levi-Strauss famously attempted to undo stereotypes of ‘primitive’ society by 
insisting these societies had complex aesthetics and social organization. As a result he 
replaced the distinction of ‘primitive’ and ‘civilized’ with that of ‘hot’ and ‘cold’ 
societies. “Our Western societies,” he writes, “are made for change; it is the principle of 
their structure and of their organization.” (1983: 321) Incorporating change, they thus 
undergo progress – they are ‘hot.’ ‘Primitive’ societies, on the other hand, “which we 
might define as ‘cold’ because their internal environment borders on the zero of historical 
temperature, are distinguished by the limited number of their people and their mechanical 
mode of functioning” (1983: 29). They seek to “annul the possible effects of historical 
factors on their equilibrium and continuity” and thus avoid change in order to 
continuously replicate a positively-valued past memorialized in myth and ritual.
Sahlins draws a similar distinction between ‘performative’ and ‘prescriptive’ 
approaches to history. As he writes in Islands of History, performative societies “tend to 
assimilate themselves to contingent circumstances; whereas, the prescriptive assimilate 
the circumstances to themselves – by a kind of denial of their contingent or evenemential 
character” (1985: xii). In performative societies 
circumstantial happening are often marked and valued for their differences, their 
departures from existing arrangements, as people may then act upon them to 
reconstruct  their  social  conditions.  As society thus  organizes  itself,  it  knows 
itself as the institutional form of historical events. But in a prescriptive mode, 
nothing is  new,  or  at  least  happenings  are  valued  for  their  similarity  to  the 
system as  constituted.  What  happens,  then,  is  the  projection  of  the  existing 
order: even when what happens is unprecedented, and whether the recuperative 
interpretation be successful or in vain.  (1985 xii)
Thus performative societies seek to emphasize the disjuncture between particular 
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happenings and the general categories which subsume them – their idiography drives 
their history. Presciptive societies seek to subsume without remainder all that they 
encounter, nomothetically reproducing the general categories that they cherish.
Given Levi-Strauss’s discussion, you might expect transnational corporations – 
the very epitome of global capitalism’s restless modernity -- to be hot and Papua New 
Guinea highlanders – classically ‘savage slot’ (Trouillot 1991) societies – to be cold. 
However on further consideration we can see that exactly the reverse is the case. This is 
the key to understanding both the Mine and the Ipili’s two distinct ways of creating (or 
not) ‘structural relays’ which ‘amplify’ the authority of ability of individuals to 
coordinate action across huge swaths of space and time.
As will become clear in what is to follow, it is the very  ‘coolness’ of the mine’s 
organization that allows it to function so successfully and at such a large level. It is a 
hierarchical organization with standard operating procedures which are designed to keep 
it open and running as efficiently as possible. In fact, not surprisingly, it fits Weber’s 
ideal type of a bureaucratic enterprise in which there is an office hierarchy, management 
is based upon written files (which define ‘standard operating procedure’) and the 
employees distinguish (ideal-typically at least) between their official role and their 
private lives (Weber 1968: 956-957).
The mine operates in this manner for many reasons. But surely one of the most 
important is, as Weber points out, “its purely technical superiority over any other form of 
organization” (1968: 973). Again we are back to the close tie between efficient 
coordination of action and the routineness with which people personate big actors. The 
complex logistics and technical requirements of running a mine in a place like Porgera is 
met by bureaucratic organization: “precision, speed, unambiguity, knowledge of the files, 
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continuity, discretion, unity, strict subordination, reduction of friction and of material and 
personal costs – these are raised to the optimum point in the strictly bureaucratic 
administration” (1968: 973).
Thus the mine’s organization is literally prescriptive – the work of its employees 
follows prescriptions described in standard operating procedure which is meant to 
exemplify ‘best practice.’ As a result, the mine seeks to deny the historical particularity 
of, say, any historically unique toilet cleaning in favor of a more efficient ‘stereotypic 
reproduction’ of rules regarding the standard way to clean toilets – and this despite the 
fact that every toilet is utterly unique and particular and will never again be in exactly the 
same state as it is at the particular moment that a janitor  experiences cleaning it. 
“Bureaucratization offers above all the optimum possibility for carrying through the 
principle of specializing administrative functions according to purely objective 
considerations... ‘Objective’ discharge of business primarily means a discharge of 
business according to calculable rules” and “without regard for persons” (1968: 975). 
Keeping the mine open depends upon institutions for action which see people in their 
particularity rather than their generality. 
Like Sartre’s ‘idealist Marxists,’ and Levi-Strauss’s ‘cold’ primitive people, 
prescriptive cultures such as the mine’s subsume particular situations with a sucking 
sound – every particular situation is seen in its generality. Standard operating procedure 
is nomothetic in its subsumption – it is of no importance whether this particular refueling 
is Bob’s first day on the job. All that is important is that the Refueling Technician 
perform his task while observing all proper safety precautions. Thus every refuelling is 
yet another instantiation of standard operating procedure. And indeed, Weber writes that 
“bureaucracy develops the more perfectly, the more it is ‘dehumanized,’ the more 
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completely it succeeds in eliminating from official business love, hatred, and all purely 
personal, irrational, and emotional elements which escape calculation” (1968: 975). The 
result is company discipline, or, as the mine refers to it, a ‘high performance culture’: 
“The content of discipline is nothing but the consistently rationalized methodically 
prepared and exact execution of the received order, in which all personal criticism is 
unconditionally suspended and the actor is unswervingly and exclusively set for carrying 
out the command. In addition, this conduct under orders is uniform” (Weber 1968:1149) .
At the top of these hierarchies are the small elites whose decisions will change 
standard operating procedure – ‘senior management.’ Like Sahlins’s Polynesian chiefs, 
these people form an evenementially hot core at the top (or, depending on one’s spatial 
metahphors, center) of the bureaucracy which takes the form of a ‘reality management 
pool’ (Murphy 1991:75) which decides what shall be done and then ensures that others 
implement their orders. Their task is complicated by the fact of having to deal with the 
Ipili themselves. 
If Weber’s ideal type of bureaucracy represents the epitome of a prescriptive 
structure, the Ipili are a good example of a ‘performative’ structure. Indeed,  in the mid-
1980s, when academics were busy debunking notions of ‘islands lost in time’ and ‘people 
without history,’ one can understand why Sahlins would emphasize the performative 
aspect of Hawaiian culture. And, to be sure, there are definitely patches of evenemential 
‘heat’ within the cultural structures of old Hawaii – most notably, the ali’i. Indeed, it is 
their status as history makers that Sahlins uses as part of his wider argument about the 
appropriateness of ‘heroic’ rather than ‘popular’ history in Polynesian societies (Sahlins 
1985), and their ability to coordinate action on a massive scale can be seen in Hawai’i’s 
incredible built environment (Kirch 1996). Compared to the Ipili, however, the 
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Hawaiians described by Sahlins appear downright tepid.
Like many highlands groups, Ipili combine a keen egalitarianism with a dislike of 
boredom. While the exact history and culture of the Ipili will be given in future chapters, 
it is worthwhile to outline here some basic proclivities. Like the Nebilyer people 
described by Merlan and Rumsey (1991), the Ipili have a strong sense “of both the 
unverifiability and importance of what others’ intentions and motives really are” 
(1991:225) as well as the potential meaning of significant physical objects (kokoli in 
Ipili). The result is “a common dimension in orientation both to persons and events: the 
possibility of concealed significance” (Merlan and Rumsey 1991:228). This “revelatory 
quality of thing” (Merlan and Rumsey 1991:228) means that events are “invested with 
the expectation of potential revelation” (Merlan and Rumsey 1991:228): 
The relative openendedness of possible meaningfulness leaves ever more to be 
experienced and discovered,  possibly even the terms in  which new kinds of 
meanings might make sense... It is a more rapacious desire to experience and 
explore  the  novelty  for  what  this  might  make  manifest...  difference  can  be 
experienced as the uncovering of new, heretofore covert possibilities. (Merlan 
and Rumsely 1991: 231)
Thus while Levi-Strauss considered “the avid need for change characteristic of 
our own civilization” (1991:1966:236) in the case of Porgera we see it to be a 
characteristic of the Ipili rather than the mine. “Indigenous emphasis and interest interest 
is not focused upon the conformity of action to structural ‘types’, but upon ‘event’ as that 
which may offer the possibility for revelation of meaningfulness and exploration of the 
difference this makes.” (Merlan and Rumsey 1991:239).
In sum, life in Porgera revolves around two conflicting structures of agency. On 
the one hand, we have the method of coordinating action as carried out by the mine. This 
is essentially the bureaucratic system outlined by Weber. A ‘standard operating 
procedure’ is created to guide the routinization of subordinates, while policy is made by 
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an elite at the top of the chain of organization. On the other we have the performative 
society of the Ipili, which is anarchic and egalitarian. The result is a constant process of 
‘fire-fighting’ – Ipili continue to attempt to disrupt the mine’s operations for their own 
advantage, while mine representatives often spent their time attempting to patch things up 
before they unravel completely. As we shall see, Filer refers to this instability as ‘the 
Melanesian Way of menacing the mining industry’ (1998).
As a result the situation in Porgera today is one in which a small ‘reality 
management pool’ who have historically served as the interface between Porgerans, the 
government, and mining companies make decisions about the valley that will be 
authoritative. But unlike a chiefly class of ali’i which is restricted on the basis of 
genealogy (albeit creatively figured genealogy) the set of microactors who can structure 
macroreality is much fuzzier in Porgera. The result is a “high society” of potentially 
important people who are constantly jockeying for power and personation. At times this 
jockeying is so intense that it threatens to undo the very structures in the valley that make 
the amplification of agency and the coordination of action possible at all. Nonetheless, 
there exists in Porgera an ‘evenemential elite’ – a group of people whose eventful lives 
can truly change the shape of life in the valley, in Port Moresby, and internationally as 
well.
In sum, from within the privileged sphere or research with the elite, where the 
arbitrariness of history-making is so apparent, it is easy to “resolve social totalities into 
the projects of self-fashioning individuals” just from a distance the complexity of these 
interactions on the ground can be read as a Scottian ‘Leviathanology’ in which 
“autonomous cultural behemoths” appear unproblematically as big actors (Sahlins 
2004a:142). As Sahlins points out, the dichotomy between individualizing and 
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collectivizing approaches to human life is an enduring one in social thought. In this 
dissertation I seek not to collapse one side of this dichotomy into the other, but rather to 
explore what the tension between the two of them can tell us about Porgera and the more 
general question that it raises: how we can understand globalization as culture – and vice 
versa?
Plan of the Dissertation
The dissertation is organized into six chapters. In this first, introductory chapter I 
have outlined the theme of feasibility, provided a rough sketch of the mine and the Ipili, 
and have laid out the main theoretical issues that are at stake in the dissertation.
The first substantive chapter focuses on a close examination of a prolonged set of 
negotiations between Ipili leaders and mine representatives called the ‘Yakatabari 
Negotiations.’ This detailed case study will provide a detailed example of the 
fundamental issues of the dissertation as they played out in one particular situation. 
With this concrete ethnographic instance in place, I then base the rest of the 
dissertation around a series of explanations of various aspects of the circumstances of 
Yakatabari. The third chapter discusses Ipili history and how the environment for the 
negotiations was created. It outlines the institutional history of the establishment of ‘the 
Ipili’ and the ‘government’ as feasible actors in Porgera and the personal histories of 
Porgera’s “evenemential elite.” The fourth chapter examines the cultural underpinnings 
of the different attitudes that the negotiators at Yakatabari brought to the table. Thus it 
will examine Ipili understandings of whites as well as how white negotiators imagined 
Ipili, and that way that the biographies of the participants in the negotiation were shaped 
by Papua New Guinea’s drive to independence in the 1970s and its decline in the 1980s. 
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The fifth chapter analyzes kinship practices in Porgera. It will demonstrate exactly 
what ‘Ipili kinship’ is and how it interfaces with government and mine institutions which 
benefit landowners. I will argue that there is no clear and unambiguous definition of ‘true 
landowners’ both in Ipili villages as well as government offices. In the final, concluding 
chapter of the dissertation I examine the way the ambiguities that are obvious at a local 
level are misrecognized at the ‘national’ level – that is, by elites in Port Moresby. I then 
draw some general conclusions about the way a study of Porgera can shed light on land 
tenure and land registration in Papua New Guinea and the role of elites in the national 
policy process. Finally, I remark more generally on Porgera’s applicability to issues that 
are of a more general interest to anthropology.
CHAPTER TWO
THE YAKATABARI NEGOTIATIONS
Tom: Can’t raise O’Gara?
Leo: No, nor the mayor either.
Tom: Hmm... That’s not good.  They’re running.
Leo: They wouldn’t dare.
Tom: I don’t know, Leo. I warned you not to hit Caspar’s club –
Leo: I’m still here, ain’t I?
Tom: Caspar’s play hurt you anyway.
Leo: Hah! That sorry sonofabitch just slit his own throat. He just made me 
decide to step on him –
Tom: Listen to me Leo.  Last night made you look vulnerable. You don’t hold 
elected office in this town.  You run it because people think you run it. Once 
they stop thinking it, you stop running it. 
-Joel and Ethan Cohen, Miller’s Crossing.
Page five of the Porgera Mine 2000 Sustainability report (Placer Dome Asia 
Pacific 2001) featured a two-thirds of a page spread entitled “Yakatabari Waste Dump 
Negotiations – Failure or Foundation for the Future[?]” I quote it here in its entirety:
Yakatabari  Waste  Dump  Negotiations  –  Failure  or  Foundation  for  the 
Future
Planning for economic, social and environmental benefits
PJV  proposed  a  new  waste  dump  site  in  1999  and  hoped  to  conclude 
negotiations with an agreed package of benefits  for landowners during 2000. 
Consensus  with  the  landowners  was  not  achieved  and  the  proposal  was 
withdrawn by PJV. The failed negotiations have had some positive outcomes 
and identified some important lessons not only for PJV but for the community.
It had been hoped that the new dump would contribute to sustainability in the 
following ways:
69
70
Dump Plan Component Sustainability Outcome
Reduced capital/operating costs of 
dump trucks.
Decreased operating costs – 
longer mine life at low gold 
prices. Continued local and 
national revenue streams.
Shorter/lower gradient waste rock 
hauls.
Reduced fuel and 
maintenance costs. Reduced 
CO2 emissions.
Compensation for use of land. Purchase of alternative 
gardening land as part of a 
benefits package.
Compensation for loss of housing Provision of new houses.
Stable low altitude dump Suitable for reclamation as 
agricultural land
Factors contributing to the failure of the plan include:
Limited information and awareness of the interplay between reduced operating 
costs, increased stakeholder benefits and shareholder expectations.
High demands of some stakeholder groups.
Late involvement of some government institutions in negotiations.
Difficulties in identifying alternative gardening and housing sites.
Difficulties in coordinating the provision of government services in relocated 
communities.
Limited  awareness  and  understanding  of  the  long-term  sustainable  benefits 
offered by the plan.
Group  dynamics  resulting  in  polarization  of  views  within  and  between 
stakeholder groups.
Precedence  of  immediate  issues  and  benefits  over  long  term  principles  and 
sustainable benefits.
Despite the failure of the negotiations many stakeholders and the PJV were in 
favor of a strategy to prolong mine life involving a new dump package of social 
benefits. The failed negotiations increased awareness and understanding of the 
key issues of transparency, multilateral decision making and the need to focus 
on long term benefits rather than short-term windfalls. These are cornerstones of 
sustainability.
In November 2000 the PJV identified an alternative possibility, Anawe North, 
for  a  new dump site  which  still  provides  for  significant  economic  benefits. 
Potential  stakeholder  options  and  discussions  are  taking  into  account  earlier 
problems  and  include  more  flexible  solutions  to  relocation  housing  and 
replacement gardening land to suit both individual and wider community needs.
In 385 words, eighteen months of intense, immensely important negotiation 
regarding the future of the mine was condensed into a single, authoritative and 
anonymously voiced narrative. A colorful twenty page booklet, the sustainability report 
represented Placer’s most stylistically accessible and complete statement of ‘what had 
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happened in Porgera in 2000,’ with synoptic charts and non-technical prose that 
addressed everything from the creation of a local branch of the Girl Guides (Placer Dome 
Asia Pacific 2001:6) to the amount of steel grinding media used as a reagent in operations 
(Placer Dome Asia Pacific 2001:16). Distributed widely outside the valley – in fact, 
distributed mostly outside the valley – the report could circulate farther and faster than 
any other account of the negotiations, including those of the Ipili themselves. Indeed, as a 
PDF available on Placer Dome’s website the 2000 Sustainability report became available 
to a literally global audience. This is the story, on order words, that became the synoptic 
account of what occurred.
Just as the sustainability report’s circulation is a perfect example of the mine’s 
ability to control the narratives of life in Porgera that circulate outside the valley, the 
events it describes provide a telling example of the struggles for the complex and fragile 
feasibility which occur within it. This chapter will re-examine the events of the 
Yakatabari waste dump negotiations in order to provide a substantive ethnographic 
introduction to the themes of this dissertation introduced in the last chapter. It seeks to 
provide a richly detailed example of how mine management keeps the mine operating, 
how Ipili strive to make themselves feasible political actors, and how these two goals are 
often at odds with one another. Future chapters will then go on to focus on details raised 
here in order to explicate them more fully.
This chapter  begins by describing the situation within which Yakatabari took 
place – the social and economic context of the negotiations. It next goes on to discuss 
more concretely how the ‘big actors’ (or ‘macro-actors’) which negotiated with each 
other in Yakatabari – ‘the landowners’ and ‘the state’ and ‘the mine’ – came to be 
mediated or represented by particular groups of people, and how those people’s unique 
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personalities affected how they mediated those institutions. Next I turn to a discussion of 
how the meetings for Yakatabari were organized. In the longest and final section of the 
chapter, I provide an event-by-event breakdown of the course of the negotiations.
Conjunctures and Stakes
At one level, the need for the Yakatabari waste dump was straightforward: the 
mine’s existing operating conditions were becoming increasingly unprofitable, and 
management decided that the best way to keep the mine running longer and more 
profitably would be to build a new, very large waste dump on about 150 hectares within 
the Special Mining Lease at a location that was inhabited by roughly two hundred 
households. Thus Yakatabari immediately presented the sort of problem discussed in the 
previous chapter: the engineers could build it, but could the dump be made socially 
feasible both de jure and de facto? What assent was necessary in order to create the stable 
social context the mine needed for Yakatabari to function?
This question was related to another – was Yakatabari new? Officially, 
relationships between the Porgera stakeholders were regimented by the agreements 
discussed in the previous chapter, and these should have provided a guide for the mine’s 
approach to future operations within the Special Mining Lease. The question at issue, 
however, was whether Yakatabari was the sort of thing that could be subsumed within 
these rules, or whether it was a novel case which entailed the formulation of new 
agreements.
Technically, any major change to mine operations that deviated significantly from 
the Mining Development Contract required a new round of consultation with landowners 
and new submissions to the government stating what the modified plan would be and 
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demonstrating strategies to mitigate environmental and social impacts.  This would in 
effect involve opening the black box of assumptions and expectations that had been 
created by the Porgera agreements in the late 1980s and which had provided a charter for 
life in the valley ever since. This in turn would create an atmosphere of potential 
instability in the valley that could threaten the  routine functioning of the mine. More 
importantly, it would enable the Ipili to launch new claims for concessions which they 
would doubtless press with all of the strength available to them. This was nothing new – 
Ipili make claims of the mine all the time – but if Yakatabari constituted a change from 
the original plan, then suddenly these claims would gain new legitimacy in the capital 
and would no longer be constrained by the agreements the Ipili had signed decades ago.
Thus from the start the issue with Yakatabari was not what was involved in 
constructing the waste dump in terms of engineering, but how that event would be 
understood, and what framing the event in one way or another would imply. Was the 
implementation of Yakatabari a case of ‘stereotypic reproduction’ of the relations 
between Special Mining Lease Landowners and the mine, or was it something new, 
something which opened the door for a reconfiguration of those rules? Were these 
negotiations, in other words, a ‘structure of the conjuncture’ in Sahlins’s sense (1985), a 
time when several levels of determination combined to create a situation in which 
existing orders were put into play and could be reshaped by individual agency, or was the 
creation of Yakatabari simply yet another instance of the stereotypic reproduction of life 
in the valley that the mine relied on? In order to understand what was stake, I turn now to 
the various orders of determination and how they shaped the conjuncture of 
circumstances that was the negotiations.
The Context of the Negotiations
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The Yakatabari waste dump had its origins in the financial constraints within 
which Porgera operated as it matured. Like all gold mines, Porgera’s early years were 
also its best. The richest ore was mined first, following the ‘capital logic’ described by 
Gerritson and Macintyre (1991). Porgera’s early days featured unusually rich ore -- often 
sixty grams of gold per ton (Zone VII had over 350 grams per ton), the price of gold was 
high, hovering just above US$350, and the price of production was low, roughly around 
US$75 (Jackson and Banks 2002: 228-239, on which this and further discussion is 
based). Like other mines, however, the quality of ore decreased through time as richer 
stocks of were worked out. The price of gold increased in the mid-90s, but fell 
precipitously as the decade neared its end. At the same time the cash cost of production 
began to increase to an all-time high in 1996 of US$250. By 1999, when the Yakatabari 
negotiations began, the difference between production cost and gold price was a mere 
US$50. Porgera was, as Jackson and Banks noted, being squeezed.
Finances were compounded by engineering issues. As ore grades fell, throughput 
had to increase in order to keep production levels steady. In August 1992, when the 
highest grade ore was exhausted, additions to the plant were built to handle additional 
throughput, which increased to 4,000 tons of ore a day. In 1993 more additions were 
made and throughput doubled to 8,000 tons a day. In 1994, with knowledge of the ore 
body’s properties roughly in place and as the amount of ore processed had to be increased 
again, a detailed study was undertaken to determine a long-term plan of operation that 
would extend through the rest of the mine’s life.
This resulted in Stage 4B of the mine plan and entailed a radically different 
approach to developing the mine. It was decided that the amount of rock mined per day 
would increase dramatically. By the time of my fieldwork, 220,00 tons of earth were 
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being moved daily. The plant was expanded to handle up to 17,000 tons of ore a day – 
more than double what it had been under the previous stage. Under Stage 4B, the excess 
ore would be stockpiled, mining would stop in 2006, and the plant would continue to 
process the stockpiles until 2010. Such a plan would maximize both the efficiency of the 
operation as well as the mine life, which all stakeholders sought to prolong in order to 
continue to receive revenue streams such as royalties, taxes, and dividends (Jackson and 
Banks 2002: 208-212).
Increased mining also necessarily entailed an increase in the amount of waste rock 
which it was necessary to dispose of. The question then arose as to where all of waste 
produced by the mine would be put. As the 1990s wore on the Kogai stable dump, where 
much of the waste rock had previously been discarded, became less and less capable of 
accommodating more rock. The dump, as it turns out, was located on the mountain range 
just slightly above and behind the mine’s open pit – this was one of the few geologically 
stable areas that could handle such a large load. As time went on, the pit deepened and 
the waste dump, by virtue of increased dumping, grew higher and higher. The cost in 
petrol and capital outlay for trucks began to cut into the mine’s already-shrinking profit 
margin in a serious way. The waste dump was literally getting too high to climb.
The Yakatabari dump was designed as a solution to this problem. It was named, 
like so many other features of Porgera geography, after a mishearing of a local placename 
– in this case, the Yakitipali stream whose watershed would form the basin of the waste 
dump. This area had the advantage of being below the open pit, and near the mine’s main 
plant. It could serve, in other words, not merely to receive waste for the remainder of the 
mine’s life, but possibly even extend the mine’s life by lowering costs. Its great 
disadvantage, however, was that it was located in the middle of the area of the Special 
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Mining Lease (Special Mining Lease) inhabited by landowners.
In order for Yakatabari to go forward, Special Mining Lease landowners had to 
provide their consent. While who ended up being ‘Special Mining Lease landowners’ and 
what counted as ‘consent’ was very much up in the air, the mine knew that obtaining it 
from them (whatever that meant) was going to be extremely difficult. Yakatabari was the 
most important negotiation regarding the status of the Special Mining Lease since the 
mine began, and it thus represented a chance for Ipili landowners to gain concessions 
from the mine that they felt were long overdue. This desire to renegotiate was 
compounded by their experience of the mine’s development. Stage 4B had been 
extremely contentious because it had not triggered this sort of reconsideration. 
Landowners insisted stubbornly that the doubling of plant capacity and the decision to 
stockpile ore was significantly different from what was originally envisaged in the 
Mining Development Contract submitted to the government, but were ultimately 
unsuccessful in triggering new negotiations. Given their previous lack of success in 
getting Stage 4B considered something ‘new,’ there was no way that the landowners were 
going to allow Yakatabari go through without comment.
This universal desire for renegotiation was combined with several additional facts 
that reflected the changes in the landowner community since the late 1980s. The 
agreements that created the mine also created a whole set of new positions of power and 
privilege for the Ipili lucky enough to fill them. Over the past ten years, the fluid scene of 
big men that characterized Porgera in the 1980s had congealed  into a still-flexible but 
much more restricted group of Landowners with a capital L – the elite who held sinecures 
and other positions of power and traveled around the valley in expensive Toyota Land 
Cruisers with tinted windows. While many of these people actively considered the 
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welfare of the people they theoretically represented, there personal interests could no 
longer be considered to always be unproblematically aligned with those of the majority of 
Porgerans. Nevertheless, it was these people who sat on the Landowner Negotiating 
Committee and served as the indigenous component of Porgera’s ‘evenemential elite’ – 
the high society whose microinteractions could structure macroreality in the valley.
Contrary to what one might expect, this split between landowner elites and local 
communities did not result in calls for a reform of this system. Average Porgerans were 
not unhappy with the existence of a privileged elite per se – they were merely unhappy 
that they were not members of it. Thus the clearest manifestation of this stratification of 
the landowner community could be seen in the rise of younger men clamoring to replace 
the now-aging group that negotiated the agreements in 1989. The conjuncture of 
circumstances that created the possibility of the Yakatabari waste dump, in other words, 
gave those people who had been busy garnering support within the more fluid and low-
stakes realms of valley politics a chance to parlay that success into influence beyond the 
valley – the black boxes being opened, as it were, this was the chance for young aspirants 
to stuff themselves into them.
The rise of these younger men also said something about the situation of 
landowner communities more generally. Landowner relocation communities had seen 
massive growth since the opening of the mine. An entire generation was coming of age 
that could not find space for housing, and who competed with their parents for space in 
the relocation houses built for them by the mine. Youth as a whole, then, were being 
forced to live in a situation not of their own making without the amenities that their elders 
received from the mine. This generational conflict was compounded by high amounts of 
in-migration – nearly every Porgeran family had a group of Engan or Huli immigrants 
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who were attached to them in a client-patron relationship. This growth in population – 
along with a more general shortage in land caused by the mine’s presence – resulted in a 
crisis of subsistence agriculture which led to an increased reliance on money from the 
mine to purchase store-bought food. In short, communities within the Special Mining 
Lease were facing serious social problems (for more details of social chance in Porgera, 
see Bonnell 1999 and Banks and Bonnell 1997). Relocation off of the Special Mining 
Lease, and the compensation that would result from Yakatabari were seen as the silver 
bullet that would solve many of these problems. Compensation, particularly a lot of 
compensation, could solve a lot problems.
Finally, it must be understood that Ipili dissatisfaction with the deal they had 
gotten from the mine stemmed from more than just unanticipated social change and a 
lack of consultation during Stage 4B. The history of mining and prospecting in Porgera 
overlapped with a series of millennial movements and a more general Ipili eschatology in 
which mine-derived benefits were considered part of an end-time scenario in which an 
apocalypse ushered in by Jesus and an ancestral python spirit named Kupiane would 
result in endless affluence and immortality. This will be discussed in more detail in 
chapter four. Here I will say simply that on this account Kupiane, the protector of the 
ancestors of the Tiyini clan and inhabitant of the Porgera orebody, is a benevolent spirit 
whose shed skin or feces became the gold sought after by the mine. Thus Ipili imagine 
the PJV to be ‘chasing Kupiane’ through the mountain – hence the title of Jackson and 
Banks’s history of the Porgera Joint Venture, In Search of the Serpent’s Skin. Jesus, in his 
sympathetic sorrow for mankind’s plight, was crucified in the years immediately 
following World War II, and it was this sacrifice that ‘opened the roads’ and allowed 
white men and their material culture to come to Porgera. 
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Different people had different levels of belief in Kupiane, and of course it is 
difficult if not impossible to measure someone’s religious faith. But it is surely the case 
that beliefs about Kupiane influenced the behavior of some negotiators, and it is 
undoubtedly the case that all Ipili felt a keen sense of disappointment with the mine that 
was literally cosmic – ten years into what was supposed to be an age of effortless wealth 
and health, Ipili felt cheated by what the mine had wrought, and deeply entitled to more 
then they had received. Ipili dissatisfaction, in sum, was underwritten by cultural 
structures that ran very deep indeed.
For their part, mine management sought to implement Yakatabari but did not 
want to let the occasion turn into an open invitation to rethink the politics of the valley 
from scratch. To this end they settled on a two-pronged approach. First, they submitted a 
document – the “Porgera Vision Plan” – to the government explaining the Yakatabari 
waste dump and the changes that it would entail. Second, they began negotiating a new 
agreement – the ‘Yakitibari Agreement’ – with the landowners that would give more 
lucrative benefits to those affected by Yakitibari than provided for under the preexisting 
agreements.
As we have seen, the future stages of the mine’s development were originally to 
be found in the Mining Development Contract that regulated the relationship between the 
company and the state. Deviation from this plan would trigger a massive restudy and 
reauthorization that the mine sought to avoid. One would expect, therefore, that the 
Porgera Vision Plan would lay out the mine’s new vision for the remainder of its life in a 
way which demonstrated as convincingly as possible that Yakitibari could be subsumed 
by the Mining Development Contract. When pressed, of course, mine management would 
claim that this was the case. But in fact their strategy was more complicated then simply 
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claiming that they were within the limits of the present agreements. Instead they claimed 
that the Porgera Vision Plan was neither an alteration to nor a continuance of the original 
Mining Development Contract -- this matter was intentionally left ambiguous and in fact 
purposefully avoided. By focusing on the future rather than the past, the mine sought to 
keep the question of its compliance with older plans as far off of people’s minds as 
possible.
This was accomplished by making the Porgera Vision Plan more than merely a 
schedule of future mine operations in the valley.  It offered the government not just a 
vision of Yakatabari, but of the rest of the mine’s life, its impact on the valley and the 
nation, and life in the valley after closure – it was, as the name implied, a complete 
‘vision’ of life in Porgera. The mine’s closure plans were attractive and generous – the 
most comprehensive developed to date in Papua New Guinea, and this at a time when the 
government was just starting to plan for a future in which it could not rely on revenue 
from mining. Furthermore, the mine’s broad concern with ‘sustainability’ and social 
change in the valley allowed it to present itself as a responsible company committed to 
partnering with government to achieve maximum stakeholder benefits through best 
practices. Compensation for landowners, of course, was described as part of the mine’s 
goal of supporting and embracing sustainable development with the Porgeran community 
and not as a cynical quid-pro-quo for a new wastedump. 
Thus the mine sought to portray itself as an exemplary corporate citizen – so 
exemplary, in fact, that there would seem to be no point in mucking about in the details 
of the Mining Development Contract. Of course, the cynical could easily see this as a 
simple strategy designed to buy off the government and make the company look good. 
However it is important to note that this turn towards sustainability was part of a larger 
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shift in Placer Dome’s global strategy – the Yakatabari negotiations occurred at a time 
when the company and its subsidiaries officially embraced sustainable development and 
began producing reports of their own efforts in this respect (Placer Dome 2000). Of 
course, the cynical could easily see this focus on sustainability as a simple strategy 
designed to make the company look good.  In my personal experience, however, it is 
important to note that mine executives and senior management in Porgera would have 
found it repulsive to bulldoze people’s homes and forcibly relocate them to make way for 
Yakatabari. Papua New Guinea is not Africa, and Placer Dome is not Summitville – on 
the one occasion I did hear someone suggest to the Managing Director of Placer Niugini 
that he hire a private military force to strengthen the mine’s position in the valley, the 
response was a visible and sincere disgust. Thus I think senior management had a 
genuine desire to do the right thing – as long as was compatible with the imperatives of 
business. As we shall see, as the situation became more and more desperate the mine was 
more and more hard pressed to find ways in which it could convince itself the profiable 
decisions were also the morally right ones.
Was the Yakatabari agreement a precedent-setting, action-regimenting document 
like the relocation and compensation agreements of the late nineties? Would it apply to 
the entire Special Mining Lease, or was it merely a private agreement reached with the 
people affected by Yakatabari? This was also a question that the mine sought to dodge. 
If the government was satisfied and landowners quiescent then Yakatabari could go 
ahead and the exact status of what had been agreed could be retrospectively developed 
later to suit the legal and rhetorical requirements of whoever requested them at some 
unspecified future point. The key here was that the government would not be satisfied if 
the Ipili were not. Keeping the agreement negotiations “up there” in Porgera and 
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preventing them from spilling over to Moresby was essential to the mine’s plan. By 
providing a suitably generous settlement the mine hoped to satisfy the Ipili and prevent 
Yakatabari from getting out of hand. Indeed, there were hopes that the advantages of 
Yakatabari (increased mine life and hence more money for landowners) and the changes 
in landowner communities might even make a better and fairer relationship between the 
mine and the Ipili possible as ‘uncorrupted’ younger leaders replaced older, ‘corrupt’ 
ones.
A final – and key – feature of the mine negotiation was that the mine was rushed 
for time. Once the mine reached a certain point in its operations, it would be forced to 
invest in a fleet of larger trucks necessary for the existing mine plan to go forward and 
the window of opportunity for Yakatabari would close. Even though negotiations began a 
year before the mine would be forced to choose between Yakatabari and another plan, the 
most important and intensive part of the negotiations would happen under enormously 
important deadlines. In fact, this pressure was augmented by landowner-induced crises 
which threatened to close the mine and thus put pressure on the PJV to act quickly. In 
sum, the mine decided to negotiate directly with landowners for a level of compensation 
that was in all likelihood much greater than what was strictly required – whatever that 
ambiguously defined level might be. In doing so, it attempted to localize the issue. Even 
if it was kept local, negotiation had to be timely – unlike other issues in the valley that 
stretched over years, the mine had to take advantage of the window of opportunity 
afforded it.
This, then, was the basic conjuncture of orders – of logistics, interests, and 
engineering – that created the Yakatabari negotiation. But as we have seen in the last 
chapter, this conjuncture of orders is supplemented by a process in which unique 
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individual come to personate big actors such as ‘the mine’ or ‘the landowners.’ In order 
to understand the dynamics at Yakatabari we must understand who concretely ‘the mine’ 
were and who ‘the landowners’ were in the negotiations that followed. As we shall see, 
this mediation was not a straightforward process, and the line between the representative 
and the actor that he mediated was hardly bright and clear. In fact, the course of the 
negotiations would hinge on just how people managed these multiple roles. 
Representatives
The Mine
‘The mine’ itself was a large, complex entity with thousands of employees. 
However, as we have seen in the previous chapter, the actual number of people 
responsible for dealing with the social feasibility of the mine were quite small – 
essentially the staff of the Community Affairs Department as well as senior management. 
However, the Yakatabari negotiations took place during a time of transition in 
Community Affairs, complicating its already-fluid structure. The section had been 
founded in the late 1980s by a former kiap (colonial patrol officer) with decades of 
experience in administration in the highlands, and much of the personnel in the 
department were hand-picked by him based on their work together before independence. 
Now, after a decade, he was stepping down after just as negotiations geared up. The new 
head of Community Affairs, Henry Nelson (a pseudonym) was taking the helm after 
being in charge of Community Affairs’s Business Development Office. His own 
experience was, atypically, not as a kiap, but as the former manager of an extremely large 
plantation in Bougainville. 
Beneath the head of Community Affairs was a group of roughly eighty employees 
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ranging from a British woman in charge of the women’s center to the Papua New 
Guinean man in charge of producing monthly glossy Ipili Wai Pii, the mine’s community 
newspaper. From the point of view of negotiations, the most important branch of 
Community Affairs is ‘Community Relations,’ the people tasked with meeting and 
interacting with landowners. Almost all of the men employed as section heads in 
Community Relations (who I refer to here as ‘community relations officers’) were kiaps 
– former government officers during Papua New Guinea’s colonial period. While it is not 
unusual for kiaps to work in community relations in the resource industry in Papua New 
Guinea, Porgera was unusual for the large number of kiaps it employed. This fact – a 
result of the section’s creation out of the informal personal network of its founder – has 
its advantages and drawbacks. On the one hand, these men had particular familiarity with 
interacting with Papua New Guineans that other expats lacked. Indeed, many of them had 
formerly worked in the highlands, and one had even been officer in charge at Porgera. On 
the other hand, employing former members of an imperial administration meant that ‘the 
mine’ was represented by men with pasts complicated by colonialism and a personal 
history whose import and meaning influenced the course of negotiations.
The roles of these community relations officers within the department were fluid 
and responded to change over time. One man, for instance, was in charge of dealing with 
groups downstream of the mine who he visited by helicopter. Another was in charge of 
the claims office where Ipili complaints about land and compensation were handled. All 
of these men has publicly accessible offices in a place called Yokelama and hence were 
the most important mine representatives that Ipili typically encountered. The head of 
Community Affairs, in contrast, had an office in the Administration Building of the mine 
which one needed a security pass to enter. 
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Beneath the community relations officers were a group of Papua New Guinean 
men who I will call (to simplify the mine’s terminology) ‘community relations liaisons’ 
who carried out day-to-day interaction with Porgerans. Some of these people were Papua 
New Guinean kiaps who formerly worked for the government. Others were Porgerans 
who were meant to act as liaisons to the landowner community. Still others were people 
who could speak Ipili who were Engans or Huli and married into the community. Even 
though these men did not negotiate on behalf of the mine per se, they often translated in 
meetings, and their role as middlemen was crucial in mediating, as it were, the mediation 
performed by mine representatives.
The interstitiality of Ipili working in community relations is perhaps best 
exemplified in the figure of Jonathan Paraia. Jonathan was the first Porgeran to go to 
university and was one of the three main negotiators responsible for the creation of the 
Porgera Agreements. As a community relations officer he was formally employed by the 
mine and had his own office. In fact, he has few official duties and was hired by the mine 
mostly to be around and offer advice about the state of things in the valley. His most 
important day-to-day job was as a translator – he translated at practically all of the 
meetings between the PJV and landowners that I attended, although this is one he had 
been performing since the mid-1980s, well before there was a mine in Porgera at all.
While Henry, the head of Community Affairs, took ultimate responsibility for the 
Yakatabari, the man who was the public face of the PJV in the Yakatabari negotiations 
was an outside consultant named Fritz Robinson who headed up the negotiations on a 
day-to-day basis (this is a real name -- I cite Fritz’s writings, and as someone who is 
simultaneously a fellow scholar and research subject I’ve been unable to find a way to 
use a psudonym. Note though that at no point did he ask for anonymity in the study, as 
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many other mine representatives did).and also describe his actions I used Fritz’s real 
name because I also cite his writings on Porgera, and I have been unable to find a way to 
do , I have been unable to . Fritz had a long history with Porgera. As a former agricultural 
extension officer in Enga province, he had visited the valley on at least one occasion in 
the 1970s. But more importantly, he had spent a good deal of the late 1980s dealing with 
landowners and had been a key part of the creation of the mine. Originally, he was part of 
the team of consultants which produced the socioeconomic impact study as part of the 
mine’s feasibility statement. Afterwards he was retained by the mine to  produce the 
relocation study which spelled out how relocations brought about by the mine would be 
handled. He was then retained to serve as the mine’s main negotiator for the 
compensation and relocation agreements, and finally served as the point man for the 
actual relocation of people during the mine’s construction. 
Hiring Fritz presented in a nutshell the more general dilemma the mine faced 
when it employed people with a long familiarity with the country. On the one hand, he 
had baggage. On the other hand, he had baggage. His extensive personal experience 
meant that he would be very familiar to the group of landowners he would be negotiating 
with. This gave him the advantage of familiarity with Porgera and its history, as well as 
with Ipili negotiators – he was not likely to be pounded into oblivion by Ipili negotiating 
techniques the way a novice would. But this familiarity had as its downside the 
dissatisfaction that landowners had with the institutional arrangements they had lived 
with for a decade – arrangements which Fritz had been instrumental in creating. For some 
people, such as the Pulumaini representatives with whom he had worked closely in the 
past, he was a trusted and known quantity. But for many Fritz was personally responsible 
for what they considered to be the injustices visited upon them.
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As a result, Yakatabari became more than a negotiation about a waste dump 
carried out between two big actors. It became a referendum on Fritz’s shared past with 
the landowners and the inequities which they, rightly or wrongly, felt they had suffered 
through as a result of his action. As it turns out, they had good cause to doubt Fritz. Hired 
to represent and pursue the mine’s interests, Fritz saw himself as an adept outsider whose 
job was to find a ‘win-win’ situation in which both the mine and the Ipili could benefit, 
even if this meant that he had to press management to make concessions which he 
thought were reasonable but which they did not. The agents were aware, perhaps more 
aware than Fritz, of the fundamental paradox of his position. He was essentially being 
paid to represent the mine’s interests while simultaneously advancing a personal agenda 
which sought to find a solution that might be suboptimal for his employer. He was to 
have a rocky ride during Yakatabari.
Landowners
Who personated the Ipili? In chapter five I will untangle the history of survey 
work and census which defined the system of ownership, agency, and representation 
within the Special Mining Lease. Here I will discuss very briefly the system of delegation 
that made possible the creation of the Landowner Negotiating Committee and its twenty 
three members.
Under the land act, individual Porgerans owned particular plots of land within the 
Special Mining Lease, and the mine treated with them on an individual basis within the 
guidelines laid out by the 1989 agreements regarding compensation. To take a common 
example from Porgera: a man’s garden is destroyed by a landslip which he believes to be 
caused by tremors from mine blasting. He visits the lands office at the community 
relations offices at Yokelama and files a complaint. The lands office then sends 
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geotechnical engineers to the site to confirm that the mine is liable for the landslip and 
consults detailed cadastral records to confirm the man is in fact the owner of the land. If 
he is and they are, the mine pays out compensation on a per-hectare rate derived from the 
costs of individual plants listed in the compensation agreement. Within the realm of these 
individual cases, then, individuals interact directly with the mine, just as they have done 
since the first prospecting leases were issued in the valley nearly a half century ago.
During the late 1980s it was widely agreed that there would have to be some sort 
of system of representation instituted in order for negotiations regarding the creation of 
the mine could occur. Government officials used a mechanism of agency described in the 
Land Act and each individual assigned an ‘agent’ to represent. This produced a pool of 
200 or so agents, a group composed essentially of the most prominent person from every 
extended household in the valley. This number was still too large, however, and so these 
agents delegated their agency to a set of twenty-three ‘agents of agents’ or ‘super agents’ 
–  one for each of the 23 ‘subclans’ of which the 7 Special Mining Lease landowning 
clans were composed. These people – often referred to as ‘the twenty three’ then signed 
the 1989 compensation and relocation agreements. These people then temporarily 
delegated their agency even further to just three men – Jolson Kuraro, Kurubu Ipara, and 
Jonathan Paraia – who then negotiated the Porgera Agreements. In all of these cases the 
idea was to provide a mechanism by which issues of community-wide import could be 
feasibly dealt with without  impinging on the rights of individual landowners. By the time 
of the Yakatabari negotiations, then, it was the twenty three members of the Landowner 
Negotiating Committee who provided legitimate consent to the mine and government. 
They were the people whose signatures (or thumb prints) were to appear on the 
Yakatabari agreement: ‘Chief’ Ambi Kipu, Nixon Mangape, John Kulina, Mark Ekepa, 
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and others who will be described in the pages that follow.
However the group of landowners involved in the Yakatabari negotiations were 
wider than simply the twenty three. A hazy penumbra of important and influential people 
– that fuzzy set which I’ve called Porgera’s ‘high society’ – surrounded the meetings, 
each of whom gathered the legitimacy necesasry to be present from a variety of sources. 
The most notable of these was the Porgera Landowner’s Association. The Porgera 
Landowner’s Association was formed in the late 1980s as the political arm of the Special 
Mining Lease Landowners and serve as a pressure group. The strength and legitimacy of 
the Porgera Landowner’s Association derived largely from its historic role in the late 
1980s when, under the direction of Jolson Kuraro and Jonathan Paraia, it pursued 
landowner claims in Port Moresby. Perhaps even more important was the fact that the 
Porgera Landowner Association had a generous annual budget funded by mine revenues 
which its officers could (and did) use in a number of ways. This resulted in one of the 
typical ironies of life in Porgera – the mine essentially funded out of its own profits the 
institution established to oppose it.
Finally, other factions of the local community were purposefully included in the 
meetings by the mine. Representatives from women’s groups frequently attended on the 
grounds that women were actually saddled with maintaining the houses that relocated 
landowners would receive. Including women also fit well with the mine’s emphasis on 
sustainable development and the general tenor of sentiment in corporate America at the 
time, when ‘empowering women’ seemed the thing to do. ‘Youth’ – people in their late 
teens and early twenties – were also included because they were the people most likely to 
experience the full impact of Yakatabari as they matured throughout the remainder of the 
mine’s life. The inclusion of different factions tended to split the landowner community 
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internally and thus weaken the ability of the twenty three’s support back in the village as 
well as challenge its legitimacy as the spokesman for all Ipili – a fact not lost on the 
mine. In sum, the negotiations involved both personators and impersonators of ‘the Ipili,’ 
and deciding who was which would become one of the major preoccupations of the 
action that followed.
The Government
The final player in the Yakatabari negotiations was ‘the government’ – an actor 
whose identity was also up for grabs. Papua New Guinea’s decentralized state produced 
two separate, and often conflicting, actors: The ‘National Government’ of the 
Independent State of Papua New Guinea and the Enga Provincial Government. The 
relationship between provincial and national government is complicated and ambiguous 
(for an overview see May and Regan 1997) but, as in many other things in Porgera, the 
relationship presented on paper does not capture the nature of governance as it played out 
in Yakatabari. In reality, the negotiations were marked by the primary importance of civil 
servants with personalistic and historically fraught ties to the mine, and not elected 
politicians.
In a thesis that studies representation in both its semiotic and political sense, it 
may surprise readers to find just how little role politicians and the political realm played 
in the Yakatabari negotiations. While figures such as Porgera’s member of Parliament, 
the Minister for Environment and Conservation, and the Governor of Enga Province each 
intruded occasionally into Yakatabari, they do so when their own on-going pursuit of 
power and resources in Papua New Guinea’s chronically underfunded and chaotic 
political scene required it of them. Frequent shifts in cabinets and even entire 
governments in Papua New Guinea meant that the ministry for mining was rarely held by 
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a single politician long enough for them to gain much expertise in the area, and more than 
one holder of that title treated it as a sinecure without obligations. Similarly, 
parliamentarians in Papua New Guinea are rarely reelected to a second term, and rarely 
have financial resources of their own. Thus they often use the funds and power elected 
office makes available to them in a desperate, five year sprint to secure some sort of 
permanent source of power. Finally, while a great deal of the Governor of Enga’s clout 
comes from his position as the executive of the province in which Porgera is located, 
local politics in Enga – whose mixture of subterfuge and brutality includes political 
tactics ranging from large-scale prestations of pigs to political assassination – means that 
the Governor is often busy securing his own position in the province to keep a hand in 
events up in Porgera (on provincial government in Enga see Derkley 1997, for the 
province and the mine see Jackson and Banks 2002:213-228). This situation, 
compounded by Porgera’s distance from the provincial capital and the fact that Ipili are 
not ethnically Engan, means that Port Moresby and Wabag often seem equally distant 
from Porgera.
Beneath the turbulent waters of Papua New Guinea’s political life, however, lies a 
more entrenched civil service. Since it is their job to implement policy – and much of 
what goes on in Porgera is nominally the stereotypic reproduction of a state of affairs 
described in the agreements of the late 1980s – they are the most frequent players in 
debates about Porgera.
While the Department of Environment and Conservation deals with specific 
aspects of the mine’s  presence (such as the quality of water flowing off of the mine’s 
lease and into the environment), the most prominent section of the national civil service 
that deals with Porgera is the Department of Mining. Like Placer Niugini, its own 
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institutional structure is relatively unelaborated. The Department is headed by a 
Secretary, a powerful senior civil servant who is in many senses the final word about 
what goes on in mining in Papua New Guinea. Beneath him are the heads of a series of 
departments, including the mining warden who adjudicates disputes between the lessors 
and lessees of mining leases and the vulcanological groups charged with monitoring 
Papua New Guinea’s very active volcanoes. Of particular interest to us is the mining 
coordination unit, run by the head of mining coordination, an expatriate Australian who 
answers to the secretary. Beneath him are coordinators for each mine, including the 
Porgera Mining Coordinator, an Australian named Harry Ulin (a pseudonym) a senior 
civil servant who lives in Port Moresby and who describes himself as a “one stop shop” 
for matters pertaining to Porgera. It is his job to liaise with the company and other 
branches of government on all things Porgera. Beneath him is the resident mining 
coordinator, who lives in Porgera and who has been seconded to the provincial 
government. It is this mining coordinator who works in the provincial government offices 
at the government station and who deals with Porgerans on a day to day basis. 
At the station itself, the ranking representative of the Enga Provincial Government 
the District Administrator, Kurubu Ipara. It is he who oversees the functioning of 
government – such as it is – at the local level. Beneath him are a pool of a dozen or so 
civil servants including several line officers who are still referred to as kiaps. Above him 
is the Provincial Administrator, the highest civil servant in the province, who oversees 
the province from Wabag. In addition to the district administration, Porgera is also home 
to the Porgera Development Authority, a semi-autonomous agency which is funded from 
royalties from the Porgera gold mine. It receives these funds directly and then uses them 
to carry out development projects in the Porgera valley on the theory that money sent 
93
directly to Porgera and used in Porgera is less likely to be ‘eaten’ then that sent to the 
provincial administration building in Wabag.
In order to understand the government’s role in Yakatabari, it is necessary to 
appreciate that the staying power of the civil service is not due merely to the fact that its 
institutional structure creates more stable tenure than the political system. For the fact 
that the people who mediate these institutions do so so effectively is largely a result of 
their own long personal involvement in Porgera. It is these personalistic ties, their own 
history of consociation, that makes them so effective. Their effective personation of big 
actors, to the extent that it is successful at all, rides on the back of this strength, rather 
than attempting to efface it.
Harry Ulin, the Porgera Mine Coordinator, is a perfect example of this 
phenomenon. A white Australian, He first came to Papua New Guinea in the early 1970s 
as an officer with the Australian administration. In 1974, he was put in charge of 
managing the newly created ‘area authorities’ of Southern Highlands Province – the 
embryonic organizations that would, at independence, become provincial governments. 
In 1977 he wrote the constitution for the province, and he stayed on as the interim 
provincial governor, provincial financial officer, and first assistant secretary until 
elections could be held in 1980, after which he served as the provincial deputy secretary.
In 1984, the government of Enga, the province next door to Southern Highlands, 
was suspended for gross financial mismanagement. As a result, Ulin was asked to step in 
as interim provincial administrator. He finished off the remaining two years of the 
electoral term, pulled the government back into shape, and resigned his commission in 
early 1986, calling for elections. He stayed on in Enga in various capacities, during which 
time he was an instrumental part of the provincial negotiating team that created the 
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Porgera Agreements. In February 1990, the former premier of the province Ulin had 
jailed in 1984 was released, and in May he was reelected to the position from which he 
had previously been removed. As you can imagine, he and the premier were not 
particularly pleased to be working with each other again, and so Ulin was made the first 
assistant secretary of the province’s Western Zone, which included Porgera.
Ulin thus served in this function for several years, and then, after stints as Porgera 
Mining Coordinator (resident in Porgera) and, later, head of the Porgera Development 
Authority, he was recalled to Wabag, where the provincial government had been 
suspended again. He returned as interim provincial administrator, a position that he left 
when he took up his current position in the Department of Mines.
The district administrator, Kurubu Ipara, had a similarly complex history in 
Porgera, and his biography gives an indication of how complex ethnicity and Porgeran 
identity can be. Kurubu was born in Tari (Southern Highlands Province) to ethnically 
Huli parents. His uncle Ipara was one of the young Huli boys taken out of Tari during 
World War II by Dan Leahy to serve as a translator (this history will be explained in 
greater detail in chapter three). After the war Ipara served as a translator, foreman, and 
general middle man for expatriate alluvial miners, and Kurubu was raised by him. He 
entered the first class to go through the first school in Porgera, and paid his school fees by 
working as a domestic servant – a literal tea boy – to the kiap at the time. Ironically that 
kiap was working in Porgera at a community relations officer during Yakatabari, but was 
not of a sufficiently august position that he could attend the meetings in which Kurubu, 
who now eclipsed him, played such a great role. After highschool Kurubu returned to 
Porgera, first as a kiap and later as an employee of the mine in the period prior to its 
construction. Most notably, he served as one of the three Ipili negotiators who undertook 
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the negotiations that resulted in the pioneering Porgera Agreements of the late 1980s. 
Thus by the time of his assent to the District Administratorship, he had represented the 
mine, the government, and landowners – sometimes simultaneously. At once an 
immigrant and one of the most important representatives of Ipili during one of the most 
crucial times in the valley’s history, Kurubu represents very clearly the personalistic 
nature of ties in the Porgera community and the way influential individuals served to 
represent a variety of institutions rather than merely one. 
The Structure of the Meetings in Theory and in Practice
In theory, the structure of the meetings for the Yakatabari negotiations was very 
straightforward. Once a month or so, the twenty three members of the Landowner 
Negotiating Committee would meet with mine representatives, typically Fritz. The mine 
representatives would make a series of proposals and hear feedback from landowners. 
After the meetings, they would return to their relocation communities, explain what had 
happened, and consult with their constituents. Community relations officers, in the mean 
time, would discuss landowner demands with the head of community affairs and the mine 
manager. Over time, a series of key issues would be identified, resolved, and noted. The 
result would be a a four or five page agreement based on the existing relocation 
agreement which would be signed by each member of the Landowner Negotiating 
Committee.
The actual conduct of the meetings was also straightforward in theory. 
Community relations liaisons would announce the date of a meeting throughout local 
communities. Meetings occurred  in a building called the ‘haus win’ -- a largish (roughly 
thirty feet across) round building with a dried grass (kunai) roof made out of timber with 
a wood floor with walls covered in their entirety with louvred glass windows.  In general, 
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community relations staff believed that the haus win was ‘like a native building’ and 
hence more comfortable for Ipili negotiators than a more formal conference room. At the 
far end of the room a small table was set up, behind which the chief mine negotiators and 
translators sat. Other mine representatives (if any) sat behind them, in chairs arranged 
against the walls. Chairs were arranged across the back of the rest of the room, where 
Ipili participants sat. Most of the time there were more participants than chairs, and many 
people (including myself) sat on the floor. As may be expected, more influential and 
powerful people sat in chairs while others sat on the floor. Occasionally, at least one 
member of the provincial administration was also present to witness the negotiations as 
well. The meetings themselves followed Robert’s Rules of Order (Robert 1915). A 
chairman (almost always the same one) was elected, minutes produced, and some system 
of managing who got the floor was also followed, although motions were almost never 
passed. These rules were taken seriously by everyone. Indeed, even in the secret 
landowner meetings at which I was the only non-Ipili present, the rules were followed. 
Afterwards a light lunch was served and landowner representatives were paid a small 
(less than K50) sitting fee. 
The haus win itself was in Suyan, the large compound at a remove from the mine 
where the main housing for mine employees was located. Like all areas in the mine, 
Suyan is surrounded by barbed wire fences, its gates are guarded, and a security pass is 
required to enter. After the riot of 1995 in which Porgerans stormed Suyan, overturned 
trucks, and caused considerable damage to the buildings, security at Suyan was 
reinforced. As a result, it was one of the more heavily fortified areas around the mine. 
The landowner elite drove their dark-glass Toyota Landrovers to Suyan and 
obtained day passes from the security guards there, who had been provided a list of 
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names of those allowed to enter. Most people, however, did not have cars. These people 
gathered at Yokelama, the compound in the special mining lease where the community 
relations offices were located, and which was open to the public. A mine bus would park 
there, and Ipili would get on board to be driven to Suyan, where a guard would get on 
board and check the passengers to make sure they were authorized. Community relations 
officers with officers in Yokelama would follow on in their own vehicles.
The Meetings in Practice
In practice, not all of the members of the landowner negotiating committee were 
present at all of the meetings, nor were only members of the landowner negotiating 
committee were present. On the contrary, The negotiations were the central place where 
power in Porgera was created and deployed, and where the future of the valley was 
directly shaped. As if this was not incentive enough to attend, people sought to attend in 
order to receive sitting fees. Finally, anyone who has watched the ferocity with which 
landowners throw themselves onto the light lunch table, stuffing finger sandwiches and 
chicken wings into their mouths while competing to  shove cans of soda pop into their 
pockets, shirtsleeves, and pants for further redistribution back in the village will realize 
that I am not exaggerating when I say that everyone in Porgera with aspirations to power, 
easy money, or a free lunch sought to attend the meetings.
As a result ambitious and curious people without permission to attend 
negotiations would attempt to worm their way into the personal entourage of powerful 
landowners, while less well-connected aspirants would attempt to inveigle their way onto 
the bus. As with most rules in Porgera, rules of attendance were flexible – mine 
negotiators didn’t want to upset current non-entities who might end up one day living on 
top of a bit of land that the mine might need. Additionally, it was often in the mine’s 
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interests to bend these rules. Often, for instance, the mine allowed representatives of the 
Porgera Womens’ Association to attend out of a general liberal sensibility that women 
ought to be included in the process. Powerful and sympathetic members of the high 
society were often included for their ability to mediate between the mine and the 
Landowner Negotiating Committee whether they were technically supposed to be there 
or not. Finally, there was always a small group of people who managed to charm their 
way into the meetings without a clear mandate to be their. Thus the very attendance of 
the meeting indicates one of the themes of the later chapters of the dissertation – the lack 
of concrete institutional organization amongst the Ipili.
In short, kicking people off the bus to Suyan was an inevitable preliminary phase 
of any meeting. Typically, it involved a fair amount of shouting and invective. But the 
strong sense of stakes that underlay attending these meetings can be seen in the fact that 
at one point in the negotiations for one lease, Ipili pushed past an ex-kiap community 
affairs officers with such force that they knocked him down, had to be pulled bodily from 
the bus, and caused such a scene outside that guards armed with shotguns and – even 
more terrifyingly – attack dogs, formed an uneasy perimeter around him and the bus to 
make sure things did not escalate to an all out riot of the unrepresented.
For instance, I was never on the list of people allowed into Suyan, although both 
the Ipili and the mine had cleared me to attend. At first, I was vouchsafed entry by 
government observers or mine negotiators who I would catch rides with. Later, when I 
was a fixture, I was simply accepted as one of the usual hangers-on. Despite my presence 
at practically all of these meetings, I was never listed in the minutes as one of those 
attending despite the fact that other anthropologists, such as Aletta Biersack, were. I was 
fortunate that the white mine employees who I knew well had more confidence in a 
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theory of the objective presence of the detached social-scientific observer than I did. I 
also learned years later that the mine entertained hopes that I would take a more active 
part in the negotiations as someone who could mediate between both locals and 
foreigners. For both of these reasons, as well as a more general commitment to 
‘transparency,’ the mine did not object to my presence.
My relationship with elite landowners over the course of my fieldwork developed 
in a way the was more or less the opposite of the relationship I developed with the less 
prominent Ipili with whom I lived. In the village, I was seen initially as a powerful 
outsider with whom people could create ties for business opportunities, arranged 
marriages to American women, immigration to Chicago, and so forth. As time went on 
and it became clear that I was essentially powerless, Ipili simply liked me enough to keep 
me around because I was not boring and Ipili hate being bored. My willingness to take 
people to the hospital, pay for treatment, and serve as translator also helped.
With the exception of Nixon Mangape (who was my adopted mother’s sister’s son 
and hence my brother) most elite landowners did not notice me initially until it slowly 
became clear over time that I was the only person in the valley who talked regularly to 
both landowners and mining representatives and was in fact recording everything that 
happened. Although I was of limited use to everyone due to my strict adherence to 
informant confidentiality, there was a sense throughout the negotiations that I was the 
kind of person it was good to take out to lunch and quiz on the state of politics in the 
valley. Even when I was unpopular with certain people, I relied on the typically Ipili 
sense of egalitarianism to be present at important events – if I was sufficiently committed 
to getting into the haus win in Suyan, it would take an uncomfortably committed attempt 
to dislodge me. Overall, though, it is a testament to each group’s surety of its own 
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essential rectitude that I was able to attend so many of these meetings – particularly the 
secret ones which I cannot document here. Both the mine and the Ipili believed that they 
had a story to tell in which they were the long-suffering partner of a dysfunctional and 
unfair institution, and they wanted that story circulated as wide as possible. It is 
indicative of the moral complexity of the negotiations that I was, with a good conscience, 
able to honestly tell both of them that I thought they were right.
The Course of the Negotiations
The negotiations for Yakatabari began in April 1999 and ended in September 
2000, a period of roughly eighteen months. Over the course of this time they slowly 
escalated both in terms of intensity and geographical spread. The initial period of 
negotiations were largely valley-bound: Ipili negotiators met with mine employees in an 
attempt to forge a new agreement. Soon a group of Ipili found a point of leverage which 
they used against the mine: during the final days before the deadline by which the 
agreement needed to be signed, they attempted to extract concessions from the mine in 
exchange for their permission to construct an urgently needed tunnel for waste water. The 
maneuvering on both sides brought this issue to the attention of people outside the valley 
and eventually  surfaced in the judicial system. The mine successfully opened the tunnel, 
and an Ipili faction then escalated the case to the national level, attempting to build 
alliances with politicians at the national level to put pressure on the mine. The resulting 
stand off continued until the proposed dump was no longer feasible and other issues 
forced themselves to the mine’s attention.
I will deal with each of these stages in turn, summarizing the activity as it 
happened. The Yakatabari negotiations involved many meetings, both with groups and 
individually, and many of them were secret. However for the sake of propriety and 
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brevity I will here cover here just the highlights of a few key points in the negotiation 
process in order to give some sense of the tenor of these negotiations. 
The First Phase: Negotiating with Community Affairs
The original offer for the Yakatabari waste dump was made on 17 April 1999 
with the formal reinstatement of Landowner Negotiating Committee meetings to discuss 
the potential terms of a Yakatabari offer. These meetings were held monthly between 
Fritz and the members of the Landowner Negotiating Committee. They ground to a halt 
when twenty of the twenty three members of the  Landowner Negotiating Committee 
deserted the negotiation process to take up the possibility of a lawsuit against the mine. 
This move was inspired by the successful settlement of a lawsuit against Ok Tedi brought 
by Papua New Guineans (Ballard and Banks 1997). Several members of the Landowner 
Negotiating Committee flew out to Australia and contacted Slater and Gordon, the same 
Australian firm which had litigated on behalf of the Ok Tedi landowners. By all accounts, 
Slater and Gordon refused to take the case and the landowners returned to Porgera empty-
handed.
By the time I arrived in December, the mine felt that the landowners’ strategy had 
backfired and that Slater and Gordon’s refusal to take the case worked in the mine’s favor 
by demonstrating to landowners the basic legitimacy of Placer’s approach. The head of 
Community Affairs told me in an early interview that he felt the Landowner Negotiating 
Committee’s failure would soon lead to a shake-up in how the mine interacted with 
landowners. He believed that the Landowner Negotiating Committee formed an elite who 
sought merely to increase their own wealth and power. Their ability to feed information 
selectively to the local community effectively allowed them to shape public opinion, and 
there was very little the mine could do about it since mine employees were not welcome 
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in Special Mining Lease communities. The effect, he claimed, was more or less similar to 
the old story of what happened in the trenches in World War I: the order “send 
reinforcements, we’re going to advance” becomes “send three and four pence, we’re 
going to a dance” as it passes down the line. He had, he said, held meetings with 
landowners until he was “blue in the face” but nothing got through -- “we’ve tried to 
explain it to them, but they don’t wish to know” he said. 
He also felt the failure of the Ok Tedi-inspired lawsuit and the different interests 
which various clans had in Yakatabari could conceivably cause a split in the leadership – 
he gave as an example growing distance between the Tiyini and the Tuanda – and that it 
was just a matter of time before the Landowner Negotiating Committee fell apart as a 
coherent decision making group. The question that he was faced with now was whether 
to work with them and encourage their unity as an organization, or whether to encourage 
new and more ‘legitimate’ (and, presumably, more ‘reasonable’) leadership to arise – to 
embrace, as it were, the devil he knew or the devil he didn’t.
Steps had already been taken to fragment the solidarity of the landowner 
community. Fritz and other members of Community Relations had been actively 
attempting to spread the mine’s message to local communities in a variety of ways – they 
had a newsletter in the offing, and had recently completed a video, shown on national 
television, which they were attempting to disseminate throughout the community. They 
were also interested in contacting youth (in order to avoid what Filer (1990) had called 
the ‘process of social disintegration’ wrought by generational change) and especially in 
reaching out to women. Fritz, for instance, had met several times with the Porgera 
Women’s Association and was planning the designs for the Yakatabari relocation houses 
with them rather than rich landowners on the assumption that they would be the ones 
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actually living in and maintaining them. This attempt to ‘reach out to and empower 
disadvantaged stakeholders’ also had the happy side-effect of eroding support for the elite 
landowners inside their local communities.
The serious splits within the Landowner Negotiating Committee was based on a 
different cause than the mine’s encouragement of special interest groups, however: if 
Yakatabari went through, some clans would be relocated and some would not. The 
Pulumaini, Mamai, and Angalaini would have the majority of their population in the 
Special Mining Lease moved, while the Tuanda and Waiwa would by and large remain. 
The powerful Tiyini would be split – some Tiyini subclans would be relocated while 
others would remain. Because each clan would be differentially affected by Yakatabari, 
their interests were fundamentally divergent. It was this divergent interest, rather than the 
mine’s attempt to reach out to ‘the uncorrupted grassroots’ that would prove to be truly 
crucial to the course of negotiations.
The politics of this partial relocation are not, perhaps, what the reader might 
expect – being moved off of one’s ancestral territory and having one’s home covered by 
waste rock was perceived as a benefit, not a hardship. Partially this was because the 
people left behind would be faced with living in a village increasingly surrounded by 
waste dumps. More generally, however, Ipili saw relocation as a chance to acquire the 
millennial affluence they missed out on in 1988. Landowners sought to be relocated 
because they were hoping, indeed, demanding, that this time they would get what they 
wanted out of relocation. Thus it was that the groups which were being uprooted favored 
the agreement, and those who were not felt that they were getting the short end of the 
stick. As strange as it may  seem to some readers, much of the negotiations would involve 
landowners attempting to convince the mine to destroy their houses and bury their land in 
104
waste rock, while the mine sought to minimize disruption to landowner communities. An 
example of how these dynamics played out at the beginning stages of the negotiation can 
be found in the Landowner Negotiating Committee meeting held on 23 November 1999.
23 November Meeting
On 23 November 1999 the Land Owner Negotiating Committee met for the 
twelfth time, and the first since the Australian law suit had fallen apart. Forty-six people 
attended, including a representative from the government. It began shortly after 10 am 
and continued for roughly two hours. This was the first meeting I attended during my 
fieldwork. As the first meeting after the attempted legal action by the landowners it was 
particularly important – a fact indicated by the mine manager’s presence.
The meeting began with a long speech by the mine manager in which he outlined 
the ‘big picture’ of what was going on with Yakatabari: it would lower the mine’s 
operating costs and extend mine life, and the relocation would offer the opportunity to 
solve problems with land shortage and in-migration that the Landowner Negotiating 
Committee had been complaining about for years. However, he added, there were two 
constraints. The first was logistical – in order to continue in its current plan, the mine 
would have to buy a new truck every three months, and each truck cost the equivalent of 
seventy relocation houses. This meant that the longer negotiations took, the less money 
would be available for compensation. Additionally, if the negotiations dragged on too 
long, the mine would be forced to invest so much in trucks that it would no longer make 
sense to continue with Yakatabari at all. 
The second thing he added was to point out that “if you are asking us outrageous 
things, that is also no use, because if we have no profits it doesn’t make sense for us to do 
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it. There must be gain for you and gain for the company or else it won’t happen.” He 
concluded by pointing out that a longer mine life was in everyone’s interest. Thus we can 
see that the mine manager was not coy about the mine’s intentions – it was a self-
interested business designed to make money, and it operated on the assumption that if 
landowners profited as well then they would allow the mine to go ahead. This 
fundamental belief that what was good for the mine was also good for the valley was a 
standard feature not just of corporate culture inside the mine, but of the larger world of 
business of which the mine was a part. This corporate culture also ruled out the use of 
force or other devious means to make the Ipili comply with the mine’s requests. The mine 
manager considered Placer to be a respectable company, and the alternative to a win-win 
situation was that the mine would close rather than force itself on the landowners.
Fritz then ran briefly over how the relocations would work, including the order in 
which residents would be moved – Pulumaini first, then Mamai and Angalaini. The 
central issue of the negotiations was then broached: the Tiyini at Yarik and its sister-
settlement Timorope would not be moved, although the Tiyini at Yunarilama would be. 
As a result, several of the most important landowners present would not receive new 
houses. However, Fritz was quick to soft peddle this fact, “what we’re saying, we’re not 
closing off forever talks on this issue... we’re not saying ‘piss off’... we’re saying ‘let’s 
talk more about this’.” 
He also emphasized that this relocation would be more generous than the previous 
one. In the case of young couple who were just starting a household -- “I don’t mean 
sleeping around, people - marrit tru [really married], paid their brideprice.” -- it might be 
possible to establish a trust fund to buy them materials to build their own house when 
they were ready. Thus he emphasized that benefits from the mine (a house) would be 
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given out based on distinctly indigenous criteria (legitimate marriage by brideprice). This 
was the first mention of what would be a recurrent theme in Porgera: the way the mine 
relied on customary Ipili criteria to give Porgerans non-customary benefits.
And finally there was the house itself. Fritz said he had taken women over to the 
government station, and that they liked the L40 house – a standard design for civil 
servants. It would be high-set, have solar hot water, and a 1000 gallon water tank with an 
underground pipe feed to tanks on the roof which would feed the house directly. The total 
cost would be K70,000. As murmurs at the figure spread about the room (the final offer 
made by the mine to the Ipili was, very roughly, worth roughly US$80,000,000 – this was 
not a minor negotiation), Fritz said that he mentioned the cost because some people had 
expressed interest in taking the cash and using it to buy a house in Port Moresby, or put it 
to other use. This was something that the mine would entertain. He ended with a plea for 
real dialog and honest representation of community interests. “I think that’s the basic 
story. I think we’ve had a solid earful from the mine manager, some straight talk. We 
acknowledge there is [sic] some difficulties for some of the clans, and we acknowledge 
we don’t have the solutions. If its possible for you to really truly talk to your people and 
come back with... not some racist [anti-white and anti-mine] talk, but some real 
information which I can relay to the mine manager,” then, he concluded, they could work 
together.
Before the meeting broke off for lunch ‘Chief’ Ambi, the elderly agent for the 
Tuanda (who would not be moved) and formerly one of the most important people in the 
valley, asked ominously whether the Yakatabari dump was part of the original mine plan. 
The mine manager equivocated, saying that “It is part of the development of the mine. 
The agreements are part of the development of the mine. And this is still happening.” 
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Next Nixon Mangape spoke in Ipili. As the agent for  the Uape subclan of Tiyini, Nixon 
was one of those who would see their clan-mates moved while they stayed behind. More 
importantly, he was scion of Mangape, one of the most powerful men in the valley before 
his decapitation-execution at the hands of his clanmates in the 1970s. Finally, he was the 
chair of the board of directors of the Porgera Development Authority and hence one of 
the most important people in the valley. He had come in to the meeting late and had 
missed two-thirds of it. Nevertheless, he rose and spoke in Ipili, which was translated by 
Jonathan Paraia, as “Nixon is saying on behalf of the landowners we are hearing your 
plan and your ideas. We want to take it back to our clansmen. We’ll bring [the] 
landowners response and go through the agenda [the issues] one by one”. Nixon added in 
mixed Tok Pisin and English “finalisim [we’ll finalize it in] in two, three weeks and sign 
agreement.” With that the meetings ended on an up note.
These meetings demonstrate several important features that came to mark both 
sides of the debate over the course of the remaining period of the negotiations. The first 
issue was house size. There are a small number of house designs in Papua New Guinea, 
and most of them are built off of a set of standardized plans – typically in accordance 
with the requirements of civil servants, whose housing is provided by the government and 
who receive larger and larger houses as their seniority increases. These houses are 
referred to by a design name which incorporates the total area of the house in square 
meters. Like many Papua New Guineans, Ipili are familiar with these house designs 
based largely on their experience with houses on the government station in Porgera and 
the relocation houses they received in the late 1980s -- which were universally 
condemned as inadequate. Thus Ipili wanted a larger house, and knew of several 
preexisting plans that could be used to build them.
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This meeting also demonstrated an Ipili tactic that would be used throughout 
negotiations – the constant and repeated assurance that they were just around the corner 
from an agreement. This idea that there were only a few minor points to be worked out 
would be used again and again to lull the mine and others into a false sense of security, 
use up time, and then force negotiators to make last-minute concessions. Finally it 
demonstrated to all the landowners present that the mine and the mine manager spoke in 
a language of self-interest that they could understand. His motives and the motives of the 
mine, then, were clear to them. As someone who represented the mine’s self-interest and 
who has no prior experience living in Papua New Guinea, the landowners considered him 
to personate ‘the mine’ in an unproblematic way. As we shall see, this proved not to be 
true for members of the community relations staff.
9 December Meeting
The next meeting would introduce more of the main dynamics of the negotiations. 
As we shall see, Ipili representatives were plagued by the disjuncture between what they 
wanted from the mine and the officially acceptable reasons they had to publicly give for 
why they ought to get it. I am sure that prominent members of landowner negotiating 
committee would have liked nothing more than a large house in an urban area – Paiyam 
or even Port Moresby – supplemented with a generous monthly pension which the mine 
would pay them in perpetuity. As we shall see in future chapters, this jives rather deeply 
with the culturally specific expectations of affluence that Ipili have. However the 
justifications for these sorts of concessions that negotiators gave were based on a 
discourse about the nature of Ipili society that had been in place for over a decade. This 
discourse of Ipili primitivity – that clans ought to be moved together, that land is the life 
of the people, that subsistence agriculture was an essential part of Ipili life and so forth – 
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and the ends to which landowners used it would grow increasingly distant as the 
negotiations continued.
Second, the affair with Slater and Gordon also established another split within the 
landowners and the crystallization of a new faction who would assert themselves with 
increasing aggressiveness in future negotiations despite their failure in Australia. This 
group – which was often (erroneously) called simply ‘the Tiyini’ by the mine, but which I 
will refer to as the Porgera Landowner Association (Porgera Landowner Association) 
faction – was composed of a core of four people. Mark Ekepa was the president of the 
Porgera Landowner Association and a member of the Landowner Negotiating Committee 
as a signatory for the Angalaini. He was also the son of the most prominent Angalaini 
leader of the past generation, and his rise to fame began after he took his father’s place by 
shooting him at close range with a shotgun and killing him in a drunken fight – a fact 
which he sincerely regrets today (he has since become a teetotaler). Anga Aralu, the 
secretary of the Porgera Landowner Association, was a young man with ties to the Tiyini 
subclan of Uape (and thus Nixon Mangape) and who was educated – on a mine 
scholarship – as a surveyor at the University of Papua New Guinea and was thus 
considered one of the more educated people in the valley. The brothers Benjamin and 
John Kulina were both Tiyini as well, and John was the agent for the Lakima subclan of 
the Tiyini and hence one of the twenty three who had signed the Porgera Agreements. 
Benjamin was also educated and could read and write English. This group, then, 
represented the younger, educated generation of prominent Porgerans. Their affiliation 
with the Tiyini gave them a firm grounding in local kinship relations, and the Porgera 
Landowner Association’s budget gave them money to pursue their ends, largely by hiring 
lawyers.
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At this meeting the main mine negotiators were Fritz and an ex-Kiap named Burt. 
The meeting began with Fritz’s urging that there be “no posturing.” Ekale Kangalia – the 
Tiyini agent for the Akira subclan -- then informed Fritz that the landowners had their 
own house plan to present as an alternative to the L40. Siapu Yako – an man aspiring to 
prominence who had joined forces with Ekale on the basis of an enatic connection to 
Tiyini Akira -- presented a worn and dirty blueprint for an H90 house which was more 
than twice the size of the L40 and, at K180,000, much more expensive to build. After 
some more talk Nixon took the floor making a speech in which he complained that he and 
other landowners had no other land on which to move – no extended clan ties. Fritz 
replied that his concern was not finding land (that could be managed) but finding land for 
Nixon (or, more accurately, his eight wives) which was suitable for the subsistence 
agriculture to which Fritz assumed Nixon sought to return – was that the problem Nixon 
was referring to? Nixon was nonplussed, since in fact this statement was intended to 
indicate that he wanted to be settled in an urban area such as Paiyam where there would 
be no subsistence agriculture at all. His point was that if he had no claims to traditional 
land in other areas (which was not true, by the way) then they would be forced to give 
him a real, ‘developed’ home in town rather than force him to settle once more in the 
boondocks. Faced with Gerlad’s statement, he finally stated baldly that he wanted the 
mine purchase land that he himself had selected. 
Still talking past him, Fritz agreed, saying that it was just this sort of feedback that 
he wanted, and that landowners should come to Charles’s (another community relations 
officer) office and let him know their preference since the last time Charles attempted to 
enter Yarik had been stoned. “Ol i ting ting yu wokim old style house [they attacked him 
because thought you were planning to build us the old style house],” said Nixon 
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reassuringly. Fritz glanced meaningfully at me for a moment, then Nixon, and then noted 
sourly “They didn’t ask questions, did they?” Unable to get his point through to Fritz 
obliquely, Nixon finally stated explicitly that he wanted a house at Paiyam, which Fritz 
agreed with as long as the land was legally acquired.
Ambi took the floor next, asking whether all landowners would be moved, or only 
those affected by the dump – a particularly relevant question for him since he was a 
landowner but not affected. Fritz replied “I made that clear in the beginning. We will 
move affected people first. The door is not closed. The door is open. The affected areas 
are Yakatabari and the areas below it.” When this was translated Ambi made a short, 
extremely angry speech complaining of the hardships of living in the Special Mining 
Lease, particularly in Apalaka, which would essentially be surrounded on three sides by 
waste dumps if the plan went through. Fritz replied again “I can’t give you much hope. In 
reply, the mine manager hasn’t closed the door. The mine in the agreements [of 1988] 
does claim to sympathetically look... it’s not a promise. We’re keeping the door open.”
This was the first mention of the 1988 Relocation Agreement’s ‘sympathetic 
examination’ clause which stated that “The PJV agrees to examine sympathetically and 
where appropriate make special provision for any Re-located Landowner whose situation 
is affected in a special or unusual manner” (Placer Dome 1988:6). This clause would 
come to loom large in what was to follow – mostly due to arguments about what 
constituted ‘special’ or ‘unusual’ whose contours were similar to those regarding the 
‘novelty’ of Yakatabari. Ambi, aware of how little leverage this actually gave him, 
responded with loud, angry tirade whose content was obvious but which was 
diplomatically translated by the Jonathan Paraia who said, sighing, “he’s saying his 
people are really affected.”
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Ambi continued shouting, only to be shouted down by Benjamin Kulina (the 
secretary of the Porgera Landowners Association) and Pakiru Pundi (a prominent Tiyini 
agent) who told him to shut up. Benjamin also insisted that Ambi’s outburst not be 
recorded in the minutes. He then delivered a very long and increasingly heated speech in 
tok pisin. He said that Fritz’s goal was to get the agreement for the company, and that he 
didn’t care about what happened to Porgerans, while Ipili negotiators were merely 
worried about their future. When the mine was closed, Fritz would disappear, but they 
would still be there and stuck with the consequences. He then compared Fritz to a 
bulldozer which destroys everything in its path without even noticing it was there, and 
accused him of trying to trick the older, less sophisticated members of the Landowner 
Negotiating Committee. He then gave the example of homeless people visible in the large 
town of Mt. Hagen who run around naked in public and have to dig in trash cans for food 
when they are hungry. “You,” concluded Benjamin, breaking into English, “want to do 
the same thing to us.”
He then presented his demands. “We must have proper planning. Government 
services, road, power supply. Schools [both elementary and highschool]. Power – it has 
to be free. If you want a power bill, put us on the payroll [give us free monthly 
paychecks] and we’ll pay. This is an example of all the bits and pieces that must be in 
place.” He also insisted that if any of ‘the Tiyini’  were moved, all Tiyini must be moved 
(as everyone in the room well knew, this was the only way that Benjamin would get a 
house out of the deal, since he did not live in affected area). This was because “Pasin blo 
PNG, clan ties – noken brekim [in Papua New Guinea clan ties cannot be broken]” He 
insisted that he must have this “in black and white... ‘door is open’ em sampela tok blo 
yu, em tainim kamap bullshit [this ‘door is open’ talk of yours is bullshit that won’t 
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happen].” He insisted (disingenuously, in my opinion) that “Majority of PNG, agricutlure 
is laif blong mipela. Yupela noken bugurupim laif-graun, graun blong mi [agriculture is 
our lives. You can’t damage the land that we live off of, our land]”. He concluded by 
telling Fritz “yu olsem snek lo bush, em no save [you are like a snake in the bush, you 
don’t] go from point a to point b, you beat around the bush!” 
There were murmurs of assent and discussion in Ipili about this and several 
people, including Ambi, went outside to smoke and eye the catered lunch that awaited 
him. Benjamin attempted to talk again, but was interrupted by Ekale who told Fritz that 
he (as one of the people who would be moved) wanted all Tiyini moved. At this point 
Benjamin got the floor again and began a new line of attack. He said “Yesterday I was at 
a meeting [the Fly-in-Fly-out management committee] with the Porgera Mining 
Coordinator, Harry Ulin. During this meeting I heard that you are preparing a tunnel to 
drain water from the mine, and that you have already started drilling. You’ve hired 
twenty-seven experts to work the tunnel from the open cut and then out two kilometers 
and that you’ve already started drilling. Who gave you permission to do that?”
This touched a nerve and Burt jumped out of his chair exclaiming “mi laik 
interuptim [I want to interrupt] – these are separate issues!” Benjamin continued to talk, 
and Fritz began saying very very forcefully indeed, “mi no bihainim dispela toktok, mi no 
raitim lo minutes. Mi finisim tok. Yu laik brukim meetin now. Yu tok win i no istap lo 
paper [I won’t listen to this, and I’m not writing it in the minutes. I’ve said what I 
wanted. You want to disrupt this meeting. Your rumors will not be written down].” As he 
did so, Benjamin was yelling at him to shut up and sit down: “pasim maut sindaun! Pasim 
maut sindaun! Pasim maut sindaun! Pasim maut sindaun! Pasim maut sindaun! Pasim 
maut sindaun! Pasim maut sindaun! [shut up and sit down].” Fritz recovered and noted 
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calmly that he already was sitting and that he wasn’t going to be derailed. Burt had blown 
his top, however, and stalked angrily out the door and Fritz had no choice but to get up 
and follow him. As they passed Benjamin, he turned to face them and screamed at them 
as they left “You are a thief! It is illegal for you to make that tunnel! I heard rumors of it 
yesterday. Jonathan Paraia can confirm it. If you do make it, where will your outlet be? It 
you put an outlet in, you are looking for trouble my friend!” At this all hell broke loose in 
the room, with people arguing amongst themselves (some had wanted the mine 
negotiators to stay so that they could meet with them). The meeting then dissolved in 
confusion.
A few minutes later, Fritz, Burt, and another ex-kiap named Lawrence emerged 
from the mess and made for their car. I joined them and did a quick after-action on the 
meeting. Fritz remarked, incredibly “I think we made good progress, we had a very 
reasonable chat with Pakiru and Nixon.” I wasn’t sure whether he was trying to put a 
good face on it for my sake or truly deluded – Benjamin’s ability to control the mine 
negotiators emotionally would demoralize them in future meetings, and give the 
landowners excellent ammunition in the future, when they could argue that it was mine 
employees, rather than them, who had stonewalled and left the meetings. Before he drove 
off, Fritz confided to me that Benjamin was clever, and that he (Fritz) could take an awful 
lot, but that when a planned insult like that happened, he simply had to leave.
Benjamin’s final speech vividly exemplifies one of the dynamics at work at 
Yakatabari that I mentioned earlier: the way that personal and institutional agendas 
collided in the negotiations, and particularly the fact that the people who mediated the 
larger entities in question had personal histories which affected their ability to negotiate. 
Given the people involved and what was said, this meant that at some basic level the 
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Yakatabari negotiations were a referendum on the agreements of the late 1980s on a 
personal as well as an institutional level. At the same time, Fritz defended those 
agreements – and by implication, his role in creating them. But the interaction of personal 
histories and institutional forces stretched deeper than just Porgera – what was at issue in 
Yakatabari was Papua New Guinea’s colonial history and the worth of the mine 
negotiators as men.
People such as Burt and Fritz had served in Australia’s administration of Papua 
New Guinea back when it was the Trust Territory of New Guinea. They had devoted their 
lives to helping Papua New Guineans and felt a deep commitment to the country. Papua 
New Guinea’s transition to independence – which they considered to be premature – and 
the anti-white feelings it generated made them feel that their own dedication and 
commitment to the country went unappreciated. Papua New Guinea’s fiscal and 
governmental breakdown in the late 1980s and 1990s gave them a certain grim 
satisfaction because it demonstrate that while Papua New Guineans may not have 
appreciated their work, it increasingly seemed it was needed. As far as they were 
concerned, they were better at governing Papua New Guinea than most of its own 
citizens. Taking careers as community relations officers was the best they could do, given 
the state of corruption in Papua New Guinea’s government, to continue to help local 
people as they were accustomed to.
For people such as Burt and Fritz, then, Ipili landowners such as Benjamin Kulina 
were particularly despicable. Not only was Benjamin ungrateful for their careers in 
service to his country, he did not understand that their current job was still essentially 
benevolent paternalism in the corporate mode – they considered themselves advocates for 
local people’s needs and wishes inside the mine. Perhaps most distressing to them was 
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Benjamin’s ignorance. In their eyes, despite his veneer of education, he was still little 
more than a rural Papua New Guinean with delusions of competence whose excursions 
into legal and economic policy were so ignorant that he would require extensive 
education just to understand their criticisms of his outrageous demands. 
As might be expected, the view of the Porgera Landowners Association faction 
was equally complimentary. Their own experience of Papua New Guinea’s colonial 
history did not feature them as helpless, grateful citizens on whom Fritz and Burt sought 
to bestow their aid. Gold had been discovered in Porgera in the first exploratory patrol 
into the area in 1938, and Ipili people had experienced a steady increase in wealth and 
income over the course of their experience with whites. Ipili’s slow education in the 
value of gold in the outside world had led them to believe that colonial officers such as 
Burt and Fritz has systematically mislead them regarding its worth. These kiaps, then, 
were liars and deceivers who had stretched out Papua New Guinea’s long status as a 
dependency in order to continue to extract value from local people who were 
intentionally kept ignorant of their land’s value. These old men, as Anga told me once, 
ought to be disagreed with in principle – by definition their offers were always 
untrustworthy and contesting them was, as it were, an act of postcolonial resistance.
As far as the Porgera Landowners Association faction was concerned, their 
negotiation with the company was part of an agonistic process in which two groups with 
competing interests each attempted to maximize their own profits. The negotiations were, 
in other words, business, not some the reincarnation of the paternalistic development 
practices of the colonial period. They distrusted community affairs officers who 
considered their job to be an intermediary between local people and the mine when in 
fact the mine was paying them to act in its own best interests. They worried that senior 
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management did not trust their own negotiators and were not being frank with them about 
the financial situation. They thus much preferred to deal with the mine manager, who at 
least was straightforward about the mine’s interest in Porgera. In sum, the Porgera 
Landowner Association faction considered their long colonial tutorial to be over – they 
considered themselves educated, experienced, and familiar with how important decisions 
about large-scale entities such as provinces and gold mines were made. That the mine 
would force them to meet with these aging, washed-up colonial officers could only be 
considered a deliberate insult designed by senior management to infuriate them. 
The Yunarilama Drainage Tunnel and the Deadline for the Agreement
The other major issue that came up in this meeting was the drainage tunnel at 
Yunitilama (or, as the mine came to refer to it, ‘Yunarilama’). As negotiations over issues 
such as house size continued, another issue quickly arose which the Porgera Landowner 
Association faction was quick to exploit at the 9 December meeting. The mine had 
encountered an engineering problem – the open cut was now deep enough that it was a 
pit, and it required drainage in order for work to continue. The mine thus wanted to build 
a drainage tunnel from the base of the open cut that would run underneath landowner 
areas, and empty out into the Kaiyia river. As usual, this engineering issue was 
accompanied by complex social dimensions. First, time was of the essence – the mine 
needed this tunnel very badly. Without drainage, work could not progress. The alternate 
plan – to install pumps to drain the pit – would be so expensive that it would shorten 
mine life considerably. 
The second problem was that while the mine could build the tunnel unobserved 
and with relative impunity, the land on which the portal was located was part of the area 
for which John Kulina was the agent. While John’s legal right to prevent the tunnel was 
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ambiguous, he certainly had de facto control of the territory. Unless the mine was willing 
to risk a violent confrontation with local landowners, then John could keep the tunnel 
from being opened. The landowners could thus use the tunnel as a point of leverage in 
negotiation – they would not allow the tunnel to be built until they were granted 
concessions in return. 
Third, the situation was complicated by the fact that the drainage tunnel opened 
just upstream of place where the events of the Tiyini origin story involving the python 
Kupiane occurred. One ambitious Tiyini landowner (Siapu Yako, who had also produced 
the alternate house design given at the November meeting) who had even gone so far as 
to build a model of the house that features in the Kupiane myth (see chapter four) – a sort 
of shrine – on the site. Given its mythocosmically relevant location, landowners found 
the idea that the tunnel was merely for waste water to be a completely ludicrous and 
pathetic lie. It was obviously, as far as they were concerned, a mine trick to extract not 
just gold, but high-quality diamonds – the thing which Ipili understood to be more 
valuable than gold -- from the mountain without paying landowners for the privilege. On 
this account, the tunnel was part of the mine’s on-going attempt to track and capture 
Kupiane, and the presence of the tunnel secured in their mind the equivalence between 
sacred locations and precious mineral wealth. 
The Letter
On 20 December, eleven days after the meeting at which Burt stormed out of the 
room, the most prominent members of the Tiyini clan wrote a letter to the mine manager 
entitled “Principal Landowner Demands on Timorope/Yunalima Proposed Tunnel and 
Yakatabari Dump by PJV.” The letter, signed by nine people from four of the Tiyini 
sublcans, listed four pages of demands that would have to be met if ‘the Tiyini’ were to 
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approve of the dump. In poor English, the laser-printed document suggested that other 
issues -- such as the relocation of affected people, could be put aside indefinitely if their 
demands were met. Sent privately to the mine manager and not intended for public 
distribution, there was a strong possibility that the letter was intended to cut a deal that 
would essentially cut off other Special Mining Lease land owners from receiving any 
benefits from Yakatabari whatsoever. The split that the head of community affairs had 
predicted had come – but it was the ‘unreasonable’ people who were attempting to align 
themselves to the mine (for the right price) rather than the other way around.
The demands of letter were, to put it mildly, extravagant. They included 
K16,000,000 as a ‘community facilities grant’ to Tiyini subclans, ‘Bonus Compensation’ 
of an additional K500,000 to the subclans, K10,000,000 for compensation for the tunnel, 
K2,500,000 for “Kupiane’s Sacred Side [sic] Compensation... for causing destruction and 
inconvenience to Kupiane’s house in mountain Wuangima as a result of the underground 
tunnel” (compensation for this site had already been paid nearly a decade earlier) as well 
as “alluvial, terrace gold and environment compensation.” Most spectacular, however, 
was the demand for “PJV to agree to produce one gold bar each at twenty (25 Kilogram) 
[sic] for the following principal landowners of the gold rich mountain every quarter of 
each year until the mine life ends” a list of individual names followed. 
Within the mine, it was widely assumed that the letter was written out of a keen, if 
uninformed, sense of avarice and it served to reinforce the mine’s sense that landowners 
were deeply misguided as to their own competency. This may be true, but it is also 
important to point out how the letter reflects an entrenched misunderstanding between the 
two parties. For over a decade, mine and government employees had used simplifying 
metaphors to explain abstract concepts such as equity and dividends. When explaining 
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equity, for instance, it was common for government officers and mine translators to use 
the metaphor of gold bars – rather than tediously explain the concept of percentages – 
and explain that the mine produced seven gold bars every quarter and that each of the 
partners received one. I believe this explanation had been taken literally by the authors of 
the letter, who were already convinced that the PJV was ripping them off by selling the 
gold on the ‘world market’. To this extent, then, the letter is merely an attempt to cut out 
the middleman and get gold directly into the hands of the land owners.
The Deadline Approaches
The mine had originally intended to have the Yakatabari agreements signed by the 
first of February, and as the deadline approached the timing of meetings increased – 
negotiations were held once a week rather than once a month, and there were also a series 
of private meetings with those members of the Landowner Negotiating Committee who 
still refused to sign. However, it was not until a meeting in 9 January that the mine gave a 
draft of the agreement to the landowners. The late date at which they received it 
infuriated several landowners, including members of the Porgera Landowner Association 
faction. They felt that now, a month before the deadline, they had finally received the 
first serious offer from the mine on paper. They were insulted that the mine considered 
them unsophisticated enough that Fritz could simply tell them what would be in a 
document, and then produce it later and expect them to sign it without reading it or 
receiving legal advice regarding its content from their own counsel. The document was 
identical in wording to the 1988 Relocation Agreement, with the amounts of money 
increased and a few clauses added to reflect changes in house size – the mine had made a 
counter-offer to the H90 proposed by the landowners and suggested instead an H75 that 
might be built. However, what was not attached was an annex described in the agreement 
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itself listing who would be moved. Landowners, in other words, were being asked to sign 
a document which did not contain information on the issue of most concern to them – 
who exactly would be relocated.
The mine – or at least Fritz – had presented this document at such a late date for 
several reasons. First, the mine feared giving landowners written documents because they 
could used to in legal proceedings against the PJV. Also, the mine had a long history of 
having Ipili produce forgeries or altered paperwork they had received from the PJV. 
Thus, for instance, it was the mine’s practice not to give receipts to individuals when 
compensation was paid to them for fear that they would be misused by local people in 
litigation against the mine. That this incredible double standard shocked landowners is 
not surprising – one can hardly the mine treating other members of the joint venture that 
ran the mine so lightly, nor does it seem unreasonable that people signing a legal contract 
be given early drafts of it in order to seek legal advice.
Secondly, the Porgera Landowner Association faction was correct in assuming 
that Fritz felt it would be easier and less confusing for them if he discussed what they 
wanted orally – except that Fritz understood this to be a kindness rather than insult, since 
he did not think of them as being as sophisticated and cosmopolitan as he was. It is worth 
noting also that this had been his modus operandi in Papua New Guinea during its time as 
a dependency, and that this was how he felt comfortable working. An informal meeting 
where trust and understanding were generated was, he felt, better than a legalistic and 
antagonistic exchange of proposals and counterproposals. This emphasis on trust and 
informality also was a reason that there was no annex attached to the agreement – Fritz 
felt that everyone knew very well who would be moved and who would not, and the 
fieldwork necessary to draw up a complete list of names would be enormous. It was, in 
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his mind, a matter of implementation that could be done in good faith after the 
construction of Yakatabari got under way. Landowners, on the other hand, felt that they 
were equals negotiating with the mine, and that if the mine was expecting them to give up 
their homes and lands, then it should also be willing to present them with a thorough and 
professionally done proposal stating exactly what its intent would be.
As the month progressed and issues of house size and relocation grew 
increasingly intractable, the Yakatbari negotiations began slowly spilling out of the valley 
and into more cosmopolitan arenas of contestation. The late date of the offer simply 
aggravated the existing situation. Both the PJV and landowners appealed to the 
Department of Mining to tell their interlocutor to be reasonable. The result was the first 
of many exchanges in which the state of the Yakatabari negotiations began to be affected 
by action not just in Porgera, but in Port Moresby as well.
20 January Meeting
The week after the mine’s offer was made, Harry Ulin, the Porgera Mining 
Coordinator for the Department of Mines flew into Porgera from Port Moresby to meet 
with the landowners. As mentioned above, he had worked with most of the Ipili 
negotiators for a number of years and had their trust as a patient and essentially truthful 
man. The Department had heard that the Yakatabari negotiations were on the rocks, and 
so he came up in order to both assess for himself who was responsible for that situation, 
as well as do what he could to straighten it out. The mine hoped that his history and 
experience with the landowners would give him their ear.
Harry opened the 20 January meeting with a long speech explaining the issues as 
he saw them. He explained that the PJV had submitted a detailed plan, the ‘Porgera 
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Vision Plan’ which outlined Yakatabari and that the Department had found it acceptable. 
He said that it was vitally important that the mine continue operations, and urged those 
present to sign.
In response the Ipili, particularly the Porgera Landowner Association faction, 
made several arguments. First, they argued that they had submitted a letter to the 
Department of Mines expressing their dissatisfaction with the PJV and had not yet heard 
back. Second, they insisted that they had not seen the Porgera Vision Plan for themselves 
and wanted an account of what the mine was going to do before they would sign. Third, 
they were disgusted when the coordinator told them that mine employees had assured 
him they were very close to an agreement – Ipili pointed out, rightly, that they had just 
received the paper copy of the agreement the week before, and were not happy with it. 
They neglected to point out, however, that they had spent the last couple of months 
telling the mine that an agreement ‘was right around the corner.’ Finally, Benjamin 
Kulina and Anga Aralu, among others, pointed out repeatedly that they were not the same 
people who had signed the agreement in 1988 – they were more experienced. Thus they 
insisted on negotiating an agreement that was not literally cut and pasted from the 1988 
agreement and receiving proper paper copies of reports. Finally, they insisted to the 
coordinator that he and the negotiators for the mine were from the old Kiap times, and 
that his speech was essentially an attempt to scare (praitim, in Tok Pisin) and intimidate 
the Ipili into compliance, and that there was no way that they were going to do that. 
After more discussion, the meeting closed with some goodwill between the mine 
and landowners restored, but no substantive movement in their positions had occurred. 
Like it or not, Yakatabari was now officially on the government’s radar.
The Deadline Comes and Goes
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As the deadline grew closer and closer, the mine’s options began to run out. On 2 
February in a meeting with the community relations officer named Lawrence, he told me 
that the mine was not willing to budge on Yakatabari, but that it did have contracts that it 
needed to sub-contract out, and that it was willing to offer them to Nixon Mangape and 
John Kulina. In other word, some job inside the mine would be done more or less as it 
had before, but ownership of the equipment doing it would be transferred to them, and 
they would receive monthly paycheck as contractors. I suggested, very discretely, that if 
someone didn’t understand that properly, they might mistake it for bribery. “Properly 
called, it is bribery,” replied Lawrence with a certain frankness that I am sure his 
employer wished he did not always exercise. I suggested that Nixon and John would not 
take the offer on general principles because what was at stake in Yakatabari was a desire 
to profit – there was no doubt of that – but also a moral and principled stand (misled or 
not) against the mine and a desire to strike a blow for Ipili people in general. Lawrence 
disagreed. Did he think there was any normative element in the negotiations are all? Did 
he really think the landowners were totally self-interested. Yes, he replied. Altruism and 
thought of others “was lacking in Ipili culture,” as proof of which he adduced the fact that 
Ipili had no word for ‘thank you’.
It turns out that I was correct. The landowners did not take the bait and on 9 
February the mine manager released a public letter to the Porgera Landowner Association 
faction categorically rejecting the demands made in their letter of 20 December. 
Community relations officers at Yokelama also began handing out copies of the mine 
manager’s response along with the original letter to select members of the community 
(such as myself) in an attempt to discredit the faction by publicizing their attempt to cut a 
deal. The next day, 10 February, the mine manager attended a special Landowner 
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Negotiating Committee meeting whose only agenda item was to convince Ipili to sign. 
This important meeting ultimately failed to reach agreement and the mine, which had 
hoped to walk out with a signed agreement, was disappointed. As a result, the mine now 
officially had a full-on crisis on its hands, even as the construction of the drainage tunnel 
continued to loom large as a more immediate threat. 
The original deadline for the Yakatabari agreement had now passed, and the 
situation began to become increasingly critical. The mine was now at the point at which it 
had to begin investing in additional trucks to build its fleet capacity to accommodate a 
Yakatabariless future. While the window of opportunity was still open, it began closing 
now and space for negotiation became increasingly narrow.
The District Administrator’s Letter
With the situation in Porgera coming more and more to the attention of people in 
Port Moresby and the official deadline for signing a document past, the District 
Administrator, Kurubu Ipara, began intervening in affairs. On February 16, he wrote a 
three page letter to the mining warden (responsible for adjudicating disputes between 
landowners and the mining companies) and send copies to the provincial administrator, 
the mine manager, the chairman of the Landowner Negotiating Committee, and the 
secretary of the Departments of Mining and Mineral Resources. The letter thus became 
the most official, on-the-record  statement of the situation in Porgera yet to come from 
the civil service. Its true power, of course, came not from the title at the top of the 
letterhead, but the signature on the bottom line – Kurubu had been one of the key players 
in the creation of the mine, and he was well respected by all involved. Having previously 
stayed neutral in the discussion, he now threw his hat into the ring in a move which both 
escalated the stakes while simultaneously providing the possibility that a crisis might be 
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averted through his intervention. Broadly sympathetic to the Porgera Landowner 
Association faction, his intervention worked on their behalf – in fact, his letter was the 
most articulate and reasoned criticism of the mine to date.
Ironically enough, the district administrator began the letter by justifying his 
intervention in the debate with reference to a clause in the land act which designated the 
district administrator “to be the protector of landowners and their rights in any dealings 
with the owners in relation to their customary land” -- the paternalistic clauses which had 
previously been used by white colonial officers who decided that they knew better than 
landowners and which so incensed the Porgera Landowner Association faction. He then 
moved on to use the mine’s own documentation against it. He quoted at length from the 
mine’s 1996 Social Monitoring report by Bonnel and Banks which found that “Special 
Mining Lease communities face a severe crisis in land” and that “a relocation of these 
communities will be essential at some time over the current mine life of 13 years 
regardless of whether or not further reserves are found.”
“The findings of these consultants are obvious,” Kurubu wrote. 
There existed in 1993 a strong justification for the relocation of all landowners 
living within the Special Mining Lease, especially in Apalaka, Yarik, and Kulapi 
villages... The fundamental need to sustain human life in the highlands and the 
Porgeran region is land. A shortage of gardening land impacts on basic human 
rights, and therefor there arose a situation where the PJV needed to make special 
provisions for those landowners affected by the land shortage.
In his view, then, the Special Mining Lease was in such a state in 1996 that the 
PJV was bound by the original “sympathetic examination” clause of the 1988 relocation 
agreement to move people. “However,” he continued, 
no action was taken to resolve the situation and now (5-7 years later) the PJV 
proposes more land (between 127 and 183 hectares) including more gardening 
land is required for the Yakatabari waste dump... since it will not be possible for 
the landowners to carry on their subsistence life within the Special Mining Lease 
due to the shortage of land, they must now be resettled outside of the Special 
Mining Lease area.
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While bolstering landowner claims that they ought to be moved under the old 
agreement, the letter’s particular genius lay in the reasoning it used to argue that all  
Tiyini should be moved. He argued that the mine was planing to relocate only people 
with primary residences within the Yakatabari dump area despite the fact that other 
people might have “primary gardening land” in the affected area but houses outside of it. 
Since subsistence (and not residence) was key criteria for relocoation, he argued that 
many members of the Tieni [sic] tribe, who have their residences in Yarik and 
Timorope  villages  would  not  qualify  for  relocation  as  their  residential  land 
would  be  located  just  outside  of  the  perimeter  of  the  Yakatabari  dump. 
However, the fact that most Tieni [sic] people have their primary gardening land 
in the Yakatabari and Yunarilama areas has been ignored. It is our view that the 
criteria should be expanded to include those people whose primary gardening 
land would be required for the further development of the mine.
In effect, the District Administrator provided the Porgera Landowner Association 
faction with just the logical argumentation to justify their relocation that they needed in 
an eloquent, official form.
February 21 and 22 were marked by two days of long, intense meetings between 
the main players in the negotiations. They were held in the boardroom of the main 
administration building – the nicest and most official space the mine possessed. They 
were meant to be the final, definitive signing event after the previous planned signing had 
gone awry. While central to the mine’s timetable, the meetings were hamstrung by the 
fact that Henry (the head of community affairs) and the mine manager were on leave, and 
their replacements had to step in at a critical time. The meeting on 21 February lasted 
four and a half hours, but the agreement was not signed.
The Mine Goes Door to Door
By 1 March the negotiations had ground to a halt. Mine negotiators had tried for 
five days to arrange some sort of group meeting for yet another attempted signing, but it 
was not going to happen. As a result they switched tactics and began asking individual 
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agents to come to community affairs headquarters in Yokelama and sign the agreement 
privately. While foregoing the group imprimatur of the Landowner Negotiating 
Committee, the mine hoped to get at least the majority of committee to sign and planned 
on calling that an agreement. I had been told by the head of community affairs that they 
had consulted their lawyers and been told that a majority signing would probably stand 
up in court. 
It might stand up in the valley as well, provided that the consensus thus formed in 
private could then be used in public to force the non-signers to capitulate. But in pursuing 
this course of action, the mine lost the imprimatur of a full and public Landowner 
Negotiating Committee signing, once of the few stable sources of legitimacy in the 
valley. The agreement might be signed, but it would not be well signed. The mine was 
entering unknown semiotic territory, gambling that a novel form of concession from 
someone who was not clearly ‘the Ipili’ would be worth the risk, especially if the 
alternative was loosing Yakatabari. Additionally, this strategy was dangerous because it 
appeared to outsiders not as a consensual, private signing but intimidation – community 
relations officers were driving into relocation communities, collecting agents, and then 
driving them back to Yokelama and pressuring them to sign behind closed doors. As it 
turned out, Ipili living in the Special Mining Lease believed that this was exactly what 
was happening, and I eventually came to the same conclusion.
On 1 March Lawrence, the community relations officer in charge of local affairs 
in Porgera, told me that the word ‘Yakatabari’ was misleading, since the document 
landowners were signing was meant to apply to all future activity inside all of the Special 
Mining Lease. Thus the people who signed it would be entitled to increased levels of 
compensation and a larger house if they were relocated in the future for any reason, while 
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the people who did not would be stuck with the terms of the 1989 agreement. I was 
surprised to hear this because, while it made breaking ranks with the Landowner 
Negotiating Committee much more appealing to Ipili, this understanding of the 
agreement has never been mentioned or discussed at any meeting I attended or had heard 
about. The mine, it seemed, was sweeting the pot for collaborators.
That evening in Apalaka, where I lived, I saw the agent for my adopted clan, the 
Waiwa. He brandished his still-blackened index finger and told me that he had signed. He 
began chewing out a friend accompanying me (who lived in Yarik and hence was ‘Tiyini’ 
despite being related to Tuanda, married to Waiwa, and agnatically Angalaini) and 
insisted that he simply wanted to get rich and that my friend should not be surprised or 
give him grief over it. This theme was repeated with vehemence by one of the more 
prominent Apalakans, and a crowd of about twenty people gathered and began 
excoriating my friend in particular and the Tiyini more generally. The general sense of 
the crowd was that their compensation money was being held up by the Tiyini, who were 
being needlessly difficult. This was undoubtedly mistaken. Not only did many of the 
Tiyini agents support the agreement at this point, even if the agreement passed the 
Tuanda would not be moved. Nonetheless, the mood in the village was that their benefits 
were on the way, and were being ‘blocked’ by a corrupt elite of Tiyini landowners.
On 15 March I went to visit Fritz in his office in Yokelama. By this point he had 
grown increasingly distanced from events in Porgera, and several of our recent meeting 
had focused mainly on his part time in the valley. Visibly moved, he told me now that he 
was out of the loop on negotiations, and that the company was more or less done with 
him. His time would now be best spent, he decided, assuming that the deal would go 
through, and doing land work identifying new house sites for relocated landowners. This 
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work, non-confrontational, designed to help and work with rural and largely uneducated 
Papua New Guineans, was reminiscent of his original time as an agricultural extension 
officer in the 1970s. It was familiar and comforting to him. Fritz had reverted to type.
The Tunnel Surfaces, Literally
Throughout late January and February, the mine’s focus had been of getting 
Yakatabari signed. As those negotiations ground to a halt, the Yunarilama tunnel once 
again became the most important item on the valley’s technical and political agenda. 
Throughout this period the mine had been drilling the drainage tunnel, and now all that 
remained to be done was to open the portal on the other end, an act that became 
increasingly important as the mine entered a stage where it could not operate at all 
without drainage. 
As mentioned above, while engineering the portal was not overly complicated, 
creating the social circumstances for it was. The portal area was on land that was owned 
by the Lakima subclan of the Tiyini – the group for which John Kulina was the signatory, 
and he was clearly not interested in allowing the PJV access to the land until they agreed 
to relocate him. At the same time, the portal area was on John’s personal land, and so he 
did not have individual control over it.
The person who did was an elderly man named Busane who had lived there for 
decades and was the patriarch of an extended family that lived on the banks of the Kaiyia 
river just upstream from where Siapu has built his shrine to the python Kupiane. Busane 
was not himself Lakima, or even Ipili – he was born in Tari and was ethnically Huli. Like 
Kurubu’s father, he had arrived in Porgera in the early 1950s along with white alluvial 
miners and had worked as a foreman overseeing local Porgeran workers. While not as 
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ambitious as some of the foreman who had gone on to dominate valley life, he had carved 
out a comfortable niche for himself, married into the Tiyini clan, and had settled near the 
site of his former alluvial workings. Thus his proximity to the portal entrance was not 
mere chance – it reflected a five decade history of gold mining in Porgera. The same flat 
land that provided Busane access to the Kaiyia in the 1950s proved to be the best spot for 
for the mine to open the tunnel at the start of the new millennium. 
The mine argued that technically the portal tunnel was a work inside the Special 
Mining Lease that was envisioned by the Mining Development Contract. Hence it 
claimed it did not need John’s approval, or even Busane’s. If this was the case – and it 
seemed to be correct to me if the tunnel was included in the submissions that 
accompanied the Mining Development Contract in the late 1980s -- then all the mine had 
to do was pay Busane compensation for his land and relocate him in accordance with the 
existing Compensation and Relocation Agreements. Busane’s position was somewhere 
between John’s and the mine’s. He certainly did not feel that John had a right to tell him 
what to do on his land, particularly if that involved John stopping him from receiving 
large amounts of money and a free house. At the same time, Busane was keenly aware 
that the mine’s desperate need for the tunnel gave him enormous leverage – any attempt 
on their part to pay merely the legal amount of compensation would drive him into the 
arms of the Porgera Landowner Association faction and create an alliance that the mine 
could never hope to overcome.
After a period of very intense and very private negotiation with the Busane 
family, the mine agreed to relocate him under the terms of the as-yet-unsigned Yakatabari 
agreement. As a result Busane received a generous compensation package and a large 
house and was detached from a potential alliance with the Kulinas. The mine, of course, 
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painted this as a precedent for a future Yakatabari agreement and a demonstration that 
authentic, grass-roots landowners found the agreement acceptable even if the corrupt elite 
of the Porgera Landowner Association did not. And, as they would be the first to point 
out, this generous donation to a local landowner above and beyond the legally required 
minimum demonstrated Placer Dome’s sense of social responsibility and stewardship by 
working with local peoples to find solutions to their problems that would produce long-
term sustainability. With the actual occupant of the portal area out of the way, the mine 
now turned its attention to the Kulinas.
24 March Meeting with the Secretary
Throughout the month of March, the Porgera Landowner Association faction had 
been in Moresby, and John Kulina had come to the office of the Department of Mines 
several times with a mixture of demands and requests. Thus the logistical necessity of a 
tunnel and Porgera Landowner Association attempts to contact powers in Port Moresby 
had essentially escalated the conflict yet again. As a result the Secretary for the 
Department of Mines, the highest civil servant with responsibility for mining, flew into 
Porgera for the morning to meet with both the mine and landowners.
The secretary arrived on 24 March in the early morning and proceeded to the 
administration building on the mine site to meet with senior management. News of his 
presence had spread amongst members of Porgera’s elite and aspiring elite, and so the 
crowd that finally gathered to meet him in the haus win at Suyan for his 10 am meeting 
with the landowners numbered about forty people. As it turned out, the Secretary’s 
meeting at the mine site ran over, and it was not until 12:05 that a car pulled up that 
disgorged the Secretary, one of the mining engineers from his office, Kurubu, Harry Ulin 
(the Porgera Mining Coordinator, also up from the coast), a variety of community 
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relations officers, and the mine manager.
Lawrence began by giving his apologies in tok pisin and explaining that the group 
had come to meet in order to “pinisim dispela toktok blo yakitibari [finish this talk about 
Yakitibari].” He then asked that they appoint a chairman so that the meeting could begin. 
Because Kule, the habitual chair, was not there Anga was elected chair, although as it 
turned out this meant merely that he sat at the table and made no further interventions 
into the meeting.
After the usual lengthy greeting to everyone and every notable person present, 
Lawrence turned the discussion over to Sir Kuma Aua, a small coastal man of obvious 
refinement. He spoke mainly in Tok Pisin for the benefit of the landowners, with 
occasional interjections in English – indeed, like many highly-educated Papuans, he 
seemed more familiar with English than Tok Pisin.. His words were then translated by 
Jonathan Paraia into Ipili. “The company is important and must go ahead as soon as 
possible,” he said. “Lo taim kampani wokim dispela project, ol i tok we [when the 
company undertook this project, they agreed that if] anyone is affected or impacted, they 
must be provided for. We believe kampani wokim planti tok tok waintaim Ipli [the 
company has consulted the Ipili extensively], for nine mun [months]. Problem now is 
sampela no sinim [some people have not signed]. We want to know exactly what the 
problem is. We’ve had a number of your people visit us this week. We believe about ten 
have signed out of twenty three. From the delegation i bin kam lo Moresby, mipela bin 
autim two problems. Namba wan em haus design kampani wokim, ol i tok haus i liklik 
beacuase yupela gat bikpela family, na blo facilitatim family ol i mas expandim haus [the 
delegation from Moresby talked about two issues. First is the company’s design for the 
house. They said it was small given the large size of your families, and wanted the size of 
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the house expanded]. Can the company do this?”
After this was translated he continued. “Second main problem ol i autim em i 
gaden land [the second problem was gardening land]. Taim ol i wokim [when they will 
create the] tunnel, their ground will be taken away. So can the company find land? Land 
em olsem tradestore blo mipela [the land is your trade store]. Your lives are connected to 
the land. So can the company find more land? Lain i kam tok lo mi, sapos graun i long 
we [the group who saw me asked whether, if the replacement land was far away], can the 
house be built there? That’s one concern we are facing” He concluded by noting that 
“purpose blo kam lo hi [my purpose in coming here] is to find out is this the only 
problem that’s keeping you from signing? Can we not find a way? Do the three people 
who came to see me share your views?”
As we shall see in future chapters, the elite in Port Moresby have conceptions of 
landowners and the nature of life in rural Papua New Guinea that are not often applicable 
to rural areas such as Porgera. The secretary’s speech indicated a familiarity with the 
situation in Porgera as well as a few points that he missed. The most telling point here 
was his use of the concept of the tradestore to clarify the nature of relations to land in 
Papua New Guinea. At one level the metaphor was simple: just as profits from 
entrepreneurial retail provided cash which provides one’s livelihood, so to was 
subsistence agriculture a means of perpetuating one’s family and one’s way of life. In 
fact, Ipili often used this analogy themselves, but in reverse – they used the familiar 
realm of subsistence economics to shed light on the purpose and nature of tradestores. 
Thus for Ipili it was not ‘tradestore as garden’ but ‘garden as tradestore.’
This may seem like quibbling, but it indicates how the Secretary’s own view of 
rural Papua New Guineans was an urban one, one in which he felt he could tell the Ipili 
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“your lives are connected to the land.” No doubt this was reinforced by visits from the 
Porgera Landowner Association faction who emphasized the importance of the land that 
they were loosing. What the secretary – and perhaps Fritz as well – did not recognize was 
that the Porgera Landowner Association faction and the Landowner Negotiating 
Committee did not consider their lives tied to the land. They emphasized the loss of 
gardening ground not because they wanted an equivalent garden to relocate to, but 
because they sought to use it as a bargaining chip to gain benefits – chief among them 
land in urban areas such as the township at Paiam or even Port Moresby itself. In sum, 
the secretary saw people concerned to recreate a rural lifestyle after relocation, while the 
Ipili themselves were attempting to use the fact of their status as victims of the mine in 
order to escape it.
Nixon took the floor next in a speech that grew increasingly heated as it 
progressed. He began by reminding the meeting that the landowners had worked with 
stakeholders in the mine for a decade. However he then invited the Secretary to an aerial 
tour of the mining lease with him so that he could take a look at the communities living 
inside the Special Mining Lease. “Mipela stap lo banis” said Nixon, “o mi nap tok, lo bel 
blo pik [we are fenced in, I could even say that we are in the belly of a pig]!” He went on 
to state, heatedly, that the lives of people in the Special Mining Lease had been 
overwhelmingly affected by mining, and that “mi no wanbel liklik lo yupela aprovim 
dispela mining plan [we are a little unhappy that you might approve this mine plan].” As 
his temper grew more and more out of control, he castigated the secretary for failing to 
protect Ipili citizens from the mine and claimed that in fact thirteen people had not signed 
the Yakatabari agreement. 
The Ipili, he reiterated, simply wanted to be relocated – all of them, off the mining 
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lease, and after that the mine to do anything it wanted without interference. However, the 
mine wanted to move only four groups, and refused to be reasonable and negotiate. 
“They are here today and gone tomorrow!” shouted Nixon, but Ipili who stayed in the 
Special Mining Lease would continue to face the consequences of the mine’s work. He 
was also unrepentant about the tunnel: “We’ll get lawyers or legal advice. You are 
supposed to advise us, but you stap lo [stay in] Waigani and Konedobu [in government 
centers distant from rural Papua New Guineans].” He ended by raising a ‘second 
question’ (although there was no explicit first question mentioned): “So second question: 
what is the government’s plan lo muvim ol manmeri baggarup lo en? Yu lukim plan blo 
kampani [to move the people who are affecterd? You’ve seen the company’s plan], so 
where is the plan?” 
The secretary began by responding: “Dispela design kampani salim i kam [the 
tunnel], em minor alteration. Em includim lo MDC. It’s already in the approval. That’s 
why it’s considered to be a minor alteration. The second point in the plan, they’ve talked 
about this [Yakatibari] with you for nine months.”
At this point Nixon attempted to interrupt the secretary, who managed to hold his 
ground and said: “Let me addim wanpela point. Depatment i no approvim Yakatabari 
dump as yet. It’s separate. That’s why we want to focus on the tunnel, because it’s 
important to the company.”
In this exchange Nixon is purposefully conflating the waste dump and the tunnel. 
He is arguing – although he was perhaps not always this articulate about it – that the 
simplest thing to do (which also happened to be in his own best interest) was to relocate 
everyone from the Special Mining Lease. It would remove obstacles to the tunnel and 
future development, and also be more humane since people were being affected by 
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mining activity. The Secretary was attempting to separate these two issues. He insisted 
that the government was not lax in its duties to Porgerans. Because the tunnel qualified as 
a minor alteration, discussions regarding compensation should be between the 
landowners and the PJV and, failing that, be taken to the mining warden for adjudication. 
Unfortunately his emphasis on the tunnel merely made him look as if he was siding with 
the company rather than the Ipili. This may in fact have been his intention, for the 
landowners he encountered in Porgera were loud (as coastal Papua New Guineans 
imagined highlanders to be) and rude – they appeared, in other words, to fit the profile of 
the ‘corrupt landowner’ that the secretary had heard so much about. Finally, being 
shouted at for minutes on end is not a pleasant experience, particularly when you are an 
important person to whom this does not normally happen. No wonder he was loosing 
patience with them.
Nixon replied testily: “Pinis? [are you finished yet?] Second question yu no 
answerim yet. Yu givim green light lo drainage tunnel and Yakatabari. Plan lo yupel lo 
affected pipol em wanem [what is your plan for the affected pipol]?”
“The nine months the company talked with you is the requirement,” said the 
Secretary, “If it [Yakatibari] requires relocation, it must be agreed in the talks you are 
having.”
At this point Nixon stood up and moved to the center of the room.
“Mr. Secretary, thank you. Em no olsem Ok Tedi, Misima, Lihir, Tokuluma. Em 
no stap lo big thick jungle. Taim i laik mine, ol i laik rousim olgeta i go outside Special 
Mining Lease [This isn’t Ok Tedi, Misima, Lihir, or Tokuluma. Porgera isn’t in the 
middle of a big thick jungle. When they want to mine, they move everyone outside of the 
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Special Mining Lease]. They don’t mine in the same place people are living because life 
is important,” at this point Nixon’s temper began to bubble over again. “You think the 
safety of the people is safe?! Em lo dispela as mispela sendim delegation lo yu [this is the 
reason we sent that delegation to you]. Em international company! They are here today 
and gone tomorrow, we are baggarup! What is your plan? Yu no tok tok. Mi no satisfy 
[you have not spoken and I am not satisfied].”
The secretary remained calm and reiterated: “the purpose of me coming here is to 
listen to whether what the company says is satisfactory. Position blo mi is to see if the 
company has fulfilled its agreement [i.e. it’s requirement to consult with landowners]. It’s 
supposed to negotiate with you. That, we believe, is what the company is doing.”
At this point Nixon attempted to speak again but was drowned out by four or five 
other people who wanted to say something. Eventually John Kulina got the floor and 
asked: “Yu tok tunnel i stap lo original plan. Ating yu mas sowim [you say the tunnel is 
in the original plan. You must show us where].”
At this point the secretary deferred to the engineer he had brought down from Port 
Moresby, who confirmed that the plans in the MDC allowed for two eventualities. The 
first was a tunnel to drain water from the open pit. The second was a series of pumps. He 
indicated that other mines, such as Ok Tedi, used drainage tunnels, and that this 
constituted a minor change. Nixon now began another tirade which grew and force and 
intensity until he was livid in the face.
“Yu tok mine life bai go siot, kost lo usim pump i antap, who wokim decision na 
wokim license. Tasol you no wokin study o investigatim mine i baggarap life blo as 
ples.Yu no gat plan blo helpim mipela. Gavman yu laik kissim tax, PJV laik wokim 
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profit, na yu laik mipela i baggarap [you talk about a shortened mine life, the cost of 
using pumps, and who makes decisions and who issues leases. But you haven’t done a 
study of how the mine has destroyed the lives of local peoples. You have no plan to help 
us. The government wants taxes, the PJV wants profits, and you want us to suffer]!”
At this point the mine manager attempted to reply but Nixon was on a roll. “We 
don’t have a bloody report for past nine months. Without knowing what is happening in 
the mine, we can’t sign.” He went on to claim that in first world countries there were no 
tunnels and that the secretary cared more for taxes from the mine then the life of people 
in the Special Mining Lease. “You don’t know what they are doing. They are foreigners. 
They work twenty four hours [i.e. The mine is unnatural and mechanistic]. Then want 
quick money!!” At this the mine manager actually got to his feet and attempted to 
intervene but Nixon was still going strong, shouting now. “What they are doing, Mr. 
Secretary, is going door to door getting people to sign! It’s illegal! This is an independent 
country. The government must witness!”
Finally the mine manager was able to speak up and attempted to calm down the 
tone that the meeting was taking:
“In the first place, we are getting carried away. There were at least two sessions 
when the engineers were here to explain what we would do. We bought you a proposal. 
Do we want to talk about that or not? We wanted to make money for the mine and the 
landowners. I’m sorry if that was misunderstood. If it was misunderstood then a lot of 
people have been wasting their time here. If we are now saying there is no plan [by which 
both landowners and the company will profit], there is only profit for the company, then 
we can’t talk anymore [i.e. If it is true that landowners believe the mine exists only for 
it’s own profit and not to also profit landowners, then the fundamental understanding that 
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this mine was built on is gone]. If we want to talk about the tunnel, then we can talk 
about opening the portal to the tunnel. If not, we can forget about the dump altogether, 
because without that portal we will be even more earlier out of business.”
As a result of this Nixon began speaking heatedly in Ipili while several other 
people – notably John Kulina – also attempted to get the floor.
“Let me say something first -- “ said the secretary clearly exasperated as John 
attempted to speak first. “Yu [Jon] tok tok tumas [you talk too much]. We have to leave 
at two o’clock. You sent a delegation down and talked about two problems. We need to 
focus. We’re going off-topic. I want to focus on those two. I’ve been corrected. There are 
sixteen signatories out of the twenty three. So maybe seven of you are not happy about 
houses and gardens. That’s what I want to talk about. So John, if you have something to 
say, please make sure it’s to do with gardens or houses.”
John now began what was to be his long speech in the meeting, starting with a 
sullen denunciation of the secretary’s memory. “Nem blo mi em John Kulina. Mi bin 
lukim yu lo Moresby na givim planti tok tok. Mi ting yu misunderstandim mi tok tok blo 
mi, or lusim ting ting. Mi no givim dispela tupela tok tok. Gavman, yu mas wokim nupela 
negotiations. Mipela no negotiate, ol explainim plan. Agriment ol i givim nau tasol, na 
mipela bin bekim. Agrimen mipela givem lo en, house plan mipela givim lo en. Mipela 
ting ting lo future generations na ol yangpela tu. Yu mas tok ok, na tokim PJV negotiate 
gen... [My name is John Kulina. I am the one who saw you in Port Moresby. I think you 
misunderstood me there, or have forgotten what I said. I didn’t talk to you about houses 
and gardens. The government must mandate new negotiations. We haven’t been 
negotiating – they’ve just been explaining their plan. They’ve only just now given us a 
draft agreement, and we’ve responded. We’ve given them a draft agreement and a house 
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plan. We are thinking of our future generations and the youth. You must agree with us 
and tell the PJV to renegotiate with us].” At this point Nixon begins speaking loudly in 
Ipili, telling John what to say. “Please, please,” the Secretary urged Nixon, “allow other 
people to talk.”
John now attempted to continue to exert pressure on the mine while claiming to 
be conciliatory. He indicated that he was the person who controlled the land on which the 
portal was located. He insisted that he would not be moved without a new negotiation – 
although he did agree that people who had signed Yakatabari could be relocated in order 
to make way for the mine. He thus presented himself as someone who did not want to 
stop the dump or impinge on the rights of other Ipili to sign, and was willing to have a 
very civilized and well-mannered negotiation – although in fact by refusing to give his de 
facto permission to build the tunnel (his de jure rights being almost entirely lacking) he 
was in fact being the most stubborn delegate present.
The secretary then attempted to hear from some of the landowners present but 
John attempted to interrupt again.
“We’ve given you a chance, so please...” began the secretary.
“Sapos i no laik negotiate gen, yumi sanap lo cot box [if you don’t want to 
negotiate again, we will see you in court]!” replied John in a stern, angry tone
“You -- “ said the secretary, attempting to signal someone else to speak.
“Why now yu no laik bekim tok blo mi [why haven’t you responded to what I’ve 
said]?” responded John.
The secretary broke down and replied heatedly, but still under control, “Mi harim 
tok tok blo yu [I’ve heard what you said]. After these discussions [in Moresby], we 
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discussed three points: Gardens, housing, and the contract. You agreed the agreement 
needed fine-tuning, so what you said now [about me misunderstanding you or forgetting 
what you said] is not correct.”
This was remarkably effective at shutting John up, since in fact these were the 
arguments he made in Moresby – even if they were not what he was really after – and the 
secretary had inadvertently pulled off the typical Ipili rhetorical tactic of publicly 
revealing information from a private meeting in order to call someone’s bluff. After this 
the secretary finally managed to allow a less august figure to ask a question. The result 
was a relatively minor figure asking a question about whether he would be relocated 
because his traditional land was currently inhabited by the chopper pad. There was a beat 
as everyone realized that the man’s question was a complete non sequitur and that he 
understood very little of the framework in which all of these claims were being made. 
Finally the secretary asked Reuben Nalepe to speak.
As the foremost, youngest, and most Christian member of the Pulumaini clan, 
Reuben represented the most legitimate and heartfelt opposition to ‘old, corrupt 
landowners’ from the clan most closely aligned with the mine. As the most Christian 
‘youth’ from the most crowded and polluted community, he represented to the mine 
exactly the sort of ‘uncorrupted’ younger generation of leader that they had been 
dreaming of encountering. Regardless of his personal qualities, it was clear to me that 
Reuben got along well with the mine because their interests were identical, a fact which 
the mine tended to gloss as ‘uncorrupt’ since, they reasoned, what was good for the mine 
was good for the valley. In the past Nixon and other has managed to intimidate him into 
submission in these public meetings, but now he stood up to them and finally had his day 
in court.
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After a long introduction in which he thanked practically everyone in the room for 
attending, Reuben said “Mi laik toktok lo dispela tupela point. Nambawan em haus, 
namba tu em gaden. Dispela agriment campani no pusim mipela lo signim dispela 
agriment [I would like to speak on these two points. The first is the house and the second 
is gardens. The company hasn’t forced us to sign this agreement].”
At this point Nixon scornfully introjected “hust witness blo yu [where are your 
witnesses]?”
“Allow him to talk!” demanded the Secretary.
Reuben proceeded to tell the secretary that the Porgera Landowner Association 
faction did not represent his interests, but only their own. “Lo haus, mipela agri lo H75 na 
tok yes na signim dispela. Em namba an. Nambwa two, we mipela bin signim, campani 
save, gavman save. Kogai dump affectim Pulumaini Ambo. Em tasol. Mipela kissim 
bagarap...  Ol landowner no tok tok lo pipol. Ol i tok tok lo bel blo en, ol i no tok tok lo 
pipol... [we have agreed to the H75 house and signed this agreement. That’s the first 
thing. Second, the company and the government know knows that we signed. The Kogao 
dump is affecting Pulumaini Ambo. That’s all. We are being affected... the landowners 
do not speak on behalf of the people. They speak on behalf of their own bellys, not on 
behalf of the people...].”
At this point John Kulina attempted to interrupt him. 
“Allow him to talk,” said the Secretary.
Rebuen continued, addressing the Porgera Landowner Association faction now: 
“Mi signim dispela agriment. Yu tok tok bel blo yu, yu go lo cot sapos yu laik kisim 
double stori haus. Mi signim lo eye blo district administrator na Papa Blo Graun. Lo 
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pinisim tok tok, sapos yu laik cot, ok. Insait lo four mun, start relocation. Mipela dai. 
Wanem hap mipela laik wokim gaden, kampani bai bihanim. Em tok tok lo mi lo 
Pulumaini Ambo. Mi no stap aninit wanpela man o ol Tiyin line – Travelodge kamap 
olsem haus man blo ol. [I signed this agreement. You speak on your behalf – if you want 
a two story house go ahead and sue them. I’ve signed in front of the district administrator 
and the land owners. In conclusion, if you want to sue, ok. But within four months, our 
relocation must start. We are dying. The company will buy land where we want to plant 
gardens. This is toalk of the Pulumaini Ambo. I don’t answer to the Tiyini or anyone else 
– the Travelodge [the finest hotel in Papua New Guinea] has become their men’s house].”
After Reuben finished speaking the Secretary attempted to hear from Peakope, 
another Pulumaini agent, but the overwhelming scramble to respond to Reuben became 
overwhelming. He continued over their objections, as Nixon yelled “You have to give a 
chance to the bloody owner of the mountain!” This was his way of expressing the fact 
that the Tiyini owned the land where the gold itself was located and hence were more 
important than the Pulumaini. This sort of opposition was especially poignant because 
Nixon himself, although shouting down a Pulumaini representative, was himself 
enatically related to the Pulumaini and grew up in a Pulumaini community after his father 
was decapitated by his Tiyini agnates.
“Please!” Implored the secretary over the chaos in the meeting room. “We should 
and must respect people!” 
“You are not chairman,” said Nixon to the secretary of mining. “Keep your mouth 
shut and keep quiet.”
Eventually the secretary did allow Peakope and Pera speak. Peakope emphasized 
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that time was running out and he wanted to be relocated. Pera, another Pulumaini agent, 
spoke at greater length, noting (through the translator) that the landowners had asked the 
company to increase the size of the house and that they had done so. He also noted that 
they had met the landowner’s demands that children of landowners receive relocation 
houses upon moving, and finally that the company had agreed to purchase replacement 
land for them. In the aftermath of his speech the furor over who would speak next was 
intense and Jonathan Paraia attempted roughly to sketch out clan divisions for the 
secretary, suggesting perhaps that one representative from every clan speak their mind in 
closing. This idea was replaced by a shouting match between Nixon and Ikipa, and Ikipa 
(the Mamai agent) was able to get the floor long enough to indicate that he too was happy 
with the agreement as it stood.
At this point it was 1:45 and the secretary was scheduled to depart in fifteen 
minutes. In an attempt to finish the meeting the secretary designated four more people 
whose point of view he would like to hear. However Nixon once more interrupted him 
and, in an attempt to adhere to the secretary’s request for comments, he began addressing 
the issues that he secretary had outlined in the beginning of the meeting. Nixon 
confirmed that the mine had originally built them an L40 house in the 1990s, and had 
offered an H75 for Yakatabari, but insisted that “We want H90 to be built by PJV.” He 
reiterated that the subsistence land that would replace their land must be within walking 
distance of their houses. “Namba wan haus lo Lihir na arapela  gold main is H90 [the 
good houses in Lihir and other gold mines]... This is a world class gold mine. Whether 
they like it or not they have to give us H90.” He told the secretary “Mi laik yu directim 
decision lo dispela [I want you to formally direct their decision in this regard]” and 
reported – the mine manager’s shocked face not withstanding -- “mine manager no 
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rejectim, em tok em reasonable, tasol ol tea boi blo en twistim – olgeta lain grisim em 
because lo colonial times they are kiaps and didiman. [the mine manager didn’t reject 
this. He said it was reasonable, but his tea boys have twisted his words – they want to 
fool him because they were kiaps and agricultural extension officers during the colonial 
period].”
This elicited laughter from the community relations officers who were present – 
they felt that it really was ridiculous to say. Also, it demonstrated that if anyone was 
stuck in a colonial mentality, it was Nixon, who was acting like a paranoid Ipili ‘bush 
kanaka’ (rural bumpkin). Nonetheless, this was a telling moment because, in the heat of 
anger, Nixon spoke clearly what was in the minds of several landowners in the room.
The Secretary thanked Nixon and attempted to provide an overview of what had 
happened in the meeting. He said he felt that “if we are talking about something, there is 
agreement.” He reiterated that the size of the house was up to the company, and all the 
government could do would be to confirm it, and that there was some “fine tuning” in 
regards to the house. There was lukewarm agreement. He also said that he was hearing 
that they wanted the company to buy gardening ground for relocated landowners. Again 
there was lukewarm agreement – I think on the whole people felt that this was a pretty 
blatant whitewash of the considerable differences that were enunciated in the meeting.
Mark Ekepa replied by noting that that the PJV had not yet agreed to purchase 
land for relocated landowners, and that this was a major issue. The secretary then held up 
a memo which he announced said that the mine would undertake to purchase this land. 
Mark Ekepa replied that he hadn’t received it and John – outraged at what he saw as a 
PJV trick – replied that that language was not in the agreement. Nixon then asked for 
clarification from the government that they would mandate that replacement land would 
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be given for both gardens and houses. The secretary replied that “this is between the 
landowners and the company, it’s not for the government to push you around.”
At this point Wasa (a Tiyini agent) attempted to speak and Nixon tried to drown 
him out. “Nixon, I want to hear him talk!” barked the secretary, clearly out of patience. 
“Can’t you wait?!”
Wasa asked (in Ipili) if the government was telling them to negotiate with the 
company on these two issues. The secretary responded that the company could work on 
those problems with the landowners, and the government was not responsible for the 
outcome, or whether they ought to negotiate part or the entirety of the agreement.
“You have to say ‘whole agreement’,” instructed John Kulina.
The secretary repeated that he had summarized the content of the agreement and 
if anyone had any objection with his summaries he would hear them or, failing that, he 
would leave.
“Yu gavman,” replied John, “yu lukautim interests blo papa blo graun. Company 
em foreigner. Position blo yu, yu mas clarim gut lo position blo yu... yu mas tok olsem yu 
mas go lo round table na negotiate gen. Klarim mipela na go [The government safeguards 
the interests of the landowners. The company is run by a bunch of foreigners. You must 
clarify your position... you must tell us that we must negotiate from scratch.   Say that 
clearly, and then we’ll go].” John, in other words, wanted the government to order the 
mine to undertake a complete new negotiation of land in the Special Mining Lease.
The secretary dodged this, replying that the presence of the PJV indicated that 
they were willing to continue to fine-tune agreement, and that that point was essentially 
John’s point – that the negotiation should continue. Mark Ekepa then spoke up: “Dispela 
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nine mun, em i no negotiation Fritz i mekim. Mine manager nogat [These last nine 
months weren’t negotiations. Fritz did them – not the mine manager].”
The secretary then gave the mine manger the floor.
“The clear message was that the Yakatabari negotiations are close,” the mine 
manager said. “That is still slightly the case. What I am prepared to do is to have you 
work together with community affairs on the house and the gardens. By the time I come 
back [from break], not this week but next week, we can meet again. What I want to 
know, particularly from the Tiyini, is if, under these circumstances, the tunnel can go 
ahead.”
When one of the community relations liaisons demanded that this be translated, 
the resulting argument grew so heated that it grew impossible for conversation to 
continue. “Please, please,” implored the secretary for mining with no effect, “I have to 
catch a plane.”
“We’re not going to negotiate with Fritz!” screamed Nixon. “We’re going to 
negotiate with the mine manager!”
More furor ensued, but eventually it was calmed down. Kurubu gave a final 
speech urging unity, and the meeting broke up. Not, however, before John Kulina 
departed with the ominous words: “Mr. Secretary, my brata, tunnel nogat until we 
finalize this agreement.”
The Lawsuit
A week later, the mine received a fax on official Department of Mining stationary 
from the secretary. Written on 31 March, it stated that he was “satisfied that the actual 
landowners have given their consent for compensation to be paid” and agreed that “the 
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tunnel portal must be commenced immediately so that the orderly flow in the 
development of the approved stages of the Porgera Mine are completed.” Mine 
management photocopied this document and community relations officers began 
disseminating it to select people in Porgera, including me.
The Kulinas remained intransigent, however. Partially this was due to the fact that 
Benjamin Kulina was impossible to track down. His house in Paiam was across the street 
from the local high school, and earlier that month one of his two wives had lured a young 
girl (to whom she was enatically related) from the high school to Benjamin’s house, 
where she was invited to have dinner and spend the night. Benjamin had sex with the girl 
that night – possibly without her consent – and she was not allowed to leave the house for 
the next week. By the time she was allowed to leave, she agreed to marry him and he 
sought to arrange for a bridewealth payment.
The girl in question came from an old and distinguished Porgera family – the 
Kwalas. They had branches in Hagen, Wabag, and Port Moresby and expected their 
members to finish high school and go on to college or be actively involved in business. 
As far as they were concerned, the woman in question had been raped and then 
brainwashed by a man twice her age who was not the kind of affine with whom they 
wanted to forge an alliance. Benjamin was jailed, bailed, and jailed again before he won 
his freedom. At this point the family began making death threats and Benjamin was 
forced to go underground. Since the Kuala’s land was based at the government station, 
this meant that it was impossible for Benjamin to attend meetings at government offices, 
or, for that matter, anywhere else.. 
At this point the arrangement of Ipili landowners began to shift somewhat. Nixon 
and Pakiru began to distance themselves from the Kulinas, whose recent criminal 
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activities and inability to put pressure on the government had damaged their standing as 
prominent actors in the negotiations. As a result the Porgera Landowner Association 
faction was now clearly separated from whatever Tiyini support it had before. Their next 
step was to hire a lawyer to seek an injunction against the PJV preventing them from 
working on the tunnel. The case was heard in Mt. Hagen and the injunction was affirmed 
in the absence of PJV lawyers, who were informed of the ex parte order only after it was 
successful.
The mine was understandably upset. Not only had their lawyers not been 
informed of the case, but disagreements about lease agreements were meant to be handled 
by the mining warden rather than a civil court. They appealed against the injunction, and 
it was overturned. The Porgera Landowner Association promptly appealed the appeal, 
which was now at the National Court, the highest level of the judiciary short of the 
Supreme Court. The case was heard on 18 April in Port Moresby. I flew down to observe 
the case, as did Mark Ekepa and a few other Porgerans. At the case, the judge stated that 
injunctive orders were only applied in situations where damage done was irreparable, and 
since all concerned agreed in principle that the mine could construct the tunnel and what 
was argued over was merely the price that would be paid, an injunction was not in order. 
Indeed, the families on whose land the portal would be located had agreed to its creation.
The injunction was thus set aside, providing that the mine give one week’s notice 
that it intended to carry out the work. The mine immediately did so, and fifteen days 
later, on 25 April PJV workers under police escort entered the area in order to do some 
basic survey work around the area where the portal would be built. This went unopposed, 
since the people who actually lived in that area had agreed to the sale of the land and the 
Kulinas were not expecting them. Two days later, the PJV workers faced sterner 
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opposition. On their return they faced Benjamin Kulina as well as a crowd of curious 
onlookers, including me. After a tense, angry confrontation, the community relations 
officer who accompanied the mine team, Lawrence, decided the situation was hopeless, 
that Benjamin was willing to use force, and that the mine was not yet ready to risk a 
violent incident.
On  29 April, Kurubu Ipara weighed in with yet another letter in his official 
capacity as District Administrator. Sent to the Secretary for Mining and copied to the 
mine manager, the chair of the Porgera Landowner Association, and the provincial 
administrator, this letter once again articulated the district administration (i.e. Kurubu’s) 
official stance on the status of the tunnel. Like his previous letter, this one articulated a 
legal argument regarding the state of affairs in the valley. However, unlike the previous 
letter, this one was more obviously biased in favor of the landowners, and its legal 
argument was much less coherent. 
Kurubu agreed that the mine had the legal right to carry out approved works 
within the Special Mining Lease, and that the tunnel was an approved work. However, he 
argued that before this could happen the mine needed approval from “traditional owners,” 
despite the fact that up until this point, everyone has agreed that it was exactly this 
approval which had been given in 1988, and more recently by Busane himself. In contrast 
to this, Kurubu argued that “the landowners or land occupiers who purportedly agreed to 
a compensation package with the PJV for the land required for the tunnel project, were 
not legally authorized by members of the clans owning the land, thereby rendering any 
agreement executed by them illegal.” Note he did not claim that Busane was an 
immigrant and not ethnically Porgeran and hence not a true landowners --  that he did not 
says something about the strength of claims of residence over descent in Porgera that will 
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be explored in future chapters. Instead he claimed that 
the Agents [in this case, John Kulina] claim that all members of the clan owning 
the land in question have vested authority to deal with the land in the Agents and 
other members of the clan cannot deal in the land, thus rendering any dealings 
made by unauthorized person’s [sic] illegal. The Agents views in this regard, are 
likely to be found by a court to be correct.
In other words, he argued that the Agents created in the late 1980s were not 
merely representatives of a community, but in fact had become a sort of elected feudal 
elite with powers to deal in land greater than the people who actually lived on it and who 
(on his account) had to request the permission of their agent to effect any sort of land 
transaction at all. Thus as part of a larger attempt to support Ipili against an outside force, 
he cast the debate in such a way that radically undercut individual Porgeran’s autonomy 
by emphasizing the existence and strength of clans as corporate groups and playing up 
the role of their agents at the expense of individuals. He concluded the letter by 
suggesting further means by which the dispute might be litigated, but emphasized that 
until the agents – that is, John Kulina – approved construction of the portal, the mine was 
not entitled to build it.
On 8 May another Landowner Negotiating Committee meeting met to hear from 
the mine the outcome of court case in Port Moresby. Previous to this time, documents 
from Moresby and the mine manager had been disseminated discretely throughout the 
valley as had been done earlier in the case of the mine manager’s publicization of the 
Tiyini letter of 20 December. In this case, community relations officers went so far as to 
make photocopies of the court’s one page ruling and distribute them to the Landowner 
Negotiating Committee at the meeting in order to dramatically demonstrate that the law 
was with them. The entirety of the decision read: 
The court orders that:
1. The  Porgera  Landowners  Association  (Inc.)  by  its  officers  and 
members and the 13 other Plaintiffs by their agents be restrained from 
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interfering with or obstructing the construction of a tunnel or portal and 
related activities by the Defendant or its agents at Yunarilama and that 
the Porgera Landowners Association (Inc.) by its officers and members 
and the 13 other Plaintiffs by their agents be restrained from interfering 
with or obstructing the relocation of the Lokopa family and the Busane 
Family from Yunarilama.
2. Liberty to apply on 3 days notice to the other party.
3. The time for entry of this Order be abridged to the time of settlement 
by the Registrar which shall take place forthwith.
However, while tangible, these papers the meaning of these papers was subject to 
the chronic ambiguity that plagued the valley. Most people in Porgera are illiterate and do 
not speak English – especially the English used in formal legal proceedings. Most people, 
then, could not understand what the decision actually said. Amazingly, Benjamin Kulina 
– who had not been present in Port Moresby because of his attempts to avoid revenge for 
his alleged rape  – picked up the decision, and told the assembled members of the 
Landowner Negotiating Committee that the mine was lying. He argued that the paper 
indicated that the Porgera Landowner Association had won the court case and that the 
mine was under a restraining order that prevented it from constructing a tunnel. He 
further claimed that he knew this because he had been present at the court case.
The result was a simmering sense of confusion in the valley regarding what had 
actually happened. Benjamin’s claims had by this point had diverged so sharply from 
reality that it seemed impossible to members of community relations that he could be 
taken seriously. At the same time, the audacity of his deception was so great that many 
Porgerans living in the Special Mining Lease could not imagine that it would be possible 
to lie so baldly. 
At this point I became entangled in the negotiations against my will. Copies of the 
decision began circulating freely in the valley, and I was asked my opinion by several 
people from Apalaka, my home community, who knew that I had attended the hearing. In 
the past I had respected the confidentiality of my informants and had not discussed the 
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negotiations with others. However I felt unable to avoid a direct question about material 
they independently obtained regarding a public trial. As a result I told people, when 
pressed, that I thought the words “The court orders that the Porgera Landowners 
Association... be restrained from interfering with or obstructing the construction of a 
tunnel” meant that the Porgera Landowners Association was not allowed to interfere with 
the construction of the tunnel. 
As a result of this Benjamin Kulina confronted me in public in front of a crowd of 
roughly seventy-five people and instructed me to tell people that the Porgera Landowner 
Association had won the court case. I replied that I did not speak to people about the 
court case, but that when pressed I had no choice but to answer their questions honestly. 
He then accused me of lying and I reminded him that I had been present at the court case 
while he had not -- my field notes included not just a list of participants but a sketch of 
the courtroom so detailed it showed everything from where they sat to the location of 
window-mounted air conditioners. Outraged, he called me a liar and insisted he had been 
present.
After some further argument our discussion ended inconclusively. The next day, 
rumors began spreading around Apalaka that I was a spy sent from the mine to write 
secret reports about Ipili in order to keep them from receiving benefits from the mine. 
This resulted in a brief struggle for legitimacy inside my field site. At this point in my 
fieldwork I had already responded to one challenge to my presence in Apalaka which 
involved death threats (for much of the beginning of my fieldwork I slept with a shotgun 
under my bed), but which had ended happily and in which people thought I had acquitted 
by myself admirably. Additionally, I had a long track record of taking friends and my 
adopted family to the hospital, the bank, purchasing antibiotics, and so forth. I also 
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attended church services regularly as part of my fieldwork. The Kulinas, on the other 
hand, were seen as greedy elites whose extravagant demands for money had prevented 
the Tuanda (the clan of my place in Apalaka) from receiving the benefits of the 
Yakatabari agreements. After a few very uncomfortable public meetings, rumors of my 
duplicity faded away.
At any rate, I was scheduled for a field break. As a result I spent most of June in 
the United States, touring the US with a Porgeran friend. When I returned, I found the 
portal complete – the Porgera Landowner Association faction had been unwilling to risk 
physical violence and had allowed construction of the portal to go ahead. 
Ministerial Involvement and Internal Politics
The tunnel was now finally in place and the immediate future of the mine was no 
longer in jeopardy. At the same time, larger issues of the Yakatabari and the mine’s 
future had not yet been solved. In this final stage of the negotiations both landowners and 
the mine used to there influence to escalate there conflict to the highest level of the Papua 
New Guinea government. Landowners dabbled in ministerial politics in order to put 
pressure on the PJV while the mine continued to insist that the letter of the law – as they 
interpreted it – be followed so that they might continue their operations. Obviously this is 
the section of my study that relies the most on second-hand testimony. However, my 
statements have been corroborated by several people so I feel confident that my 
discussion here is accurate.
When I returned to Papua New Guinea in July I found that the tunnel portal was 
under construction and that Porgera has begun to play into national politics. Sir Michael 
Somare (GCMG) had recently been appointed the new Minister for Mines, and had 
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visited Porgera in order to see the mine’s operation for himself first hand. People in 
Apalaka eagerly recounted for me his visit and remembered that he expressed 
unhappiness with the how landowner lives had been impacted by mining, although 
whether he had done this from within his car, or murmured these sentiments as he stood 
at the edge of the village and gazed at the massive expanse of the Anjolek waste dump 
beneath which their original village was located was a source of debate. Regardless, 
Somare’s visit was truly memorable. He was not merely the minister of mining – he was 
the central figure in Papua New Guinea’s movement to independence, the first Prime 
Minister of the country, and the father of the nation. His face graced the fifty kina note – 
the only human figure to appear on PNG’s paper currency. His presence reaffirmed for 
local people Porgera’s centrality to Papua New Guinea.
However it proved to be the other minister on the trip – Minister for Environment 
and Conservation Herowa Agiwa – who would play a larger roll in the events of 
Yakatabari. The Department of Environment and Conservation (DEC) was in charge of 
overseeing the water permits that the mine was required to acquire in order to discharge 
tailings into the river system, draw running water for the mining camp, and so forth. One 
of DEC’s routine functions was to oversee the renewal of these water permits. DEC 
personnel made annual trips to the mine site to make sure that the mine was in 
compliance with the terms of these permits. On 7 July DEC administrators visited 
Porgera and held community meetings with people in the Special Mining Lease as part of 
standard procedure in the renewal of permits. Typically, unless the mine has done 
something extraordinary the renewal of water permits is yet another of the complex 
ongoing processes that are routinely carried out as part of keeping the mine open.
Landowners quickly moved in, however, to pressure DEC employees not to 
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renew the licenses. They were resistant, since they considered the mine to be in 
compliance. Although sympathetic to the plight of the people, they could not cancel 
leases because of other, unrelated inequities. The landowners then moved to urge the 
Minister of Environment and Conservation to ignore the decision of his executive council 
– which is normally binding – and refuse to renew the license anyway. They also 
encouraged him to make use of his authority and argue in public that by the standards of 
the DEC the people in the Special Mining Lease were affected by mining and that the 
company ought to, under the ‘sympathetic evaluation’ clause, be moved out of the 
Special Mining Lease. On 22 July I heard from senior members of Community Affairs 
that the minister had made both of these proposals. He had instituted a plan whereby the 
relocation would be paid for partially by the mine and partially with tax money the 
government received from the mine.
At the same time, who counted as ‘landowners’ and ‘the Porgera Landowner 
Association’ was changing. Within landowner communities, there was a strong sense that 
the twenty three members of the Landowner Negotiating Committee had let a golden 
opportunity for compensation slip through their fingers because of their own 
overreaching avarice. As a result an alliance of influential but out of power Ipili 
coalesced and made a legal challenge against the Porgera Landowner Association. The 
two most important players were William Gaupe and Jolson Kuraro. 
William was famous for a spectacular raid in the mid-1980s on what was then 
Placer’s prospecting camp that resulted in the theft of tens of thousands of kina and the 
passports of all foreign workers in the mine. Jolson was the head of the Porgera 
Landowner Association and a key negotiator in the signing of the Porgera Agreements in 
the 1980s. He had fallen from a position of enormous influence after his part in a clan 
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fight which devastated his home village and in which (on all accounts) he killed three 
people. These men organized a meeting, claimed that it was a legitimate meeting of the 
board of Porgera Landowners Authority, and elected themselves the new executives.
Technically the Porgera Landowner Association received its budget from a 
section of the royalties that the mine paid quarterly to the Porgera Development 
Authority. I was told by senior staff within the Porgera Development Authority that this 
had amounted to K5,500,000 in the last six years, and that currently there was only 
K300,000 in the Porgera Landowner Association’s account, and that there was no clear 
record of how the balance of the money was spent. In general, what happened to the 
money received by the Porgera Development Authority to fund local projects around the 
valley was, shall we say, opaque. It was in the interests of so many parties that the 
distribution of these funds not be too carefully scrutinized that now, with legal action in 
the offing, the head of the Porgera Development Authority (an accountant originally 
hailing from Ghana) asked Price Waterhouse Cooper down to Porgera to audit the 
Porgera Landowner Association’s books in an attempt to provide some impartial book 
keeping and demonstrate his own objectivity.
By late July the opposition to the Porgera Landowner Association faction hired a 
lawyer from Mt. Hagen and gained an injunction against the Porgera Landowner 
Association which required that their budget be frozen. Their proposal was that, if they 
were to replace the current leadership, the Porgera Landowner Association budget 
(minus, most likely, their own salaries) would not be used to fund lawyers and stay in 
fancy hotels, but would instead be directly distributed to Ipili as a cash payment. This 
effectively meant dismantling of what had been – regardless of how justly it had been 
used – the most effective political tool landowners had in the Yakatabari negotiations. 
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That this proposal was popular demonstrates the Ipili cultural tendencies towards 
egalitarianism and receiving a free cash handout.
At roughly this same time I heard from a lawyer working for the Provincial 
Government in Wabag that the mine was shifting positions and attempting to classify 
Yakatabari as a ‘minor change’ to the original mine plan and thus on the same scale as 
the tunnel. This was verified for me a month later in Port Moresby on 1 September by 
DEC officials. Their opinion was that Placer was unusual in the way it was tight lipped 
about the submissions it made the DEC. “Even Ok Tedi” the notorious polluter, 
submitted plans and then just built them – it didn’t attempt to revise or reframe its 
submissions. It should be pointed out that these employees were not partisan to 
landowners --  in the mid 1990s a community meeting with landowners degenerated into 
a riot which resulted in them scampering onto the roof of a building and being evacuated 
by helicopter, an event they remembered without much fondness..
On 15 August I was told by Jolson there was a hearing in Hagen on 4 September 
to freeze the account. That same day Kurubu told me that negotiations were still stalled, 
but that he thought some “pressure at the top,” including an upcoming meeting of 
ministers about the problem in Port Moresby, would help pull things together. Apparently 
he felt that the mine’s tax and royalty payments could be massaged to get the mine the 
money it needed to meet landowner demands.
The next day I spoke with a senior (and Papua New Guinean) member of 
community affairs about Yakatabari. He laughed ruefully and said “it’s dying a slow 
death.” There had been no official feedback from the minister for mines about the plan 
for the government to take some of its tax money and then plow it back into a 
resettlement scheme. I was also told that the minister for environment and conservation 
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was “overstepping his power” and that granting of water rights on the Special Mining 
Lease are the mining minister’s decision. The Environment and Conservation could only 
regulate water that flowed off the lease. Ironically, he noted that the mine would soon 
start relocating the owners off the land on which the portal had been built -- and giving 
them the H75 houses that the Yakatabari group missed out on. He also sourly noted that 
in the paper the other day that there was talk of moving the long-anticipated natural gas 
pipeline to Australia from Papua New Guinea to East Timor. What kind of world were 
were living in, he said, if East Timor was seen to be a more stable investment 
environment than Papua New Guinea? He used this as an example of the long-term 
consequences of politicized ministerial intervention at major resource development 
projects.
On 21 August I had a short conversation with Fritz, who had not been actively 
involved in negotiations for months. He was extremely negative about the whole 
situation, as one would expect. He could at least take comfort in the fact that the worse 
Yakatabari got the less his lack of progress looked like a personal failure and the more it 
seemed to be inevitable. It also demonstrated clearly to him just how right he had been in 
his opinions of the shortcomings of landowners. He told me that it was increasingly 
looking like there would be nothing done at all, no dump at all, and that “the socalled 
zero-option is beginning to look like a possibility.” He said that there would be no more 
negotiations (this is something all of us closely involved with the situation recognized 
long ago) and that the mine now just had a single, non-negotiable offer to make -- “and 
it’s not going to be an H75, let me tell you.” He said that people who were lucky were the 
portal owners, who had signed an agreement and were going to get H75s. If other 
landowners were moved, they would get old relocation houses.
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Still, Fritz understood what had happened to his negotiations not in terms of the 
paradoxes at the heart of personating the Ipili as a larger actor. Rather he considered the 
pathologies of there personators to be at fault. He said that it was unfortunate that some 
people in the government were getting on the whole ‘social and environment impact’ 
bandwagon that “Kurubu and his boys” were pushing. He said he was sorry that he had 
wasted 18 months of his life attending “all those fucking meetings.” “To have negotiated 
for so long,” he said bitterly, “and then to turn it down at that last moment is stupid, just 
stupid.” 
I said I was glad I was distanced from the process and that it just ate people up. 
He said yes, it was too bad as he enjoyed doing implementation. I said I was happy to do 
work in the village now that the politic part of my work was over, and actually be 
working with informants who wanted to help you - not “rapist embezzlers.” He much 
preferred to sit down with the people, most of which were just trying to get along and 
raise their kids. He said people loved to talk about their gardens, the great frost of 1973 
and so on. It was just “the scum on the surface” that was the problem, “some prick 
putting a layer on it” and separating the mine from authentic and decent Porgerans. 
Ultimately what Fritz was unhappy about was not what was being mediated at the 
negotiation table, but who was doing the mediating.
The Anawe Spill
With all of these issues still up in the air, the mine had the perverse good luck to 
be subject to a serious environmental incident. Waste that was flowing into the tailing 
flume beneath the mill had overflown the banks of the waste dump leased for them and 
had flown onto land outside the Special Mining Lease. This was clearly, and very 
seriously, illegal. However, the mine responded quickly by announcing that they would 
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‘buy the land’ (i.e. apply for a lease for mining purposes) and indemnify its owners. In 
fact, their first move was to indemnify the owners by paying them large amounts of cash 
in anticipation of a lease being granted. In theory, such an action was perfectly legal – the 
mine was paying for land which it had not yet (but would) acquire, an expediency which 
had been used several times before, when the engineering timeline of the mine ran ahead 
of the cumbersome government mechanisms for acquiring leases. When both lessor and 
lessee were agreed in principle, use of the land and payment for it could occur before the 
final lease was approved. Here, however, the mine was using this technique as a way to 
satisfy landowners immediately before they began to realize that a more lucrative route 
might be via the courts, where the PJV would definitely be found in the wrong.
This spill – in the Anawe area – also quickly proved to be a solution to the 
Yakatabari impasse. Engineering reports indicated that Anawe could be the future site of 
a smaller waste dump which could serve as an alternative to Yakatabari. The site was less 
optimal technically but infinitely more attainable socially, and the damage to it had 
already been done. The mine commenced discussion with Anawe landowners which 
eventually were a success. 
The logic of the mine’s offer was simple. First, by inadvertedly ruing their land, 
the mine had presented them with a fait accompli- now that the land was already 
despoiled, why not gain as many benefits from it as possible? Second, Anawe landowers 
had never received much money from the Porgera gold mine compared to Special Mining 
Lease landowners – although many of them had benefited from earlier mining booms in 
the valley’s history. Over time, however, they had thus watched themselves be eclipsed 
by the Special Mining Lease landowners and their sense of jealousy was palpable. Living 
well, they decided, would be the best form of revenge. Finally, the Anawe landowners 
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had lower expectations (and no baggage) because they had never received Special Mining 
Lease money. As a result they were easier to please and -- despite attempts to disrupt the 
negotiations by Special Mining Lease landowner agents – they were in fact finally 
pleased. Negotiations for Anawe stretched on for another dozen months, and it was not 
until my departure from my fieldsite half way through 2001 that the Anawe agreement 
was signed. I attended the negotiations for it as well, but that story must be told 
elsewhere.
With negotiations for the Anawe dump well under way, the mine officially 
withdrew its offer for Yakatabari on 21 September 2000. The story of Yakatabari 
circulated many places and was told and retold by its participants. One of the people who 
pondered it the most was Guy Mascord, the British consultant the mine hired to produce 
its 2000 Sustainability report. His long experience in Porgera gave him several ideas 
about how best to portray what had happened. The night before I prepared to leave 
Porgera and return to the United States, Guy let me stay in his apartment in Suyan so that 
I could catch a lift to the chopper pad the next morning. He showed me his draft of report 
and asked me if I had anything to add, since by this point I was well known in the valley 
as the expert on a now-moot negotiation. I couldn’t think of anything to add that wasn’t 
longer than 385 word. Stripped of authorship and written in a formal third person, his 
narrative became the official version of the story that I quoted at the beginning of this 
chapter. In 2004 I flew to Australia and met some Placer executives, who told me they 
remembered Yakatabari as a distant and unpleasant memory that they had “moved on 
from.” The anthropology involved was not so lucky, however -- it would take me five 
years of musing over the events recorded in my fieldnotes before I could find my own 
time and my own way of telling Yakatabari’s story..
164
Conclusion
In the last chapter I examined some of the theoretical issues that drive this 
dissertation: the way that individuals mediate institutions, how the typification of routine 
underwrites the logistical complexity of global operations such as mining, the importance 
of disaggregating concepts like ‘the mine’ in the course of analysis, and the way in which 
it is fourth world peoples, rather than first world institutions, who exhibit ‘heat’ in Levi-
Strauss’s sense. In this chapter I have focused on a densely ethnographic analysis of one 
particular moment in the relationship between the mine and the Ipili. 
Each of the issues of the dissertation are clearly evident in the Yakatabari 
negotiations. The personal backgrounds of the negotiators on both sides of the table 
clearly affected their ability to effectively represent their respective institutions. The 
mine’s attempts to create the tunnel demonstrates the way that Ipili disruptions can affect 
the mine, and the way that a single portal carved in stone can come under scrutiny in the 
highest levels of government. Actors such as ‘the landowners’ or ‘the state’, while often 
actors in a general sense have also just as often proven to be complex entities composed 
of multiple actors with diverse interests.
This chapter has thus introduced the reader into the dizzying realm of mine 
politics ‘on the ground.’. However, many things remain to be explained. Why is it that 
idioms of subsistence agriculture and clan unity were the acceptable method of 
argumentation in Porgera when they so poorly described landowner aspirations? What is 
the nature of Ipili kinship such that the landowners tended to be so factious? How 
specifically did ex-kiaps imagine their relation to Papua New Guinea? Who exactly is 
Kupiane, and why does he protect the Ipili? Why do Ipili feel so cheated of revenue from 
the mine? We have seen that there are people jockeying for power below the elite that I 
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have discussed – who are they and what other arenas exist in the valley for the pursuit of 
power and influence? We have seen that Port Moresby is also an arena for action that 
bears on the mine. What, then, occurs at the national level?
Each of the following chapters will deal the issues raised in the course of this 
discussion of the Yakatabari negotiations, expanding and amplifying on topics which 
have only been introduced here. The next chapter seeks to answer one of these questions: 
what, exactly, was the nature of the shared colonial past of the negotiators involved with 
Yakatabari? How were the agreements of the late 1980s – the keystone of so much of life 
in the valley – established? What is the history of mining in Porgera? How did 
institutions like the state and the global financial market come to know the valley? These 
and other questions will be answered in the next chapter of the dissertation.
CHAPTER THREE
THE HISTORY OF FEASIBILITY
“The 1960s and early 1970s were halcyon years at Columbia... the department 
was chaired during this period by Harris, Fried, and me, in that order. As we all 
lived in the same suburban town and car-pooled together, most of the faculty 
considered us to be a troika. This, however, would call for too much 
organization and agreement, and it would have been more accurate to call our 
rides to Columbia a reality management pool, which ended in 1969 when Harris 
began to drive his own car.” 
- Robert Murphy, Anthropology at Columbia: A Reminiscence
While the previous chapter served to introduce the details of landowner politics in 
Porgera, it raised many questions as well. On the one hand, the Yakatabari negotiations 
demonstrate the incredible power that certain institutions had in delineating boundaries 
within which negotiations could take place. The Relocation Agreement and the Mining 
Development Contract defined an arena within which contestation occurred, and stepping 
outside of them was a venture into unknown and feasibility-destroying territory which 
threatened to unravel life in the valley. On the other hand, the Yakatabari negotiations 
also demonstrated the way in which individuals exerted enormous influence in the course 
of the negotiations. Indeed, personal histories and idiosyncrasies ended up being some of 
the most important forces shaping life the course of Yakatabari.
In this chapter I discuss the history of the Porgera valley from its discovery by 
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whites to the beginning of the construction of the Porgera gold mine, a period stretching 
roughly fifty years from 1938 to 1990. My goal is to explain the origin of the agreements, 
contracts, and studies that we encountered in the previous chapter. How did these forms 
emerge out of the government’s discovery and pacification of the Porgera valley? In 
addition to these institutional forms, I will also explore the history of the personal 
networks that have grown up around Porgera and proved to be as important to shaping its 
history as the documents whose meaning they mooted. In this chapter I examine where 
these people came from, and what their history together was previous to Yakatabari.
In addition to providing an original historical and ethnographic contribution to the 
literature on Porgera, this chapter also engages some of  the theoretical issues raised in 
this dissertation. As I pointed out in the first chapter, while some analysts take granted 
the existence of big actors and in doing so help them structure macro-reality, I have 
argued that the tension between individual agency and institutional power is particularly 
visible in Porgera. I will thus use this chapter to elaborate my general argument regarding 
the necessity of interrogating the relationship between institutions and the people who 
personate them.
A History of Legibility?
At first glance, Porgera seems ripe for an analysis which focuses on the link 
between legibility and administration as Scott suggests. Porgera is obviously an area 
where the extension of government control has gone hand in hand with a growth in 
knowledge about the valley: in 1939 Porgera was literally a blank space on the map. By 
the time of my fieldwork in 2000, it was one of the most studied places in Papua New 
Guinea and possibly the world. All of this was due to gold. The continual and enduring 
dynamic of Porgera’s history has been increased white presence, increased exploitation of 
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Porgera’s gold resource, and increased wealth for the Ipili as a result. 
Sixty years of mining and exploration has led to an unparalleled level of 
geological knowledge about the valley – a knowledge simplified, of course, but its 
disinterment. Anthropologists and linguists have produced accounts of Porgera’s 
language and culture. Government and mine employees have censused the population 
regularly, typically every five years. Their results, stored in a computer data base, can be 
cross-referenced to a digital orthophoto of the valley’s topography which was so detailed 
that it allowed each individual house and garden plot to be scrutinized. This information 
in turn was linked to a detailed GIS database on which every property boundary from the 
house hold to the clan level had been recorded. These databases were themselves linked 
to the archive of past land claims and ongoing disputes held between the company and 
Ipili. If this isn’t legibility, what is?
Accompanying this knowledge was a variety of ‘governmental’ processes 
(Foucault 1994, Pels 1997) which did not merely regulate the Ipili, but which produced 
them as subjects. Missionary work in the Porgera valley had gone on for four decades by 
the time I arrived in the valley, and practices such as confession, baptism, and mixed-
gender housing had institutionalized an entire pastoral mode of power. The government 
suppressed fighting and introduced a system of courts by which Ipili life was to be 
organized. Ipili working for the mine accustomed themselves to the twelve-hour shifts as 
they became complicit in the temporal rhythms of industrial power. Those relocated by 
the mine had been given houses made of metal and wood, and the mine had an ongoing 
program to teach Ipili how to live in them which effectively meant the end of the 
traditional system of men’s and women’s houses. In these meetings, women were taught 
how to care for durable goods such as textiles and houses – how to sweep, how to cook 
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with stoves, how to wear clothes, and how to wash their feet before they came inside. The 
Ipili were quite literally being domesticated.
In some way, then, Scott’s discussion of the Ipili being made ‘legible’ and hence 
visible to big actors called ‘the state’ and ‘the mine’ neatly captures the processes of 
knowing, governing, and control that occurred in Porgera. It would be possible to find 
‘resistance,’ the key term of Scott’s earlier work (1990). Ipili peoples’ customs, too 
diverse and multiform to fit the requirements of the state, constantly evade and elude full 
state definition. The details of their kinship system, misrecognized and reified by the state 
and its capitalist partners, continue to create problems that could never be explained or 
predicted by the simplistic centralized models of the laws formulated in Port Moresby. 
For instance, the Suyan riot of 1995 swept through one of the camp dormitories and Ipili 
caused millions of dollars worth of damages, smashing in windows and turning over cars. 
Strikes and other industrial action by Ipili mine workers have been attempted, and above 
all the mine has experienced the constant, silent, but no less effective methods of 
resistance – theft, corruption, attempts to scam resources from the company and from 
community relations. So it is possible to speak not only of legibility, but of resistance as 
well.
So there is some prima facie evidence to indicate that a Scott’s approach to 
legibility could shed light on Porgera’s history. However, I think an approach such as 
Scott’s misses the crucial way in which governance in Porgera has involved a tension 
between the authority of individuals on the ground and the mandated power of 
institutions which have attempted – often unsuccessfully – tried to establish control over 
life in the valley. A more detailed examination of the Porgera’s history, I argue, paints a 
very different picture of how the Porgera gold mine came into being.
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The Contact Period
Technically, the first white people to enter the Porgera valley were the Fox 
brothers, who crossed the lower Porgera river in the course of an illegal gold prospecting 
patrol across Enga and Southern Highlands Province in 1934 (Ballard 2003). The patrol 
failed to discover any gold, including that in Porgera’s mountains and streams. This fact, 
combined with its illegality, meant that it was not widely publicized outside the valley, 
and the Fox brothers’ lack of enduring or significant contact with Ipili meant that 
Porgeran oral history is vague about their presence. The case was a classic ‘structure of 
misjuncture’ (Schieffelin and Crittenden 1991:285) – the Fox Brother’s reticence to 
discuss their experience and its attendant illegalities meant that their stories about Porgera 
were never integrated into Territorian knowledge about the highlands and vice-versa. 
Two groups of people had met, but two cultures had not.
For all intents and purposes Porgera’s ‘first-contact’ with the ‘outside world’ 
came on 12 September 1938 (Gammage 1998: 248) when the Australian Government -- 
personated by the australian kiap Jim Taylor -- entered the valley during the Hagen-Sepik 
exploratory patro (Gammage 1998, Golub 2001: 138-139, Jacka 2002). On 15 March 
1939, Taylor’s lieutenant John Black also passed through the valley and discovered 
alluvial gold in the Pongema river. At the end of the patrol both men returned to the 
valley together and put in a sluice to work the alluvials, took basic notes on the people 
living in the area, and mapped the valley before returning to Mt. Hagen to finish the 
patrol. Porgera’s entanglement with the world free of the influence of gold had lasted six 
months.
The Hagen-Sepik patrol was exploratory – its purpose was to ‘fill in the blank 
spaces’ on the map of Papua New Guinea. As a result, the patrol was among the best 
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documented in Papua New Guinean history. The corpus generated by it includes maps, 
photographs, landscape paintings, anthropometric measurements, film, geologic samples, 
and artifacts. The centerpiece of the patrol was Taylor’s official report, which was 501 
pages long. The report was the first of many that would be written by which people 
distant from Porgera could inform themselves of the state of affairs in the valley. Even 
given its length, it was still considerably easier to duplicate and transmit Taylor’s report 
than it was to duplicate and transmit Taylor. This report was thus the first of many text 
artifacts that would be written which people distant from Porgera would use to inform 
themselves of affairs in the valley without actually going there or engaging in face-to-
face interaction with someone who had. Taylor and Black were thus the two people 
whose description of the valley would prove to be the first precedent for how the valley 
was understood by distant whites. 
What sort of knowledge did this first patrol into the valley generate? Most 
obviously, Black and Taylor put Porgera on the map – literally. One of the main fruits of 
the patrol was a map five feet long and two feet high which was the first relatively 
accurate survey of the area between the Fly river and the Wahgi valley (Gammage 
1998:214). While later kiaps would make other sketch maps, Black’s work was the only 
unified map of the region based on original ground surveying. It would not be until the 
Australian Survey Corp visited the highlands in the 1960s that a more definitive version 
would be produced, and even present day maps of Porgera include place names and 
tracks that Black added. 
Practically, the Hagen-Sepik patrol set precedents about how to physically enter 
the valley – with only minor refinements, the route they took over the dividing range 
between the Lai basin and the Porgera watershed were followed for roughly sixty years. 
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Patrol officers, their interpreters, carriers, and police men taught each other these tracks 
informally. The fact that two decades of government patrol and consolidation could occur 
without any overall attempt to map the area it was pacifying indicates the extent to which 
the Australian imperial endeavor in the 1950s and 1960s relied on the ‘straight young 
backs’ (Shearston 2000) of a handful of officers with personal familiarity of the area 
rather than a more complex and depersonalized bureaucratic apparatus.
Geography, then, was a major part of the discovery of the patrol. A similar major 
discover had to do with the geology of the valley – the discovery of gold. Gold booms 
had been occurring in New Guinea since the late nineteenth century, and gold was 
something on all territorian’s minds since the 1926 gold rush at Edie Creek. Like many 
kiaps, Black’s routinely prospected streams and watersheds for gold, and he included in 
his patrol Papua New Guineans who had worked gold in Morobe and were familiar with 
panning and prospecting. One of them – named Porti – first found gold in the Pongema 
river where Black had set up camp. Excited, Black prolonged his stay in the valley a few 
extra days to prospect. He explored the southeastern tributaries of the Pongema, missing 
the true source of the gold, which lay amongst the streams of the southwestern side of the 
valley. 
He and Taylor were more fortunate when they returned to the valley together 
towards the end of their patrol. At that time they traced the gold much closer to its source, 
at Kakai creek, roughly a kilometer from the house where I lived during my fieldwork 
and currently within the special mining lease (in fact quite near the Yunarilama portal 
area). Taylor’s official report noted the presence of gold at Porgera but reported that the 
field was poor and not ‘another Edie creek.’ Informally, Taylor and Black seemed to 
report the same thing. The more cynical of their consociates would later doubt the 
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accuracy of this assessment and claim that Taylor and Black wanted to keep Porgera’s 
gold to themselves. Future events would prove Taylor and Black correct: the richness of 
the field and its distance from urban centers made working the Porgera more trouble than 
it was worth.
In addition, Taylor and Black created a body of knowledge about Porgera that 
went beyond the geography and geology of the valley. They conveyed knowledge of the 
people living in the Porgera valley back to the metropole. Their patrol thus marked the 
first transfer of knowledge about life in the valley from its inhabitants to Port Moresby. 
Indeed, John Black’s misrecognition of the very name of the valley was the first of many 
confusions that would occur in the future. ‘Porgera’ is not and indigenous term for the 
valley (which was and is today in Ipili simply called ‘Ipili’). ‘Porgera’ is a neologism 
based on Black’s mishearing, at the time of first entrance into the valley, of Pongema, the 
name of the river in which gold was first located and which later became a popular site 
for  European visitors who sought to work its gold. Black tips us off that this is the case 
when in his patrol diaries he corrects his earlier recording with the words 
“PORGERA=PONGOMA” (NLA MS. 8346) .  Nonetheless, the name – albeit with the 
variation ‘Pogera’ – stuck and continues to stick to this day. The history of 
misunderstanding in Porgera is thus just as long as the history of the valley’s contact with 
the wider world.
It is also with Black and Taylor that we get the first clear indication of the Ipili as 
a distinct ethnic group. In the ‘ethnographic appendix’ to his report Taylor distinguishes 
between the “Huri” (Huli), “Enga-a” (Enga) and “Hoiyamo” (Ipili), creating divisions 
that still exist to this day, albeit with different ethnonyms. “Ipili” would not become an 
ethnonym until the 1950s. Taylor used it, correctly, as a place name (Hagen/Sepik Patrol 
174
Report 38/39:xx).
Of course, Taylor and Black were not creating all of this de novo. The guides who 
they hired were following well known paths over which the long-distance trade practiced 
in that region was carried out (Mangi 1988), and often times these guides were 
themselves traders or, more often, young men with ties to many of the groups which 
Taylor and Black passed through. The tracks in the valley which were passed down from 
kiap to kiap were originally passed from indigenous trader to kiap. Thus Taylor and 
Black’s practice of hiring local guides to lead them over the pass and into Porgera was 
also equally precedential – not only did other whites hire people from the same ethnic 
groups and locations as Taylor and Black, they even hired the same specific people who 
‘had been to Porgera.’ 
By using indigenous guides and translators, they created not just a new kind of 
role or job, but a new class of people who specialized in filling it. Even in the late 1950s 
guides who could lead kiaps on patrol into Porgera were chosen ‘because they had been 
there with Taylor and Black.’ This patronage was the beginning of an emergent class of 
local middlemen who would parlay their ability to manage the interaction between patrol 
and Porgerans into riches and success for themselves. Taylor and Black were thus not just 
the point at which indigenous knowledge was repackged into white texts and text 
artifacts, they created a personalistic sociology of middlemanship as well. The context in 
which Taylor used the term Ipili correctly is a word list – the first ever of Ipili – which he 
reports is a “vocabulary obtained from GWARA of Ibiri” (Hagen/Sepik Patrol Report 
38/39, appendix A). ‘GWARA’ is Kuala Laipia, a young man who joined Taylor’s patrol 
in Porgera and returned with him to Hagen. Kuala was the first of what would become an 
emerging elite in Porgera in the 1960s and 1970s. A terrified teenage boy in 1938, Kuala 
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would leverage this comparative advantage for all it was worth, becoming a businessman, 
gold dealer, and polygynist. Fifty years later his son, one of the most powerful figures in 
Papua New Guinea’s trade union movement, would dine with Fidel Castro in Havana and 
his granddaughter would be allegedly raped by Benjamin Kulina.
While the documentation the patrol produced was impressive, it cannot be 
emphasized enough here how little difference there was between the formal sphere of the 
administration and the informal circle of expatriates known as ‘territorians.’ While it is 
possible to see Scott’s ‘legibility’ at work in the Hagen-Sepik patrol, it is also possible to 
find Murphy’s ‘reality management pool.’ The number of whites in New Guinea at this 
time was extremely small, and lives on plantations or outstations made for a close-knit 
community. As a result, the line between ‘official government channels’ and the 
territorian grapevine could be quite blurred at times. White society in New Guinea was a 
very small world, and Black and Taylor were at the center of it, one the most up-and-
coming young officer and the other already a legendary explorer. Knowledge about 
Porgera thus had a double life, circulating through the territorian grapevine as well as the 
official world of reports.
While news of the Hagen-Sepik patrol allowed knowledge of Porgera to circulate 
in Port Moresby and New Guinea more generally, it did not leak out much further than 
that. Taylor and Black’s report was suppressed when World War Two broke out for fear 
that it could provide the Japanese with knowledge of the interior of the island. Taylor and 
Black’s advocacy for native peoples made them unpopular in the administration as well 
(Gammage 1998), and both left the service soon after World War II. With the exception 
of a few pieces published in the Pacific Islands Monthly, knowledge of Porgera was 
restricted to word of mouth and the bureaucracy in Papua New Guinea.
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The Strickland Syndicate
The war radically changed the future of the valley, altering the follow-up patrols 
that might otherwise have come to Porgera in the wake of Taylor and Black’s expedition. 
Porgera was patrolled only once between 1938 and 1948. In 1945, the improbably named 
Captain Neptune Beresford Newcomb Blood led an exploratory patrol into the valley 
with two other whites and a line of indigenous carriers. Captain Blood was an Irishman 
who had served in the New Guinea police for many years, and although the purpose of 
his patrol was ostensibly to find and rescue downed allied airmen, it is clear that he 
yearned to conduct a grand exploratory patrol in the style of Taylor and Black. An 
amateur ornithologist, he was also particularly interested in discovering new species of 
Birds of Pardise, which he did in fact do. Accompanying him on the patrol was William 
MacGregor, an experienced prospector who had heard of Porgera through the territorian 
grapevine and wanted to have a look himself. 
The turbulent transition from a civilian government to military administration and 
back resulted in massive administrative tangles as paperwork was moved back and forth 
and the report from the patrol, like the Fox brother’s earlier patrol, ultimately was never 
absorbed by the administration and disseminated. It was the territorians grapevine – this 
case MacGregor - who were to be the most effective disseminators of knowledge about 
the Blood patrol. MacGregor’s opinion of the Porgera field differed from Taylor and 
Black’s. He considered it a rich prospect – so rich, in fact, that he abandoned the patrol 
after it reached Porgera and headed back to Mt. Hagen on his own to plan his own patrol.
By the end of the war – spring 1949 – MacGregor was ready to lead a large-scale 
prospecting patrol into Porgera sponsored by Bulolo Gold Dredging. Bulolo Gold 
Dredging was the largest gold miner in Papua New Guinea before the war. Taxes and 
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royalties from Bulolo funded the government of New Guinea throughout the 1930s, and 
the business supplied jobs to natives and territorians alike (Healy 1967) – ironically, it 
was owned Placer Gold, and thus the Bulolo Gold Dredging patrol marks the beginning 
of Placer’s interest in Porgera. During the war their operations and facilities had been 
destroyed by retreating Australian forces in order to deny them to the Japanese. After the 
war they were attempting to rebuild, and MacGregor was able to convince company 
executives of Porgera’s potential. The government in Port Moresby was eager to 
encourage the company’s recovery, and MacGregor’s expedition had the blessing of the 
administration. 
The Bulolo Gold Dredging expedition was slow to get off the ground due to its 
size and complexity, and news of its plans spread through the territorian grapevine. A 
group of expatriates, including the Leahy brothers, Neptune Blood and John Black (who 
had both been to Porgera), Joe Searson (a kiap who had legal training and had worked 
with Dan Leahy during the war) and Doug Elphinstone (a pilot who could provide air 
support) formed a business group called the Strickland Syndicate and organized a quick 
patrol into Porgera to locate and peg claims before the Bulolo Gold Dredging expedition 
could reach the valley. The Strickland Syndicate required special permits and paperwork 
in order to enter what was then uncontrolled territory. They were aided in this by Jim 
Taylor who was both the officer in charge of issuing permits and a close friend of every 
member of the syndicate. Blood and Searson, still officially kiaps, submitted identical, 
one-line resignation letters a day before the patrol set off. Appropriately certified, the 
syndicate sped off to the edge of controlled territory to await the date the administration 
had set when prospecting in Porgera would be legal – 1 April 1949 (this and other 
information about the Strickland Syndicate is drawn from NLA MS 8346 Series 7 and 
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Papua New Guinea National Archives accession 61 Box 458).
At this point the administration heard about the syndicate. The punctilious Acting 
Director of the Department of District Services and Native Affairs, Ivan Champion, was 
furious. He felt it was disgraceful that two officers in a critically undermanned area 
should resign. He also felt that their permits were issued illegally – although on what 
basis is not clear. Finally, the intense rivalry between the Papuan civil service in which 
Champion worked and the New Guinea kiaps who participated in the syndicate may have 
played a role in antagonizing him as well. As a result, the nearest patrol post was radioed, 
and a cadet patrol officer was instructed to march out to the syndicate’s camp and order 
them to return. 
When the patrol officer arrived at the camp on 31 March 1949, he found himself 
face to face with some of the most experienced patrol officers in New Guinea, the very 
people whose travel writings and popular accounts of their journeys influenced cadet 
patrol officers like him to join the service in the first place. Faced with such opposition, 
his attempt to personate the government failed. Searson  -- the groups legal expert -- 
pointed out that their group had met all legal formalities, and suggested that the scrap of 
paper with pencil notes from a wireles transmission that the cadet claimed to be from 
Ivan Champion – items without a seal or signature – hardly constituted an official signal 
from Acting Director of the Department of District Services and Native Affairs. Michael 
Leahy suggested that the entire incident was an elaborate April Fool’s  joke. The cadet, 
they decided, was merely impersonating the government. The group marched on to 
Porgera. 
Eventually Champion flew to Wabag himself and sent a properly authorized 
patrol to recover the syndicate, although they arrived after the syndicate had a chance to 
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look Porgera over. Sure enough, the results were as Taylor and Black had predicted – the 
valley was a wash. The syndicate returned, defeated. Searson decided to stay on and try 
his luck in Porgera, the Leahys returned to their businesses, and Black went south to start 
a farm. Neptune Blood was left holding the bag – his attempt to convince Champion to 
give him back his job failed, and he was forced to become the head of an experimental 
sheep farm funded by an Australian refrigerator magnate (Baglin 1988). 
As brief as this incident was, it was to have profound repercussions in the history 
of the valley. It represents the uneasy relationship between law, personation, and the 
balance of power on the ground that grew to be typical of the valley’s history: an 
authority based in a distant metropole claimed to be, and failed to be, the force which 
created rules which had a regimenting force on the conduct of people living at a physical 
remove from it. Agents claiming to speak for the state failed to do so convincingly. And 
yet it is not as if the members of the syndicate denied the power or legitimacy of the state. 
They were careful to follow the letter of the law in both the manner of their resignation, 
the manner in which they acquired paperwork, and their waiting until the proper deadline 
of derestriction to march into the valley. They were planning to prospect the valley and 
submit legitimate requests for mining leases. Indeed, they hoped to fend off a large 
multinational mining company by  establishing an earlier, legal claim to the land. 
What we see in the incident surrounding the Strickland Syndicate is not a 
situation where the state’s power and existence is unproblematically assumed – far from 
it. But neither do we have a situation in which the binding power of notions such as ‘the 
state’ are reduced to the arbitrary self-interest of actors who simply to pursue the most 
pragmatic, hardheaded course to the maximization of their own benefits. The idea of the 
state and the idea of the law had a structuring power on action in the highlands which 
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could not be ignored by the syndicate – indeed, it hoped to enroll it to its own end. But, 
contra Scott, the representation and personation of the state was hazardous, and in this 
particular instance a young man lacked the will to stand up to older, more experienced 
colleagues. What counted as order and what did not, what was ‘legal’ and what was not 
were decided, and the method by which law and the state could be construed – all of this 
was up for negotiation, even while the terms involved (state, law, and so forth) were not. 
It was not the last time access to Porgera’s gold would hinge on such a dynamic of 
‘reality management’
Porgera as an Uncontrolled Area
The sociology and epistemology of Porgera grew more complex in the 1950s. As 
I mentioned above, between 1948 and 1962 the valley was declared a ‘restricted’ area. 
Declaring areas restricted was the main way that the Australian administration dealt with 
the task of ruling a territory and population that it simply lacked the capacity to handle. 
The expedient had a long history under both German and British administrations and was 
continued by Australia in the years after the war: interior areas of the island were labeled 
uncontrolled and set off-limits for all white non-government employees. This was meant 
to maintain the safety of whites, who were susceptible to indigenous violence, and blacks, 
who were susceptible to introduced white illnesses.  Whites who did want to enter 
restricted areas needed special passes approved on a case by case basis by a local kiap.
The process by which uncontrolled areas were opened up to outsiders was 
straightforward. Kiaps based at government stations in controlled areas led semiannual 
patrols into restricted areas trying to stop violence, heal sick people, take censuses, 
distribute steel tools, and so forth.  After some time, these patrols would find a suitable 
location for a new government station. This station would be built – typically with an 
181
airstrip – and the area around it would be derestricted, allowing the people who wanted to 
get in – typically missionaries and miners -- to settle there. This new station would then 
serve as the point from which kiaps could begin patrolling even more distant areas. 
Ideally, the process would be repeated until the entire highlands were under 
administration control. By 1948 the post-war era administrative responsibility for Porgera 
had moved west from its original seat in Goroka to Hagen, and then to Wabag. In 1952, 
Laiagam was chosen as the site of a government station, and became the administrative 
center for patrols to Porgera. Throughout its time as a restricted territory, then, for 
Porgerans the government was noticeable largely by its absence. This was not the case, 
however, for miners.
Alluvial Miners
The presence of gold in the valley meant that Porgera would have a 
fundamentally different experience of contact than other areas in Enga. The fact that 
white men – and soon, black men – would come to Porgera to work gold created a set of 
organizational imperatives which had wide ranging sociological and epistemological 
implications. While the government did devote more resources to governing the valley 
than it would have had it not been a source of gold, it still lacked the capacity to suppress 
violence and create a situation in Porgera sufficiently stable for mining to take place. 
Despite the attempts of distant whites to control and regulate mining in the valley, it 
would be the miners on the ground and not the visiting kiaps who would come to know 
Porgera’s alluvials and its people. Miners would be responsible for keeping their 
operations socially feasible without a great deal of help from the government.
As a result, the fifties saw the continued growth of  that class of middlemen who 
got their start during the exploration period. Previously translators and guides, these men 
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now mediated between the Ipili whose labor was necessary to wrest gold from Porgera’s 
rivers and the whites who sold the gold they worked. They were responsible for creating 
and deploying knowledge about the valley, its gold, and its people that was concrete and 
practical – they kept the peace, kept the workers working, and made sure that gold got to 
market. They conceived of themselves as middle-men who bridged a gap between two 
different ‘cultures’ -- white men who specialized in dealing with black, and black men 
who specialized in dealing with white. But in fact they were less people at the edge of 
their culture looking out to another than they were the points of articulation through 
which both passed and a third emerged.
These men who ‘knew about the Porgera’ crystallized and formed a distinct social 
network, a group I have referred to elsewhere (borrowing a phrase from Meg Taylor) as 
“Medici of the Highlands.” They were powerful and influential and had multiple business 
interests spread across the highlands. They formed a small but powerful elite who filled 
the vacuum of power and commerce that existed in the highlands in the period between 
first contact and widespread development. This group had a sociality that was sui generis: 
they were the first white men who had married highlands women, and the first to take up 
leases on land in what would become Goroka and plant coffee. They were the first Huli, 
Porgerans, and Engans who agreed to be trained as medical orderlies, translators, and 
labor overseers, throwing in their lot with their white rulers in anticipation of a better life. 
Consider the small world connections of this period: Jim Taylor was the kiap who 
accompanied Mick and Dan Leahy during their initial exploration of the Mt. Hagen area. 
Later Dan was to marry two sisters from Hagen while Jim Taylor settled down in Goroka 
with his own Papua New Guinean wife. Joe Searson had served with Dan during the war, 
and sent his own interracial son to live with Dan and his children in Hagen. Searson 
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worked leases in Porgera, which were later transferred to Taylor, and Dan’s nephews 
(also half Papua New Guinean) were the main gold buyers in Porgera when I lived there. 
Jim’s daughter Meg, a former ambassador to the United States, visited Porgera as a child 
and played polo with George Brugh, whose Australian father oversaw Searson’s leases 
and whose mother was Porgeran, the sister of the Elder Brugh’s overseer, who was, with 
his sons, one of my closest friends in Porgera. I even made a point of clearing away the 
weeds at Jim Brugh’s grave at the old graveyard in Goroka in order to take a picture for 
the people back in Porgera so that they would know where he was buried. Like the 
Leahy’s, George would later work in Porgera.
As the example of the Leahys and the Brughs indicates, by the time of my 
fieldwork  this network of pioneers and their children was functioning much as it had 
fifty years earlier with the notable exception that it was now one anthropologist larger. 
This group, in sum, had its origin in the post-war highlands, and continues to operate as 
business men, entrepreneurs, and culture brokers much as it did fifty years earlier. It was 
these networks of kinship and consociation – intensely personal and often incestuously 
small – that were responsible for so much of the action that occurred in the highlands. 
Personalistic ties, rather than one’s ability to personate a legitimate institution, would 
come to be crucial in keeping plantation and mining operations in the highlands feasible.
Although a temporary patrol post was established in Porgera after the Strickland 
Syndicate affair, it was shut down when both the syndicate and Bulolo Gold Dredging’s 
expedition both came up empty. The administration would not have a permanent 
presence in the valley for another ten years. This left Joe Searson to try his hand working 
gold in Porgera and, after applying for the necessary permits, he became the only white 
man living in New Guinea between Wabag and Telefomin. Searson took up two leases at 
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Porgera, one at the junction of the Kaiyia and the Pongema rivers (where Black had first 
discovered gold) and another on the Kakai (where Taylor and Black had set up a sluice 
when they returned to the valley). This site on the Kakai was further up the watershed, 
and close to the Mt. Warokari, which would later be traced as the source of Porgera’s 
alluvials and the mountain ridge beneath which the Porgera ore body was located. Soon 
another miner named Jim Brugh began working the Kakai claim on Searson’s behalf 
while he lived and worked on the Pongema. 
Between 1948 and 1951 Searson lived in Porgera with an Engan woman, and 
Brugh was soon – and without his Australian wife’s knowledge – to take a up residence 
with a local Porgeran woman, the sister of one of his foremen. It is not clear if Searson 
and Brugh were aware just how quickly the steel axes, machettes, and shells that they 
paid their workers were turned into bridewealth. Nor is it clear that they were aware that 
helping a young man amass bridewealth was customarily the role of an elder brother or 
uncle. What is clear is that Ipili understood the way that confluence of kinship and 
business immediately and worked hard to supply women to the powerful white outsiders 
who came to live with them – a trend that I would be one of the few to buck. It was 
during this time that Kurubu’s uncle would come to Porgera, and that Busane would 
settle at Yunatilima.
In 1951 Searson left Porgera in order to make a go of farming when the first 
agricultural leases in Goroka were issued (Downs 1980:179). He was tired of the minimal 
returns and incredible work it was necessary to put into Porgera. His leases on the Kaiyia 
were transferred to Jim Taylor, now a private citizen and Medici. In 1957 Brugh – who 
had lost his hand while trying to save his dog from a stick of lit dynamite it had unwisely 
chosen to fetch – slipped and fell during the course of one of the fearsome walks he 
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periodically took from Porgera to Laiagam to buy supplies. Thrusting its stump into the 
ground, he swore the small round hole it left was the last Porgera would ever see of him. 
He left to pursue coffee in Goroka as well, and took his two children with him. 
Searson and Brugh had lived in the valley and took the arduous, week-long hike 
to Wabag to buy supplies only when necessary. Taylor, on the other hand, was fully 
occupied with his growing estate in Goroka. Every two months or so he would travel to 
Laiagam (or, in the early period, Wabag), take gold from his leases, and pay his workers 
in steel, cloth, and other sorts of good with which they were acquainted. He would remain 
a figure of myth and might for Porgerans, and his absence, along with that of Brugh and 
Searson, created a void into which Papua New Guineans stepped.
The Legal Status of Early Mining
Technically, the laws governing Searson’s leases were covered under the mining 
act. In 1948, Papua New Guinea’s mining laws were essentially unchanged from those 
passed to deal with the Edie Creek gold rush in Morobe in the late 1920s. By law, any 
expatriate with an easily-obtained mining license could apply for a mining permit from 
the government. This allowed them to stake claims on land after submitting a simple one-
page form and a sketch map of the area in question. This is in fact what Searson did. 
Miners also lodged a deposit with the local kiap, who could then distribute it to any 
‘natives’ (a legal term) in compensation for any damage done to their land. The kiap, in 
his role as line-officer for the Department of Lands and Mines and Surveying, was 
responsible for deciding whether mining activity disrupted the life of natives on whose 
land mining was carried out. There were no cadastral records – land was surveyed for the 
lease, but not to determine traditional ownership.
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Legally, the relationship between white miners and Ipili workers would change 
over the years. In 1964, for instance, Taylor technically transformed his leases to a 
tributary system. But these legal shifts were little more than formal reframings of facts on 
the ground which had little to no effect on actual practice. Practice, from the Porgeran 
view, remained identical throughout the history of alluvial workings. Teams of workers, 
typically around two dozen or so, would working alluvial deposits in gangs, forcing water 
through sluices and breaking up larger rocks with crowbars and hammers. This gold ore – 
it was not, I believe, typically processed – was put into empty coffee cans. When the 
coffee can was filled – which typically took two months or so -- it would be taken to a 
white man who would pay them for it in textiles, axes, machetes and – in the early period 
– shells. 
These work groups were overseen by a group of men who could communicate 
with whites using Tok Pisin, and convey their wishes to the work gangs. Although these 
men were sometimes Porgeran, many were not. In addition to the Gorokan men who 
Searson and Brugh would occasionally leave in charge of their camps when they left the 
valley for supplies, there were also a group of people Enga and Huli speakers – most of 
them Huli, actually – who used their ability as translators and guides to establish a local 
power base in Porgera.
The origin of these men varied. Some, like Kuala, has been taken out of Porgera 
with Black and Taylor. Others had come over from Paiela. But a strong core of these men 
were Huli, and were taken out of Tari by Dan Leahy in 1945 during his time as an officer 
in New Guinea’s military administration. By that time it had been a decade since the 
discovery of the Tari basin by Jack Hides (Schieffelin and Crittendon 1991) and the 
government still had no body of translators and guides to communicate with that large 
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population. Dan Leahy, now a volunteer in the army, led the patrol to Tari to collect 
young men (children, really) to volunteer to be taken out on that patrol and be taught Tok 
Pisin at the Mt. Hagen station. These men were then used by parties heading out west to 
Porgera. This included men like Ipape Papume, Busane, and others who managed Jim 
Brugh’s line of workers, and especially Tongope, perhaps the most powerful man in 
Porgera for decades. While Searson and Brugh lived in the valley, Taylor met his workers 
in Laigam. Tongope was the man who oversaw his operations and became one of the 
most important men in the valley, setting standards for wearing clothes, eating tinned 
fish, and using his power and wealth to marry multiple wives which are emulated even 
today. As we have seen, some of these local corodinators In the case of Brugh, local 
coordinators would establish themselves via kinship connections to whites. As Huli, these 
men came from a dominant ethnic group whose language Porgerans could speak, and 
they were also familiar with Tok Pisin. Often they did not learn Ipili. Tongope’s Ipili, for 
instance, never became very good. In many ways they were recreating indigenous 
patterns of coalition formation and bigmanship.
Government Patrols
While miners proved important to life in the valley the government was was not 
completely absent in Porgera in the 1950s. After the short-lived Porgera patrol post 
closed, Porgera was visited more or less biannually until 1962 by a small number of 
kiaps. It was from them that the most widely disseminated understandings of ‘who the 
Ipili are’ and ‘what they were like’ was generated. This was true despite the fact that 
these kiaps were not particularly knowledgeable about Porgera and the people living 
there. Nor were they particularly successful at census, pacification, or the other activities 
which it was their duty to discharge. The Porgeran experience of state representatives was 
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more of powerful, easily fooled individuals than of impersonal agents of a powerful big 
actor called ‘the state.’
The administration of the Ipili through patrols was unsuccessful. The Ipili’s first 
experience of ‘the government’ was that it could be manipulated to serve local ends – a 
lesson they would not forget about a circumstance that would not change. The early Ipili 
attitude to the government is best summarized by J.R. Hicks. Although speaking of 
Paielans shortly after government patrols began in their valley in 1964, it summarizes 
what Porgerans generally felt about the government during an equivalent period in their 
own pacification:
Concerning  the  ethos  of  the  Pai’ela  [sic]  people  I  gradually  came  to  the 
conclusion that he regards himself as a superior being to the European, in fact as 
being superior to any other race of people. The superior material possessions 
and powers of Europeans are nonchalantly passed away as being essential to the 
white man for him to survive, whereas he, the Pai’ela, needs only a garden of 
sweet potato, his axe and a bow to exist (Porgera #1, 64/65).
Throughout this period Ipili attempted to co-opt government patrols for their own 
internal political ends while satisfying government demands for peaceability through 
simple dissembling. In 1951 M. Brightwell noted that “the patrol being completely free 
from the usual minor complaints and disputes, and the natives in, what I suspect to be, a 
transitional stage of tranquility” (Wabag #2, 51/52). A year later B. Corrigan wrote that 
“The Ivi [Ipili] are now happily at peace. Not so very many years ago the Ivi were from 
time to time devastated by the hordes from the upper and lower reaches of the Porgera… 
the last raid of any consequence took place some years ago.” Corrigan concludes that 
“unless there is a conspiracy to conceal crime, and this I very much doubt, everyone 
seems to be living in harmony and are at peace” (Wabag #5, 51/52). Brightwell’s 
suspicions proved to be much more on the mark than Corrigan’s happy prognosis. 
Indeed, it is clear from the record that just such a conspiracy was taking place. Two years 
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after Corrigan’s patrol Denys Faithful records that 
The natives still live dangerously. They are continually having intertribal fights. 
During a court sitting made on the Patrol we heard that the habit of these natives 
is as follows. When Europeans are in the area they discard their arms. When 
Europeans leave the area they all carry them again (Laiagam #1, 54/55).
Government patrols were indirectly implicated in tribal fighting, as murderers and 
other people in danger of revenge killings would willingly give themselves up to be 
jailed. Ipili experience of the rule of law, from their first encounter with it, taught them 
that law and the actors who enforced it were tools to be manipulated, not impersonal 
forces which regimented action.
“Their general contempt of Government influence,” wrote K. Graham in 1956, 
is shown by their attitude to courts. The standing joke in this area is to advise an 
aggrieved party to ‘go and make a court.’ Their attitude to prison is much the 
same,  and  is  illustrated  by  the  alacrity  the  chief  troublemakers  present 
themselves to be taken into custody (Laiagam #3, 55/56).
Four years later in a memo on a patrol, RS Bell noted that “the only good thing 
about Porgera murders is that there is usually very little difficulty in arresting the 
culprit… murderers are more than willing to be arrested and taken out of the area for a 
period of time” (Laiagam #2, 59/60). In the same year Graeme Hogg noted that “it has 
apparently been the usual practice for murderers to give themselves up in order to escape 
the local consequence of their actions – pay-back killings. Not only does Perari’s [a 
murderer] evasion of the patrol introduce new tactics to the locally accepted norm in such 
cases, he also exhibits the ease with which malefactors may escape the long arm of the 
law in such areas such as this.” (Laiagam #4, 56/60).
The period of patrols also resulted in the first anthropological knowledge about 
the valley. In February 1957 Mervyn Meggitt accompanied an administration patrol into 
Porgera and became the first anthropologist to visit the valley. The ethnographic report he 
attached to the patrol report was published later that year in Oceania (Meggitt 1957). 
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Meggitt’s visit to Porgera was part of his larger project of mapping out the ethnic groups 
of Enga province and the report, like other pieces by him, was the first to document 
ethnographically the area between Wabag and Telefomin. His piece on the Ipili became 
the first published scholarship on that group and as such it had a definitizing effect. The 
ethnic identity and placenames of Porgerans were hazy before Meggitt’s trip. After it, 
‘Ipili’ instantly becomes adopted as the ethnonym of the people of the valley, and 
‘Porgera’ becomes the definitive name of the valley itself. This convention, which as we 
have seen was actually incorrect, was immediately adopted in all official reports. Only 
among native police do we find people still referring to the Ipili as the ‘Ipi.’
We can thus see that there was a distinction made very early on in the valley’s 
history between the people living and working on the ground in Porgera and the 
government officers who were officially charged with controlling life in the valley and 
making it, as Scott would put it, ‘legible.’ Ironically, it was the latter who were the least 
familiar with day-to-day affairs there. This was to become one of the enduring traits of 
Porgeran history -- the people who know the most about the valley and worked hardest to 
make mining operations (in this case alluvial ones) feasible were those with strong 
personal connections to people in Porgera and elsewhere, and not those acting as 
representatives of the government. In the fifties white miners and black middlemen 
became specialists in working gold and managing Porgerans, but it was the patrolling 
kiaps who made the first sketch maps of the valley, carried out the first censuses, and 
made possible the first ethnographic reports. The kiaps, in other words, were the ones 
who generated the texts about Porgera which would circulate back at the metropole even 
as the miners were the people who had control ‘on the ground.’
Indigenous Miners
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By the late 1950s Ipili began working gold for themselves. In May 1958 Puluku 
Poke made history by becoming the first Porgeran to sell gold directly to the government 
when he traveled to Laiagam and sold 14.4 ounces of fine gold to the kiap there, who 
weighed it out on a postage scale. Puluku had previously left Paiela to go to Goroka, 
where he worked as one of Searson’s domestic servants. After watching indigenous small 
scale mining in the Eastern highlands he returned to Porgera, used his knowledge of the 
outside world and the power associated with it as a middleman,  and began mining in the 
lower part of the valley. A second miner named Pawe Lembopa was soon to follow. He 
was an Engan who had been taken from his family as a child and trained as a medical 
orderly. After traveling around, he too saw gold being worked by indigenous people and 
when he settled down in Porgera he began working gold as well. By 1962, when the 
valley was derestricted, over twenty men had licenses to work gold and sell it to the 
administration.
Indigenous gold miners were not a new thing for the colonial government. 
Indigenous people had been working gold in Papua New Guinea since the late 1890s, 
when Misimans began working over claims abandoned by white prospectors (Nelson 
1976:41). By the 1950s the government’s official policy was to encourage this sort of 
activity since it introduced Papua New Guineans to the cash economy, accustomed them 
to a work schedule and ethic that was considered civilized and morally uplifting, and was 
a way to exploit mineral fields that were unprofitable for whites. By 1957 the department 
of mines estimated that there were 5,000 ‘native’ miners in Papua New Guinea, centered 
mostly on fields in the Sepik, Morobe, and Bougainville.
The regulations which governed ‘native mining’ were more or less identical to 
those which governed white miners. Natives could apply for the same sorts of leases as 
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whites, could sell gold in the same way as whites, and were bound by the same forms of 
adjudication under the mining warden. The main difference between natives and 
expatriates was the different method of registration used for each.
In 1959 Puluku brought another parcel to Laiagam for sale. This one was worth 
₤597. This was too large an amount to be ignored, and the kiap suspected that Puluku was 
illegally working gold on one of the leases held by Jim Taylor. Puluku was flown to Mt. 
Hagen – then the district headquarters – where his case was heard by a judge. Puluku was 
in fact working an area below Taylors’, and explained this to the judge. He was acquitted, 
and a patrol was designated to visit Porgera to stake the limits of his claim. 
Unfortunately, the patrol into the valley was so grueling that by the time the mining 
warden reached Porgera his feet were too blistered for him to stand, and he was too 
exhausted to do any work. Thus was the government’s exercise of power defeated by the 
fallibility of its personators.
With Puluku’s success more imitators followed, and there was increasing 
competition between indigenous gold miners, as well as between gold minders and the 
people who occupied the land they were working. By May 1960 the situation had become 
so convoluted that a kiap noted that “the native mining situation has degenerated into a 
seething mass of intrigue.”  Upon entry into Porgera the kiap was besieged with requests 
for exclusive permission to work gold in various parts of the valley. While it is not clear 
whether the kiap himself has the legal ability to settle claims in uncontrolled areas, he 
claimed that he did not, and that a mining warden would have to visit Porgera. This 
happened two months later when another patrol was led into the valley which included 
the chief of the Division of Mines and N.C. Robinson, the Native Field Assistant for 
Mining, who specialized in educating and organizing indigenous people.
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The court case at issue in 1960 boiled down to a rivalry between Puluku and 
Kuala, Taylor and Black’s interpreter in 1939. Both claimed to be legitimate claim 
holders over the same area of the Pongema. However neither were native ‘landowners’ in 
the sense that an Australian might use the term – Kuala was an Engan who had lived 
briefly with distant relatives elsewhere in Porgera before joining Taylor and Black, while 
Puluku had distant consanguineal ties to the land in question. 
Under the law, indigenous peoples’ right to work gold was based on being the 
first to stake a claim to a particular area, and not their own status as indigenous owners of 
that particular area. Puluku and other gold miners, in other words, couched their claim to 
work gold not in terms of indigenous authenticity, but in the same colonial framework 
that whites used to expropriate land from Papua New Guineans. This was, after all, the 
strategy that had worked for Puluku in Hagen, and was doubtless something that he 
claimed to other Porgerans gave him legitimacy. While land was held to be in ‘customary 
tenure,’ rights to mining – even for indigenous people – were not. Puluku was thus using 
colonial law, but shaping it to his own ends – a manipulation that would become 
increasingly common in Porgera’s history.
Kuala had only a limited range of options under the law as it existed at the time. If 
he was in fact the ‘owner’ of the land in question, Kuala was entitled only to receive 
compensation for the damage his land had received during the course of mining. In 
addition, he could bring a complaint to the mining warden who could consider revoking 
the lease but given the paternalistic nature of Australian law, Kuala’s consent was not 
required for mining to occur. Nor would it ever be likely that Puluku’s claim be revoked 
and given over to Kuala. Obviously, if Kuala argued for the revocation of Puluku’s 
license on the grounds that it was damaging his land resumption of land-damaging 
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activity, even by Kuala himself, was not an option. There was, to put it simply, no link 
between indigenous rights to land and rights to mine it.
The result of the case was a decision which was not in accordance with the law 
deeply fitting with Porgera’s rapidly-emerging history of rule-by-compromise. After a 
period of negotiation it was decided that Puluku would divide his claim into several 
smaller areas and give other miners the right to work them in exchange for a one-time 
payment of 30 pounds per claim. Woods, the chief of the department of mining, noted 
that 
The apparent ‘sale’ of portions of Puruk’s [Puluku’s] claim is not in accordance with the 
Mining or other Ordinances relating to transfer of land, but it does conform to local 
indigenous conceptions of compensation. To have redistributed the claim without 
requiring compensation would have implied official sanction to the illegal pressures 
applied by the applicant miners. Reports of all previous patrols to the Porgera, and the 
report of an anthropological study agree in reference to killing and violence as the 
common method of adjusting disputes. In view of this it was felt that the duty of this 
patrol lay in the resolution of tension rather than in the illustration of a system of law 
foreign to the concepts of such primitive people. The actions taken to resolve the tension 
were frankly expedient measures, to be interpreted within the existing local concepts of 
justice rather than in relation to existing statutory legislation (Papua New Guinea 
National Archives asscession 52).
Expedient it may have been, but it also proved to be precedent setting. It taught 
Porgerans that the law of the government was something that could be negotiated with 
and not merely submitted to, and it taught the government to couch novel legal 
arrangements in terms of ‘local indigenous conceptions.’ The idea that a decision could 
be made on the ground to keep the peace and the legalities could be worried about later 
would become the modus operandi of the entire valley. As would happen again and again 
in the history of the valley, an arrangement would be made which would keep mining in 
the valley feasible, and a narrative would be created afterwards which would tell a story 
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of law, legality, and the state to distant whites. The intervention of the mining warden 
marked the introduction of a new layer of government control to the valley, but it also 
demonstrated to Porgerans exactly how seriously the idea of ‘the government’ could be 
taken. Thus by the time the Porgera mine had to be negotiated into existence, Ipili had 
been litigating against each other and outsiders for three decades. The Ipili experience of 
government, then, taught them to see the person, not the big actor they were personating.
As a result of the court case, Robinson began actively working with local miners 
in Porgera such as the rapidly-rising Mangape, Nixon’s father. Most spectacularly, this 
included a paid airplane trip to Lae and other ‘outside centers’ so Porgerans could get 
some idea of their situation in the world. Robinson’s final notes on the trip captures in a 
nutshell the Ipili’s unruly expansive nature and the administration’s inability to enforce a 
rigorous application of the law:
It is yet too early to positively state any direct benefit derived by the Porgera Natives who 
journeyed and observed much during their conducted tour of the outside centers. In one 
instance a remarkable change was obvious in a native who had previously not traveled 
farther than Laiagam. On his return to the Porgera he immediately appealed to me for 
assistance and is now set up mining gold in his own right on a registered claim. Another 
had no sooner stepped from the aircraft when he seriously assaulted his “meri” [wife] 
with a piece of timber and was sentenced to two months prison detention (Papua New 
Guinea National Archives 52 box 3025).
In sum we can say by the 1950s that Porgera was on the map. Its location was 
known, the ethnic identity of its inhabitants established, and a few place names and some 
rough geological data was known. The valley’s interaction with the world was marked by 
three things. First, a powerful class of middlemen had emerged who were responsible for 
getting things done in the valley and who relied on their own personalistic ties to 
accomplish their aims. Second, the government proved to be ineffective in gaining the 
same sort of capacity in the valley. As a result, third, Ipili began their experience of 
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governance recognizing its fundamental weakness and manipulability rather than its 
strength. As a result indigenous people were encouraged to exercise their own agency 
through in a variety of different arenas, including legal forums.
Derestriction
The Porgera airstrip was completed on 15 May 1961, and the Porgera government 
station upgraded from an outpost to a permanent patrol post on 1 July 1962. This meant 
that Porgera was no longer a restricted area – a kiap would be stationed there at all time, 
and whites could come and go from the valley without applying for a special permit. This 
had several effects, most notably the introduction of Christianity to the valley and the 
beginning of more intensive exploitation of Porgera’s gold resource. Both of these trends 
marked an increasing regimentation of knowledge about the valley – to a certain extent.
In the 1960s gold mining had expanded in scope. Taylor’s leases were still 
functioning under Tongope’s direction. The number of small scale miners also grew, as 
did their regulation by the administration. In addition to bi-monthly visits by Robinson, a 
permanent native mining warden was stationed in the valley. This man was Ludwig 
‘Ludi’ Schmidt Jr., the son of the infamous Austrian prospector Ludwig Schmidt, the 
only white man ever to be hanged in Papua New Guinea for his treatment of the locals 
(Mennis 1979).
Theoretically, Schmidt was the terminal node in a chain of command that 
stretched back to Port Moresby – he was the was man on the ground who represented a 
distant source of authority which controlled mining. Realistically he was, like kiaps or 
indigenous translators, a local whose power in the valley hinged on his ability to interface 
with distant whites as well as locals. He soon became part of the growing Porgeran high 
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society, an incorporation indexed by the fact that he moved in with Joe Searson when he 
first came to take up his position in the valley. Searson had returned to Porgera after 
giving up on coffee farming. His goal now was large-scale mining: now that Porgera was 
derestricted he could take out exploration leases and begin examining the prospects for a 
large gold mine. Like many before him, Ludi would also develop relationships with 
Porgeran women, and his son by one of them worked for the mine during my time in the 
valley.
Finally, throughout the sixties the middlemen who had grown to prominence a 
decade earlier attempted to cement their position as elites – wealth from gold was causing 
social stratification. Men like Tongope. Puluku Poke was the defacto ruler of the lower 
Porgera, while a coalition of three or four powerful translators took up power on the 
upper Porgera, around the old Kakai workings.
Theoretically, government control in Porgera went hand in hand with increased 
knowledge of the valley. And yet official state projects often had little or no effect on life 
in Porgera. It was in the 1960s, for instance, that the first definitive mapping of the valley 
took place. Prior to 1939 no large-scale organized survey of Papua or New Guinea had 
been done (Sinclair 2001), and while the war had produced an improvised attempt to map 
large areas of the country, it was not until the 1950s that this survey was systematized 
and completed, something that would not be achieved until the 1960s. Porgera was 
included in part of this enterprise, when in roughly 1962 the Division of National 
Mapping of the Department of National Development of Australia surveyed the 
highlands as part of a project to make a complete set of 1:100,000 topographical maps of 
Papua New Guinea. This work was carried out by Australian government representatives 
rather than subalterns of the New Guinea administration (Sinclair 2001:291-292). These 
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maps continue to be used today throughout Papua New Guinea and are readily available 
from Papua New Guinea’s National Mapping Bureau. 
On the one hand, these maps were a pictorial representation of Porgera which 
could be disseminated and understood by distant whites. Because of their accuracy and 
integration into a literally global frame of reference these maps allowed accurate 
navigation for aircraft, provided administrators a way to locate centers of population, and 
displayed topographic information that allowed engineers to plot roads. However, here 
again we have an instance of seeming standardization, but once again we see the informal 
mechanisms which guided life in the valley. 
Aviation in New Guinea was an informal affair to say the least, and pilots who 
flew from Laiagam to Porgera Station or the Kolombi strip in Paiela followed routes 
which were obvious and dictated by the extreme geography of the area. Typically, 
aviators would circle about Laiagam to gain altitude, and then enter Porgera by a well-
known pass. In cases of inclement weather (not uncommon), there was a southern route 
known as the ‘bad-weather’ route (Barnard 1969:88-89). Navigation in Porgera was 
based on local landmarks and a knowledge of geography that was communicated via 
informal face-to-face interaction rather than extensive mapping.
Travel within and out of the valley was relatively untouched by mapping as well. 
The traditional trade route used by Ipili to travel from the western edge of the valley to 
the salt springs at Pipiraka had been used by Taylor and Black and continued to be used 
people traveling in and out of the valley. It was well known and relatively well traversed, 
but various attempts to turn the rough bush track into a road were essentially unsuccessful 
– the terrain was simply too rugged. Even after the valley itself had some well-developed 
roads, the first car in Porgera had to be carried in on peoples’ shoulders. Indeed, with the 
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creation of the airstrip air travel, rather than walking, became the main method of 
entering and leaving the valley. Thus despite the panoptic potentialities of a new regime 
of mapping, life in Porgera continued much as it had before 
The prospecting that began in the sixties expanded in the 1970s. After a few false 
starts Anaconda took up rights to drill on Searson’s leases and began a medium scale 
alluvial operation intended to offset exploration costs. As would come to be the case in 
much of Porgera’s history, it proved to be the person on the ground, rather than the 
company, who would come to have a large impact on the valley. Rudi Jezernik, a Czech 
national, became Anaconda’s man on the spot, and continued to live in the valley for the 
next fifteen years. Jezernik became one of the Porgera elite, and constituted one of the 
main links in the social networks that flowed through Porgera.
The community of expats who lived permanently in the valley was now steadily 
growing. In addition to Jezernik, Searson, and Shcmidt there was the local Catholic priest 
(other churches were run by indigenous pastors), the kiap, and a few mine workers. In at 
least one case the mine workers were kiaps who had jumped ship from the government 
and gone into mining in Porgera. This communities solidarity was evinced in its 
commensality – a small private club was built on the crest of the Warokari summit and 
christened the ‘Porgera Heights Country Club.’ Originally members could simply take 
beers from the refrigerator and make a tick by their name and settle account later, but 
soon people were making ticks against other people’s names and Rudi was forced to 
actively tend bar.
Throughout the 1970s, then, the valley became more and more tightly engaged 
with institutions that existed beyond its borders. Mining companies hired official 
representatives, the Catholic church opened a permanent mission post, a kiap existed to 
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provide law and order, and a native mining warden oversaw indigenous alluvial 
workings. But however much these people were meant to personate distant big actors, 
they became part of a tight-knit community where roles could and did overlap. Thus 
outside forces such as mining companies and the government still relied on the distinct 
character and personalities of their representatives rather than their authority as agents of 
legitimate and effective institutions to get things done around the valley. Technically, for 
instance, Anaconda – and later Mt. Isa Mines – had purchased and taken out a number of 
alluvial leases throughout Porgera, and local people who brought gold to them (in the 
form of their agent, Rudi) to be weighed and assayed were technically operating on a 
tributary basis. As far as Porgerans were concerned, however, Rudi was merely another 
gold buyer like Searson and Brugh before him. Porgerans did not connect his personation 
of Anaconda or Mt. Isa Mines to his role as owner and operator the alluvial workings 
where they also occasionally worked. Nor were they particularly clear that he was the 
representative of a foreign business. The Catholic priest also administered first aid, 
making him similar to the government medical orderlies from whom Porgerans received 
medical treatment. In addition he began – at their request – one of the first stores in the 
valley. Indeed, as we shall see business and religion were always closely linked in the 
Ipili imagination. The mining warden was not only the official face of the law, his 
romantic liaisons with local woman also made him an affine in the minds of many 
prominent Porgerans.
While the 1970s was a time of expansion of white power and presence, it marked 
the zenith of the incipient elite who had grown so powerful in Porgera. More and more 
people were working gold, more and more of them spoke Tok Pisin, and more and more 
the deeply-seated egalitarianism of Ipili culture began to kick against the consolidated 
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power of Porgera’s middlemen. In 1971 or 1972 this was made particularly clear during 
the public and fantastically graphic decapitation slaying of Mangape, the father of 
Yakatabari negotiator Nixon.
Mangape was originally from Tari, but had left the valley early on like Tongope, 
Ipape, Busane, and others. He had eventually settled in Porgera and affiliated himself 
with the Tiyini clan on the basis of shared residence and a tenuous genealogical tie – his 
father’s mother’s brother’s wife’s mother was a Tiyini woman. Mangape was a forceful 
personality and one of the few people in the valley who could speak Tok Pisin, and so 
was quickly became accepted as one of the Tiyini. Mangape was one of the Medici, and 
was one of the seventeen men who had received the first mining leases from Robinson in 
1960. When the government arrived in the valley, he was appointed Luluai. His personal 
extensive personal network included ‘Chief’ Ambi Kipu, the son of Kipu Aiyengi (one of 
the prophets associated with the serpent Kupiane), who occupied a similar role as leader 
of the Tuanda at Apalaka – in fact we have met him previously in the Yakatabari 
negotiations. Between the two of them, they exerted enormous power over the people of 
the upper Porgera. Mangape was a polygynist as well, with one wife from Paiela, and 
another whose sister Tongope had married. In Ipili society, two unrelated men who marry 
sisters are called timutale and are typically close. As a result, Mangape had close ties 
with the most important man in the Mungalep area. Most importantly, Mangape was a 
good friend of Joe Searson and Ludi Schmidt. Both lived on Tiyini land and both had 
married women (in Searson’s case, two) related to Mangape. Mangape had thus 
established a security circle that spanned the Paiela and Porgera, included prominent 
Porgerans and – the ultimate coup – counted two white men as his affines.
As it turned out, he was too successful. A plot was hatched among the Tiyini to 
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kill Mangape and so equalize power in the upper Porgera. During pandanus season, 
someone stole some of Mangape’s pandanus nuts from trees growing in the upper rain 
forest. In Porgera stealing highly valued pandanus is a particularly egregious act. 
Mangape was outraged. A group of young men from the area were framed for the act and 
Mangape scheduled a public hearing to deal with them.
Ipili conspirators typically warn a man who is about to be killed through a kokoli  
-- words and symbols with hidden meanings. The first of these came for Mangape the 
night before the hearing, when someone stripped the bark from a pine tree near his house 
and painted the exposed wood bright red. Mangape did not realize the true meaning of 
this kokoli, however, and the next morning proceeded to the public square (ama) where 
the case would be heard. On his way there, someone whispered to him in passing that he 
wouldn’t come to watch the court case because he would be busy chopping fresh 
firewood up in the mountains. This was the second kokoli to Mangape, a common way of 
telling someone secretly that you are out to kill them - the ‘fresh wood’ to be chopped is 
the recipient of the message himself.
But Mangape, like Caesar, was blind to the portents around him. He began the 
court in full form, laying out his claim to the trees from which the pandanus nuts had 
been stolen. When Mangape claimed that the land where the trees were located was his 
own, a young man named Kakali who was Mangape’s cousin stood up and pretended to 
be outraged. He claimed it was his land, not Mangape’s. Without further ado, he took his 
axe and, to the shock of one and all, struck Mangape on the neck. Ambi Kipu, who was 
present when Mangape was cut, remembers that he did not die immediately from the 
blow. To the surprise of all present, Mangape remained standing and, although partially 
decapitated and bleeding heavily, said to Kakali “Do you think I am a woman? come here 
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and fight me!” Then he walked over to Ambi, put his hand on his shoulder, asked for his 
help, and fell dead.
Ipili are not the most level-headed people at the best of times, and this shocking 
turn of events galvanized the entire area. Even Joe Searson and Ludi Schmidt are 
reported to have rushed to get their guns and avenge Mangape’s death. However, as 
people say today, Kakale had ‘merely swung the axe’ – the real killers of Mangape were 
the Tiyini who had planned his death. They had other plans in store as well. They knew 
that they could not kill Mangape and let Ambi live. They quickly spread the rumor that 
Ambi himself had planned Mangape’s death, and that he had held Mangape down while 
Kakali cut him. They leaked this news to the Pulumaini, into which Mangape had 
married. Outraged at what had happened, a Pulumaini man came down to Alipis to find 
Ambi and kill him. As far as Ambi was concerned, he and the Pulumaini were allies in 
the common cause to find Mangape’s killer. It therefore came as something of a surprise 
to him when the man, supposedly one of his allies, gave him a full on blow with his 
machete. Ambi’s head was split open – by all accounts his brain was visible – and he 
would have died without medical attention. Luckily Les Barnard, the Seventh Day 
Adventist Missionary cum amateur pilot, was at the station visiting in his Cessna. Ambi 
was carried to the airstrip and became the first Porgeran ever to be medivac’d out of the 
valley. He was flown to an SDA hospital where he made a full recovery. Ambi still has a 
large scar above his eyebrow from the blow that is visible today.
The death of Mangape is more than just a dramatic story. It had reverberations 
that could be felt twenty years later. Kakali fled to Paiela, and Mangape’s sons – most 
notably Nixon -- seized his land, a move that would pave the way for their rise to 
prominence as ‘landowners’ during the late 1980s and 1990s. It also put Nixon in the 
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strange situation of negotiating against the mine with fellow-Tiyini who may have bene 
responsible for his father’s death. More fundamentally, however, the death of Mangape 
was a visible sign of the growing egalitarianism in the valley. Medici such as Mangape 
had failed in their attempt to create permanent discrepancies of wealth and status in that 
valley that favored them. In the initial years of contact with whites, the Medici exploited 
opportunities available to them by their role as middle men to acquire wealth and power. 
By 1970, the Ipili tendency towards distributive justice in extremis had reacted violently 
to the growing power of the elite. The death of Mangape demonstrated that the Ipili 
would not allow that wealth to gather in the hands of a few people. Instead of rule by a 
few Medici who could monopolize power and influence in the valley, the local scene 
gradually came to be run by a ‘high society’ – less a clearly delineated and small elite 
than an amorphous web of respected people whose fortunes could rise and fall. For the 
next twenty years Porgera would have a pool of possible leaders from which it could 
draw, rather than an elite with which it would have to deal.
Placer and Exploration
In 1980 Placer Gold, a Canadian transnational, became the principal partner in 
exploration in Porgera. Placer’s decision to take up exploration in Porgera in the 1980s 
proved to be more fateful than the Bulolo Gold Dredging patrol they funded thirty years 
earlier. They brought to bear resources – both human and financial – that would 
ultimately result in the creation of the mine. The coming of Placer marked the beginning 
of a new era for the valley.
The most pressing concern to Placer was the state of the resource – what exactly 
was the nature of the ore body and would it be feasible to mine it? A group of consultants 
from Fluor, an internationally known consulting and engineering firm, were hired to write 
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a report to determine whether this was the case. In fact it was not – in 1980 Porgera’s ore 
was too difficult and to process and too far away from world markets to be profitable to 
mine. Existing refining processes also looked to be too polluting (Jackson and Banks 
2002:111-114).
At the same time that Placer came to know the ore body, it also needed some sort 
of concrete knowledge of who was living in the mining area. By 1980 decades of dealing 
with Rudi and local kiaps had made it clear that there were three distinct ‘clans’ who 
lived atop the ore body – the Tiyini, Tuanda, and Waiwa – and others who ‘owned’ 
surrounding areas. These were clearly the groups that would have to be dealt with if a 
mine was ever to be created. Placer hired Ian Smalley, a former Kiap who had gone into 
private practice as a consultant and entrepreneur, to conduct a census. To the best of my 
knowledge, Smalley had had no previous experience in Porgera, and his qualifications 
were based essentially on his time as a kiap. 
Previous censuses of Porgerans had been, as I noted above, difficult to conduct 
and most likely of dubious worth, but Smalley’s census was particularly inaccurate. 
Smalley visited local people and took genealogies one clan at a time. He then added up 
the total number of people within each clan. As clan membership is not exclusive in 
Porgera, most people on the census were counted in at least two separate lists, and some 
were counted as often as six times. The result was that Smalley estimated the population 
of the valley to be 30,000 people when it was widely acknowledged that that true 
population could not be more than 10,000 at the very most.
One of the earliest critics of Smalley’s work was Philip Gibbs. Gibbs was at that 
time the Catholic missionary in the valley and had a post-graduate diploma (Gibbs 1975) 
in anthropology from the University of Sydney, where he studied with Peter Lawrence. 
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He was, in essence, the first anthropologist to conduct extended fieldwork in Porgera. As 
he put it,
I took a look at his [Smalley’s] figures and immediately picked up that he didn’t realize 
that someone can claim a number of clans and he just added it up. And so I went to the 
company because I realized the significance of it, because it was very important for the 
future peace of the place that they really know who owned the mountain.
Gibbs’ genealogies proved to be highly accurate and formed the basis for the 
mine’s – but not, note, the government’s – records of who ‘the landowners’ were in 
Porgera. Here again we see a situation in which a local person is able to transform 
knowledge gained through informal mechanisms into a text artifact which could be used 
in distant circles for official purposes. Gibb’s methodology was simple and relied as 
much on his anthropological training as it did his engagement in the local community. He 
asked the dozen or so men who were acknowledged leaders and expert genealogists and 
asked them to come to his house in Mungalep. There, in the course of fifteen hours – with 
breaks for food, cigarettes, and the bathroom -- they enumerated their entire ‘clan,’ 
starting with an apical ancestor and ending with the current generation of children. Gibbs 
did one clan a day. The entire process took a week and a half.
But Placer needed more than reports. It needed someone to help organize their 
new and greatly enlarged exploration camp, as well as to mediate between the exploration 
crews and local Ipili – someone, in short, to personate it in Porgera. This man, the ‘camp 
manager’, would have to take over the practical task of making mining socially feasible, 
thus undertaking in a transformed and expanded role the same task originally performed 
by Tongope and other early middlemen.
The man who finally got the job was Michael ‘Mick’ Searson. Mick was Joe 
Searson’s son by an Engan. She had run away from Searson when still pregnant, and 
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Mick had been raised in a village in Sirunki. He had gone to school there, and won a 
Churchill scholarship to attend high school in Australia. From there Mick became one of 
the first students at the UPNG but, like his father, he grew restless and dropped out, 
roamed over Papua New Guinea working in construction, aviation, and coffee farming. 
He had worked with Jezernik in Porgera between 1974 and 1976, and was brought back 
to work as the camp manager for Placer in 1980.
Mick’s ties were multiple. Half-white and half-black, Mick was technically an 
Engan but was – and continues to be today – considered by everyone in Porgera to be 
Ipili, and particularly a Tiyini. When the PLA faction attended their court case in Port 
Moresby, for example, it was Mick who picked them up at the airport and gave them a 
ride to court. While non-Porgeran Papua New Guineans had often worked as middlemen 
before, Mick’s Western education and mixed blood marked the collapse of a strong 
distinction between ‘white knowledge of the Ipili’ and ‘Ipili knowledge of whites.’ In 
addition to minding the logistics of Placer’s operations, Mick also served as an unofficial 
one-man community affairs staff. His ability to move fluidly between both cultural 
worlds essentially collapsed the space between them. He became a precedent and role 
model for future Porgerans who were serve as the Ipili interface to the mine and vice 
versa such as Kurubu Ipara and especially Jonathan Paraia. By combining a multitude of 
different skills, he became a vital part of the reality management pool working in the 
valley during the 1980s.
While Mick managed things informally on the ground, every compensation 
payment made to Ipili whose land had been disturbed in the course of exploration had to 
be reported to the government. The main method of exploration at this time involved 
clearing small plots of land for use as drilling pads. Diamond drills would then be 
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brought in to take core samples. Here most official knowledge about Porgerans – who 
owned a piece of land, what sort of money they had received, where their land was 
located, and what their clan affiliation was – paralleled knowledge of the gold resource 
most closely: every sample spot on the prospecting map corresponded to a compensation 
claim and landholding record. And just as prospectors attempted to deduce the geological 
makeup of the mountain through a few small samples, each one of these compensation 
claims build up a set of haphazard precedents and expectations about Ipili social life, 
landholding patterns, and identities.
The discovery of the the high grade zone of ore which made the mine feasible is 
itself indicative of the situation with which Placer was dealing: the Porgerans hired to dig 
the exploration trench where the vein was located smeared mud on the walls of the trench 
to keep it secret from their supervisor so that they could take out the ore themselves. 
Their activities and the high grade zone were discovered at the same time. 
By 1987 it was clear that a large-scale mine in Porgera would probably be 
technically feasible and financially profitable. The question then turned to its social legal 
feasibility. Although physically challenging to engineer, the mine would also require a 
more embracing set of social agreements than had existed previously. In addition to 
buying up all of the existing mining leases that had been issued over the past years, the 
mine would take up a new, larger mining lease (and several adjacent ‘leases for mining 
purposes’) which would affect literally thousands of people. When paying individuals 
under an exploration license, the company dealt with individuals. Now that the company 
sought a Special Mining Lease, it would have to deal with a corporate group, ‘traditional 
landowners.’ The informal network of middlemen, their sons, present and ex-kiaps, and 
mine employees now had to be supplemented with a series of paper accounts of 
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landownership which could circulate in both Vancouver and Port Moresby. Where 
previously miners and rulers had relied on face to face communication and a personal 
knowledge of the individuals involved with mining, the distant cosmopolitans responsible 
for creating the mine needed a slew of text artifacts which purported to describe ‘what the 
Ipili were like.’ The bureaucratic apparatuses that coordinated large-scale action for the 
company and the government had established sets of demands for the structuring of life 
in Porgera which had to be met. When Placer entered feasibility studies for the Porgera 
goldmine in 1987, the amount and kind of stories circulating about the Ipili increased in 
both quantity and quality. 
Feasibility Studies
In this section I will focus on two of the most important reports that were written 
during the late 1980s, the Social and Economic Impact Assessment (SEIS) and the Land 
Study. The SEIS was a two volume study conducted by Pacific Agribusiness based on six 
weeks of research. Despite its seminal nature as the authoritative document on which 
future knowledge about the valley would be based  it is not well remembered as one of 
the most thorough accounts of the valley. Most notably, the team of consultants who 
produced it did not include an anthropologist or sociologist. As a result the section on 
Ipili culture and social organization consisted of a summary of Aletta Biersack’s 
dissertation (1980). The agricultural specialist on the SEIS team remembers that the head 
of the consultancy team was responsible for the section of the report on Ipili culture: 
“Bob Mckillop [the head of the team] did it. The origin of his knowledge was 
Aletta’s unpublished Ph.D.  Yeah, we had a special bloke to read it --  I’m not 
kidding, it was so dense, and he said “Ah!” You’d hear him at eleven o’clock at 
night: “Ah! that’s what she bloody well means!”
It is true that Biersack’s dissertation is technically difficult, but the wider point to 
glean from this example is not that Biersack’s dissertation was ‘too hard’ bur rather that, 
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as John Burton has written, “asking a neophyte to stray into the ethnography of a 
previously unresearched society is a reckless practice” (Burton 1999:286). His evaluation 
of the SEIS is quite damning:
It is very unlikely that a social impact study team, without an anthropologist, 
would properly characterize Ipili society in a matter of weeks. To be frank, the 
SEIS authors should have owned up to this, but instead presented ‘data’ of a 
quality that is embarrassing to mention, such as a land tenure survey based on a 
questionnaire administered to Grade 6 school children. When, in the report’s 
findings, it is claimed that ‘Ipili society and land tenure were studied in detail’, 
the writer or writers are having us on. (Burton 1999:285)
Thus the SEIS, like Smalley’s earlier census, demonstrates a continuation of the 
sort of very formal but also very removed style of reporting that we saw in the 
government reports of the 1950s. Theoretically an objective and scientific act of legibility 
performed by ‘experts’ its lack of vision was not the result of a myopic, overly-
simplifying macro-actor so much as a simple lack of familiarity with Porgera on the part 
of that macro-actor’s personators. These were simplifications, yes, but ones motivated by 
and explicable through a distinct sociology of the people who produced them.
A different set of social networks were responsible for producing the Land Study. 
As I mentioned in the first chapter of this dissertation, in order for a mining lease to be 
issued, its owners had to be identified and compensated, even though it was the 
government, rather than the Ipili, that had the right to issue the lease. The first step in this 
process, then, was to determine who was ‘a landowner’ and who constituted ‘the Ipili’ 
that would negotiate with the company for compensation. To this end the secretary of the 
department of Enga issued an order to the civil service to begin a land study to determine 
generate a list of ‘customary landholders.’ The result would, as everyone knew, set a 
precedent of enormous consequence: being deemed a ‘landowner’ made one a point of 
articulation between the valley and Port Moresby, and decades of middlemanship made 
everyone aware of how lucrative that could be.
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The Land Study that was eventually produced is fascinating. In a country where 
‘accurate’ land registration had grown cripplingly problematic, the land study had proved 
remarkably durable and influential in valley life. While complaints do occur, most Ipili 
aware of its existence consider it an accurate portrayal of their ‘traditional culture.’ From 
an anthropological view, it represents an interestingly distorted understanding of Ipili 
kinship.
The head of the land study team was Jeffrey Puge, a kiap originally from the Mt. 
Ialibu area of Southern Highlands Province. After two decades of compensation 
payments and local politicking, it seemed unarguable to anyone that ‘the Tiyini’ or ‘the 
Tuanda’  had rights over the majority of the land on which the mine would be located. 
The question was who got to be ‘the Tiyini’. His guideline to the practical task of 
carrying out the study was a thin photocopied booklet produced by a senior civil servant 
in the mining department which specified how land studies throughout the country should 
occur. The official instructions in the book were to record the names of the adult men as 
‘landowners,’ and that each of these men could be associated with one and only one clan. 
This proved not to be so easy – as we have seen, Ipili have multiple ‘clan’ 
affiliations, and women and children are not as easily dismissed by them as they are by 
technocrats in Port Moresby. We can see the difficulties entailed in the land study in this 
memo attached to the final report by Frank Faulkner, then the local mining coordinator at 
Porgera:
The main purpose of my letter to you is to re-emphasize the very difficult task that field 
officers had in preparing this report. The Porgera landowners are not only a particularly 
volatile people they are possessed of an intricate customary land tenure and inheritance 
system which is probably unique both to and within Papua New Guinea. It is an extended 
cognatic descent system in which all individuals have multiple clan affiliations and 
recognized rights to parcels of land in several clan territories, and they exercise these 
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right simultaneously... the result of this has been the absolute insistence of landowning 
family heads to include all of those who have rights (including all children) into the 
Schedule of Owners (Government of Papua New Guinea 1988:2).
On the one hand, the government was working on a lineage model of social 
organization based on the idea that Ipili were organized into clans with definite leaders 
(‘elders’) who could make decisions for the whole group. These clans were then 
supposed to be broken down into subclans, each of which was a distinct subsection of the 
clan with its own leaders. Beneath the subclans were the individual households or 
extended families with a household head. The reality of Ipili kinship, as we shall see in 
future chapters, was quite different.
The most interesting thing about the land study was that it was conducted entirely 
by Papua New Guineans, most of whom were highlanders, and much of the work was 
done by young Porgerans whose experiences outside Porgera – now as high school 
students and not domestic servants – made them valuable members of the lands team. 
The result was a compromise between Ipili notions of relatedness and the corporate, 
lineage-based government model. The final report included the names of every man, 
woman and child (even infants) who were members of a clan. Additionally, membership 
was allowed in more than one clan. As a result, well connected Porgerans (including the 
ones doing the fieldwork on which the reports were written) would be listed two or three 
or seven times in the study.
The land study’s decision to allow people to be listed in more than one clan 
register had several feasibility-enhancing results. First, no one was unhappy with the land 
study, as everybody who could possibly have been included was. Government staff thus 
avoided conflict by casting a very, very wide net. Second, the land study defined a set of 
people who were definitely ‘landowners’ but did not articulate the principles – either 
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imposed or indigenous – used to subsume individuals under this title. By relying on the 
expertise of educated Porgerans they finessed definitional difficulties in the present, but 
failed to produced guidelines that might be used in the future. By allowing multiple 
affiliation to landowning clans, affiliation via marriage, and other mechanisms of 
association with a clan – none of which were ever spelled out in the study -- created a 
bounded arena for contests of identity but did not define the outcomes of those contests. 
Third, it definitely did extinguish the claims of some to ownership of the land in the SML 
– accompanying the study was a document signed (i.e. thumb printed) by local leaders 
outside the SML in which they explicitly rejected any claim to an interest in the land in 
question. These were people who lived far off the special mining lease, and who would 
receive smaller ‘spin-off’ programs in their areas. Thus the prominent people in Kairik 
and Paiyam would get to be hosts of an airport and a township. Their non-inclusion 
would meaningfully disambiguate the situation, even as the rules for inclusion, by being 
quite permissive, kept the situation within landowning clans quite fluid.
The ironic thing to note about the land study was that while it got the sociology of 
Porgera wrong, it is in itself a perfect example of the valley’s coping style – which is 
probably why Porgerans liked it so much. Legally a document meant to describe and fix 
right to land, it in fact became a charter and indeed the raw material for a creative 
semiotics of landownership which enabled a wide variety of claims to be made.
Negotiations
As we have seen in the previous chapter, the Land Study resulted in a distillation 
of agency that eventuated in the Landowner Negotiating Committee. With a set of official 
representatives in place, the government and the company finally had a feasible corporate 
interlocutor – the big actor ‘the Ipili’ had finally been created and had representatives 
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who were institutionalized licensed to sign legally binding agreements on its behalf. Ipili 
were certainly ready to come to the table. 
By this point the Ipili had developed strong millennial aspirations regarding 
mining and a strong sense of history as a progressive enlightenment about the value of 
goods from ‘outside.’ In the 1950s Ipili had to do hard, physical labor, freeing alluvial 
gold from rock with pickaxes and shovel in freezing water for three or four months in 
order to earn a piece of shell, a handful of salt, and – if they were lucky – a steel axe. In 
the 1960s they learned to work gold on their own and began being paid in cash. By the 
1970s, AUD$20,000 was being pumped into the local economy by Rudi Jezernik’s 
alluvial workings. Ipili wealth seemed to be increasing exponentially every ten years, and 
with the construction of a large-scale gold mine, their expectations of further wealth 
would most likely be met. In sum, when it came time to negotiate Ipili were highly 
motivated.
The Compensation Agreement
While the land study was in its final stages of completion, negotiations began 
between the the newly formed Landowners Negotiating Committee and Placer about 
compensation rates for land and improvements damaged the mine’s activities. 
Although the Landowner Negotiating Committee had yet to be finalized in the 
land study on paper, its existence dated back to Mick Searson, who had originally 
developed an informal group of people with whom he could discuss the relation of the 
mine and the community – as we shall see in chapter five, it was not so much that twenty 
three subclans had representatives as twenty three already-important people ‘solidified’ 
or, as Ernst (1999) would put it, ‘entified’ twenty three subclans to represent. Mick 
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Searson did not play a role in the compensation agreement, however. When negotiations 
for the compensation agreement got underway, Mick had already gone. Placer had found 
its gold and there was going to be a gold mine. He felt he had done his part, and that it 
was best to leave this new stage of the valley’s history to younger, less weary men. 
His job was split into three separate positions: business development, lands, and 
community affairs. Graeme Hogg, an ex-kiap who had patrolled into Porgera in the late 
1950s, was brought to serve in business development and to help manage IPI, the 
business arm of the Porgera landowners. David Moorehouse, another kiap, oversaw lands 
work. Community affairs was headed up by Kundapen Talyaga, one of the first Engans to 
graduate from the UPNG. Kundapen’s offsider was Johnathan Paraia, Mick’s protege. It 
was Johnathan who was to do most of the translating at these Landowner Negotiating 
Committee meetings, just as he would a decade later.
Perhaps the most prominent person on the Ipili side of the table was Jolson 
Kuraro. Among the first Ipili to be educated, he left the valley to train as a policeman. 
Jolson had continued to grow in power since his return from Lae in the early 1980s. In 
1986 he had been elected the provincial member for Porgera and received two ministries 
from the Premier. He had also been involved in the formation of Ipili Porgera 
Investments (IPI), a company designed to be the business arm of the landowners which 
had sold shares to individual Ipili families. Although his English was severely limited, 
Jolson could make forceful, coherent arguments in Tok Pisin with a logic that whites 
could understand, and was an even more powerful orator in Ipili. He was so central to 
negotiation that at one of the meetings the Landowner Negotiating Committee passed a 
motion that no meetings could be held without Jolson’s presence.
The Compensation Agreement negotiations got underway in June 1987. The 
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compensation agreement for Placer’s other major mine in Papua New Guinea – the much 
smaller Misima gold mine -- had been signed a month before, and formed the basis for 
negotiation. Even the page layout of the Porgera Compensation Agreement would be the 
same as that of the Misima agreement. Landowners were also given information about 
compensation at Bougainville and Ok Tedi to use in their negotiations. Initially meetings 
were held every Friday, although this was to become more flexible over the course of the 
negotiations. Ipili showed their toughness as negotiators immediately. After four 
meetings Frank Faulkner, the provincial government mining liaison officer, noted that 
Proceedings are, as expected, proceeding very slowly with the representatives using 
every argument both rational and irrational to press for as much compensation as 
possible... initially of course nothing quoted is “acceptable” to the landowners. The 
statutory occupation fee is not acceptable, the 5% royalty payment is not acceptable, and 
so it goes... (PPCU memo 6 July 1987).
In August the PJV gave the landowners a draft agreement to look over and 
review. While the landowners had many problems with the draft, there were two major 
sticking points. The first was the price of sweet potato and pandanus. Both of these crops 
were central to the Ipili diet and culture and the prices Placer offered, based on Misiman 
evaluations of these crops, was unacceptable. The second was that the Landowner 
Negotiating Committee was unwilling to commit themselves on paper to a settlement 
without knowing what Placer’s plan was for the mine. They were afraid that they would 
miss out on potential benefits if they locked themselves into an agreement at too early a 
stage in the mine’s planning. The company, of course, argued that it would not know its 
plans until other pieces of the puzzle were put in place, of which the Compensation 
Agreement was one.
Finally, on 31 January 1988, the Compensation Agreement was signed. By all 
accounts, it was a success. Occupation fees were, in toto, K20 higher per hectare than the 
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agreements at Misima and Ok Tedi. Sweet potato was priced at six kina per mature 
mound – three times the value set by the Valuer General in 1985. Mature pandanus was 
valued at K12 per tree, or four times higher than that Valuer General’s recommendation. 
In the remaining fifty eight items on the Porgera list were, in nearly every case, valued at 
more than the governor general’s rates. The result was a list of sixty different economic 
trees and plants. 
The list differed in several ways from what had been done at Misima. The 
climates of Misima and Porgera are radically different – coconut did not figure 
prominently on the Porgera list – and the landowners in both locations pursued different 
strategies. Misimans decided on a set list of plants such as coconut, sago, betel nut palm, 
and so forth which were highly valued, while the remainder of their plants on their list 
were worth little money. Ipili, on the other hand, applied their tendency to take 
distributive justice to its extremes. Each and every kind of plant conceivably used had to 
be valued so that everyone would get exactly what they were entitled to, even if the that 
plant was worth a very small amount. As a result, the Ipili had a lot of plants with low 
value on their list, while Misimans had fewer plants with a higher value each.
The Relocation Agreement
As soon as the compensation agreement was signed, the Landowner Negotiating 
Committee continued into negotiations for the relocation agreement. This was the 
agreement specified who the mine would displace in the course of its operations, and 
what sort of compensation and replacement dwelling they would receive for their 
destroyed house.
Placer had hoped to avoid dislocating anyone in building the mine because of the 
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difficulties it would cause. In a 1986 study Richard Jackson reminded the company that 
“as a cardinal principle, the PJV should, at almost any cost and wherever possible, avoid 
relocation of any sort” (Jackson 1986:3). The only precedent for what was to be done at 
Porgera was Bougainville, where relocation was amongst the greatest hardships that 
Bougainvilleans suffered at the mine’s hand.The mine there had moved 200 households 
in the twenty years of its existence. The cost of this relocation to the mine was AU$1.64 
million, but, as Douglas Oliver points out, “its cost to the relocated people, in terms of 
physical and psychological hardship, cannot be expressed in figures. Their sufferings 
stand out as a grim reminder of the human costs of operating an open-cut mine” (Oliver 
1992:23). Bougainville and its armed insurgency was a precedent that no-one wanted to 
repeat. 
But it soon became clear that there would have to be relocations at Porgera. The 
location of the plant site – where the gold would be separated from the ore and refined – 
was inhabited by the Pulumaini. In addition the relocation of other areas, although not as 
obviously necessary, quickly became politically and technically expeditious. In fact, 
people were moving onto the future site of the mine and building houses at a furious pace 
so that they would receive increased compensation from the mine. When all of the houses 
were added up, it became clear that the relocation at Porgera was to be larger than that at 
Bougainville. While Bougainville has moved 200 households in twenty years, the PJV 
was seeking to move around 230 in the course of the twelve to eighteen months it woul 
take to build the mine. The challenge of the relocation was summed by Fritz Robinson in 
his report on relocation options:
There is no precedent in PNG of the scale and methods proposed in the Porgera SML 
relocation. The movement of perhaps some 230 families, their rehousing, and their 
relocation is not simply an enormous and difficult logistics problem. It is a human 
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problem requiring considerable resources, and great sensitivity. The cross-cultural 
understanding required for a successful outcome will be difficult and costly. PJV’s 
staffing must continue to be of a high order and the company must seek to be as 
adaptable to change as have been the people of Porgera over the past fifty years since 
foreign intrusion (Robinson 1988:12).
While the PJV was right to be mindful of the negative social consequences of 
relocation, the situation in Porgera was fundamentally different from Bougainville. On 
Bougainville, relocatees were fundamentally opposed to the presence of the mine and to 
their relocation. In Porgera, the local community had made a fundamental decision to 
have a mine in their valley. A mine meant development, and Porgerans wanted 
development. Thus although one oft-quoted remark of Jackson’s 1986 study  --  that “it 
cannot be said too often or too forcefully that for Papua New Guineans the focus of life is 
land” -- has often been used to demonstrate how distressing it would be for Porgerans to 
be separated from their land, when read in context it drives home a rather different point:
It cannot be said too often or too forcefully that for Papua New Guineans the focus of life 
is land. In the Porgera setting, it might be very easy to begin to doubt exactly how sacred 
and inalienable land is; at first sight, Porgerans seem to fall over each other in trying to 
offer their land for use by the PJV. For example, during my short stay there individuals 
during group discussions wanted to offer their land for township development, and the 
Paiyam people jointly wrote to the Site Manager offering their land for the same purpose 
(Jackson 1986:28).
Thus we see that while claims for compensation developed a rhetoric of 
landownership and ecological purity, skepticism about this authenticity of this idiom of 
articulating demands was born alongside them. As we have seen in the last chapter, this 
disconnect between what Porgerans want and what they had to claim to get it continues 
up into the present day. 
Porgerans nearly universally saw relocation as a positive, something that would 
ensure that their lives be fundamentally transformed. Relocation was combined with 
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expectations for a mining township in Paiyam in a vision in which Porgerans would live 
like and with white people. As we shall see, this desire for increased material well-being 
was tinged by and inseparable from the millenarian prophecies. The coming of the mine 
and in particular relocation was seen as the long-deferred arrival of a time when wealth 
and plenty could be got without work. There was no sense amongst Porgerans that they 
wanted to be relocated in houses that were ‘traditional,’ or that relocation ought to 
involve the creation of a community protected from the corrosive effects that contact with 
whites might have on some sort of highly-valued Ipili traditional culture. On the contrary, 
Ipili landowners were not at all afraid or unhappy to be relocated – they embraced the 
relocation project and saw it as the start of their own ‘modernization.’ The goald was to 
live with and become like white people.
The minutes of the relocation meeting make it clear that the landowners expected 
to be relocated in a compound essentially similar to the workers’ camps that were later 
built at Suyan and Alipis. Their vision was of an SML fenced off from the surrounding 
area, with paved internal roads and a boom gate at the entrance to control traffic. High 
covenant housing with free electricity, water, and furniture would be provided. SML 
children would be taken to school and back in a PJV school bus provided free of charge. 
They would live white lifestyles (insofar as they understood those lifestyles) in white 
houses. As one Ipili man told Richard Jackson in 1986:
We expect the Company to provide free permanent houses; when the Company wants to 
start a mine, all our houses will be replaced with permanent buildings. This includes our 
haus kuk (kitchens), toilets, piggeries, chicken house and our residence and stores with 
exactly the same dimensions we have on our own land. We will live like the white men. 
These houses will be used by our sons and daughters when we die. There will be deep 
freezers, entertainment facilities, furniture and such other accessories in houses. We 
expect the Company to build our houses with wire fences around it and these houses will 
have security gates, etc. (Robinson 1988:15).
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The man who negotiated the relocation agreement with the Landowner 
Negotiating Committee was Fritz Robinson. He was retained again to write a consultancy 
report on relocation options, and was then retained again to implement the report. As we 
have seen, he was also the lead negotiator for the failed Yakatabari negotiations. No 
wonder, then, that house size was a sticking point in Yakatabari – landowners were 
reiterating in the late 1990s the same demands they had made to him a decade earlier.
The biggest issue in the relocation agreement was the design of the relocation 
house. An original PJV design was rejected on the grounds that it was constructed of 
timber and that the windows were sufficiently big to allow people to see into the house. 
Neither of these were acceptable to Ipili, who valued privacy and feared that their houses 
might be burned down in fighting. An alternative design with metal walls and small, 
barred windows was eventually drawn up based on a sketch done by Peakope Auwikini, a 
Pulumaini leader. Towards the end of the negotiations there was vigorous debate about 
whether the company could include a veranda with the house design, as many leaders 
wanted, but this was finally rejected.
As we can see, there would be considerable argument in the future as to whether 
landowners had been cheated by the PJV in the relocation agreement. One the one hand, 
in the future Ipili would compare their relocation houses unfavorably to matchboxes, and 
view many of the other subsidiary benefits guaranteed in the Relocation Agreement as 
useless and unacceptable. On the other hand, while many of these criticisms would be 
valid, the houses they received were to their own design, and it was inevitable that the 
PJV would not be able to fulfill the expectations of the landowners involved, informed as 
they were by quasi-religious expectations of a total transformation of Ipili life.
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The Development of the Development Forum
With the creation of the compensation agreement and relocation agreement, the 
PJV had fulfilled its legal obligation to consult with landowners. The Ipili had gotten a 
good compensation agreement, and had made history by the size and scope of the 
relocation project that they had signed on for. However, on 15 May 1989 Porgerans broke 
decisively with the past by signing another, unprecedented set of agreements. These were 
known as the development agreements or the Porgera Agreements, and were the result of 
a round-table ‘development forum’ carried out between landowners, the Enga Provincial 
Government, and the National Government. These were the agreements that created 
Paiyam town, the Kairik airstrip, and the Porgera Development Authority. They would 
prove to be precedent setting – every future mining and hydrocarbon development project 
in Papua New Guinea would include a development agreement based on the one 
originally engineered in Porgera.
The fact that a development forum could take place at all was the result of several 
intersecting orders of determination in which larger national and international structures 
created a space of opportunity which a few Ipili negotiators seized on to great effect. The 
most important factor was the growing troubles on Bougainville. On 21 August 1987 a 
groups of Bougainvilleans unhappy with the way that their landowner representatives 
were representing them took action. They repudiated their leadership as yes-men installed 
by Bougainville Copper Limited and created a ‘new executive’ which demanded 
recognition from the company. The chair of this new executive was Perpetua Serero and 
the secretary was Francis Ona. They wrote to Bougainville Copper Limited and 
demanded that they be recognized as the legitimate landowner group or else there would 
be “massive demonstrations.” Joseph Kabui, the premier of the province, backed the new 
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group. In the same month that the Porgera feasibility study was submitted to the 
government, the first roadblocks on the access road at Bougainville were set up. The 
Bougainville crisis was underway (Oliver 1992).
There were also events in Porgera that demonstrated that Bougainville might not 
be a special case. The history of the compensation agreement was not merely one of 
routine Friday meetings at which motions were tabled and counter-offers made until an 
official agreement was duly. At times it appeared that Porgera might become another 
Bougainville before the mine even occurred. For instance, Landowner Negotiating 
Committee meetings were temporarily canceled during the course of the events known 
today as ‘the raid on Coya Construction.’ 
In 1987 the PJV’s prospecting authority came up for review. While renewals of 
prospecting authorities are generally non-controversial, a group of Porgerans headed up 
by William Gaupe (who would later attempt to usurp control of the Porgera Landowners 
Association in the course of the Yakatabari negotiations) used this opportunity to insist 
that the PJV suspend its exploration activities. They demanded that exploration in the 
valley cease and that the company shut down its camp and “return to Canada” until a 
decision was made as to whether prospecting could continue. 
It is not clear whether these demands could be made legally – certainly none of 
them were met. Soon thereafter William and Nelson Akiko (related to each other by 
Nelson’s enatic connection to the Waiwa clan of which William was an agnate) became 
the principles in a daring, night-time guerrilla raid against Coya Construction, the 
contractor who was drilling a test adit into the newly-discovered high-grade zone or ore 
which had catapulted the mine to feasbility. The group located the camp safe and 
somehow, despite its enormous size and weight, managed to escape with it up a footpath 
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into the Warokari range and the safety of their own land. At this time there were no 
vehicular roads into the area. This meant relative safety for the raiders. Many people in 
Apalaka and Yarik today remember excitedly the sight of William Gaupe stripped to the 
waist, covered in mud for camouflage, brandishing an automatic weapon “just like 
Rambo” on the summit of Mt. Warokari defiantly screaming the Ipili equivalent of “come 
at me you bastards!” as PJV helicopters buzzed above him.
According to William, the safe contained K69,000. But, more importantly, it 
contained the passports for every expatriate worker in the exploration camp as well. As a 
result, there was an immediate reaction on the part of the police characterized by the care 
that police exhibit in Porgera when faced with a major operation in which concerns with 
due process and human rights are foremost: they engaged in a spree of completely 
unwarranted looting and pillaging. The main target was the settlement of Alipis – despite 
the fact that William and Nelson had fled to Paiela. Houses were simply burnt to the 
ground and, some inhabitants claim, gold stolen as well. Many people with no connection 
to the raid were left without shelter until they could build new houses. This would be the 
first of many illegal mass house-burnings conducted by the police in Porgera in the name 
of the maintenance of law and order – yet another example of the disjunction between the 
state as macro actor and the idiosyncrasies of its representatives.
In the resulting furor negotiations for the Compensation Agreement were stalled. 
Tensions ran high and many people in Alipis favored a forceful response to the police. 
Eventually the situation was resolved when William turned himself in and was sent to 
Baisu prison for two years. Most of the money and all of the passports were recovered. 
Nelson Akiko was not jailed or even charged with a crime. He disappeared for a couple 
of months, and then eventually resurfaced in April. A Frank Faulkner noted at the time, 
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The leader of the gang responsible for the Coya holdup and robbery Nelson 
Akiko  who  has  been  “on  the  run”  for  some  months  has  re-appeared  and 
strangely enough has been employed by the PJV (they are aware of his identity) 
I suspect for perverse reasons out of curiosity to see whether or not the Police 
actually attempt to arrest him (PPCU 11 April 1988).
Nelson would later find success as a contractor providing janitorial services to the 
PJV after a white mine employee, following the precedent established by Searson and 
Brugh, married one his sisters, a position that would make him of the valley’s richest 
inhabitants. Ten years after the raid, The National newspaper would write of him that, “it 
is still universal that honest sweat always pays off eventually. Nelson Akiko is another 
one of those numerous people who sail the crest of success and attest to this phenomena” 
(The National 2000:10). While Nelson demonstrates the staying power individuals can 
have in Porgera’s high society, the raid on Coya Construction demonstrated that while the 
police were able to inflict some damage on inhabitants near the company camp, in the 
long run Ipili could make the valley sufficiently unpleasant to keep a mining company 
out of it.
Thus landowner discontent in Bougainville made income from a potential gold 
mine in Porgera vital to shoring up the national budget even as events in both locations 
demonstrated that the government had little if any ability to impose mining on local 
people who did not assent to it.
At the same time, politics at the provincial level also exerted pressure to bring the 
government and the company to the table. The PJV’s social and economic impact study 
was quite critical of the Enga Provincial Government (Enga Provincial Government), and 
they had no confidence that it would be able to deliver the services that a government was 
supposed to. The authors of the Social and Economic Impact Study (SEIS) wrote that 
It is widely accepted that there has been a significant decline in the operating 
performance of PNG public sector institutions since Independence. Services to villages 
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no longer patrol to outlying villages and are unable to maintain effective supervision of 
existing projects; basic procedures are subject to excessive delays; cost recovery and 
financial control are plagued by mismanagement; and the breakdown in law and order is 
attributed to ineffective performance by responsible agencies... the outlook for the 
Porgera people in the short to medium term is that they will have to muddle through with 
government services of limited effectiveness (Banks and Bonnell 1997:3).
This upset the provincial government. In their comments on the SEIS, the Enga 
Provincial Government included a lengthy discussion of their dissatisfaction with how 
they were portrayed. They wrote that “the department of Enga wishes to place on record 
that it considers the report is consistently biased in its presentation of the role and 
performance... of the Enga Provincial Government.” The Enga Provincial Government 
was determined to demonstrate its competence and to be involved with future events in 
Porgera.
As a result, they developed a set of proposals for the development of the Porgera 
mine and gave them a grand launching at a press conference and reception at the Islander 
in Port Moresby on 5 June 1988. The main thrust of the proposals was that provincial 
governments should be signatories to the Mining Development Contract. They also 
demanded increased revenue for the province, either through additional taxes or royalty 
allocations. Finally, they demanded equity in the Porgera project and the placement of 
infrastructure and other forms of development to Porgera.
The Enga Provincial Government followed through on the launching at the 
Premiers Council held in September that year. The Premiers Council was a body 
composed of the premiers of each province, the Prime Minister and the national ministers 
for finance and provincial affairs. The council met annually to discuss issues of important 
to provincial government and in doing so avoid legal proceedings between governments 
by providing a forum for the non-judicial settlement of intragovernmental disputes. In 
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1988 one issue that was of importance to both Enga province and the Southern Highlands 
was the upcoming resource developments in at Kutubu and Porgera. As a result they 
began a push to get the Premiers Council to urge the National Government to revise 
legislation on mining and petroleum, including the 1977 Mining Act, which was then 
under review. The council created a ‘Mining and Petroleum Working Committee’ which 
was composed of the premiers whose provinces has resource developments in them. The 
goal was to ensure that any new legislation contain clauses assuring that provincial 
government would have a say in resource development. The working committee did two 
things: first, endorsed the Enga Provincial Government’s proposals for development and 
second, it created a series of recommendation about the structure of the new mining act.
While the Premier’s Council was meeting, there were shifts going on in politics at 
the national level. Paias Wingti had been removed as Prime Minister through a vote of no 
confidence and Rabbie Namaliu had assumed control of the country. While in opposition 
he had endorsed justice for local people and a revamping of the laws regarding mining. 
Now as Prime Minister he worked to turn these promises into a reality, spurred on by 
both his principle and the crisis on Bougainville.As he told me:
We didn’t want what had happened in Bougainville to happen in Porgera or anywhere 
else in this country, and we wanted to create a situation where as much as possible issues 
and grievances were sorted out before an agreement was reached and before a project was 
developed. From our perspective, it’s extremely difficult for the state to impose its will 
on the people without expecting some reaction and in some cases some very strong 
reactions from some quarters. We have many different cultural-linguistic groupings in 
this country and we must respect them, and the way to do that while at the same time 
strengthening the nation state is to bring them into your confidence. Because if they feel 
they are involved and they have a meaningful role to play in something like that, then in 
the broader context that’s also contributing towards building up the state as a nation.
Thus the development forum occurred as the result of opportunities created 
locally in Porgera and Bougainville, regionally at the level of the relationship between 
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provincial governments and the National Government, and at the level of national politics 
itself. However, despite the opportunity that these openings presented, the forum process 
would not have run the course that it did without the unique individuals who came to 
serve as representatives of each of the three institutions involved in the negotiation.
The Forum Process
The development forum as it finally evolved thus included three institutions: the 
Enga Provincial Government, the National Government, and the Porgera Landowners. 
The course of the negotiations would be shaped by the people who came to personate 
these larger actors when they met around the negotiating table.
By 1988 Ned Laina was the premier of Enga Province, which had just emerged 
from a long period of suspension. He was backed up by an impressive staff. Harry Ulin, 
the future Mining Coordinator who we met in the previous chapter, had been the interim 
administrator during the suspension and stayed on as secretary of the province under the 
Laina regime. He was joined in the civil service by Luke Kembol, Philip Kikala, and 
Kundapen Talyaga. These people represented some of the first Engans to go through the 
UPNG and were very much the ‘bright young things’ of the province. In addition, the 
province had received a new provincial lawyer in the form of Harry Derkley, a 
Tasmanian with a history of working with the Tasmanian aboriginal community. 
Although mild-mannered personally, Derkley was a strong supporter of the rights of 
indigenous peoples and actively supported the work of the province by finding innovative 
ways to accommodate their interests within the law.
On the landowners side, the key players were to be Jolson Kuraro, Johnathan 
Paraia, and Kurubu Ipara. By this time, Jolson had grown even more prominent. Not only 
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was he the unofficial leader of the Landowner Negotiating Committee and a minister in 
the provincial government, but he had made a fortune at the Mt. Kare gold rush. In 
addition, after some political maneuvering he had become the president of the Porgera 
Landowner’s Association, a pressure group formed in the mid-1980s and which had 
floated around Porgera in a couple of different guises for some time and which we have 
already met in the last chapter. Although a powerful presence, Jolson was not exactly a 
policy wonk. Johnathan and Kurubu, therefore, took up the task of briefing Jolson 
regularly and doing the nitty-gritty work of the negotiations. By this time, Kurubu had 
replaced Frank Faulkner as the provincial mining liaison officer, and Johnathan was the 
president of the Porgera local level government – Namaliu’s invitation to the 
development forum had been addressed to him. 
Mick Searson was not the only person to take up his father’s footsteps. Placer’s 
expansion happened at roughly the same time that the children of the original Medici 
came of age. Nixon Mangape and his brothers, the sons of the spectacularly decapitated 
earlier leader, were at this point in their early twenties. The members of the first class of 
the Porgera elementary school had graduated and returned to the valley. These included 
Kurubu Ipara, the son of Ipape Papume, one of the early translators and gold workers, 
Johnathan Paraia, the first Porgeran to earn a bachelors degree (in political science at the 
UPNG), and Jolson Kuraro, the first Porgeran to be trained as a policeman. All of these 
people were the second generation of the sorts of middlemen who had been so key to the 
development of life in the valley in the 1950s. They thus represented the full-flowering of 
the Porgeran scene. Among the first Ipili ever to be educated, they had both come of age 
in an atmosphere full of innovative ideas and excellent role models. Although young – 
Kurubu was only 26 years old – they felt that the time had come for them to show what 
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they were capable of.
The National Government drew on a wide range of people to represent it as well. 
Namaliu, of course, was not involved in every single meeting. The Porgera Coordinator 
at the Department of Minerals and Energy was John Reid, and it was he who most often 
met with landowners. The assistant secretary of the department, David Evesson, was 
called upon at a number of points to deal with politically sensitive problems. Behind the 
entire forum process, however, was the secretary of the department, Bill Searson. Bill 
was Joe Searson’s son and Mick’s half-brother. While Mick had inherited Joe’s 
restlessness, Bill had acquired his cultivation and tact. Bill was a naturally quiet man, like 
his father, but without Joe’s penchant for solitude. Bill’s personal network was large – it 
is hard to dislike Bill Searson – and he had connections in a variety of places. He quickly 
became the eminence gris of the Porgera project. The adoption of the forum process was 
at least partly due to him, and there is a strong chance that if he had not been on the scene 
at the time the Porgera mine would never have come into being.
Harry Derkley remembers the first meeting of the development forum:
The first meeting we had, the Prime Minister was there, and Namaliu opened the 
meeting. PJV was there, they led off, they said this is what we’re going to do. The Prime 
minister turned round to us and said “what have you got to say about it?” And we were 
prepared and we said “oh, this and this and this.” It lasted for a couple of hours, and at the 
end of it the prime minister said, “well thank you very much, we’ve heard your views and 
we’ll go off and make a decision” and we said “now hang on, hang on, hang on! This is 
just the beginning as far as we’re concerned!” And that’s when we came up with the idea 
that we wanted to negotiate agreements, and therefore there had to be an ongoing process 
of negotiation. We said look we want this, we want that, we want that, the landowners 
had their demands, the provincial government had their demands, and what followed was 
months of negotiations.
In fact Derkely’s team was well prepared – the concessions that they wanted 
consisted more of “oh, this and this and this.” They had prepared an eighteen page 
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document that was essentially a compact version of the Proposals for Development 
released at the Islander earlier that year.
The landowners were prepared as well. Johnathan Paraia told me that
Kurubu and I gathered all the clan leaders and even councilors and we developed a 
development proposal, and in the proposal we told them we want a high school, we want 
an international school, we want the hospital, we want the long term economic 
development plan, and provide us with the economist. We want a road, road 
development, we want the Tari road surveyed, we want the airstrip to be built, we want a 
town to be built, you know, all that. All the services that were not available here, we put 
it to the National Government: if you agree to this, we will sign on the dotted line, and 
you will have a mine. Otherwise - forget it! (laugh) Yeah! We gave it to them at the 
forum. And whatever was missing we talked to them and said this is what we want, and 
on the cover of the proposal we put a man with a bow and arrow, and said, ‘if you don’t 
give it, we’ll fight!’ (laugh) Yeah.
After this first meeting, the forum process continued for months. The size, 
structure, and location of the meetings depended on what was being discussed. 
Sometimes individuals would meet, sometimes large groups. Harry Derkley remembers 
that
There were lots of trips to Moresby and there were lots of faxes and rewritings and 
at times the atmosphere was pretty highly charged on things like the equity and 
things like fly-in fly-out, you know. There were some toe-to-toe sort of exercises 
there, you know. Where we said we wanted it and they said no you’re not getting it, 
and that’s where you used to have the big meetings. But a lot of it was laborious 
stuff, you know, technical stuff, and that’s where the small groups, Kurubu and 
Johnathan and Graham and myself sitting down with John Reid and nutting out all 
the details came in.
Despite the sometimes heated nature of the debate, there was a sense among all 
involved that it was in everyone’s interests to work together – something that would not 
be true with Yakatabari. With events at Bougainville shaping up as they were, everyone 
realized that it would be quite possible that there would be no mine in Porgera, and that 
was something that no one wanted. Namaliu remembe
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Well, we obviously expected that it would be difficult from the beginning, because 
you’re dealing with a situation which had never been tried before. But on the other hand 
we knew it was an experiment to begin with. So we didn’t go into it with any fixed lines 
in so far as what we expected what would happen. We went into it with an open mind. 
We said, look let’s try it out and let’s see how it turns out, because the way it turns out 
would be the best way that we could expect it to develop in the circumstances, because 
there’s no precedent that you can go back to and say well you know this is what was tried 
before and it didn’t work and this is why we have to do it this way. So it was a trial and 
error thing. The important thing was to be focused on why we had come up with the idea 
to bring everybody together and give them that opportunity. 
In all of these meetings, the interests of the Landowners and the Enga Provincial 
Government were closely connected. The Enga Provincial Government by itself lacked 
the power and legitimacy to ensure the National Government that the mine would go 
ahead – no one could guarantee that but the landowners. Landowners, in turn, found a 
powerful ally in the Enga Provincial Government. As a result the Enga Provincial 
Government and landowners cooperated most of the time in order to gain concessions 
from the National Government.
The tenacity with which the landowners negotiated was impressive. The 
reputation they had earned as negotiators in the two earlier agreements proved to be well 
deserved. A single example, the Kairik airstrip, serves to illustrate this point as well as 
provide an example of how particular issues were worked out over the course of the 
forum.
Both the landowners and the Enga Provincial Government originally requested 
that the planned airstrip at Kairik be upgraded to take Dash Seven aircraft. A group of 
senior ministers met at Waigani to consider these points on 3 February 1989 and were 
informed by the Department of Civil Aviation (DCA) that Dash Sevens could not land at 
Porgera due to a variety of factors, including the altitude. To an outsider, this seems like 
an open and shut case – if the plane was not physically capable of landing at the new 
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airstrip, then it was not physically capable of landing at the new airstrip. One cannot 
negotiate with physics. Or so you would think. When Kurubu Ipara faxed back his 
response to the decisions made at the meeting a few days later, he replied that 
We intend to challenge DCA’s story that Dash 7s cannot land in Porgera due to high 
altitude. We insist that the Kairik airstrip be built to take larger aircraft than the Twin 
Otter only. So a clause in the agreement to be signed between the landowners and 
NG[National Government] should read: “that the Kairik airstrip will be built to take in 
larger aircraft then the twin otter and should the landowners prove to the national govt. 
that Dash 7s can land in Porgera, the NG will undertake to ensure that Dash 7s will 
extend services to Porgera.
The truth – what was physically possible and what was not – was not something 
that the landowners were going to concede to the government without a fight. Although 
the clause was not ultimately changed (because it is impossible to effectively run Dash 
Sevens into Porgera) the example illustrates the way that landowners were willing to test 
and challenge every assumption to get the best deal possible for themselves and their 
community.
The Signing and the Agreements
The result of the development forum was a tripartite set of agreements. These 
consisted of an agreement between the Enga Provincial Government and the National 
Government, and agreement between the Enga Provincial Government and Porgera 
Landowners, and the Porgera Landowners and the National Government. The PJV were 
not themselves party to the agreements. 
Each of these agreements described the same state of affairs, but they varied in 
that they each specified the roles of all of the parties involved. This sounds complicated, 
but made sense in practice. Again, the Kairik airstrip provides a good example. Everyone 
knew what they wanted to happen: The PJV would build an airstrip at Kairik and then 
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hand it over to the Enga Provincial Government, although the landowners maintained the 
option of taking over the maintenance of the airstrip if the provincial government was lax 
in its duties. The National Government would then organize regular flights into the 
valley. The way that this was spelled out in the agreements was as followed: In the 
National Government – Landowner agreement the government promised the landowners 
that it would make the PJV build the airstrip. In the Landowner - Enga Provincial 
Government agreement the Enga Provincial Government agreed to take the airstrip once 
the PJV had built it, but promised the landowners that the newly formed Porgera 
Development Authority could take over maintenance of the airstrip if it wished. In the 
Enga Provincial Government - National Government agreement the National 
Government officially gave its consent to this arrangement. In all of these arrangements, 
the only thing the landowners had to promise to do was to refrain from burning the mine 
to the ground.
The end of the development forum was an arbitrary one. The situation in 
Bougainville had worsened. The presence of four hundred police on Bougainville had 
temporarily halted the deteriorating situation, but in early May attacks by dissidents 
increased in frequency. The National Government was eager to get Porgera up and 
running. As Namaliu remembered
We had a situation where Bougainville was closed, we wanted to see a new project going, 
not just in terms of seeing a new mine developed but in the whole context of 
macroeconomic development. We wanted to see a project going quickly that would take 
the place of Bougainville in terms of revenues and also stimulate economic activities 
within the country. I suppose if it was a situation that was different, we might have had a 
bit more time to talk through some of these things. We concluded some things maybe a 
little earlier than we should have but as a result we got a project going, had a billion 
dollars coming in at a time when we needed something like that to happen.
The landowners were not so enthusiastic. Johnathan Paraia remembers that 
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actually, we were not quite ready to sign, but the Prime Minister sent a plane to Porgera 
and said, hey the aircraft is here. If you want to participate as you have been always 
complaining to participate, then you jump on the plane and come to Port Moresby and 
sign it. If you don’t come, we won’t wait for you, because no law in the country says we 
have to sign an agreement with you. There’s no requirement for you. So we took it as a 
threat, and we sort of, see, if we don’t go, what’s going to happen? Maybe whatever we 
have not secured maybe we can negotiate and discuss later. Its good to protect whatever 
we’ve got on our plate already and grab it rather than letting it go, so we developed that 
kind of attitude and we said OK.
Ultimately, though, the landowners were happy with the agreements. They had 
received the best deal in the history of the mining in the country – so good, in fact, it was 
in violation of the mining act of the day. What most disturbed them was not the contents 
of the agreements so much as the haste with which the final documents were presented. 
Harry Derkley was to later note that he believed that “the final draft was prepared in haste 
and was executed before a final ‘vetting’ took place.” Johnathan was more blunt in terms 
of his assessment of the situation:
Mind you everything that we agreed they had changed in the computer. We said ‘shall’ 
and ‘will be’ they said oh, they changed it to ‘undertake to consider’ you know? Not shall 
and will - all that we put in there had been changed, and then we were not shown the final 
copy before we signed. 
As it turns out, the agreements were signed just in time – on 15 May 1989, three 
days after the signing, Bougainville Copper Limited shut the Bougainville copper mine 
for good. The Porgera Agreements were over fifty pages in length, and the concessions 
that they granted to landowners were greater than anything previously seen in the mining 
industry. For all of the concessions they received, the landowners promised to do two 
things – three paragraphs out of the fifty pages are devoted to their undertakings. They 
read:
The Landowners agree that they will work with the National Government and 
the Porgera Joint Venture to ensure that the Porgera Mine Project is constructed.
The Landowners agree that they will not disrupt the operations of the Porgera 
Mine Project at any time during the lifetime of the mine should any problems 
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arise which require resolution.
The Landowners agree to explore all avenues of consultation with the Porgera 
Joint  Venture,  the  Provincial  Government  and  the  National  Government  to 
resolve difficulties.
Even today it is a contentious issue how many of the promises in the Porgera 
agreement have been fulfilled. To a certain extent the development agreements were not 
strictly enforceable because, as Harry Derkley says, “they sought to bind parties such as 
the PJV that were not parties to the agreements.” Some of the clauses in the agreement 
required their own separate agreements to clarify the implications and planning of things 
agreed to. What the development agreements really amounted to was less a legal 
document than a simple agreement between parties who have all made a commitment to 
the provisions in the agreement in good faith. They were not settled issues – they were 
the starting point of discussions which would continue into the future. Thus while the 
contents of the agreements would be contentious in the future, future disagreements 
would be settled through negotiation and consultation rather than in court or through 
violence. By creating arenas within which debate could occur and be controlled, the 
agreements made Porgera and the Ipili feasible. As Harry Derkley has written,
The agreements  are not  simply legal  arrangement but  political  ones  between 
powerful political players in the Papua New Guinea context who all felt  that 
when the agreements were made they should combine to accommodate each 
other’s legitimate interest so as to ensure the orderly development of a project in 
which each have an important stake. Thus it is probably the political, economic, 
and social  consequences  for  the  nation,  the  province,  and  the  local  clans  of 
failure to make them work which is the more effective guarantee of the validity 
of the agreements and the ultimate sanction of their enforceability.
Ultimately, some were happy with the agreements and their implementation. As 
Harry Derkley says,
I thought the Porgera agreements were always going to be a difficult thing to 
pull off, you know. And they were always going to be difficult to implement, 
they could have just gathered dust in the bottom of the drawer, but they didn’t 
and there have been enormous brawls about things, the equity, the hospital, the 
IPI, the loan guarantees, but they’ve stood the test of time. I mean each of these 
issues have in the end been resolved, or have been progressed in some way, you 
know? So I think in the end they’ve been enormously resilient. They did bring 
development to Porgera.
What is more, these agreements had a national scope. Rabbie Namaliu remembers
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We were dealing with a situation were investment was low in PNG and we were 
looking  for  a  different  approach  to  development,  obviously  spurred  on  by 
Bougainville, but also before that premiers and provincial governments had been 
raising concerns about greater participation and these things. So I suppose I see 
it as one of the most important achievements of our government at that time and 
as a trailblazer in many ways for future resource development in this country, 
and its something that I’m proud of and I suppose will always be proud of.
Landowners were not so sure. They felt that they had finally received the 
promises of development that they longed for – but could what happened on the ground 
in Porgera be subsumed as the fulfillment of those processes? Such was the question that 
they would face in the years that followed, and that would structure so much of the 
personal dynamics that drove Yakatabari.
Conclusion
In this chapter I have provided a history of how outsiders came to know the 
Porgera valley’s mineral resources and its Ipili inhabitants. I have argued that Scott’s idea 
of ‘legibility’ has a certain prima facie validity when events are examined at a distance. 
When one examines the history of Porgera in detail, however, narratives of the state as a 
single coherent actor and observer grow problematic. As I have suggested in the 
introduction of this dissertation, the interplay of representative and represented institution 
is much more complex than Scott’s vision of the mypoic high modernist state allows. In 
this chapters I have attempted to substantiate this claim by examining the history of the 
Porgera valley.
The history of Porgera is about both knowing the valley and managing life in it. 
Despite official attempts to know and control the valley, the group of people most 
successful in getting things done there were often those involved with mining but 
removed from official state institutions – first the Medici of the Highlands of the fifties, 
and their children who composed the ‘Porgeran High Society’ of the eighties and 
nineties. The interaction of local efficacy and distant authority was complex, but it is 
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clear that the history of Porgera has consistently been one where the unproblematic 
assumption of an entity known as ‘the State’ or ‘the Ipili’ gives way to a richer and more 
fulfilling analysis of the nature of the representation of abstract institutions on the ground 
by their representatives.
‘The state’ cannot be assumed simply to ‘see’ and as we have seen here, and shall 
see in future chapters. To judge records of Ipili lifeways by reference to their ‘accuracy’ 
is to miss the way in which official representation is part of a complex process in which 
groups and institutions are created by the act of eliciting information about them. Thus 
the state and its laws did not regiment life in the valley. Instead, the partially successful 
attempts of larger, institutional actors to regiment life in the valley created new idioms of 
landownership and rights which were actively appropriated by a wide variety of actors. 
Thus it is not merely ‘the state’ which makes ‘simplifications,’ rather it is the case that a 
wide variety of actors attempt to create and manipulate authoritative accounts of both 
themselves and others for their own culturally-given ends. The continuing existence of 
these forms and their relevance to life in the valley today underscore the genealogical 
nature of this chapter and emphasize its role in the larger work as both a history of the 
valley and an inventory of the rhetorical strategies that makes up the textual patrimony 
deployed in the Yakatabari negotiations in the previous chapter.
However, it is impossible to explain the emotional and personal power that these 
rhetorical strategies had without understanding something of the cultural background of 
the actors who deployed them. It is for this reason that I turn in the next chapter away 
from institutional history to provide an analysis of the wider cultural context within 
which the representatives of these institutions found themselves situated and how they 
became so emotionally committed to their respective projects.
CHAPTER FOUR
POSTCOLONIAL REDEMPTIONS
In the last chapter I described the historical origins of the Yakatabari negotiations. 
These institutions created a framework which delimited the sorts of claims that the 
various actors in the negotiations could make as they pursued their individual projects. To 
a certain extent, then, understanding the institutional history of Porgera and its gold mine 
allows us to grasp the history that lay at the back of the Yakatabari negotiators as they 
attempted to achieve their ends. 
It is tempting to assume that an analysis of the negotiations might stop with a 
description of the institutions, how they articulated with governmental structures and 
economic markets and how this articulation formed a context for the action of the 
pragmatic actions of individuals. An approach based on Ostrom’s analysis of the 
management of common pool resources such as land or fisheries (1990), for instance, 
might examines how the formal and informal institutions governing Porgera incentivize 
the exchange of self-interested human agents in the valley. However,  James Weiner 
notes of the literature on indigenous people and resource extraction in the Asia-Pacific, 
“from an anthropological perspective, these studies leave largely unexamined and 
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unanalyzed the nature of the knowledge systems and the culturally distinct 
epistemological and discursive processes within indigenous societies in this context” 
(Weiner 2001a:1). Even the New Institutional Economics, the area of economics that has 
made the largest strides towards a coherent concept of culture, continues to understand 
“myths, dogmas, and ideologies” as little more than “half-baked ideas” which prevent 
people from accurately discerning the most efficient means of achieving their ends 
(Denzau and North 1994:3 – for more on the behavioral assumptions of New Institutional 
Economics see Hogarth and Reddy 1985, North 1990:17-26, and North 2005). And yet as 
Sahlins (1976) and Weber (1968) noted long ago, when people act purposively, they 
always do so using culturally-defined means to achieve culturally-defined ends. For this 
reason a truly anthropological account – indeed, a full account – of the Yakatabari 
negotiations must describe not only the social fields within which the Yakatabari 
negotiators acted, it must explain the rationality – the cultural rationality -- of that action. 
It is just this ability to make intelligible the intersection of personal project and general 
cultural structure, the cultural determination of both means and ends, which North 
considers so elusive, and which anthropology can provide.
An account of the cultural background of the actors involved is not only necessary 
because of the tendency of the literature on institutions to ignore the meaningful, cultural 
dimension of human behavior. It is also necessary because it is extremely easy to 
comprehend events in Porgera from a ‘commonsense’ view. The story of Yakatabari 
accords well with the standard average European’s ‘native cosmology’ which sees “need 
and greed as the basis of all sociability” (Sahlins 2000c:533). Indeed, many people 
familiar with Porgera simply write off the acts of Ipili elites as motivated by an 
unremitting greed, and explain the activities of Ipili people as simply a result of a ‘cargo 
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cult mentality’ (see Jones and MacGavin 2001 for one such approach in political science) 
or pathologies induced by rapid social change. Similarly, anthropological critiques of 
global capitalism too often assume that transnational corporations are big actors driven by 
greed  and need and that their actions can be explained by reference to their 
uncomplicated, plunderous intent. 
It is thus it is important that this analysis of the cultural underpinnings of action in 
Porgera move be symmetric. It is not enough to assume that we must contextualize the 
cultural imperatives of the Ipili but can explain away the biographies and personal 
histories representatives of big actors by reference to the relentlessly ‘modernist’ 
character of  the colonial state and its agents who produced “patrols and reports [which] 
constituted part of a highly ordered and ordering process of intrusion, appraisal, and 
control” (Errington and Gewertz 2004:33). As we have seen in the last chapter, this is 
certainly the way kiaps wanted to come across on paper. However, there is no reason we 
should take their word for it. The unproblematic personation of colonial institutions in the 
field was never a sure thing. In order to understand Yakatabari, then, we must understand 
not only the culture of the Ipili, but the culture of the community relations officers 
involved in Yakatabari. We have to take into account the cultural logic by which they 
saw their role as negotiators an extension of their previous positions as kiap. As we shall 
see in final chapter of this thesis, the ‘kiap knowledge’ they bring to their job has a very 
real impact on the policy process in Port Moresby today. 
In this chapter, then, I will argue that while being incredibly cynical will get you 
far in understanding life in Porgera, the culture concept will get you farther. Here I will 
explain and describe the different viewpoints that the Yakatabari negotiators brought to 
the table. While these were briefly mentioned in the second chapter of the dissertation, in 
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this chapter I examine the cultural logic of the negotiators’ background and goals in 
depth, using as my theme the central idea of ‘postcolonial redemption.’
By ‘postcolonial redemption’ I refer to the way in which the Yakatabari 
negotiations – and, by extension, the mine’s presence in the valley more generally – has 
been seen by both Ipili and whites alike as a chance to make good on the undelivered 
promises of Papua New Guinea’s transition to independence in 1975 in light of the 
decline of provincial government in the mid-1980s (for a readable overview see Dorney 
2000:238-262) and national government in the 1990s (Dorney 2000:73-101), and law and 
order more generally (Dinnen 2001). Ipili see the mine as a chance to achieve the wealth 
and affluence which they have been expecting since the early contact period , when 
millennial movements promised an end to poverty and illness. Indeed, the mine’s arrival 
fits in with deeply help Ipili notions which focus on the attainment of fertility and health 
and an Ipili historical consciousness which sees history in a constant state of entropic 
decline punctuated by bouts of rejuvenation which theoretically could, but in practice 
never seem to, break this cycle and establish an unending utopic state. In Porgera, the end 
of Porgera’s colonial tutelage and the arrival of the mine signaled the latest stage of an 
ever-escalating but never-satisfying flow of wealth and health. For Ipili then, postcolonial 
redemption involves realizing the promises implicit in the arrival of whites and their 
material culture, and achieving that redemption means coming to grips with white 
material culture and mores.
For the men – for they are almost entirely men – who were hired by the company 
to negotiate with the Ipili, postcolonial redemption had a different but related meaning. 
They were men who had worked for years in Papua New Guinea, the majority of them as 
kiaps. While it is undoubtedly the case that they have profited financially from their time 
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in Papua New Guinea, their experience of the country extends further than monetary 
gain. These were men who gave years of their lives – often their best years – to the 
country of Papua New Guinea. For them independence and the country’s subsequent 
decline meant the destruction, decay, and breakdown of the institutions and infrastructure 
that were literally their life work. After years in Papua New Guinea, many returned to 
Australia only to find it more foreign to them than the outstations that had been their 
homes in Papua New Guinea. For them, postcolonial redemption meant returning to 
Papua New Guinea to continue their former work in a new mold – as community 
relations officers. It was their attempt to continue to help a country that had spurned 
them.
This chapter is divided into two parts. The first outlines Porgerans’ sense of their 
own history and how it affected their expectations of what mining would bring. It then 
discusses how Ipili conceive of whites and their world. The second begins with a 
discussion of the biographies of the community relations officers who negotiated 
Yakatabari. I discuss their history and their understanding of themselves and Papua New 
Guinea. Finally, I discuss their understandings of Ipili culture and society – what I call 
their ‘kiap knowledge’ -- and how it emerges from their own exposure to anthropology 
and their time in Papua New Guinea.
Ipili Cosmology: Energy, Replacement, Embo
In order to understand the cultural origin of Ipili responses to mining, it is 
necessary to begin at a very abstract level – with their cosmology. As Aletta Biersack has 
pointed out, at the base of Ipili cosmology is a deep seated concern with decay and labor, 
“an Ipili metaphysics of finitude” based on the idea that “life is perpetuated only at the 
cost of life, that regeneration and death are inexplicable dimensions of the human 
244
condition” (Biersack 1998b: 43). Ipili understand their own life energy to be finite, and in 
expending it through work they deplete themselves in a cycle of work and reward that 
Biersack calls the ‘service economy’ (1995b: 241): work creates rewards which replace 
that which exists even as it diminishes the worker. As Biersack has pointed out, Ipili 
understand children to be people who have incorporated their parents nurturance. Both 
the transmission of bodily fluids in conception (menstrual blood and semen) and 
nurturance (milk) as well as the labor of child rearing strengthen the growing child even 
as they literally exhaust the parent. 
Ipili express this by saying that their children are their lawa. At its base level, 
lawa means to exchange, in the sense of switching places or roles. Ipili gloss the term in 
tok pisin as ‘sens’ (change). For instance, a man once told me of his young son “em i sens 
bilong mi” – literally, ‘he is my change.’ Thus, a man is replaced by the son he nurtured. 
That son grows to become the hardest worker, and the man responsible for the household. 
Similarly, the practice of sister exchange is referred to as imalini lawa lawa (‘cross-sex 
sibling exchange’) because the sister of a new affine takes the place of ego’s sister when 
ego marries her, just as ego’s sister has married her cross-sex sibling.  Both of these 
examples indicate the way that the Ipili verb lawa combines notions of reproduction and 
transformation, replacement and innovation in a way that does not pit one against the 
other. A woman comes to take the place of one’s sister, but not in the same role – the 
sister’s replacement in an affine and not a consanguine.  Thus for Ipili, change is 
fundamentally tied to transformation. This helps account for the insatiable Ipili appetite 
for novelty – while there are many factors that make Ipili interested in new things, one of 
them comes from the fact that there is no deep-seated notion of ‘authenticity’ in the 
culture, at least not in the sense of a perfect reproduction of the past in which any 
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deviation is understood as adulteration.
This zero-sum system of energy transmission and replacement is what Biersack 
refers to as “the sacrificial principle:” “equivalence is always achieved through reciprocal 
labor and life, through a mutuality of sacrifice” (Biersack 1998:55), while I have referred 
to it as a “work-wealth equation” (Golub 2001:78-80). Thus unlike the classical 
protestant attitude which ennobles work, Ipili see work as a necessary but not meritorious 
activity from which you can gain no surplus – you get out of it only what you put in. You 
work, you get old, and you die. For the Ipili, there really is nothing but death and taxes.
Furthermore, Biersack argues that the Ipili make a distinction between nembo, 
which she glosses as ‘mind’ and umbaini, which she glosses as ‘body’ or ‘skin.’ They 
employ a theory of action in which promises to act (words) are proved true indicators of a 
hidden intentionality only when they are redeemed by the performance of the promised 
act – a movement of the body (flesh). Hence action is, for Ipili, ‘word made flesh’ 
(Biersack 1996). This notion of agency is directly related to the epistemology of other 
minds – other minds are in principle unknowable, and the only way that we can guess 
their intentions is to examine their manifestation through action. Although Melanesian 
societies are famous for their cynicism about knowing what goes on in other people’s 
heads, Ipili are particularly concerned with secrecy and concealment. We have already 
seen the role of kokoli or “veiled speech” (Strathern 1975) in the assassination of 
Mangape. For Ipili, then, the indeterminacy implicit in the unknowability of other minds 
has been privileged as a mode of politics and sociality in a way it has not in other areas of 
the country.
This work, this activity, is the manifest form of nembo, the mental faculty that 
Biersack glosses as ‘mind’ or ‘logos.’ While this equation artfully serves to unite her 
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discussions of Ipili theories of agency and Christianity within a single article punningly 
entitled ‘The Word Made Flesh’ (1996), it is important to note that nembo has an 
affective component tied to Ipili notions of desire. Translating nembo as ‘mind’ -- 
particularly when relating it to ‘the word’ and its Hellenistic relation to logos – produces 
overtones of logic and rationality that, while appropriate, fails to capture the full force of 
the Ipili term. Nembo does move people to action, and it is made manifest on the skin. 
But I believe a better translation would be something along the lines of ‘appetitive desire’ 
or ‘desirous intelligence.’ Nembo is the intentional part of people, but it is always 
directed towards an object which it longs for. It is not just mind which plans, but the 
hunger or desire that prompts to action. Indeed, the fact that it is manifested in the body 
and in action suggests that it is incarnated and passion-filled in a way that Biersack’s 
Johannine structuralism does not capture. 
While Ipili conceptions of the zero-sum nature of energy transmission have often 
been compared to Etoro notions of hame (Kelly 1993:147-157) a closer analogy of 
nembo would be the notion of hame as found among the more closely related Huli 
(Frankel 1986: 83-84; 140-143). While Frankel links the Huli faculty of mini as a sense 
of ‘social responsiveness’ similar to the well-documented example of noman from Hagen 
(Strathern 1981), Frankel translates hame as ‘desire’ or – more tellingly – ‘covetousness.’ 
“This may be a simple desire for food,” he writes, “but extends to stronger feelings 
including cupidity, lust and yearning” (Frankel 1986:140). The pathology lingi results 
when a person’s hame becomes desirous for the food that another eats and enters their 
stomach, making them ill. The fact that this is seen as an inherent human faculty rather 
than an unusual or pathological form of sorcery can is confirmed when Frankel notes that 
cases of lingi are accepted with “unusual equanimity:”
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In contrast to most conditions which are in some sense attributable to the actions of 
others, there is little interest in apportioning blame, and in no case was there any 
litigation. Hame is regarded as an inevitable response to the sight of food, so that the 
individual is not seen as culpable for any ill effects that follow from it. One woman said 
‘How could we take anyone to court when we all have eyes?’ (Frankel 1986:140).
This concept of covetous desire, I argue, is very similar to the concept of nembo 
or, as it is sometimes called in Porgera, emborene. Ipili believe that at night, when people 
sleep, it is possible for their emborene to leave their body and travel around. As in 
Frankel’s description of hame, the intent of one’s emborene is typically malicious – it 
seeks to injure and hurt those of whom one is jealous and envious.
The ubiquity of this concept of emborene as roving, appetitive, vindictive power 
is evinced in the fact that it is featured in the most popular story of my field site: the story 
of the python Kupiane, who also features as the protector of the founders of the Tiyini 
lineage and as the source of the gold in Porgera’s mountains. Although the story of 
Kupiane has been told before in the anthropological literature (Biersack 1999a), its 
exemplification of the concept of embo along with it’s importance for the history of the 
valley make a retelling worthwhile.
The Kupiane Story
The story begins after the eponymous apical ancestor of the Tiyini fights with his 
brother over the distribution of cassowary meat. Leaving his native Kandep, Tiyini comes 
to Porgera and builds a house there, attracted by the abundant and fruitful pandanus trees 
located there. One day, he and his wife left two small children alone in their house and 
traveled to Suyan – some say for sweet potato runners, some say for a pig distribution. 
While the parents are away, a strange man (in some versions of the story, a giant) 
finds the two children playing alone. When they tell him that they have been left in 
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Porgera by their parents, the man looks after them, building a fire in the house to keep out 
the cold of Porgera’s ever-present rain. From within his netbag he produces a variety of 
valued food incuding taro, cassowary, sweet potato, and various kinds of marsupial meat. 
As night falls, he stays with the children.
In the evening, the couple are blocked from returning home by a sudden rainstorm 
which floods the river between Suyan and Yarik at the site of the current government 
station. Miserably unhappy sleeping outdoors in the rain, they remember their two young 
children, who are sleeping safely and soundly back at the homestead. The emborene of 
the parents leave their bodies and fly back to the homestead, intent on attacking and 
perhaps killing their own children out of jealousy and envy. When the story is told, the 
chirping of cicadas (lene) – popularly said by Ipili to be the malevolent sound of 
approaching ghosts – is narrated in increasing volume as the parent’s embo prepare to 
burst into the house. What happens next depends on the teller of the story – in some 
variants, the mysterious man turns into an enormous snake (or half-snake, half-man) and 
hisses terribly, blocking the door of the house with his fearsome jaws. In some versions 
of the story, the man turns into a snake and uses his tail to slap the floor of the house, 
which he had previously asked the children to spread with dry grass, igniting it and 
scaring the parent’s emborene away. In any case, the spirits depart and the man saves the 
children.
The next morning, the man prepares to leave. Before doing so, he gives the 
children a set of instructions: when their parents return and ask who looked out after them 
the night before, they are to reply “Winge Kupiane” (glossed in Tok Pisin as ‘papa 
Kupiane,’ though I have never heard the word winge used in any other context, including 
terms for parents). He tells the children that since he saved them, they must now do as he 
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asks. He then points out a sheer limestone cliff with a single breadfruit tree growing out 
of it which is still widely visible today. He tells them that when the breadfruit tree blooms 
it is a sign that he wants them and their parents to sacrifice pigs to him. That done, he 
leaps into the cliff face and disappears into his home inside the mountain. 
When the parents return, unaware of the actions of their vengeful emborene, they 
are amazed to see how well-kept the house is. When their children tell them the story and 
Kupiane’s orders, the parents are amazed. From that day on, the story concludes, Kupiane 
has been seen as an ancestor and protector of Tiyini and his progeny.
This story is disconcerting to whites – the idea that parents could, even 
unconsciously, desire to hurt and injure their children out of envy and spite goes against 
the grain of how we imagine parent-child relations should be. Certainly such a reaction is 
hardly rational, because that hurting their own children will not keep the parents safe and 
warm. But that is indeed the very point: nembo is the dreams and hopes and desires that 
prompt the body to action. While it is, as Biersack rightly points out, a ‘rational’ faculty 
in the sense of involving a ratiocination unique to humans, it is also much more than that. 
It has an affective content: driven, occasionally greedy, and sometimes violent. 
In conclusion, we can say that this combination of an appetitive faculty with a 
zero-sum service economy means that to a certain extent Ipili culture is all about 
unfulfilled desire. Thus we can say that in some sense the Ipili are ‘an affluent society’ in 
Galbraith’s original sense of a people whose historical consciousness is haunted by a past 
they imagine as an “unedifying mortification of the flesh – from hunger, sickness, and 
cold” (Galbraith 1958:2) and who rejoice in a historical moment of mine-derived 
affluence “where the ordinary person has access to amenities – foods, entertainment, 
personal transportation, and plumbing – in which not even the rich rejoiced a century 
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ago” (Galbraith 1958:2). Thus while Sahlins famously inverts Galbraith’s image of fifties 
satiety to suggest that in fact hunter-gatherers had their needs satisfied because they are 
not infinite (Sahlins 2000d), I suggest that Ipili see themselves in very much the same 
light that Galbraith suggests. As we shall see in the next section, Ipili attempts to gain 
endless affluence have been combined with a unique sense of history and just how close 
they have come in the past to achieving their goal.
Multiple Apocalypses
As we have seen, the Ipili see the present as world full of want, even as they 
imagine and strive for a future full of plenty. Throughout their short recorded history, the 
Ipili have experienced constant cycles of enthusiastic belief that a millennial moment lay 
just around the corner that would finally enable them to short-circuit the work-wealth 
equation. Their constant disappointment stems not just from the collapse of these 
movements when they fail to pan out, but from rising expectations that occur when they 
seem, from the Ipili point of view, to partially succeed. Thus while Ipili share a cyclical 
sense of decline and regeneration with their neighbors, the history of mining in Porgera 
has given them a unique take on it. In some sense, the cargo has actually come to 
Porgera, and despite Ipili disappointment with it, their history teaches them that the 
millenarian promises made in the past might be redeemed at any moment.
At the broadest level, Ipili seem to have a prehistoric affinity for themes of world 
renewal. The Ipili shared with their neighbors a sense of the decreasing fertility of the 
earth – each succeeding generation, it was believed, was growing smaller, sweet potato 
tubers were becoming less nutritious, sows had less piglets and so on and so forth. Ipili 
believed that only a large-scale, region-wide series of rituals performed at certain sacred 
sites could renew the earth’s fertility. The end of the world would be marked by a time of 
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darkness known in Ipili as yu undupi (yu meaning ‘earth, ground, territory’ and undupi 
meaning ‘night or darkness’) or ungi (Jacka 2003; for cognate beliefs in Huli see Glasse 
1995, for Enga see Mai 1981, for Duna see Sturzenhofecker 1998:163-172). If these 
rituals were performed properly, the cosmic clock would be reset and people would 
experience a period of unprecedented fertility with bumper crops and strong children. If 
the ritual was not performed, then the world would end.
Belief in yu undupi, like much of Ipili millennial thought, was well founded 
because it was more or less true. There is a good reason why time of darkness legends are 
so widespread throughout Papua New Guinea – the time of darkness actually happened. 
In 1622, a volcanic island off of the coast of Papua New Guinea exploded Krakatoa-style. 
The resulting cloud covered much of the highlands, blotting out the sun for a period of 
days and the resulting ashfall coated the ground (Blong 1982). While doubtless terrifying, 
the tephra soils deposited as a result of the event were high in nitrogen and particularly 
fertile. As a result, crops planted after the explosion were in fact spectacularly successful, 
and microclimates where tephra were trapped are still some of the most fertile gardening 
ground in Porgera.
While not as widespread as they once were, it is still possible today to find old 
people who remember the instructions – past down orally over two hundred years – for 
the proper preparation for the time of darkness. In fact, they resemble safety procedures 
for surviving a volcanic explosion. Ipili are instructed to store large amounts of potable 
water in doors, to build houses with peaked roofs to slough off ash buildup, and to plant 
tall sticks in the location of sweet potato mounds so that they could be identified beneath 
the ash. Other prohibitions – that only children travel outside, for instance – are less 
obviously ‘practical.’ But the important point to realize was that while I was unable to 
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explain the complex geophysical conditions that accounted for yu undupi, I could not 
deny to my informants that such an event had taken place in the past and, the earth’s 
mantle being what it is, that it might occur in the future.
The protohistorical period – from first contact in 1938 to the establishment of an 
expatriate mining presence in Porgera in 1948 – was also a time of world-transforming 
cults. Ipili, Huli, and Enga peoples formed an active cosmopolitan community through 
which innovations flowed, including religious and ritual practice (Biersack 1995a). One 
of the most important of these cults has come to be known in the literature as ‘The Cult of 
Ain’ (also known as marakamo). This cult existed throughout Porgera between 1943 and 
1945, long before anthropologists had visited the valley. Nonetheless, ethnohistorical 
work on the Cult has produced a surprisingly rich literature on the subject (Gibbs 1977; 
Jacka 2002; Meggitt 1973, 1974; Biersack 1996).
At one level, the cult was a response to the influx of porcine and human 
epidemics that swept through Enga province as the vanguard of white penetration. At the 
same time, as Wiessner and Tumuu have pointed out (2001), the cult was a deeply-seated 
cultural response to the prevailing social disharmony of the times. The focus of the cult 
was the restoration of health and the acquisition of wealth through ritual means.  It 
originated in Enga province and was then spread by a group of brothers and their 
converts. Participants were encouraged to sacrifice pigs to the sky. Old prohibitions and 
sexual prohibitions were abrogated, and people who undertook cult rituals often 
underwent ecstatic fits of shaking.
The cult operated on something like a pyramid scheme. People from one 
community would train members of the adjacent community in the cult’s esoterica. 
Members of the second community would then proselytize the communities adjacent to 
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them, and so on. As a result the cult spread quite rapidly. While the cult was concerned 
with issues of fertility and wealth in a way that is typical of a wide variety of Melanesian 
societies, in Porgera it took on a distinctly millenarian tone. There, the proper 
performance of the rituals was reinterpreted. Instead of simply bringing fertility, it was 
believed that the cult would bring the end of the world and the ascension of Ipili to 
heaven, assuring them immortality and endless affluence. Ipili enthusiastically embraced 
the cult with spectacular consequences that included the a decimation of Ipili pig herds in 
enormous sacrificial offerings and even one large-scale mass suicide.  By the late 1940s, 
however, the world failed to end, Ipili became disenchanted, and the cult temporarily died 
out.
Shortly thereafter – the exact dates are uncertain -- three close friends named 
Kipu, Pingipe, and Esape began making prophecies about the future. Kipu and Pingipe 
were prominent people amongst their groups, the Tiyini and the Tuanda. Esape was from 
a Huli group in Hoiyebia with ties to the Tuanda. Most of these prophecies centered 
around Mt. Wuangima, where Pingipe had his gardening ground and which, incidentally, 
was the future location of the mine’s open pit. Ulipa Kipu, Kipu’s son, remembers that 
everyone said that they were all crazy. “At my place at Wuangima,” Pingipe said, “a tree 
will grow. White and black birds from all over the world will come, shake it, and die.” 
He said “birds will shake the tree and eat. All of these white and black birds will eat,” he 
said. “It will be really sweet and nice, and they’ll eat - you’ll see.” 
At the time Pingipe and his companions were feared men, and were known for 
committing semi-miraculous acts. They encouraged sacrifices to Kupiyan at an ipa 
angini, or sacred pool, on the slopes of Mt. Warukari at a location near the future sight of 
the Yunarilama drainage tunnel (it was here that Siapu Yako would later build his shrine 
to Kupiane). Ambi Kipu, Ulipa’s brother, remembered that his father had two eyes – one 
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for this world, and a second one that allowed him to see inside mountains. Within, he saw 
men and women, pigs, and an entire city. The three, moreover, were said to have the 
power to travel underneath the earth. They made a number of other prophecies as well. 
They predicted that Apalaka, Kipu’s place, would someday be abandoned (Apalaka 
sounds like the Ipili word apala, or empty) but that Pingipe’s place, Yarik, would become 
beautiful (Yarik sounds like yari or adorned). They made other strange predictions, for 
instance that men with large netbags would come from the mountains.
At the time, many thought that they were crazy. But the development of gold in 
the valley began to change people’s minds. Today, it is taken as a truism that Pingipe, 
Kipu, and Esapa were predicting the coming of the Porgera gold mine. The birds, people 
came to believe, were outsiders come to find gold. The fruit of the tree was to be seen in 
future years as the gold in Mt. Warokari, adjacent to Wuangima. You cannot talk about 
the prophecies today without people pointing out that they have been fulfilled. This was 
made clear in another prophecy that Ulipa recounted to me.
My father said that there was a Komba fruit inside of Mt. Wuangima. He told all of the 
people here, “you are all rubbish people, but you will become rich, there’s a Komba fruit 
underneath Mt. Wuangima.” He was right - that thing was gold, gold can do that. It 
covers up the earth like water, and people go around slitting each other’s throats over its 
sweetness. They talk behind each other’s backs. The company worked gold with us at the 
headwaters of the rivers here. They came and stayed with us and they gave us the first 
kina shells. “They’ll come and give you some good sharp axes and knives,” he said. Now 
we have them right here in our hands. They said that he said these things because he was 
crazy, that they were all crazy, Esape, Kipu, and Pingipe
Shortly thereafter alluvial gold began to be exploited in Porgera at the base of the 
mountain where Kupiane slept. At first, this activity was limited to the two white 
prospector Brugh and Searson, but mining activity grew. Later on, after a decade of 
irregular patrols into the area, a patrol post was built to provide a permanent base for 
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governance in the valley. One of Pingipe’s prophecies that received the most play during 
my time in Porgera was that ‘men would come with wonderful things in their netbags’ – a 
prophecy that was assumed to refer to the coming of white men. 
The arrival of missionaries and material wealth to the valley that resulted from 
derestriction caused the Ipili to reevaluate their earlier prophetic movements. They now 
considered Jesus’s death (which most Ipili today believe occurred shortly after the 
Second World War) the moment at which ‘the roads were open’ allowing good things 
from outside the valley to enter it. The similarities between the earlier cult and 
Christianity were also striking to Ipili. As Philip Gibbs writes, 
Both call for the rejection of the old which is ‘bad’ and the acceptance of a ‘new way’, a 
‘good road’. Both have a ritual purification ceremony of washing. Both have 
extraordinary happenings: shaking, or now speaking in tongues. Both present a new 
figure as the center of worship: the sun and God... There is a sharing of food which 
distinguished the faithful... Adherents are to wait for the imminent end of the world... 
Both have the same basic function of improving general well being. (Gibbs 1977:24)
These good things, symbolized above all by labor-saving steel implements and 
sickness-curing injections of antibiotics, seemed exactly the sorts of things prophesied by 
the precontact cult. Indeed, since most precontact Ipili ritual revolved around acquiring 
wealth and health through magical means, the coming of these goods was itself proof that 
the precontact cult, as well as Christianity, was efficacious. Gibbs continues,
Now when I ask whether the cult from Lyeimi was true I hear, ‘of course it was true. 
Now we see the skin of the white man. Look at my axe, my bush knife.’ ‘Yes, it was true. 
It has all come with the white man.’ ‘Yes, it was true; now the white man has come and 
we have plenty of pigs and pearl shells and soon Jesus will come and we will go to 
heaven.’ (Gibbs 1977:25).
The first contact of Ipili with whites took place at the same moment as the 
discovery of gold and the arrival of a millenarian cult. Ipili historical consciousness 
would be fundamentally shaped by this conjunction, and the increasing wealth the valley 
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received as mining expanded only served to make plausible the idea that Ipili were 
gaining increasing amounts of wealth and health through a historical dynamics that could 
only end with their ascension to immortality. The establishment of a government station 
also meant the coming of Christianity, and this, in turn, prompted a reevaluation of the 
previous work of the Cult of Ain. The influx of material objects, the suppression of 
fighting in the valley, and the arrival of health care (particularly injections) left a huge 
impression. Ipili quickly came to believe that the Cult of Ain was completely true and 
that Ain, like John the Baptist, had prepared them for the coming of Jesus.
Massive Change
In sum, every two decades events occurred in Porgera which fueled the Ipili belief 
in a sea change which would short circuit the hated work-wealth equation within which 
they labored.  While the Ipili have not yet become immortal, by the 1980s such a 
transformation seemed increasingly plausible. In 1938, they had only stone tools. In the 
1950s, metal tools revolutionized life in the valley, while workers were paid in salt and 
shells – previously scarce commodities – in copious quantities. In the 1960s, Ipili began 
to earn cash, and by the 1970s ambitious miners owned cars and houses made out of 
metal and timber. By the 1980s, then, the Porgerans on whose land the actual ore body 
was located had already developed an understanding of why and how gold would be 
mined in their valley. The semi-religious experience of development in the 1960s had 
only served to bolster these beliefs. 
Ipili responses to Placer and exploration have to be understood with this 
background in mind. In 1990, when the mine was finally being built, Ipili were receiving 
a million dollars a month in compensation from the mine. In September 1990 the PJV had 
1,500 employees working on construction – a number of people equal to the population 
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of the entire valley in 1952! The company was spending a million dollars a day building 
the mine, and the results were tremendous. When considered abstractly the work of 
construction seems impressive– but when viewed from the ground, it appeared downright 
magical. Even the Australians involved in community affairs were amazed. Fritz 
Robinson remembers:
Basically it was cultural shock. I mean neither Noel [the head of the lands department] 
nor I had any experience of a construction of anything of this scale. I remember walking 
from here where I’m sitting [in Yokelama] to Kulapi as it is now -- which was big bush -- 
and it took me an hour and half to walk there. And there was some pegs in the ground 
over here and I said “what the hell are they?” And they said “that’s going to be the haul 
road.” I said “don’t be silly, don’t be silly - look how far apart they are! They’re a 
hundred meters wide!” And he said “yeah?” I honestly couldn’t believe the scale. From 
the ground up you know, a two minute drive from an hour or more walk. It just blew my 
mind. Suddenly these bloody huge lumps of concrete and these gigantic trucks and fellas 
with no name and great power suddenly appearing, it was pretty magic stuff. It was not 
all good, but it was certainly not boring.
Many Porgerans had already come by a considerable amount of money as a result 
of the Mt. Kare gold rush (Ryan 1991), but now they were receiving wealth that could 
have been described, if it wasn’t for the extravagance of the Ipili imagination, as beyond 
their wildest dreams. Between August 1987 and December 1992 Porgerans received a 
total of 25.9 million kina in compensation for damage to land that was required for the 
mine. Assessment and payment were made in accordance with the compensation 
agreement – lands officers came to the landowner’s home, counted the economic crops, 
and then returned to the PJV, where he put in a request for the money. When the request 
was approved, the lands officer then carried the money up to the landowner. During 
construction, huge amounts of land were needed – most of the face of Warokari, for 
instance – and the amounts were large. In one case a single family received K520,000 for 
the land that they lost to the mine. This was before the issuance of the fifty kina bill, and 
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so the highest denomination that compensation could be paid in were the twenty kina 
notes known to Porgerans as yia perene (very roughly, ‘the one with the pig on it’). 
Despite the fact that the cash was often carried in large crates, the lands officers still had 
problems getting it all physically to the landowner – often times large payments were 
made partly in cash and the rest was put in the bank. In addition to this money, 
landowners also received their new homes, and a substantial amount of cash with the 
keys. Soon their houses would have electricity and they would begin receiving their first 
royalty payments and occupation fees.
In 1945 the excitement of the Cult of Ain had triggered a wave of enthusiasm for 
cult movements in the valley. In 1962, the coming of Christianity, the availability of 
white material culture, and the pacification of the valley combined to produce a deep 
impression -- with the ‘roads open’ the Ipili reckoned correctly that a new age had begun 
in the valley. But now, in the early 1990s, all of these events paled in comparison. People 
whose fathers’ idea of supernatural wealth were pigs the size of horses were literally 
receiving crates full of money. The amount of money and benefits coming to the Special 
Mining Lease landowners was unprecedented in the sense that nothing like it had 
happened in the valley before, but it was not unexpected or unheard of -- as far as the 
Ipili were concerned, the events taken place in the 1990s had been predicted for nearly 
half a century. As Ambi Kipu told me in 2000, “noken abrusim, stori bilong Pingipe 
kamap olgeta (you can’t ignore them, all of Pingipe’s prophecies have come true).” As 
one Seventh Day Adventist pastor told me, “olgeta prophecy i fulfill pinis” – every 
prophecy has been fulfilled. Pingipe, Kipu, and Esape were vindicated. Birds from all 
over the world had come to eat the fruit growing on the slopes of Mt. Warokari.
Everyone agreed Kupiane was behind it. He told them so himself. He had 
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appeared to ‘Chief’ Ambi Kipu in visions throughout the course of exploration. When the 
first adit was drilled into the mountains in the 1970s, Ambi had killed pigs and offered 
them to Kupiane. “Chief,” the python told him, “yu kaikai (you eat).” Now, in 1990, 
Kupiane appeared to him again. He told Ambi to have a feast celebrating the new found 
wealth, and that the spirits inside the mountain would celebrate along with him. Just as he 
had brought every different kind of food to Tiyini’s children, so too should Ambi’s feast 
include every kind of valuable food stuff. Ambi spoke to the then-head of community 
affairs, who provided him with cattle bought up from Hagen which Ambi killed and 
distributed on two separate occasions, one at Alipis before his community was relocated, 
and one afterwards at the new relocation community of Apalaka. Thus a collective feast 
meant to frame relocation as proof of the eschaton was encouraged by the mine, which 
underwrote it as a ‘community event.’
Social Change
Shortly after relocation beliefs about moral and physical decay that had long been 
a part of the culture of the area came to life in new ways. Previously, people believed that 
children were maturing more slowly than their parents and were shorter than previous 
generations. Now these began changing. While some people considered their children to 
be smaller than them, others saw an apocalyptic process going on in reverse: they 
believed that children were now growing prematurely and much larger than was normal 
and healthy. They were having sex earlier than previously, and traditional ways of life 
had changed. One particularly educated Ipili man who was sensitive about his short 
stature and balding head had assimilated these distinctively Ipili beliefs to the scientific 
theory of evolution – he believed that he was the most highly evolved Ipili, and that Ipili 
would grow shorter in the future as brains, rather than brawn, became central to survival.
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These beliefs about the end of the world seemed realistic to Porgerans because all 
of the symptoms that they described were in fact coming true. Porgera has never been a 
good place for gardening and Ipili do tend to be very small people. Changes of diet and 
access to protein rich foods such as rice have resulted in physical phenomenon that were 
rare or absent in traditional Ipili society – obesity being the most noticeable. While I did 
no biological anthropological work during my fieldwork, my impression is that in 
Porgera children fed healthy diets often are much taller than their parents.
Sexual mores had changed as well. Traditionally, Ipili were prudish people. 
Gender segregation and misogyny was very common in Ipili society. Although originally 
women wore only grass skirts, one of the earliest white practices that Ipili women 
adopted was to wear clothes to cover their bodies. Traditionally men and women lived 
apart, and men shunned food prepared by women for fear of female pollution. They did 
not marry before initiation and were taught a plethora of magical rituals and spells to use 
immediately before and after sex to protect themselves. This separation of sexes, which 
had been in decline since the arrival of Christianity, was finally completely extinguished 
with the creation of relocation homes.
For this reason, it is difficult to judge the state of social change in Porgera based 
on reports from the Ipili themselves -- activity that many white people would consider 
normal would be viewed by Ipili as a sign of moral decay or degeneracy. In 1930 the idea 
of an Ipili man sleeping in the same house with a woman would have been viewed with 
horror and disgust. The idea of eating food cooked by a woman, or sharing food with 
them was still abhorrent. Despite the fact that originally neither men nor women wore 
any clothes at all, the arrival of textiles and the combination of Christian modesty with 
precolonial concerns with exposure to women meant that by the 1980s any woman who 
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could be totally clothed ought to be. In fact by the 1990s, women in clothes that revealed 
such taboo sections of anatomy as the knee or elbow were viewed as licentious hussies. 
Behavior that the average Australian viewer might expect to see on television shows such 
as ‘Neighbors’ or ‘Home and Away’ were viewed with alarm by Porgerans. The idea of a 
young (and uninitiated) man taking a woman out to dinner and then actually sharing a 
milkshake with her was repulsive enough to Ipili, but then to actually have sex with her – 
without even taking the simple precaution of inserting bespelled leaves into one’s nostrils 
to keep out her polluting female smell – and then sleep in her bed, a bed in which one 
could only presume at one point she slept in while menstruating, could only be 
interpreted as a sign of impending eschatological breakdown. The advent of the teenager, 
in other words, was viewed by Ipili as a sign that the end of the world was at hand. 
To be sure, some of the changes to life in Porgera are not the sort of thing that one 
might make light of – the spread of HIV and sexual violence being chief among them. 
Still, while these ought not be made light of, it is nevertheless true that it is difficult to 
know whether sexual violence is more common today than it was in the past. Consider, 
for instance, an anecdote from the kiap Chris Vass about the state of male-female 
relations in the early 1960s:
a party of Porgerans arrived carrying a home-made stretcher with something bound up to 
it. They brought it up to my house... this wasn’t an ordinary dead body. It was a headless 
woman, and she had a sapling about two inches in diameter pushed right up her vagina so 
the top end of it was up near her neck, and just the bottom end of it sticking out between 
her legs. And the separated head was placed alongside. (Nelson 1982:36). 
In light of the possibilities for violence against women that existed in Ipili society 
in the past – even if they are sensationalized in this kiap’s account -- measurements of the 
long-terms change in attitudes towards gender need to be made in terms of both history 
and recent events in the valley, and they are very difficult to make. While Biersack 
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suggests that “individualism, or some highlands version of it, may be on the rise” and 
laying “the foundation for complementarity without asymmetry – for horticulture, as it 
were, without hierarchy” (1998b:87-88) it seems more likely that what is happening in 
Porgera today is the entrenchment of gender divisions that reflects a world with an 
increasing amount of hierarchy, but lacking in horticulture.
A similar thing could be said for public order. Through the 1990s the valley 
would be disrupted by civil unrest on a scale that it had not seen before. Civil disturbance 
and even rioting became a feature of life in the valley in a way that it had not been 
previously. The visibility of civil disturbance and the frequency with which it occurred 
were undoubtedly the cause of many people’s perceptions of Porgera as a ‘wild west’ or 
‘frontier’ town. As Glenn Banks remarked in 1996, “minor disturbances are so common 
that they are often just considered part of life in Porgera” (Banks and Bonnell 1997:23). 
As a result, the image of Porgera as a place with a ‘law and order problem’ or a 
‘deteriorating law and order problem’ became endemic in the 1990s. Susanne Bonnel 
summed up this point of view when she wrote that “the deteriorating law and order 
situation in Porgera is the main problem affecting the quality of life of Porgerans and the 
long term viability of the mine” (Bonnell 1999:132). It is important to note, however, that 
the very existence of the peaceful public sphere that is being torn apart is itself a relative 
novelty that is the result of the pacification of the valley that occurred in the 1960s. It was 
only at this point that people felt safe moving throughout the valley and that something 
like a ‘public sphere’ or ‘public space’ was created. Despite the Porgeran sense of an 
increasing affluence, then, some aspects of life in Porgera which seem to be declining are 
in fact an artifact of foreign rule and may end up being a blip in the long-term history of 
life in the valley. Nowhere is this more evident than in the massive physical change that 
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has occurred in the valley.
Physical Change
The massive physical changes in the valley that the valley experienced during 
construction did not end after the mine came on-line. The first example of this ongoing, 
large-scale physical change in the valley was the Maiyapam landslip. Porgera is a 
geotechnically unstable place, and landslips and landslides are frequent. In 1985 a 
landslip occurred above the Porgera station on the Maiyapam river. At the time people 
were not particularly worried about this as it happened four kilometers or so from the 
station. However, in 1991 the slip became active again and began moving down towards 
the airstrip. Its progress was too slow to be visible to the human eye, but it soon sped up, 
moving forward at a meter a day. It became clear that it was going to plow through the 
middle of the station, destroying the buildings and improvements there. As Harry Ulin, 
the zone coordinator (whom we met in his role as Porgera Mining Coordinator during 
Yakatabari) wrote in a briefing of that time, the landslide
has slowly been working its way down the mountain, it has now reached Porgera Station. 
It is an enormous landslide and it cannot be stopped, it will plow its way through Porgera 
Station as surely as night follows day. Currently, the Bromans store has been shut down 
and it’s being pulled down this week. The Porgera Health Center is slowly each day 
slipping sideways, we must make a decision to either pull it down or let it collapse down 
in the near future. The buildings to follow after this will be the Community Hall and the 
school, the landslide has not reached these buildings yet but it will. On the other side of 
the station in the future the police housing and vocational school will be affected and 
prior to them the complete commercial section, it is only a matter of time.
Finally, after attempts to avert the bulk of the damage, the Porgera airstrip was 
closed on 22 September 1991 after having been in use for just short of thirty years. 
Suddenly, all of the long-term planning that had gone into the Porgera agreements had to 
be rethought in light of the destruction of so much of the valley’s infrastructure. The 
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Kairik airstrip suddenly assumed much greater importance in the minds of all involved, 
as it was now the only way for planes to fly into the valley. With the threat of future land 
movements at the station Paiam town, which had previously been more of a long-term 
project, became the focus of future urban development in the valley.
In any case, by 1994 yet another event would lend credence to the Ipili belief that 
the world was on its last legs. Porgera uses 200 tons of high explosives a week in its 
operations (Jackson and Banks 2002: 207), and all explosives are manufactured on site in 
an explosives facility. One of the most commonly used explosives are piped into a casing 
creating what are essentially highly explosive sausages. On the day of 2 August, a friction 
build-up of some sort occurred around this machine, and the resulting heat caused the 
4,000 kilograms of explosives in the machine to detonate (Jackson and Banks 2002: 207). 
There was a loud explosion and eleven workers were killed. The vast majority of the 
remaining explosions were intact.
This was not to last. Most of the remaining explosives were designed to be inert 
until subjected to extremely high temperatures (hence the use of blasting caps and other 
priming explosives). The fires that resulted from the first explosion grew in size and heat 
until, seventy-seven minutes later, the remaining explosives in the explosives plant – 
roughly 75 tons – detonated. Windows ten kilometers from the site were shattered, the 
explosion was heard in Mt. Hagen 200 kilometers away, and the bodies of the eleven 
victims of the mine site were – according to the PJV employee who led me on a tour of 
the site -- extruded through a chain link fence around the perimeter of the plant. The 
cloud from the explosion was moving fast enough that it formed a mushroom cloud. 
Debris and shrapnel from the explosion ended up embedding themselves in people and 
buildings kilometers away. The explosion was a severe industrial accident, and shook the 
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confidence of investors – Placer Pacific’s shares fell thirty cents within two days of the 
explosion. The mine’s operations were disrupted for a fortnight, and operations were 
halted for a day to commemorate the tragedy, the only day in the mine’s history prior to 
my fieldwork that they completely stopped production. Eventually a memorial meeting 
hall would be built in memory of the deceased, and a monument erected on the location 
of the former explosives plant.
Initially, there was fear on the part of the community that a nuclear explosion had 
occurred. The fact that there had been two blasts led many people to believe that it might 
not be an isolated event. The explosion was also understood in terms of Ipili culture. It 
had been caused, they said, by Kupiane. The fact that none of the people who died had 
been Porgeran was proof that although he was angry with the mining company, the 
feasting carried out earlier by Ambi Kipu and others had acted to ensure his happiness 
with Porgerans themselves.
The final momentous change that I will discuss occurred during my fieldwork, 
and was connected with the arrival of the year 2000. When I first arrived in the field in 
November 1999, there was already a palpable concern in the valley about the end of the 
world, although belief about the end of the world were, as Ira Bashkow (2000) would say, 
‘soft.’ While people were unsure exactly what would happen on the millennium, that fact 
that they thought something would occur was unbelievable overdetermined.
Ipili constantly read the national newspapers in order to be informed of ‘wol nius’ 
in a way similar to that described by Robbins for the Urapmin (1998). These newspapers 
frequently reported on concern about the upcoming millennial bug and possible power 
outages, an event glossed in Tok Pisin throughout Papua New Guinea as ‘wol blakaut’ 
(world blackout). The importance and relevance of this was underscored by the fact that 
266
The National, the second largest daily in Papua New Guinea, printed a millennium 
countdown on its masthead that featured a large box with the number of days slowly 
ticking down to zero. This concern was immediately assimilated to early Ipili notions yu 
undupi, which in fact can also be glossed in Tok Pisin as ‘wol blakaut’. Indigenous myths 
of a time of darkness, then, articulated with globalized news stories of possible power 
outages in a particularly elegant way.
What exactly would happen during the coming time of darkness was unclear. 
Some claimed that the world would end utterly, while others thought that all forms of 
illumination (the sun, fire, electric light) would not work. Everyone made preparations, 
including those who considered their lives would mostly likely be instantly snuffed out 
but who reckoned it was better to be safe than be sorry. Some people reported that they 
had lived in the past without power, and that they could simply ‘eat sweet potato’ through 
the blackout and revert to the ‘bush ways’ they had given up when they received 
relocation houses – a clear harkening back to the Paielan quoted in chapter three who 
needed “only a garden of sweet potato, his axe and a bow to exist.” Others planned to 
rely on store-purchased food. My adopted sister, an ardent Seventh Day Adventist, told 
me that she was planning to buy a large number of soft drinks and flavored biscuits and 
put them next to her on her bed. When the world blackout occurred, she would simply 
reach over and take the supplies she needed and eat and drink when she got thirsty.
As this story demonstrates, there was also a strong Christian millenarian tone 
which combined with precontact beliefs and global news sources to confirm people’s 
fears of the millennium. As noted above, Ipili Christianity has always had a strong 
apocalyptic bias, and news coming from all over regarding the coming of the millennium 
was eagerly incorporated into internal church doctrine. The possible existence of the 
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timing of the millennium was quickly swept up into the political wrangling of local 
church groups. At the early stage of the onset of the millennium, the Seventh Day 
Adventist community – the largest, youngest, and most quickly growing community in 
Porgera – were the most enthusiastic about the upcoming of the millennium since, 
obviously, Seventh Day Adventists had a strong doctrinal interest in the millennium. The 
Lutheran church was older and previously more prestigious because of its links to the 
outside world – the pastor was Engan and the liturgy was done in Engan as well. Now 
that they were eclipsed by the Adventist congregation, the Lutherans were particularly 
eager to brand their millenarian enthusiasm as bird-brain. Repeatedly citing injunctions 
that Jesus would come “as a thief in the night” (1 Thessalonians 5:2), they argued that 
while Jesus would return we did not know when. As the millennium approached, the 
national Seventh Day Adventist church explicitly disavowed the notion that this was 
definitely the end of the world. Local enthusiasm remained undiminished, however, and a 
week-long prayer vigil drew literally thousands of new converts to the enormous and 
newly-completed Adventist church in Yarik.
 Millennial expectation was ratcheted up dramatically after the events of 27 
December, when an industrial accident occurred on the mine site. Mere days before the 
new year, one of the pipes carrying highly-pressurized oxygen burst, and the resulting 
high heat melted a pipe running parallel to it that contained slurry. The result was the 
creation of a stream of ultra-hot vaporized water and rock that created an enormous 
cloud. Because the metal and rock in the slurry had oxidized (i.e. rusted) in the course of 
treatment, the cloud was a bright red. It was accompanied by a large explosive sound. 
Many reported that it formed a mushroom cloud, although this seems unlikely to me.
This was an impressive, if not serious, industrial accident in and of itself, but its 
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timing in Porgera elevated it to an event of eschatological significance. The mine was 
operating on a skeleton crew because most employees – and particularly the expatriate 
management – had returned home for the holidays. As a result community relations staff 
were ill-prepared to deal with the resulting community concern. Assurances that the 
accident was a minor one and that the situation was repaired were cold comfort to a 
community that remembered the delayed explosion in 1994.
At this point, whatever ‘soft’ beliefs that people had about the coming of the 
millennium rapidly hardened. Hours after the accident word had spread throughout the 
community that ‘gas’ had escaped that was poisonous and – according to one prominent 
man – it would kill everyone in a thirty-mile radius. Memories of the 1994 explosion 
were widespread in the Porgera community and – in scene amazingly reminiscent of 
Cecil B. DeMille’s Ten Commandments -- there was an exodus of people out of the 
valley as cars and buses streamed out on the only road leaving the valley, while other 
people fled on foot to Paiela. My own community – which was filled with in-married 
people of other ethnicities as well as many guests who were living in the community – 
was noticeably empty, and many local people made loud speeches about the shallowness 
of these outsider’s attachment to them and their status as fair-weather friends.
In sum, the landslip, the explosion, and the millennium, like construction itself, 
were part of a string of incredible events that occurred in Porgera in the early 1990s. 
Most communities in Papua New Guinea – or anywhere else for that matter – do not 
usually experience mushroom-cloud explosions, or destruction of their city center due to 
natural disaster. In the case of Porgera, these fantastic events were happening almost 
annually. All in all, inhabitants of the valley were living through times that any 
community would find extraordinary. The previous lack of development in the valley 
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only served to highlight the magnitude of the events going on in Porgera. The Ipili 
reaction to these events involved casting them in light not only of beliefs and stories they 
had inherited from their traditional culture, but also in light of the specific historical 
experiences leading up to the creation of the mine in the valley. No wonder, then, that 
millenarianism is still a popular belief amongst Ipili.
Fulfilled Promises, Increased Expectations: Whites and Their World
One of the senior employees of the Porgera gold mine in charge of ensuring 
‘sustainable development’ likes to use biblical imagery to explain his job. Ipili, he says, 
are walking through the Sinai desert of turbulent times and need strong, responsible, 
‘uncorrupted’ local leadership if they are to reach the Canaan of a sustainable, post-mine 
future. While he attributes his inability to find a Moses among landowners to the 
‘corruption’ of local elites, I would argue that his difficulties are caused by the fact that 
Ipili consider his metaphor to be fundamentally flawed. Given that the Ipili see their 
prehistoric existence as one of deprivation, and given the amount of goods and services 
that have been pumped into the valley, it is not surprising that the consider themselves to 
have already arrived in the land of milk and honey. 
Or are they? The signing of the Porgera Agreements was meant to bring an end to 
the days when Ipili would not be paid the true value of their gold, but doubts still linger. 
Like utopias of previous times, this new age of mine-derived affluence fails to live up to 
the Ipili hopes of unbridled affluence. Their experience of the white world has been one 
of initial excitement and growing disenchantment. Even with – especially with – the 
arrival of the mine, Ipili feel more strongly than ever that the utopia they long for and feel 
so entitled to has not yet been delivered, despite the fact that most of their wishes have 
been fulfilled. In this section of the dissertation I trace this disappointment through two 
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areas: Ipili dissatisfaction with white material culture, and Ipili disillusionment with 
white social mores.
As I mentioned earlier, Ipili have -- like the Hagen people described by Strathern 
(1988) and Merlan and Rumsey (1991) -- a keen sense of the way in which the white 
world is a lawa – replacement, augmentation, transformation – of their own and hence 
simultaneously both new and familiar. Thus the arrival of unprecedented change in the 
valley – a totally novel and indeed unbelievable change – was in fact seen as typical and 
expected. After all, unexpected, unimaginable change has been happening to the Ipili 
regularly for the past fifty years – if one impossible thing happens, why not another? As a 
result Ipili see the material culture that whites brought with them as fundamentally 
familiar, a transformed but recognizable version of their own. New but not essentially 
novel, white material culture is thus in some sense familiar to Ipili. They are the lawa of 
the objects that Ipili have been using for as long as they can remember. In particular, they 
are seen as augmented -- ‘better’ or ‘improved’ -- versions of what has come before. The 
value added by whiteness is typically understood in terms of two qualities which Ipili 
objects lack: either of their infinite durablity or endless replaceability.
The example of prepackaged food demonstrates the way in which Ipili see white 
material culture as being augmented through its replaceability. As every member of 
America’s affluent society knows, some commodities are meant to be disposed and 
replaced by an infinite succession of exact duplicates which are cheap and readily 
available -- one’s desire for food can be fulfilled without any effort at all.
Take salt, for example. As in many other areas of the highlands, salt was a 
valuable and scarce commodity in Porgera and the wider region (Wiessner and Tumu 
1998). Typically, wood was soaked in salt-springs, burned, and the ash was collected and 
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traded over long distance. Salt was a scarce and highly-valued commodity – while it is 
not clear, it appears that it may also have been essential for the local diet. Much of Ipili 
involvement in long-distance trading involved acting as middlemen in the salt trade or 
traveling to salt-springs owned by other groups with whom they had ties in order to make 
their own salt. Today Ipili are true saltaholics – every meal, be it rice or sweet potato, can 
and should be eaten with salt, preferably lots. Salt, like cooking oil and sweet potato, are 
considered de rigeur in any Ipili household. Ipili without salt are poor. 
So what is the white equivalent of salt that the Ipili use in the valley today? It’s 
salt! The now-ubiquitous plastic bags of salt available in trade stores are seen by Ipili as 
essentially similar to the salt that they consumed before contact, but ‘new and improved.’ 
Today’s salt is purer, cheaper, healthier and more readily available. The salt that Ipili eat 
today, then, is not merely analogous to the salt that they had before, it is identical but 
transformed – the same but better. No more boring trading! Why waste hours soaking 
wood at a salt pool? Just heat and serve! 
While the similarities between salt and salt are fortuitous, this tendency to see 
things in new items is even more clear in the case of less easily equated objects such as 
tadpoles and cheese twisties. These deliciously cheesy snacks were explicitly described 
as ‘white men’s frogs’ (one monge) and were definitively labeled as food eaten only by 
children – so much so that people laughed at me when I ate them. Why? Ipili children 
traditionally spend a good deal of their time unsupervised, running around the bush. A lot 
of that time is spent hunting small animals such as frogs, tadpoles, spiders, and other 
insects which are then cooked (or not) and eaten. Most Ipili – and especially Ipili boys – 
engage in this activity, which is not surprising given the presumably low level of protein 
in the typical Ipili diet and the nutritional demands of growing children. As a result, 
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children’s love of the sodium- and fat-rich cheese flavored snacks has caused them to be 
identified as analogs of these foods – the lawa of tadpoles. As a result, adults never eat 
them.
Here, the work-wealth equation is short circuited through replacement and 
convenience – one’s desire for food can be meant without any effort at all. Consumer 
goods, in this case premade food, offer the opportunity of satisfying one’s appetite 
without laboring to create food. They can be purchased using mine-derived money for 
which one did not have to labor. But Ipili also imagine white objects to be better than 
their own because they are infinitely durable. 
Ipili encounters with the white world have been with a segment of it concerned 
with efficiency, durability, and precision. The presence of mining culture in the Porgera 
valley has heightened the Ipili’s preexisting concern with durability and given them a 
familiarity with the productive, industrial technology of the West. Ipili have incorporated 
as ‘white’ items that many anthropologists, whose occupation and class background often 
puts them at a remove from primary industry, may not be familiar with. Backhoes, load 
masters, autoclaves, primary crushers -- all of these are familiar to the Ipili.  Thus while 
the Hawaiians described by Sahlins may have sought “everything new and elegant” while 
spurning “coarse articles” (Sahlins 1990:50), Ipili predilections for the permanent 
collided happily with miners’ concerns for equipment and gear that would survive heavy-
duty wear and tear. 
This quality of durability is encapsulated by the term ‘permanent material,’ which 
has worked its way from English into Tok Pisin and Ipili. White goods are seen as the 
‘permanent material’ versions of indigenous Ipili objects.  For instance the Ipili think it is 
funny, but also absolutely accurate, to refer to a cigarette lighter as ‘permanent material 
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matches.’ The clearest example of improved durability comes from the paradigmatic case 
of stone and steel tools. By the time of my fieldwork, almost no one in my community 
had had the experience of making or using a stone axe. Nonetheless, the difference in 
effort that using stone versus using steel took was universally remarked upon when 
people reflected on the differences between the past and the present. One person, when 
summarizing their view of contact with whites, said to me simply “before we had stone 
axes, now we have steel ones.” Steel axes had become metonymic of the labor-saving 
properties of white material culture. 
One of the most ubiquitous signs of the superiority of white technology are the 
relocations houses which the mine had built for Special Mining Lease landowners. Made 
out of a timber frame with metal siding, these sorts of houses are known in Tok Pisin as 
‘coppa haus’ (coppa being ‘copper’ or ‘metal’) or ‘permanent material house’ in contrast 
to indigenous ‘bush houses’ or ‘bus haus.’ 
Ipili take the ‘permanent’ in ‘permanent material’ seriously. Permanent material 
houses that have been built are expected to exist forever without maintenance. There are 
other examples. Axes stay sharp forever. Strong boots – another keenly sought after item 
– will keep their tread and waterproofing even after extensive use on limestone. The idea 
of something being permanent and unchanging, stable, and durable across time holds 
enormous appeal for a people whose culture focuses on decay and regeneration. Thus the 
idea of white objects being ‘permanent material’ speaks not only to dichotomies between 
asocial bush and the cleared social space of Ipili homesteads, it speaks of a way of short-
circuiting the work-wealth equation which is central to Ipili culture.
The tragic side of this belief comes from the fact that ‘permanent material objects’ 
are not maintenance free, but in fact maintenance intensive. Shoes require care – and 
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preferably two pair worn on alternate days – if they are to last. Houses must be 
maintained. Delicate clothes restrict what a wearer can do in them without destroying 
them. It is one of the ironies of Ipili life that objects which they imagine will free them 
from work and care one in fact ensnare you in a web of maintenance and work much 
greater than that involving bush material objects which are all, at heart, disposable. Like 
the prototypical American housewife in a kitchen full of ‘labor saving devices’ which in 
fact demand more work from her than they save, Ipili are often disappointed by their 
experience with white material culture. Houses with burnt-out light bulbs, clogged 
gutters, and broken water pipes seem to Ipili to have essentially missed the point and not 
to be permanent at all. Cars which break down, shoes which wear out, axes which require 
sharpening, electric stoves that require new heating coils, all seem to renege on the bet 
that Ipili have made that their mountain will be replaced by ‘permanent material objects.’
The disastrous devaluation of the Kina over the course of the mine line (from 
US$1.05 in 1990 to US$0.36 in 2000) means that the purchasing power of mine-derived 
revenue has decreased – a fact frequently commented on by Ipili. Thus items like store-
bought rice and tinned fish which Ipili expected to be cheap and ubiquitous are now 
relatively expensive. Ipili expected white objects to allow them, as Audrey Hepburn puts 
it in Roman Holiday, “to do just whatever they like” -- give free rein to their nembo 
without care or restriction. Instead they have become, as Bob Marley (or was it Karl 
Marx?) once put it, “possessed by their possessions.”
How could this have happened? To many the answer is obvious: they were 
cheated by the mine, and that the real houses, the high quality houses are somewhere else 
– the most likely locations being in white countries and at other mining developments 
where landowners have gotten ‘real’ houses. The decreasing value of their royalty and 
275
compensation payments is somehow tied to the occult forces of ‘the market’ and financial 
arrangements which they do not understand and which white miners control. Thus 
disappointment with white material culture leads on to Ipili disappointment with whites 
themselves.
Dealing with Whites and Their World
Just as the Ipili see the world of white material culture as a version of their own, 
so too do they understand the wider white world – by which they mean largely Port 
Moresby and tropical north Queensland – as in some sense familiar (for the construction 
of whiteness in Papua New Guinea, see also Bashkow 1999). Initially, Ipili understood 
white society as having solved the problems which they feel plague their own. As they 
grew more and more experienced in dealing with whites, however, they began to imagine 
life in Australia as an inversion of their own values. Either way, there is a sense amongst 
people who have had the most dealings with whites that white life is a dystopic 
transformation, or lawa, of their own.
Earlier on in Porgera’s contact history, white society was seen as utopic. While 
Ipili perceptions of the government as something trickable continue to exist, it is 
nevertheless true that the ability to colonial officers to end internecine feuds and pacify 
the valley was seen as proof of the powerful ability of whites to live in peace and 
harmony with one another. Obviously, the introduction of Christianity and the explicit 
articulation of an ethic of Christian living by white missionaries lent force to this idea.
In the mid-1960s and early 1970s when Porgerans were first introduced to the 
court system and fighting was suppressed in the valley, courts were understood as 
something new, an innovation of the white men which had no clear equivalent in 
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Porgeran custom. Although analogies were drawn between the way that both courts and 
homicide compensation ‘ended fights,’ the novelty of this method – in which no-one had 
to be killed before peace-ensuring prestations were given -- was striking. Ipili were also 
particularly impressed with the idea of due process and the right of every person involved 
in a court case to present their own opinion in group meetings with the kiap – two 
features of the white world that greatly appealed to Ipili egalitarianism. The suppression 
of violence by the government, the maintenance of social relations via litigation rather 
than violence, and the Christian emphasis on love and fellow feeling all came together to 
provide an alternative to the Ipili way of life that seemed powerful and compelling to the 
people who first experienced them.
Today, this sensibility has been dulled as Ipili have gained self-confidence in their 
dealing with outsiders. Sixty years ago Puluku Poke and other indigenous miners were 
part of a small group that understood white law well enough to use it to their own ends. 
More and more, however, more and more people have developed the self-confidence they 
need enter the world of litigation, and Ipili have become more and more litigious. 
Experience with court cases at the national level, the work of hiring lawyers, making 
depositions, and so forth has given a small but significant number of Ipili a chance to 
experience the operations of the legal system in a non-local setting. Amongst these 
people and those close them, the law is not seen as the way in which white men pursue 
peace, but rather the arena in which they undertake conflict. Litigation, in other words, is 
the lawa of tribal fighting and courts, as one man said to me, are “how white men fight.”
No more is this more clear than in an interview I did with one of the most well-
known and experienced of Porgeran middlemen, Jonathan Paraia, who drew the parallel 
explicitly when he described how he explained the origin and purpose of the Porgera 
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Landowner’s Association to landowners in the late 1980s:
Now you must have your haus man as well. The haus man is called association. That is 
going to be the mouth for speaking on behalf of landowners. Because no politicians and 
nobody will come and help you unless you form a pressure group like this who will talk 
on behalf of the landowners. Because they don’t understand what association is. So I 
have to put it in a local context where they can understand what it’s like, you know, how 
it operates. And they know what akali anda [the men’s house] is, you know. The haus 
man is where you sit down and talk and plan and how to go and attack other people and 
how to go and take things from other people. (laugh) How to negotiate. And they are 
already used to that. And I was saying, you know, we’ve got to build our own akali anda 
now, and you guys some of you are going to be leaders like clan leaders and sub clan 
leaders, you’re going to be leaders like that. And that is where you are going to deal with 
from which you can deal with national government, provincial government, and company 
on behalf of the landowners. 
Here Jonathan analogizes a political pressure group with a traditional military 
institution. His gloss of ‘negotiate’ as ‘go[ing] to attack other people and how to go and 
take things from them’ is revealing of the way he and the Porgeran elite who interacted 
with the mine understood negotiation with government and company representatives as 
the ‘lawa’ of Porgeran raiding parties.
On the one hand, contemporary Americans believe that systems of redistributive 
justice such as the Western legal system enshrines standards of impartiality, justice, and 
procedural fairness which could not be more at odds with guerrilla raiding in the central 
highlands of Papua New Guinea. On the other hand, lawyers, judges, and other people 
actively involved in the legal system might ruefully admit that Jonathan is more right 
than some would care to admit. Ipili see Western law as an augmented, transformed 
version of their own methods of conflict, but this identification might not, however much 
we might like it to be, a misrecognition. In some ways Porgerans’ long history of 
litigation has led them to some valuable insights about Western culture. While this 
understanding of white culture is not the same as the understanding that many whites – 
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including kiaps – might have of it, this does mean that it is wrong.
Ipili save their greatest shock and dismay for white familial relations. It is here, 
more than anywhere else, that Ipili see white lives as a dystopic inversion of Ipili mores. 
The basic contrast here is between Papua New Guinea as a ‘free country’ and Australia as 
a ‘money country.’ Porgerans are proud of and emphasize their autonomy. In Papua New 
Guinea, I was told repeatedly, “you can run free, eat free, sleep free.” Those without 
formal employment could rely on ‘wantoks’ for food. In contrast, Australia is a place 
where those without money are destitute and homeless. In Australia, you must purchase 
food, rent a house, and pay taxes.
Classically, sociology distinguishes societies with ascriptive versus achieved 
status, and the creation of a formally free, monetized economy is understood to result in 
more freedom and autonomy rather than less, even if this includes the ‘freedom to fail.’ 
But Porgerans, like Marx, are keenly aware of just how far one can fall in a world where 
one can not exit the market and return to a subsistence lifestyle. Thus Ipili understandings 
of whites articulate a certain leftist suspicion of merely formal freedom.
On one level, this Ipili understanding of Western society reflects an impressive 
intuition about the consequences of ordering the organization of society through a 
steering medium such as money. At the same time, it must be understood that this is more 
than an Ipili diagnosis of a particular type of sociality. Indeed, Ipili understand all of 
white life to be completely and totally commodified – as if all interactions were mediated 
by cash payment. It is this aspect of white life that Ipili find appalling. The number one 
question I was asked – after requests for my Goretex jacket and the work boots that I 
wore – was whether it was true that white parents charged their children money for food 
and rent. The idea, I gathered, was that mealtime in white households was more or less 
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analogous to eating in a restaurant. This horrified fascination with the soulless 
regimentation of white life can be seen in Nixon’s description of the heartlessness of 
industry simply by saying “they work twenty four hours!”
In sum, exposure to the ‘outside world’ has brought Porgerans benefits that their 
ancestors could barely conceive of. But even as Porgeran wishes are filled, Ipili 
familiarity with the outside world grows, and their sense of what ‘true’ satisfaction is 
changes. The more they learn of the white world, the less compelling the material culture 
available to them seems, even as the white lifestyle they come to know more and more 
seems less appetizing than it once was.
Whites in Papua New Guinea
Just as Porgeran’s sense of the Yakatabari negotiations were based on a culturally 
specific historical consciousness focused on the rising expectations that developed as 
contact with outsiders grew more sustained, so too were the biographies of the 
negotiators they faced on the other side of the table shaped by their own expectations for 
the country’s gradual improvement. But while Ipili experienced their entanglement with 
Western colonialism and the postcolonial state as an ever-increasing if never satisfying 
affluence, the community relations officers with whom they dealt understood Papua New 
Guinea’s postcolonial history as a fall from its pre-independence grace.
In this section of the dissertation I will focus on the history of the white 
Australian negotiators involved in Yakatabari – the community relations officers who 
served as department heads within the community affairs department. As I mentioned at 
the start of this chapter, all but one (who had worked in plantations) had served as 
government officers during Papua New Guinea’s colonial period, and of those all but one 
280
(who worked as an agricultural extension officer) had worked as kiaps. My discussion of 
the world view of these community relations officers will be based on my fieldwork 
inside the mine, as well as discussions with other former kiaps and colonial government 
officers who I encountered in Port Moresby and other places in Papua New Guinea and 
Australia.
Studying expatriates in Papua New Guinea can be difficult. On the one hand, the 
formal academic literature is extremely thin. In their recent discussion of expatriate life, 
Errington and Gewertz (2004:109-137) very correctly point out the paucity of 
information on this topic (their literature review includes, for instance, Bettison 1966; 
Bourke 1993; Griffin 1978; Nelson 1982; Sinclair 1995; Upton 1998). On the other hand, 
there is a much larger literature that they do not engage which, although not officially 
‘anthropological,’ has genuine documentary value and is often written to high standards. 
At the very least, it is highly evocative of the ethos of expatriate life in Papua New 
Guinea. To focus merely on volumes that document the post-war years, we have Michael 
Chalinger’s (1992, 1994) portraits of expatriate life in Port Moresby, Missionary 
memoirs by Chatterton (1974), Barnard (1969) (Porgera’s famous ‘flying missionary’), 
expat memoirs (Harnkness 1994; Clelland 1985; Hollinshed 2004; Inden 2001; Lloyd et. 
al. 2001), biographies (Fowke 1995), and accounts of traveling in-country by airplane 
(King 1993, Sinclair 1971, Ward and Serjeantson 2002), and surveying (Sinclair 2001). 
Biographical and autobiographical accounts of Kiaps’ lives are common (Downs 1986; 
Fitzpatrick 2005; Gammage 1998; Sinclair 1969, 1981, 1988; Kituai 1998; MacPherson 
2001) as are richly evocative (and often quite thinly disguised) fictional accounts (Downs 
1970; Shearston 1979, 2000; and the particularly outstanding Stow 1981). 
This literature reflects more than the public’s appetite for adventure stories or 
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expatriate’s interest in self-memorialization. It points to the crucial role that kiaps played 
in Papua New Guinea’s postwar development as well as the strong social ties they 
developed and continue to maintain today – seen, for instance, in the active postings at 
the website exkiap.net and the existence of the Papua New Guinea Association of 
Australia (former the Retired Officers’ Association of Papua New Guinea), which 
publishes a regular journal. Former colonial officers – indeed, former Papua New Guinea 
expatriates in general – form a close-knit group which is the latter-day reincarnation of 
the territorian grapevine I discussed in chapter three.  Their own mutual understandings 
exhibit the collective, enduring, and integrated beliefs that makes their personal 
experiences more than mere idiosyncrasy. There is, as Gordon put it, a distinct ‘Kiap 
High Culture’ a “characteristic professional or at least occupational culture” which in 
some respects “differed markedly from contemporary Australian or civilian culture” 
(Gordon and Meggitt 1985:49). It is perfectly appropriate to speak of (and analyze) an 
‘Papua New Guinea expatriate culture’ or, as I will (perhaps unfairly) label it here, a 
‘kiap culture.’
Rather than pursue a detailed account of the themes and history of this culture as I 
did with the Ipili, I take it for granted that the reader has some familiarity with standard 
average European culture and perhaps even Australia’s own version of it. Thus my own 
discussion of kiap culture will be more a sort of collective profile of a generation of 
Australians and the commonalities in their collective biographies, and is intended to 
provide an ethnography – however incomplete – of at least one sector of Papua New 
Guinea’s postcolonial expatriate population. I will begin by outlining the role of these 
former government officers in Papua New Guinea’s mining sector, and how their life 
history led them to work for the mine. I will turn next to an examination of how that same 
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life history provided them with a unique way of viewing Papua New Guineans, and how 
this has influenced their interaction with the Ipili.
Heading North: Kiaps in Papua New Guinea
Like many countries in the world, Papua New Guinea is a place whose 
postcolonial history is marked by the continued presence of a small number of expatriates 
in key positions throughout the country, both in the civil service as well as in the private 
sector. This is particularly the case for Papua New Guinea’s mining and hydrocarbon 
industry. It is a truism today that large resource extraction companies tend to assume the 
role and function of the state in the rural areas where they are based, and perhaps the 
most obvious sign of this is the fact that they often employ the same people as the former 
colonial government. As Banks and Ballard write, “one of the ironies of contemporary 
Papua New Guinea is that the Australian Kiap, the ultimate icon of colonial rule, has 
reappeared as the visible face of the mineral resource industry” (1997:160). The reasons 
for this are simple. As Banks and Ballard remind us, 
Many tasks which confront community liaison staff are strikingly familiar to those who 
were kiaps. They become embroiled in mediating disputes, overseeing compensation 
payments, determining land ownership and group membership, censusing, and as 
mediators in labor relationships (Banks and Ballard 1997:162).
At mining and hydrocarbon developments across Papua New Guinea there tends 
to be at least one – and often more than one – former colonial government officer acting 
as a community relations officer. In fact Porgera is a particularly clear example of this 
phenomenon. The head of Community Affairs for the first decade of the mine’s existence 
was a kiap with an extensive and impressive history in the administration of Papua New 
Guinea, and the community relations staff he put in place were all people who were hand-
picked by him on the basis of their performance as government officers. Thus while 
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every mining or hydrocarbon project tends to keep kiaps as community relations officers, 
Porgera is truly unusual because of the way that its community relations officers are 
almost entirely kiaps.
While each of the people who worked in community relations had their own 
unique personality and biography, there are similarities in their careers that are worth 
noting. Each decided to move to Papua New Guinea as young men, and most experienced 
considerable success – indeed, some rose to occupy some of the most powerful 
administrative positions in the country. However, each experienced personal unhappiness 
as their work was undone when Papua New Guinea’s civil service began to be politicized 
in the 1980s and the government’s capacity began to decline. Almost all of them ended 
up leaving the country. Some left simply because their time was up, while others left due 
to quite traumatic circumstances – the revolt on Bougainville, for instance. After a period 
of reorientation they ended up back in Papua New Guinea, where they attempted to 
continue their lives not as government employees, but as the next best thing: 
representatives of the current big actor attempting to regiment action in Papua New 
Guinea’s hinterland, the Porgera gold mine.
How does one end up moving to Papua New Guinea in the first place? The men 
who I interviewed were on the whole from working and middle class families – often 
from rural Queensland -- who might otherwise have grown up to be farmers or bank 
clerks. They came to Papua New Guinea between the years of 1959 and 1970, with most 
of them arriving in the late 1960s. During their childhood, Papua New Guinea was a 
place remembered by Australian veterans of the war, and the location for almost a 
century of romantic travel literature about brave young men who traded in lives as bank 
clerks and farmers for ones of dangerous excitement in the ‘last unknown’ (Souter 1964). 
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For this reason, most of the community relations officers that I talked with were 
reluctant to discuss their initial decision to move to Papua New Guinea – the general 
feeling was that one ought to be sucked into such lines of work ‘accidentally’ and that to 
admit to intentionally seeking it out was a bit embarrassing. To seek a life of adventure 
was simply not done – real men had it inadvertently thrust upon them. Even those who 
admitted to being entranced with Papua New Guinea’s allure preferred not to reflect on 
how intelligent their choice (often made in their late teens and early twenties) to come to 
Papua New Guinea had been – a reluctance that is, if not universal, perhaps experience-
near for those of us who entered graduate school directly after college. In some instances 
people remarked that they had “a romantic notion” or “knew people who had settled in 
[Papua New Guinea] from where I had originated in Australia.” This uneasiness with 
discussing their motivations was epitomized by one man who told me “I guess I’ve 
always wanted to come to Papua New Guinea. My father was here during the war, my 
uncle was here during the war... My father was a ship’s doctor round the coast before the 
war. There’s family connections.” There was an awkward pause before he continued: “a 
sense of adventure – you’re allowed to have that!” Some had elaborate, well-rehearsed 
narratives which ascribed their actions to fateful but random decisions which accidentally 
propelled them into life in Papua New Guinea. Alcohol often features prominently. One 
man remembered  
I finished the third year of a degree in primary metallurgy, focusing on analytical 
chemistry and I realized that I wasn’t particularly interested in it... About the same time I 
saw in the newspaper an advertisement under the old Department of External Territories. 
They required field officers in Papua New Guinea. I had drunk sufficient whiskey at that 
time to scribble out an application and a few weeks later I got this telegram saying ‘front 
up for an interview’... They interviewed me in Melbourne, that was about the end of 
November. Didn’t think much about it. Just before Christmas I got another telegram 
saying ‘you’re accepted!’
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Another man blamed his mother:
The Vietnam war was on, and in Australia we had a system like raffle -- your birthday 
dates were all thrown into a big barrel, and if your birthday date came out, you were 
called up. And that’s how you got called up. And the only other way you could get to go 
to national service, you could volunteer... Seeing as my father, my uncle, and my two 
grandfathers all died of war injuries, and I’m the only son my Mom reckons that was a 
bad idea. So she actually found an ad in the paper for a kiap in New Guinea and she says 
instead of gong to Vietnam why don’t you do that? So I said ok, that looks pretty good, 
so I applied and became a kiap.
It is important to realize that going to Papua New Guinea in the 1960s was an 
entirely different affairs than it was in the interwar period memorialized in books like 
First Contact (Connolly and Anderson 1987) and Like People You See In A Dream 
(Schieffelin and Crittendon 1991).  While it would be facetious to describe the Australian 
administration as ‘the Peace Corps with guns’ it would also not be too far off. This was, 
after all, an era when Gough Whitlam’s labor government was responsible for 
undertaking far-reaching and extremely controversial liberal reforms. By the 1960s the 
benevolent paternalism that had always characterized the Australian administration of 
Papua New Guinea was stronger than ever, and work had shifted from exploration – 
which was by then largely accomplished – to the development of infrastructure. The 
counterculture of the sixties had made its mark as well. “I always hate to use the word 
‘hippy’ because it has all sorts of implications of ‘dope’ and ‘peaceman’,” said one man, 
who then went on to admit that that wasn’t far off from describing his own folksy 
background and the interest in self-sufficient agriculture that led him to be an agricultural 
extension officer. Another man described his shock arriving at Laiagam with “me guitar 
and me love beads and my long hair and my buffalo jacket” and being told to build a 
road. Not every kiap who arrived in Papua New Guinea was wearing a buffalo jacket, of 
course, but the story is telling.
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One of the most important differences between kiaps such as Jim Taylor and John 
Black and the kiaps of the 1960s is the way they viewed their position in the international 
order. While the atrocities of the First World War had shaken Europe’s confidence in its 
status as a paragon of civilization and the Dominion system was changing the 
relationship of England to her settler colonies, it was still possible to participate in 
colonial work in Papua New Guinea for the glory of Britain and the advancement of 
civilization. By the 1960s, in contrast, decolonization was a fact, ‘civilization’ seemed 
less and less a good idea in general, and the British Empire was rapidly turning into the 
Commonwealth. In this period, then, the sentiment that Papua New Guinea was “never a 
colony” reported by Hank Nelson (1982:8) was particularly strong. In fact, one of the 
most important points the former kiaps sought to convey to me in interviews was that 
Papua New Guinea was not a colony and that they were not colonial officers. They 
emphasized the fact that the expatriate lifestyle in Papua New Guinea was hard and not 
particularly lucrative and that they were there to help. As the former head of community 
affairs put it:
I don’t think Australia knew how to be a colonial power. It was an ex-colony itself from 
England. It doesn’t show the signs of what colonizing powers did. There are no big grand 
stone buildings around this place like there was in the old colonial empire of the Dutch 
and the Spanish or the more modern one of the 1800s... These things don’t show up here. 
It was very temporary. We had fibro buildings and louvres, you know, these sort of 
things. They aren’t seen in what I call true colonies. You know, the French in Indochina, 
in India, in African countries, because Austrlia’s time here was very short.
Many of my interviewees preferred the term ‘imperial administration’ to ‘colonial 
rule’ and emphasized that Papua New Guinea was a Trust Territory of the United Nations 
that was administered, but not owned by, Australia. 
We were an imperial administration here, it was an imposed administration. Australia did 
not hold Papua New Guinea, the New Guinea side as a possession... Australia took it over 
287
under the League of Nations as the administering authority and later on under the United 
Nations. The New Guinea side of this place was subject to every three years to 
investigations, to a visiting delegation from the United Nations to see what Australia was 
doing here. We did not own this place. 
For many the most obvious indication of their humane treatment of the subjects 
they governed had to do with land rights – the topic which of course would become 
crucial to their position as negotiators in Yakatabari:
To me one of the things that denoted a true colonialism was total disregard for native land 
rights. This country had law, law in the country, under the Australian administration of 
protection of native land rights. Hence even today there’s only five percent of land in this 
country which has been alienated. The other is still in the hands of the traditional 
landowners. I think the examples of what I call true colonies in Africa [is] where there 
was total disregard for land rights, it was just ripped off them. This didn’t happen in this 
country. I think that was one of the things that really denoted a colonial type thing was 
just total disregard for whatever traditional land rights were and they just took it off them.
Once settled into the country, the careers of the community relations officers had 
several things in common. First, almost all of them worked in the highlands, and many of 
them had worked in Enga. One of them has actually served as the officer in charge of 
Porgera in the early 1970s. In fact, there was a great deal of friendly joking about one 
former kiap who had spent his career entirely in coastal areas and his inexperience in 
dealing with the aggressive ethos of most highlanders. Second, in my experience these 
community relations officers were on the whole remarkable men who had achieved 
remarkable things in their lives – when the department was created much care went in to 
choosing people with outstanding records. Admittedly, some led lives that were a bit 
colorful. The former kiap in Porgera who now works for the mine described his period of 
administration thus: “I just went down there, Crazy old Kelly with his shotgun and all 
sorts of things, and said ‘you fight, I shoot you.’ So we didn’t have any fights. Not while 
I was here.” On the whole, however, most had a more nuanced approach to 
administration. Indeed, many had distinguished careers and some had risen through the 
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ranks to truly extraordinary positions of power and influence. One man began as a 
foreman on a plantation in Bougainville over seeing workers and ended up general 
manager of the company, responsible for literally tens of thousands of employees. Two 
men I interviewed had become Provincial Secretaries and had budgeting and other power 
over provinces with literally hundreds of thousands of inhabitants. One wrote the 
constitution for one of Papua New Guinea’s provinces during independence. Yet another 
helped create a development corporation which effectively organized all public works in 
Western Highlands province, organized the 1980 national census for the province, and 
then moved to join the the provincial office in Mt. Hagen. He remembers: “At one time I 
was commissioner for liquor licensing, assistant secretary for social development, I was 
on the town planning board, I was a resident magistrate, provincial statistical officer and 
several other things.” Thus it was not only Ipili who were used to the idea that 
‘governance’ involved a network of powerful people who combined in their person a 
bundle of institutional representations – preindependence Papua New Guinea operated in 
much the same way.
Postcolonial Disenchantment
All of these people, then, felt deeply responsible for a large part of Papua New 
Guinea’s development, and most of them stayed on in Papua New Guinea after 
independence occurred in 1975. However, they shared the widespread sensibility that 
independence had come ‘too soon’ and that Papua New Guinea was not ready to be ‘on 
its own.’ The politicization of the civil service soon confirmed their suspicion. Many of 
them chose to leave. One man remembered “By that time I had twenty seven years of 
service all up, and I could see the politics the way it was eroding and gnawing away at all 
aspects of government, especially the public service, I decided it was time for me to get 
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out.” Another man remembered
Shortly after independence came this drive for provincial government. And that came 
about and became a very unwieldy and expensive exercise. Duplicate elections, duplicate 
officers, access to funds without due ethics -- without due training to be honest -- political 
appointees of staff who would listen to the politicians rather than following the rules. The 
more outspoken more developed areas such as the Wahgi and Hagen and the more 
educated people were able to manipulate things and control the large slice of the cake... at 
the end of 1985 we [the kiap and his wife] decided there was corruption and everything 
that we had each strived to attain for the province was being undone by corruption and 
rather than try to carry on it would be best if we left before we became very bitter. So 
towards the end of ‘85 we left.
For the plantation manager leaving was not a matter of choice – events on 
Bougainville forced the evacuation of his family and the destruction of a business he had 
devoted two decades of his life to developing. Others finished their contracts and simply 
left in the mid-70s without much regret. Even these people, however, were dismayed by 
the performance of Papua New Guinea’s state throughout the 1980s, and they way they 
were vilified as colonial. Even worse, they found themselves blamed for Papua New 
Guinea’s predicament. The irony of being accused of deserting Papua New Guinea in its 
hour of need was not lost on men who felt they had been forced against their will. As one 
man wrote on the exkiap.net message boards:
The United Nations resolution 1514 in 1960 called for the immediate independence of all 
colonial peoples. It stated that inadequacy of political, economic, social or educational 
development should never serve as a pretext for delaying independence. Good 
government was not a substitute for, nor preferable to, self-government. The 
Administration took action as best it could (given the resources made available to it) to 
implement these goals, particularly the recommendations of the Foote Report in 1962 and 
the World Bank report in 1964 but time was not on their side.  If we had been allowed 
another generation to train a critical mass of indigenes to form a viable core of experts in 
all fields, things would probably have turned out differently. As it was, the pressure was 
on and many schoolboys became master craftsmen without having served an 
apprenticeship. The legacy of this failure is the shambles that the country has become 
and this was predicted at the time. 
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Working for the Mine
While many people left, not everyone came back. The men who returned to Papua 
New Guinea to work in the mining industry did so for many reasons. Despite what I have 
said about their sense of commitment to the country, it is important to note up front that 
one of the main reasons was, in many cases, the fact that the money was good. For some, 
it was extra money to fill out the time until they retired that could be combined with 
entrepreneurial activity in Australia – many ex-kiaps run small businesses in Australia or 
fix up houses and sell them. To others without a job or long-term financial security, 
working in Porgera was a real necessity – being a kiap was the only job they knew how to 
do, and the only way to earn a monthly paycheck greater than that of their pension or the 
dole. For most, however, the truth was in-between. As they approached retirement, or 
decided to push the date back a bit, they viewed their work in Porgera as an opportunity 
to make a generous amount of money and do some good as they wound down their 
careers. Regardless of whether they stood to gain monetarily, there was a clear sense that 
coming to Porgera could be justified on the same grounds as their colonial mandate – it 
was good work that included good works.
As might be imagined, the community relations officers were very different from 
the rest of the mine’s employees. Other mine employees, for instance, considered them to 
have ‘gone native’ in a literal sense -- the word “feral” to describe them. They were 
viewed as socially separate and somewhat suspect by the other expatriates with whom 
they shared the mine’s fenced-in compound. This is not to say that they were deeply 
socially isolated or made no friends at all, but it is to say that they were a recognizably 
distinct group with their own social mores. “Its not only me,” explained one kiap tellingly 
when explaining something to me, “because I speak to the other exkiaps over dinner.” 
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They also tended to eat together and often played sports together.  For instance, after 
dinner the community affairs officers engage in a fast-paced walk around the grounds of 
the worker’s camp, circling several times through the main road as they talk and share 
some conviviality. This small but distinctive gesture to maintain solidarity and settle 
one’s meal was not, as far as I know, practiced by any other group.
Community Affairs was an unusual branch of the mine because it was non-
productive – not part of the process of making gold. Such departments are not highly-
valued in the corporate culture of mining. Yes, within Placer Dome, Porgera is well 
known for the extraordinary amount of time that the mine manager must spend in dealing 
with community affairs. I have heard estimates that fifty to sixty percent of the mine 
manager’s time is spent keeping the Ipili ‘in check.’ As a result community relations 
officers have access to senior management that the average foreman does not. Indeed, 
many mines simply do not have large community relations offices. Some lack the 
department at all. As a result the community relations staff did not fit in well with a 
corporate culture simply because that culture typically did not have a place in which they 
could fit.
Community relations officers differ not just in corporate culture and role from the 
other employees of the mine, they also differ in their conception of their job. Mine 
employees typically move from one mining property to another, advancing (if they are 
lucky) to more and more senior positions as they do so. While they will sometimes move 
from company to company as they move from property to property, some spend their 
entire career with one firm. Very often, then, professionals in the mining sector feel more 
loyalty to their company than they do to a particular property where they happen to be 
working, and most certainly feel more attached to the property than to the place where it 
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is located.
Community relations officers on the other hand, are more committed to working 
in Papua New Guinea than they are working for a particular mining company. While 
some people have moved from Porgera to Misima, Placer’s other property in Papua New 
Guinea, on the whole community relations officers come to the company late in life 
without the intention to climb the corporate ladder into senior management. They have a 
strong sense of themselves that comes from successful accomplishments in another 
career. As a result there is a sense of independence from the company.
Community relations officers see themselves as mediators whose job is to explain 
the mine to the Ipili and vice versa. This conception is obviously a transference from their 
previous job as government representatives. It also accords well with corporate culture -- 
both benevolent and (when possible) paternalistic, community relations officers’ role as 
mediators plays into the senior management’s portrayal of themselves as partners with 
local communities seeking to maximize stakeholder benefits. Corporate imperatives, 
then, are often (but not always) well served by kiaps’ desire to explore the way the 
mine’s pursuit of it’s own interests opens up a space in which they find a ‘win-win’ 
situation for all parties concerned. As one man explained to me:
We do still tend to take the people’s side. If it’s a land claim, when we look at it we might 
think ‘well this is perhaps fifty-fifty, let’s go the landowners side.’ And this is endorsed 
by management if it’s not too far - if it’s taken to sixty forty maybe thats ok, but let’s not 
go any further. But there’s always in the back of your mind: “how can I best help the 
people? How can I use this company to help those people?” Keeping in mind of course 
the company’s paying me, so the companies got to get something out of it. So we’re 
looking for the win-win situations, not just the company gets it results and the people are 
secondary. We’re trying to find the road, the method that will give both parties what they 
want. I think the kiap background - I don’t think you could do without the kiap 
background. I don’t think you could be in the middle. You’d have to be one way or the 
other. You’d be the tree-hugging do-gooder on the side of the people and you wouldn’t 
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last too long with the company and you wouldn’t do anybody very much good. And if 
you were the highly trained professional administrator you’d be too far to the company 
and you would not consider the people’s needs fully.
The head of community affairs quoted his predecessor who said that community 
relations officers could only survive in the difficult environment of Porgera by mimicking 
it. It was for this reason they did not fit in to the ethos of professional engineers or 
technicians:
We behave like it and we look like it. Now that can be a bit dodgy if you belong to a 
corporate structure. If you get too far out you loose track of where you are and that’s the 
delicate balance and I see that as my role, is to keep the department closely aligned with 
the company without being so close we loose touch with the people who we’re supposed 
to be servicing. 
Indeed, more than one person remembered that the difficulty of making the 
transition from the public sector to the private was not learning to work with Porgerans, 
but learning to work with white people after a career in Papua New Guinea.
This was my first exposure to working with the private sector, and it happened to be a 
mining culture. And I had to become used to working with white people. I had spent most 
of my life working with Papua New Guineans. So I had to become used to working with 
a large white group, with expatriate people, and trying to be the bridge between a 
traditional culture to this expatriate culture that came in here, which were miles apart in 
many ways, and you became the bridge between the two, trying to marry the two together 
where it was necessary, and you were the in-between part.
Kiap Knowledge
Community relations officers approach Ipili, then, on the basis of a historically 
particular and long-term experience of Papua New Guinea. They did not arrive in 
Porgera, like some colonizers who have been described in the literature, with 
essentialized images of the Melanesian other in their heads and one-dimensionally 
‘modernist’ plans in their hands. Instead they have extensive experience in Papua New 
Guinea and a deep affection for the country. Their view of the Ipili difference and 
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pathology, then, are made not in contrast to the civilized West, but to other people in 
Papua New Guinea with whom they are familiar.
In fact community relations officers had developed what might be called ‘kiap 
knowledge,’ a genre of knowing about Papua New Guinea’s indigenous peoples that 
combined anthropological knowledge with the sort of practical understanding of people 
required by their profession. It is the latter-day incarnation of the ‘knowing about the 
valley’ that Porgera’s middlemen of the 1950s and 1960s exhibited. It was this stock of 
knowledge, rather than some sort of formal schooling, that qualifies them for the work 
they do. “Your training,” as one man told me when discussing his qualifications, “is your 
experience in Papua New Guinea, which is more broadly based than one particular 
school.”
This kiap knowledge was formed not only by long experience in Papua New 
Guinea, but also by the kiap’s own background in social science. All community relations 
officers who were formerly kiaps had done training at the Australian School of Pacific 
Administration (ASOPA), where they were required to take a short course in 
anthropology as part of their Patrol Officer Certification course (Lawrence 1964). Since 
many of these men went through the course in the 1960s, they received training that was 
standard in Australia at the time and were taught by lecturers such as Ian Hogbin and 
Peter Lawrence. Westermark reports that a 1965 syllabus “includes articles and books by 
such well-known anthropologists as A.R. Radcliffe-Brown, J.A. Barnes, Robert Redfield, 
Raymond Firth, Ward Goodenough, Paula Brown, and Kenneth Read” (Westermark 
2001:50). Thus Jorgensen is right suspecting that this is situation where anthropological 
models have “taken on a life of their own when deployed in legal and political contexts 
far removed from their original sources” (Jorgensen 2001:100).  
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Some who were sensitive to their relative lack of education vis-a-vis the visiting 
anthropologist made a special point of noting that their ASOPA certificate was in fact a 
tertiary certificate and that they had, in some sense, ‘been to university.’ Although spy 
novels were perhaps the thing most commonly read on chopper flights into and out of 
Porgera, some community relations officers enjoyed reading popular non-fiction as well 
as ‘literature.’ The tenor of the kiap reading list can perhaps best be seen in the fact that 
one man offered to lend me his copy of The God Of Small Things by Arudhati Roy, while 
another was nonplussed when he volunteered to purchase some books for me when on 
leave in Australia and I requested a copy of Gravity’s Rainbow. One man who had been 
reading Geoffrey Blainey’s Very Short History of the World told me how surprised he 
was to find Judaism lacked a missionary tradition, while another thought superior 
European culture developed in response to cold winters which forced people to spend 
time indoors together and discuss innovative technology. All of them enjoyed browsing 
through ethnographies from areas where they had formerly been stationed. In sum, 
community relations officers, like their legendary predecessor Jim Taylor, conceived of 
themselves as “intellectuals in action” (Gammage 1998), but the emphasis was on the 
‘action.’
It would be disingenuous to say that kiap knowledge was some sort of corrupt and 
derivative of the pure and untramelled discourse of anthropology. Their instructors at 
ASOPA were not the only anthropologists who kiaps met. Indeed, many of the men 
working in Porgera had rubbed elbows at various rural clubs and outstations with some of 
the most well-known anthropologists to have worked in Papua New Guinea. This point 
was driven home to me quite forcefully very early on in the course of my fieldwork when 
one old Papua New Guinea hand asked me idly if I had ever read anything by Robert 
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Glasse. When I said that I had his eyes misted over in reminiscence and he murmured 
“Robert Glasse.... my God, that man could tango!” Others remembered Mervyn Meggitt 
and Andrew Strathern. The same was true of many Papua New Guineans as well. My 
very first day in Porgera when I told one man I was an anthropologist he responded “oh, 
so you record myths and take genealogies, like Aletta [Biersack]?” The janitor at the 
Porgera District Government Station is warmly thanked as the chief informant in the 
acknowledgments of Wohlt’s doctoral thesis (1978), and one of the police officers at the 
government station had two children named ‘Francesca’ and ‘Alan’ after the authors of 
Merlan and Rumsey 1991.
My point is that anthropological knowledge and kiap knowledge – indeed 
knowledge in and about Papua New Guinea more generally -- exist in reciprocal 
relationship with one another. While this is explored further in the conclusion, I wish here 
to note the way that personal experiences with anthropologists have made kiaps skeptical 
of the value of academic anthropology. Despite some memories of people such as Glasse 
and Meggitt, most kiaps’ experience of anthropologists occurred during the authors’ 
formative years of fieldwork, during which the kiaps were seasoned professionals with 
great power and the anthropologists were tender naifs in search of a patron. Thus where 
we see ‘The New Melanesian Ethnography’ (Josephides 1991) they saw a confused 
twenty-something badly in need of a shower and desperate to catch a ride in the jeep to 
the nearest airstrip. Indeed, these men’s familiarity with this role as mentor and patron of 
the innocent anthropologist greatly eased my ability to talk with them during my own 
time as a confused twenty-something badly in need of a shower and desperate to catch a 
ride in the jeep to the nearest airstrip. In sum, while few anthropologists have had valets, 
most Melanesianists can attest to the fact that, sadly, no man is a hero to his kiap.
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Thus kiaps had a strong sense of their own familiarity and expertise with Papua 
New Guineans, combined with an appreciation for what anthropology could teach them 
as well as what it couldn’t. The deflating effects of knowing the authors while in the 
field, and a concern with ‘practicality’ and ‘efficiency’ which was typical of both the 
requirements of their occupation as government officers as well their working-class 
Australian sensibilities, which often had more than a streak of anti-intellectualism. There 
was a strong sense amongst the community affairs officers I encountered that life’s 
complications could always be handled if looked squarely in the eye, and that doing 
things ‘proper’ was not difficult if one was sensible, not distracted by frivolities, and 
simply rolled up one’s sleeves and got to work. They were, as Gordon records, “practical 
men of action” (1985:50). 
As a result there was a  strong sense that academics often quibbled over small 
points. “The Enga had clans and they called them clans,” one man told me, referring to 
debates decades dead in anthropological theory. “There’s always arguments amongst you 
guys about what’s a clan and what’s a bloody parish and what’s a whats-his-name. They 
themselves adopted the word and called themselves clans and subclans and being an 
outsider I just adopted the same thing.” Another man remarked fondly, “ah, Jimmy 
Weiner – why doesn’t he write a book that someone could actually read?” We have 
already seen that Biersack’s dissertation was considered ‘too difficult’ to read. 
In sum, kiaps had more time on the ground than any anthropologist. However 
their point of view was shaped by the requirements of their job as well as their own 
cultural predisposition for plain speaking. It was this kiap knowledge they deployed in 
their time in Porgera.
The Ipili as Pathological Losers
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What sorts of understandings and opinions, then, did these community relations 
officers have about the Ipili, based on this background? We have already seen in the 
introductory chapter of this dissertation how poorly liked the Ipili are by white people 
who know them. Although very few community relations officers were willing to say so 
explicitly on tape, there is a widely-held understanding of Ipili prehistory and culture 
which circulates throughout the valley’s white elite. This account is based on a sort of 
folk theory of ‘evolution’ and ‘civilization’ that is a mix of somewhere between White’s 
cultural evolutionism (1987), William Graham Sumner’s Social Darwinism (1992), and 
Huli and Engan chauvinism. The idea here is that the Ipili are the losers of wars and 
competition in Engan and Huli territories who were exiled to Porgera, a harsh and 
undesirable territory. On this account Ipili are literally the dregs of humanity – a mongrel 
culture which shares the traits of both Huli and Engan people. As one man put it,
I became very aware that they evolved here mainly from Enga and from Tari and they 
brought aspects of what I regard as core cultural things with them from both societies. 
And over a period of time they took aspects of both cultural groups where they originated 
from and as they evolved as a group, those cultural aspects which they brought with them 
were put into what had evolved as Ipili society. 
This view is thus a way of understanding the complex diasporic nature of 
settlement in this area of Papua New Guinea (which will be discussed in the next chapter) 
within the existing folk-social science understanding that the kiaps imbibed through 
reading social science and their own time in Papua New Guinea. One suspects it is also 
informed by discussion with Huli and Engans, whose well-known chauvinism often 
combines with envy for Porgeran’s incredible luck as landowners to produce a less than 
pleasant attitude towards their less populous neighbors.
It is not surprising, then, that Community Affairs Officers consider Ipili to be 
physically weaker, less courageous, and less talented militarily than other highlanders 
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they have encountered. As one man put it, 
Well actually, when I came to Porgera I thought the Porgerans were pretty mild when I 
compare them with the Engans. And like you know they used to have some really good 
tribal fights out in the Enga... I had the feeling that the Paielans were basically the 
Kukukuku of the Enga. They were fierce fighters, and they were very good shots with 
bows and arrows. Whereas most Engans and Porgerans were not real good - I mean I 
even came second on a competition on the [Porgera government] station! (laugh) So 
they’re not that good mate! So they seemed to me fragmented. And they weren’t as 
aggressive as the Engans. Nowhere near as aggressive... not as in your face as Engans 
were.
Often times people explained Ipili secrecy and their ability to negotiate as an 
evolutionary adaptation to their physical shortfalls.
Porgerans are not as strong, not as physically strong or aggressively strong as say Engans 
or Huli or Western Highlanders or people from Chimbu or Eastern Highlands or 
whatever and I think there’s no accident. I think they perhaps arrived here because of 
that. And they have developed other techniques for defending themselves so they’re not 
as aggressive necessarily say as a Laiagam. I think that’s one of the reasons they are just 
sensational negotiators is that they’ve learned to talk their way out of trouble.
For working class Australian men who were used to plain speaking highlanders, 
Ipili secrecy seemed particularly problematic.
These guys are much more hidden then the Enga. They’re secretive. They’re almost 
bloody paranoid. You know: “How are you?” “What do you want to know for?!” That 
sort of stuff. I asked Kurubu I said “Don’t you trust anybody?” He said “No!” I said 
“What about your wife?” And he said “NOT HER!” (laugh).
Often times, these community relations officers have served as chaperons for 
some of the first trips that Ipili leaders have taken to Australia to attend board meetings or 
other functions. There is a small but robust body of stories these men tell about Ipili 
behavior in hotel bars. These typically revolve around some Ipili leader drinking in a bar 
and becoming panicked when a stranger strikes up a conversation with him. Their 
subsequent panicked phone call to the community relation officer’s room (“there’s a 
strange man talking to me for no reason! What does he want?!?”) -- is humorous to kiaps 
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because it casts the Ipili leader in the role of confused and helpless client whose 
pathological paranoia renders him unable to engage in the paradigmatic Australian form 
of masculine sociality – mateship. 
Not everyone considered Porgerans as weak. Sometimes the reverse was argued -- 
that Ipili were in fact more tenacious and rugged than other highland groups because of 
their poor lot in life. On this account, skill in negotiation is a result of Ipili social 
structure
They’re different. They’re hole in the wall. They’re smaller, they’re probably tougher in 
some ways. I think that cognatic structure is a response  to the situation in which they 
found themselves. I’m sure Aletta [Biersack]’s right about it being an inclusive culture, 
they’re trying to gain people all the time... all those things I think are part of the facts of 
life of being a mixed group from between two huge groups I mean the two biggest groups 
in the country probably.
As this last quote indicates, community relations officers were keenly aware of 
how different Ipili patterns of kinship and residence were from other areas where they 
had lived and worked. This was often described as ‘fragmentation’ -- implying an ideal 
state of corporate integrity that was presumably lost in the past. Again, the idea that this 
was result of a series of historical migrations was common. As one man who had served 
as kiap in Porgera in the early 1970s put it,
They seem to be fragmented. They didn’t call themselves Porgerans, they called 
themselves by their group names or large clan names. Whereas even in the Laiagam area, 
even though they were Laiagams, in conversation, you’d hear the word Enga. The 
Porgerans didn’t often use the word Ipili to describe themselves as people from Ipili. Ipili 
was their language, but it wasn’t a joining together. My theory was that they seemed to 
have come from all these different places, they still had those sort of ties there and they 
didn’t make themselves as Porgerans. You know, “we’re Porgerans, this is our valley, 
and we’ll all stick together and here we are.” To me as an outsider just walking in and 
used to the big Engan clans, and how those sort of looked at themselves, Ipili seemed to 
me a bit fragmented. And the Paielans, well, they were their own people. 
While this community relations officer casts ‘fragementation’ in terms of an 
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absence of shared ethnic identity, others understood it in terms reminiscent of 
anthropological studies of kinship and residence:
The clan-subclan structure here is quite different from everywhere else. This is almost a 
dual matrilineal-patrilineal society. Very rarely anywhere else that I’ve worked and been 
in the highlands has there been this degree of women’s land rights. Also here there’s 
more, tends to more individual land plots whereas in other places its communal land and 
you have the right to use it with the consensus of the community. You go there and you 
say I want this plot to grow coffee and you have to argue your case with the community 
and once they say you have the right, you have the right for your lifetime but it doesn’t 
then go on to your children, and if you don’t follow the tribal laws you can lose your 
right to that, so there’s nothing permanent about it. Here in Porgera people tend to have 
control of a block and it’s theirs and it’s passed on getting broken up as they have more 
and more children getting more and more fragmented, forming little islands dotted all 
over the place and our GIS system can illustrate that quite well with compensation 
payments. Once you start to analyze it you’ll find a name down at Mungalep, the same 
name will have rights at the back of the open pit, and in the Anawe they’ll have a small 
block half a hectare or a quarter of a hectare and they’ll have several blocks spread all 
over the place.
This ‘fragmentation’ was tied to an oft-noted lack of unity and organized 
leadership, which was often blamed on a penchant for secrecy. As one former kiap with 
extensive experience in the Mt. Hagen area remarked
Generally in the highlands you have a very clear and specific leadership hierarchy. You 
have your big man, big orators, the five leaders, the people who are good at trading land, 
the people who are good at trading commodities, the specific purposes for each leader, 
and they’re respected for those skills and abilities. They became big men and they have a 
lot of authority. Its not ultimate authority, they can be deposed very quickly by an axe in 
the head or by general consensus, but there is a hierarchy and you’re able to go to any 
community and speak to handful of people and know that the information will be 
disseminated throughout the community. That doesn’t happen in Porgera... They tend to 
hold information as power. “I know something you don’t know, ha ha ha.” If I hold it I 
might be able to use it to gain something. 
Often this lack of leadership or corporate organization was seen as ‘more 
primitive’ than the ‘more advanced’ people in other areas, and was remarked on by more 
than one person in the course of my interviews
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They were different. They had many traits of all the highland people I had worked with 
but I became aware they had differences because they did not have a regimented big man 
society like other large groups who they neighbored, for example Enga, Huli and beyond 
Enga [Western Highlands]. It was not as evolved as a big man system like you had in 
those places, and hence there were differences in how these people negotiated. They 
didn’t come to a conclusion about things as quickly as what a big man society would. 
This wasn’t as apparent in Ipili society. 
This man went on to explain the source of this difference using an idiom 
reminiscent of cultural ecology and drawing on the idea of prehistoric migration into the 
area:
I think a lot of  [Ipili culture] was dictated how they were evolved by the environment 
here. It’s a much harsher environment for subsistence because of the altitude and the 
ruggedness of the place, the kaukau [sweet potato] here, which is the staple diet, doesn’t 
mature as quickly as it does in the warmer and more fertile alleys of Enga. Also the Huli 
have very very advanced agricultural patterns, and that’s shown by the population that 
they sustain and also the pig culture that they sustain. The pig culture requires good 
agriculture practices to be able to feed the pigs and look after them, this place here 
couldn’t sustain a lot of that because of the altitude, the types of soils and everything else. 
So it wasn’t in the scope, they were lesser in numbers of course, and it wasn’t in the 
scope of what say the rest of Enga was, or the main part of Enga or the main part of the 
Huli basin.
This, then, was the view of Ipili in general: a pathological, paranoid race who had 
been on the loosing side of contests of strength for most of their history. Individually, of 
course, many community affairs officers had warm relations with particular landowners, 
even when relationships between ‘the mine’ and ‘the Ipili’ were strained. “We have never 
lost our relationship with individuals,” the head of community affairs told me, “We’ve 
certainly had damaged relationships with CICs [a community committee] and certain 
factions of the agents and whatever and that’s the politics of the mine. But the personal 
relationships are still in place.” But collectively, the features of Ipili society discussed 
here add up to a picture that many community affairs officers did not much care for. 
Many of them viewed the Ipili – and particularly elites -- as essentially duplicitous.
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The most bitter opponents after the most horrendous arguments in an LNC meeting will 
be the first people here the next day. “I’ve got this lovely plot of land and I think you 
might need it. Can we do a deal?” These same people are saying “You’ve destroyed all 
our garden land and you’re doing everything terrible -- by the way I’ve got some spare 
ground here and you can have it if you want it.” So the development side of Porgera is 
one of greed on the community side.
This duplicity is then compounded by bad decisions on the part of most 
landowners, induced by the rapid nature of social change in the valley. As one man put it:
I think we’ve got to think that about 12 years ago Porgera was a little backwater with a 
very small Mt. Isa mine with a handful of employees and very quickly almost over night 
it became a very very big thing with a lot of money, and there was no education process, 
no experience, there was this sudden wealth. And through lack of experience they’ve 
misused it. It’s their right to do with it what they like, but they’ve misused it in my 
opinion. 
These, then, were monsters which the mine believed they had themselves created. 
As one man said to me, “The simple fact is Nixon has his nice big car and nice big house 
and all of his wives because of the money we’ve made available to him. And when the 
mine is closed, he’ll be back to wearing ass grass.”
In sum then, community relations officers felt that the Ipili were not the same as 
the groups they encountered in other areas of the country. ‘Ipili’ culture was seen as an 
amalgamation of the achievements of several more “evolved” groups, and Ipili behavior 
surrounding the mine was not seen as culturally distinct – it was understood to be 
pathologically driven by out-of-control social change.
Conclusion
In this chapter we have seen the way in which the viewpoints of the Yakatabari 
negotiators were shaped by their biographical experiences. These, in turn, were shaped by 
the culture in which they were situated. I have tried to demonstrate that both sides of the 
encounter had specific ideas of who they were and who their interlocutors were that 
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fundamentally shaped what they wanted and how they thought they ought best to get it. 
We can now see more clearly the gulf that separated the negotiators in Yakatabari. 
On the one hand we have the Ipili, who saw the world in terms of people driven by 
occult, appetitive forces with a keen concern with secrecy who felt they were dealing 
with old men who had continued to deny them the satisfaction they deserved of receiving 
what they considered the full value of the gold in their mountain. On the other side we 
had a group of men who said what they meant and meant what they said who felt they 
were forced to deal with a group of mongrels whose culture was not up to not only their 
standards, but the standards of the highlanders they had devoted their lives to. For both, 
the offers made at the table at Yakatabari were not just about a Porgera’s future, but 
Papua New Gunea’s past. 
The ironic fact of life in postcolonial Papua New Guinea is that each side saw 
perhaps a bit too clearly the failure of their interlocutors even as they missed positive 
aspects of them which might have allowed them to humanize their interlocutors. Each, of 
course, found it easier to see the positive things about themselves. The problem, in other 
words, was not that they did not understand each other, but that they understood each 
other too well and, simultaneously, too partially.
It is tempting to assume that the Ipili point of view is a reflection of their unique 
circumstances – that their orneriness is a result of social pathologies brought about by the 
gold mine next to which they live. But we need to also take seriously the proposition that 
Ipili within the Special Mining Lease are becoming “more themselves than they ever 
were before” (Sahlins 1992) and take seriously the fact that Ipili culture as it has 
developed in the Special Mining Lease, no matter how “fucked” it seems to others, may 
be a unique and legitimate transformation of preexisting cultural themes which – 
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pathological or not – are certainly rational from the point of view of an Ipili cultural 
logic. 
At the same time, it is important to recognize that community relations officers 
are, in a way, Papua New Guineans as well. Although their job professionally is to serve 
as representatives of big actors – and, indeed, of ‘civilization’ more generally – they have 
as people lived lives so deeply rooted in Papua New Guinea’s colonial history that many 
of them returned home to Australia only to find themselves strangers in the country 
which they were supposed themselves to be serving. To this extent they have more in 
common with Kuala and Tongope then they might imagine.
This discussion of the history of Ipili and kiaps answers several questions raised 
by Yakatabari. However, it leads to further issues as well. We have already seen that both 
Ipili leaders and kiaps had fairly well-elaborated reflexive accounts of ‘what Ipili society 
was like,’ and we have seen how these reflexive accounts affected practice in the valley. 
Equally, we have seen that anthropological accounts of Ipili are related to Ipili and Kiap 
accounts in several different ways. All of this leads us to ask a wider question – what is 
the nature of Ipili sociality as practiced on the ground in Porgera, and how does practice 
that literally occurs ‘in the village’ interface with official representations of Porgerans? 
What, in other words, is the relation between the grassroots Ipili sociality and the mine? 
What are Ipili communities actually like on the ground? I take up this question in the next 
chapter.
CHAPTER FIVE
BEING IPILI IN PORGERA
Every attempt to specify the set of agents to whom an issue of justice pertains 
will itself, as an act of identification and recognition, be a potential site of 
injustice; and as such will demand a kind of critical scrutiny that cannot appeal 
to a distributive principle... every appeal to the identity as a settled criterion of 
distribution will likewise be a potential site of [nondistributive injustice], both 
because existing patterns of identity and difference may bear the traces of past 
wrongs, and even more fundamentally because those people for whom justice is 
a live issue are not done becoming who they are; or, better, who they will turn 
out to have been.”
 -Patchen Markell, Bound By Recognition
They’re cognatic, if by ‘cognatic’ you mean ‘accommodating.’
-Head of Community Affairs, Porgera Joint Venture
Throughout this dissertation we have seen numerous references to ‘life in the 
ground’ in Porgera, and ‘how real Ipili really live.’ In chapter two we saw how elites used 
their authority as representatives of ‘grass roots’ Ipili to bolster their position in 
negotiations, and examined briefly the way in which these claims to authority conflicted 
with ‘on the ground’ claims regarding the ownership of the land for the Yakatabari tunnel 
portal. In chapter three we saw that the land study was meant to create a stable social 
context for mining in the valley by accurately registering ‘traditional native land rights.’ 
In chapter four we have seen how expatriates decry the excesses of Special Mining Lease 
land owners and contrast them with the authentic, ‘uncorrupted’ practice of other 
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highlanders they worked with in the past. Thus throughout the dissertation we have seen 
how Porgera’s history and institutions create a certain notion of authentic ‘Ipiliness’ 
which contrasts with actually existing Ipili. None of these discussions, however, have led 
to a sustained analysis of Ipili kinship and identity and how it articulates with the the 
mine and government as Ipili live their lives every day. In this chapter I turn to the task of 
describing the circulation of Ipili identity, the ethnography of which will extend over the 
next two chapters. In the next chapter I will examine how ‘the Ipili’ are understood at 
‘the national level’ – that is, in Port Moresby, the national capital. In this chapter, 
however, I begin on a smaller scale, with an examination of how Ipili identity is claimed 
within the Porgera valley itself.
As we have seen, the creation of ‘the Ipili’ as a coherent ethnic group was part of 
a process of creating a social context within which the mine could operate. This in turn 
resulted in an unexpected second type of ‘feasibility’ as well, insofar as it has rendered 
people subsumed under the title as efficacious political actors. This was particularly clear 
in the case of Yakatabari, where those categorized as ‘representatives’ wielded extensive 
power and influence and were able to both enrich themselves as well as influence the 
valley’s future. Few Ipili, however, are involved in the closed-door world of high-stakes 
negotiation that we saw in Yakatabari. Most of the inhabitants of the Special Mining 
Lease lead very different lives. Being ‘Ipili’ in the more mundane sphere that they inhabit 
is still important, but the benefits that these people accrue are less glamorous and the 
spheres in which they move lower-profile.
While Yakatabari dealt with issues of novelty and events which had no precedent, 
Ipili today shop around their identities around the various institutions in the valley in 
order to tap into the money and resources which are regularly handed out according to 
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fixed rules and policies.  Being Ipili in Porgera, then, involves dealing with Porgera’s 
institutions during the course of their ‘stereotypic reproduction.’ Doing so means working 
to make sure that you are subsumed under the proper categories such that you are 
processed the right way by the valley’s institutions. Quarterly royalty checks, annual 
occupation fees, preferential hiring, and compensation payments are all available to 
people who can be incorporated into the administrative machinery of the mine and the 
government. 
In Porgera, being Ipili is closely tied to ‘Ipili kinship’ or ‘Ipili ethnic identity’ – an 
overall set of attributes that I well refer to here as ‘having an Ipili identity.’ My particular 
focus will be on ‘Ipili kinship’ since this is the main criteria that people in Porgera 
themselves take to be central to Ipili identity – being part of one the seven landowning 
‘clans.’ Unfortunately, it is not easy to discern what constitutes Ipili kinship. In the first 
place, while anthropologists today might agree that kinship can be understood in its 
loosest sense as idioms of sociality or ‘relatedness’ deriving from metaphors of marriage, 
procreation, and nurturance which structure action, anthropological surety in the 
existence of a distinct object called ‘kinship’ which is amenable to study is not what it 
once was (for an overview that I am sympathetic to see Carsten 2003). Equally, as we 
shall see, the idea of ‘Ipili’ itself is problematic, as kinship practices in this part of the 
world are pliable and readily reshaped. Furthermore, identity is often articulated in 
diasporic, regional terms that do not fit well with the ‘African model’ of Ipili identity 
used by the mine and the government. 
Finally, and most interestingly, the idea of ‘real Ipili kinship’ is complicated by 
the fact that Ipili and outsiders are engaged in a mutually-determining relationship in 
which what it means to be Ipili is shape by outside requirements, just as outside 
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requirements seek to use Ipili notions as the basis of their legislation, are forced to 
conform with the more intractable bits of Ipili culture even at times when they would 
prefer not to. This makes it hard to take the the sort of position that James C. Scott does 
and model Ipili identity in terms of the imposition of gaze and the response of resistance. 
If this were the case one could easily describe ‘how the state and the mine misrecognize 
and distort Ipili identity’ and then go on to show, as the privileged specialist, ‘how the 
authentic kinship system really works.’ But in fact decades of wrangling over land and 
compensation has made this clean split unrealistic. Porgera today is a place where what 
‘Ipili kinship is’ is something that has been shaped to correspond with the expectations of 
outsiders. Thus as Foucault (1994) (with whom Scott mistakenly believes himself to have 
something in common) has pointed out, the issue is not the imposition of inaccurate or 
myopic models upon local people so much as it is the interplay between the personation 
of big actors who believe themselves to describing populations whose very description 
elicits – in classic Strathernian fashion (1988) -- the creation of the entities which they 
believe themselves to be measuring.
This chapter thus has two tasks. First, it seeks to present an ethnography of Ipili 
kinship practices as they are practiced ‘in the village’ amongst Ipili people in the Special 
Mining Lease. Second, it seeks to understand how Ipili represent themselves and their 
ways of life to outsiders who share their valley with them. I will describe, in other words, 
how they interface with representatives of institutions on the ground in Porgera. These 
two tasks are related because in each case they involve the circulation of Ipili identity in 
areas outside of the direct experience of Ipili themselves. A final third task, that of 
relating anthropological views of Ipili with those of people in the metropole, is the 
subject of the final chapter of the dissertation.
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This chapter thus begins by describing my ethnographic field site: the relocation 
‘villages’ or ‘communities’ of landowners that exist inside the Special Mining Lease. I 
then move on to a discussion of Ipili identity which focuses on the configuration of ethnic 
identity in the larger region of which Porgera is a part. I then move to a rather abstract 
description of Ipili kinship and sociality and how it operates. With this in place I then 
present some very basic census data from Apalaka, the community in which I stayed 
during my time in Porgera. My particular interest there will be to describe the 
relationship of epo arene – people who come to reside in Porgera despite lacking both 
affinal and consanguineal ties. I conclude that Ipili themselves do not have a clear, 
delineated sense of what it means to be either Ipili or a landowner in a way that allows 
them to easily and routinely exclude people from these categories. I then move on to 
discuss how official and government representations of Ipili identity affect how Ipili get 
access to good and services within the valley – how well, I ask, do the criteria of 
receiving compensation, royalty payments, and preferential hiring correspond to 
indigenous notions? I conclude in the final section of the chapter that even these 
institutions themselves lack any sort of coherent internal logic that might provide a 
‘simplifying’ clarity that Ipili identity itself lacks.
Relocation Communities
As we have seen, the Porgera Special Mining Lease Land Study officially divided 
Ipili landowners into seven landowning clans: Tiyini, Tuanda, Waiwa, Angalaini, 
Pulumaini, Mamai, and Anga. Each clan is composed of subclans. The Waiwa, Mamai, 
Tuanda, and Anga have two, the Angalaini have five, and the Tiyini and Pulumaini have 
six each. When the mine was being built, the members of these groups living within the 
Special Mining Lease were relocated to an area of their choice. While some people were 
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relocated at a distance from other people, most chose to live in nucleated settlements built 
around an ama (a cleared area or central meeting place). In fact the history of relocation 
is complex, and includes several bouts of house-building as the mine acquired land 
initially for the mine, and then for its growing waste dumps. The result, however, is 
straight forward – densely populated nucleated settlements, each associated with one 
‘clan.’ Each village was placed on a named piece of land, and each piece of land was 
associated with a particular ‘clan.’ Thus the Tiyini lived in Yarik, the Tuanda lived in 
Apalaka, the Waiwa lived in Waiwanda, the Pulumaini lived in Kulapi, the Angalaini 
lived at Mungalep (much of which was adjacent to, but not in, the Special Mining Lease) 
and the Mamai lived at Panandaka (for more on the Porgera relocation see Banks 1999; 
Bonnell 1999;  Robinson 1988; for relocation in Papua New Guinea more generally see 
Asian Development Bank 2000:55-73).
I lived in Apalaka, one of the most heavily populated settlements in the Special 
Mining Lease. Much is made by cynical expatriates of the idea that settlements in 
Porgera did not predate the mine and were built opportunistically in order to receive 
compensation. While there is an extensive history of migration and resettlement around 
Porgera’s various mining and prospecting projects, it seems clear that Apalaka is a 
settlement of some antiquity – it appears as ‘Abaraka’ in John Black’s 1938 diary of his 
patrol into Porgera. This does not mean that the Apalaka Black recorded is identical with 
the settlement where I live, however. Most of where Apalaka was originally located is 
now covered by the Anjolek waste dump, a large erodible which carries waste rock from 
the open pit down to the Kaiyia river (see Parker 2004 on the geotechnical aspects of the 
waste dump). Today Apalaka is a cluster of relocation houses and the improvised 
residences that grew up around them. Perched on the slopes that emerge out of the waste 
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dump, Apalaka is basically a bulging pocket of land which the waste dump wraps around 
on three sides. Apalaka is surrounded by two satellite settlements. Ekanda, which is 
upstream of the main settlement, is a break-off community founded by the brother of one 
of Apalaka’s two Landowner Negotiating Committee members. Up the slope from 
Apalaka is an area known as Waiwanda which extends to the uninhabited ridge top. On 
the other side of that ridge line is the relocation settlement of Yarik. Here I will focus on 
Apalaka and Waiwanda.
We can say roughly that each territory is associated with a particular ‘clan’ and its 
constitutive ‘subclans.’ Apalaka, for instance, is the home of the Tuanda, while 
Waiwanda is the home of the Waiwa (anda meaning house in Ipili), and Yarik is the 
home of the Tiyini. These are then subdivided on sub-clan lines. Thus (very roughly) the 
Tuanda Ulupa own the land between the waste dump and the Apalaka ama, while the 
Yapala own the land between the Apalaka ama and Waiwanda. There is only one subclan 
of the Waiwa in Waiwanda (the Yaliape) – the other subclan of the Waiwa lives outside 
of the Special Mining Lease. My house during my stay in Porgera was in Waiwanda 
proper, however since Waiwanda is a satellite community without an ama of its own, I 
took as my field site both Apalaka and Waiwanda, and was considered to be affiliated 
with both the Tuanda and the Waiwa. When asked where I lived in Porgera I would tell 
people ‘Apalaka’ and then specify ‘Waiwanda’ only if my interlocutor had lived in the 
valley for some time or knew quite a bit about it – it was sort of the equivalent of 
describing yourself as from ‘Manhattan’ as opposed to ‘Alphabet City.’ As a result, for 
much of this chapter I will use the term ‘Apalaka’ to refer to both communities 
collectively.
The Tiyini, Tuanda, and Waiwa are not just any clans. They are the triad at the 
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core of the seven landowning groups. As we have seen, the Tiyini are not only the owners 
of the land on which Porgera’s open cut is located, they are closely associated with the 
serpent Kupiane, the mythical origin of the Porgera ore body. The genealogies of both the 
Tuanda and the Waiwa involve migrations to Porgera, and both groups record their early 
ancestors arriving in Porgera and marrying women from the Tiyini, thus aligning all three 
of them as interrelated and the truest of the true landowners.
As we saw in the second chapter of this dissertation, it is hotly contested whether 
or not these relocation communities are healthy and safe places to live in and, if not, 
whether the PJV or local people are to blame. Because these communities are located 
within the Special Mining Lease, and the extent to which they are being ‘affected’ or 
‘squeezed’ by the mine is a topic that could only be addressed by someone with extensive 
expertise in assessing the ecological and environmental impacts of gold mining on a 
community. As an anthropologist I lack the expertise to judge what sort of environmental 
impacts the mine has upon residents of relocation villages. Experientially, however, I can 
report that people in Apalaka do feel surrounded by the mine. It is difficult to convey to 
the reader the extent to which relocation communities feel hedged in by mining 
operations. 
While I am not a geographer or epidemiologist, I must say that experientially 
these relocation communities are not like other areas of Papua New Guinea that I have 
visited. The view downhill from practically every area of Apalaka is of a massive 
expanse of waste dump – a flat moonscape out of which a few brave weeds poke. The 
vast surface of the waste dump alternates between soil-like firmness and a quick sand 
consistency. People often venture out on to it to try the rock within for gold (inevitably 
unsuccessful, as far as I know), while children swim in the large pools of gray rainwater 
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water which collect on depressions on its surface. When blasting operations are regularly 
scheduled, it is possible to set your watch by the tremors that accompany them. Similarly, 
the mud – which is ubiquitous in Porgera and even more omnipresent in the Special 
Mining Lease - and what expatriates describe as the ‘squalor’ of the relocation 
communities make these places fairly grim. The incredible density of settlement makes 
them crowded, and the presence of cash means the presence of purchased food stuffs, 
which means the creation of garbage for which no sanitary system exists. There is no 
sufficient supply of fire wood, and a jury-rigged system of electrical cables extends from 
relocation houses which are connected to the power grid that supplies the mine and 
connects relocation houses and bush houses without power. These new communities are 
too high up for and on too poor terrain for much agriculture to take place (although 
gardens are still planted) and firewood is scarce. Anyone who has had occasion to live in 
Apalaka will find Banks and Bonnell’s assessment of the plight of relocation 
communities quoted in the second chapter  to be convincing indeed.
The community in which I lived, in other words, was considered dangerous, dirty, 
degraded, and squalid by expatriate mine employees and others who visited it. At one 
point a high school student from East Sepik Province came to visit her brother who had 
married in to the community there. A smart and modern young woman, when I asked her 
what she thought of the place she replied “I can say these people live like animals.” 
Drinking bouts, gambling, prostitution, and violence against mine employees are said to 
lie in store for any who venture up there. Many outsiders consider these communities to 
be at the forefront of the decadent, self-destructive behavior of Ipili who receive money 
from the mine. They point to outrageous expenditures on alcohol, and increased rates of 
polygyny and domestic violence as two of the most obvious ways in which Ipili have 
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misused the money they have received from the mine. At the same time, the steady influx 
of immigrants from other area – the ethnic Huli and Engans known as epo arene in Ipili – 
is key to creating social change in Porgera and, when it is particularly intense, it threatens 
to turn Porgerans into strangers on their own land. While stories of prostitution in Porgera 
have, in my opinion, been greatly over estimated (at least during my fieldwork), the rest is 
more or less true – on one occasion when a Porgera Joint Venture vehicle drove into the 
village after dark (to drop me off after a meeting at the mine site) it was stoned by local 
people.
Thus these communities remain black boxes for the government and mine – 
although densely populated by Papua New Guinea standards, they are so unwelcoming to 
outsiders and mine employees that it is difficult to gage exactly what is going on within 
them. Even the work that has been done, such as that by Glenn Banks (1997), is based on 
brief survey work and, while well-done, does not paint a detailed picture of life in these 
places that long-term participant observation can provide. Still, in order to understand the 
dynamics of life inside relocation communities, it is necessary to have a sense not only of 
how Ipili live in them now, but how Ipili lived before the arrival of mining in the valley. 
In the next section of this chapter I describe Ipili kinship in general before turning to a 
more detailed analysis of Apalaka and its environs.
Regional Identities and Clan Diasporas
It is telling that the terms ‘Ipili’ was not a prehistoric ethnonym and appears to be 
a colonial neologism whose popularity was inspired by Meggitt’s early work in the valley 
(1957). There is an even further irony in the fact that the term ‘Porgera’ – which is, as we 
have seen in chapter three, is a mishearing of the ‘Pongema’ river – is unpronounceable 
to Ipili, whose language eschews consonant clusters. Even today, when elderly Ipili 
316
speaking amongst themselves, the names ‘Ipili’ and ‘Paiela referred to the two valleys in 
which ‘the Ipili’ (as we call them today) live. Thus discussions of ‘Ipili’ identity must 
start by recognizing that there does not appear to be an indigenous term for ‘the Ipili’ at 
all.
Prehistorically -- and, indeed, even today – Porgerans were, as Aletta Biersack 
puts it, “centered not on themselves as geographical isolates but on culturally diverse 
fields in which their mythology, trade routes, and marriage practices embedded them” 
(Biersack 1995a:7). As a result, “the region was neither atomized nor centralized but was 
organized (through its myth, rituals, trade, and intermarriage) as a polycentric system of 
overlapping yet noncoincident worlds” (Biersack 1995a:27). 
This regional embeddedness is tied to kinship at the most general level. Ipili 
genealogies run deep – typically beyond ten generations – and terminate with an 
eponymous apical ancestor. These genealogies frequently trace the migration of ancestors 
across the region, leaving communities dotted across the landscape which are connected 
via genealogy. These mythological accounts of ancestral movement seem to correspond, 
at least in Enga, to actual prehistorical migrations of clans from one area to another 
(Wiessner and Tumu 1998:119-155). The result is what I refer to as a ‘clan diaspora’ – a 
network of related clans which spread across the Southern Highlands and Enga Provinces 
and which cut across the ethnic boundaries of what are today considered to be the three 
distinct ethnic groups of the ‘Huli’ the ‘Enga’ and the ‘Ipili.’ Even though the fact that 
both Huli and Engans are well-known for their strong sense ethnic particularism would 
seem to undercut this approach to regional ethnicity, it should be remembered that the 
term ‘Enga’ is also a colonial neologism and that Huli have always conceived of 
themselves members (albeit of the most superior sort) of a galaxy of related ethnic groups 
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(Ballard 1994). Thus while the literature today discusses three separate groups – the Huli, 
the Ipili, and the Enga – most scholars would emphasize the real sense that ethnicity in 
this area is based on grades or continua of cultural difference in a population crisscrossed 
by flows of people.
Regardless of whether other researchers feel comfortable identifying mythical 
stories with actual prehistoric human migrations in their areas the way that Wiessner and 
Tumu do in theirs,  it is undoubtedly the case that these mythic linkages were and are 
mobilized by Ipili and their neighbors. Indeed, rather than fading away as Papua New 
Guinea modernizes, the spread of roads in the highlands and creation of resource 
developments in formerly-peripheral areas has meant a renaissance for these regional 
identities. In the past, these ties were used to facilitate long-distance trading (Mangi 
1988), to gain concessions at locations such as salt springs (Wiessner and Tumu 1998) 
controlled by related groups, and to request hospitality when ecological hardship such as 
drought or frost meant temporary migration from one’s home (Wohlt 1978). Today Papua 
New Guineans use these ties to conduct business along the highlands highway, to find 
hosts at areas near mines and hydrocarbon projects, and to travel safely through areas 
where tribal fighting occurs. 
While these diasporic relations thus have a real sociology and use, it is important 
not to overstate their coherence. While it is tempting, as Burton puts it, “to uncover as 
many of them as possible and and map them out” (1999:284) when doing fieldwork in 
this part of the world, to do so would not result in some sort of master narrative 
sufficiently coherent to provide a basis for landownership in regards to land rights. Even 
master genealogists can not state with precision the specific spread of lineages and clan 
ties beyond the mythical level – and even these were unclear and subject to confusion. It 
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is tempting to consider this a sign of the loss of genealogical knowledge as the result of 
contact with the West. However, it is important to note that Wohlt, who conducted 
research twenty years earlier than I in Kandep, recounts that while everyone “know the 
gist of the myth” in fact “if one asks a dozen informants over [the] age of forty the 
particulars of genealogical connection... one gets a dozen different versions” (Wohlt 
1978:42). He concludes that “beyond the unity maintained through oral tradition and the 
ceremonies described above, relationships among tribal members entail little else that 
hospitality, and that only in need.” (Wolht 1978:54).
So while these clan diasporas are not literally corporate groups or have the sort of 
lineal, segmentary genealogies that anthropologists find so attractive, they do represent 
communities linked by an ideology of ancient consanguinity. This ideology thus has 
implications for how one understand ethnicity in this part of the world. Writing of 
Wohlt’s analysis of these diasporas, Burton notes that a recognition of their prominence
throws into question whether the Ipili people even ‘exist’ in the same way as, 
say,  Motuans  or  Hageners  do...  They  begin  to  look  far  more  like  the  local 
representatives of regionally dispersed ‘genealogical groups,’ lumped together 
under  one  name  only  because  they  live  in  one  place  as  neighbors.  (Burton 
1999:291)
This is not to say that there is “no such thing as the Ipili” (neither Burton nor I 
would say that) or that there was no sense of a coherent and unique set of culturally 
specific practices for people in Porgera – styles of wig and dialect, for instance, clearly 
indicated that Porgera was home to a culture with such distinctiveness. But it is to say 
that belonging in Porgera and to Porgera was much less a matter of being part of an 
externally bounded group, and much more about living in one of many culturally distinct 
centers whose influence with the others faded away as one moved farther from them.
Thus the situation we are presented with is a continuum of cultural difference 
across a landscape through which people have long moved. Within the Porgera valley, for 
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instance, there does seem to be a distinction between Ipili from Porgera proper and the 
outlying community of Tipinini studied by Jerry Jacka. The distinction is a linguistic one 
– Jacka’s community being referred to as ‘tumbiame’ and Porgerans in my area being 
referred to as ‘wakiame.’ This is based mostly on different verb conjugations – 
particularly in the case of imperatives – and a small difference in pronunciation. This 
distinction was not, however, a particularly strongly articulated one.
 In the case of Tuanda, genealogies relate that Apalaka was settled when Tuanda 
left his home in Hoyebia in the Tari basin (north of Tari town and near the location of 
Glasse’s original fieldwork) and settled in Apalaka, although not before establishing 
communities in Enga territory around Mulitaka. Some claimed that if I traveled to 
Hoyebia I would be able to trace a further Tuanda diaspora all the way southwest to Lake 
Kutubu, where the landowners of the Kutubu oil project ‘were also Tuanda.’ While the 
connection to Hoyebia and Mulitaka seemed certain to me – I met people who were from 
there and who visited there and confirmed it – these farther flung ties to another lucrative 
resource development seemed suspiciously convenient to me. At any rate, the Waiwa 
claimed much more clearly to have ties only with groups in Paiela and the Tari basin and 
did not claim connection to any group in Enga.
In sum, Ipili identity is not something bounded with clear and bright lines. While 
there is no question that there is something culturally distinctive about people living in 
Porgera, they are situated in a wider ethnic universe with groups in other valleys, and 
those ties are based on a sense of shared agnation. This lack of a clear and brightly 
bounded ethnic identity at the regional level should immediately make one suspicious 
that even a first approximation of what it is to ‘the Ipili’ is problematic.
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Vertical Expressions of Horizontal Desires
So far, my emphasis on lineality and agnation may seem puzzling to those 
familiar with the literature on Ipili kinship, which overwhelmingly describes it as 
‘cognatic’ (Biersack 1995, 1980; Jacka 2003 ) and emphasize the lack of corporate 
groups in Porgera. Consider, for instance, John Burton’s literally emphatic declaration 
that “we can abandon any pretense at trying to fit the Porgeran lines of descent to the 
orthodox clan model. In fact, there are no corporate groups we can call ‘clans’ in 
Porgera.” (Burton 1991: 9, italics in original). Government and mine employees, used to 
the Special Mining Lease’s seven clan system, might wonder at how this can be the case 
given life in the valley today. Equally, anthropologists unfamiliar with the area might see 
the names of corporate groups like Tuanda and Waiwa and consider Ipili society as 
organized into nonunilineal kinship groups (á la Davenport 1959) rather than cognatic 
kindreds. The key to resolving these differences is to understand the way that in Porgera, 
as in Wohlt’s Yumbisa, 
the cognatic nature of groups in practice is the product of the interaction of a 
“vertical” agnatic ideology and “horizontal” ideologies concerning cognation, 
affinity, and, particularly, exchange, as these are played out against limitations 
and emergent  opportunities  in  the  existing  physical  and  social  environment” 
(Wohlt 1995:215).
In Porgera, then, Ipili live their lives and achieve their aims by creating ego-
centric networks of people who work with them and whose action they (ideally) 
coordinate. People express these coalitions as though they were the result of a vertical, 
agnatic lineage by saying ‘the Tuanda do this’ or ‘the Tiyini do that’ when in fact the 
networks in question are based on ‘horizontal’ relationships with collateral relatives and 
affines. Understanding the way this is true in Porgera ties in with several larger themes of 
the dissertation (a similar approach could also be used, incidentally, to resolve the 
impasse between cognatic and agnatic readings of the Huli material). It helps explain how 
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what analytically appears to be a cognatic system of kinship could come to be described 
as a lineal one by outsiders interested in creating a feasible corporate group named the 
‘Ipili.’ It also helps explain why Ipili themselves do not object to this method of 
representation. Indeed, understanding the role of agency, innovation, and entrepreneurial 
activity in the coordination of action via idioms of kinship allows us to understand the 
claim in chapter three that the seven clan system as an extension of Ipili kinship practices 
rather than a deviation from it.
There are many things that lead one to conclude that names such as ‘the Tuanda’ 
or ‘the Waiwa’ do not refer to clans in the classic anthropological sense of the term. 
Problems with a lineage model arise immediately. First, Ipili do not have a word for 
‘clan’ in the sense of a corporate group defined by descent. The most common term used 
to describe the Tuanda is that they are a yame – Tuanda yame. But yame simply means 
‘group of people’ or ‘organization’ – it has no connotation of descent, consanguinity, or 
kinship whatsoever. Thus Ipili use the term indiscriminately to refer to Security Guards, 
descendants of Tiyini, and Lutherans. An Engan word, tata is sometimes used and this 
word does carry with it the full weight of Engan organization as it does further east 
among the Enga themselves. Furthermore, this word appears to be a borrowing from 
people further east and the ‘eight tata system’ reported by Jacka for Tipinini (Jacka 
2003:107-110) does not appear to be present in the Special Mining Lease. Thus the idea 
of yame describes the principle or idea around which a group forms. “Daniel yame” for 
instance, does not refer merely to the descendants of Daniel, it refers to his descendants, 
close affines, and other people whose mutual imbrication is a result of his central position 
in their social networks. Similarly, people often refer to ‘Tuanda yame’ or ‘Tiyini yame’ 
to refer to a group of people related to each other on the basis of their shared heritage of a 
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common ancestor rather than the total group of people descended from that ancestor. It is 
telling, for instance, that for much of Yakatabari many people referred to the faction 
opposing the opening of the Yakatbari waste dump as ‘the Tiyini’ when one of the 
leaders was an agent for Angalaini and most the most influential of the Tiyini agents 
were not active participants in the their clique. ‘Tiyininess’ became a basis of the 
mobilization of personal networks, not an exclusive and clearly defined corporate group.
Famously, affiliation in ‘clans’ in not exclusive in Porgera, and one can claim 
affiliation with multiple groups. As we shall see in a moment, clans do not in and of 
themselves form the basis for exchange or collective action or even (in a curious way 
described below) claims to land. Ipili consider themselves to have a ‘portfolio’ of eight 
lineages to choose  from – they are associated with each of the lineages of their 
grandparents (this is the same domain within which sexual relations are considered 
incestuous), and Ipili enjoy discussing the twists and turns of their genealogies (known as 
malu in Ipili) and those of prominent people in the valley the same way that Americans 
dwell on the statistical minutiae of professional baseball players. Finding and mobilizing 
these connections is thus an art.
It is not only the case that ‘clan’ affiliation is nonexclusive, it is telling that Ipili 
do not consider it a virtue to identify strongly with one named clan. In contrast to a notion 
of pure and exclusive membership in an agnatic clan, Ipili seek to be middlemen 
operating in the interstitial spaces between groups, using multiple affiliations to be ‘in the 
middle’ of things. Thus often times people who outsiders consider to be ‘not really 
Tiyini’ or ‘not really Tuanda’ because their claims there are not based on an unbroken 
line of agnatic descent are mistaking their own ideologies of lineal purity for those of 
Ipili. It was occasionally said by mine employees that Kuala yame – the group of people 
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descended from the early alluvial miner Kuala – that they were ‘not really Maipangi’ 
because Kuala was originally from an Engan area and was related to Maipangi via only 
the most tenuous of tenuous connections. When I tried this out on one of my informants 
he looked surprised and remarked that if anyone was Maipangi it was Kuala yame, since 
they had no other groups to claim affiliation with. For him, ‘pure’ and singular affiliation 
was thus seen as an unfortunate problem, and impoverishment of a potentially much 
richer and wider set of relationships.
We can agree, then, with Gabrielle Sturzenhofecker when she writes of the nearby 
Duna that “what is articulated in malu genealogies is a principle not of group recruitment 
but of individual entitlement” (1998:79-80).  While malu begin with an apical ancestor, 
after a few generations comes a level of named ancestors after whose names the 
‘subclans’ of Ipili are sorted. Shortly thereafter genealogies include people within living 
memory of the current oldest generation, and the genealogies begin to form something 
approximating my own census data. The pattern here, in other words, is similar to Enga, 
where there is a sharp break between historical’ events (atome pi) and ‘mythic’ ones 
(tindi pi) (Weissner and Tumu 1998:25). While Ipili do not draw this distinction as 
sharply as Engans appear to, it does seem clear to me that something similar holds for 
them. ‘Real’ genealogical time seems to start just below the ancestors of the several 
subclans. The result is a wide swath of collateral space within the lineage that extends up 
a few generations. When people trace their connections with their relatives, they tend to 
move horizontally through that space in often quite elaborate ways, locate themselves in 
relationship to other consanguines, and shoot directly up through layers of mythical 
forebearers to the apical ancestor.
In sum, it is clear that groups are organized in a cognatic fashion, with one’s 
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individual kindred serving as the effective pool from which relatives may be recruited. 
Although conceived by Ipili in terms of genealogical depth rather than collaterally, this 
pool operates on the classical principles of the kindred as described by Freeman: “a group 
of persons who acknowledge their descent, genealogically or by adoption, from one 
family, whether through their fathers or their mothers.” (Freeman 1962). 
A personal kindred consists of ‘people who have a relative in common’. However, it in no 
sense follows that all of these people know or are known to one another: they are not a group 
but a category...  Thus,  a kindred has no name except with reference to the individual  or 
sibling group at its center and is not a discrete or autonomous unit in the society to which its 
members  belong.  Furthermore,  by  the  very  nature  of  its  composition,  the  members  of  a 
kindred have no collective perception of unity, no persisting common objective and no leader 
or organization. A kindred, therefore, is not a group in the sociological sense of the term, but 
rather a category of cognates, a set of persons who have in common the characteristic that 
they are all related cognatically in varying degrees to the same person.
Put another way, the kindred is a field of possible relationships of blood which 
can be mobilized by an individual, not a predefined group in which the individual takes 
his or her place. 
Burton has argued that Ipili social organization mirrors most closely that of the 
Garia as described by Lawrence, and I agree (for similar suggestions see Langlas 1974 on 
the  Foi). Thus Porgeran kinship is less a matter of corporate groups than of a massive 
mesh of egocentric personal networks of individual ‘security circles’ - “those persons 
with whom he has safe relationships and towards whom he should observe stringent rules 
governing marriage, diet, and political obligation” (Lawrence 1984: 28) – of which the 
consanguineal ties we are currently discussing are merely a part. Thus Terms like 
Tuanda, Waiwa, and Tiyini form a vocabulary of cognatic stocks which gives an 
individual a portfolio of possible groups to which they could be a member. As a result, 
Ipili are networkers not only social-structurally, but in the more prosaic sense of the term 
– inveterate hand-shakers and let’s-do-lunchers, they are always on the look out for new 
allies and potential ways to expand who they know and where they know them. 
325
Kin, Kith, Consociation
To Ipili, the mean fact of genealogical relatedness does not necessarily produce 
relationship. Cosanguineal ties count for little until they have been realized through the 
contributions of work, wealth, and consociation – the ‘service economy’ that I discussed 
in the last chapter. Thus we can say that relations of consanguinity and affinity merely 
provide a kinship portfolio of possible ties which are activated through consociation. 
Each individual Ipili converts these possible kin relations into actual relationships of 
mutual support through work. This includes giving pigs during bridewealth, sharing food, 
chatting together, and all the nebulous activities of sharing life together which is typical 
of face to face interaction.
This process of transforming potential relations into real ones through 
consociation applies not just to kin, but to affines as well, and even more broadly to that 
group of nonconsanguineals known in classical accounts of Anglo Saxon kinship 
(Philpotts  1913) as the kith. Ipili kin terminology tends to follow an ‘Iroquois’ type 
terminology and cross-sex sibling’s spouse is referred to by the same term as that used 
for a same sex sibling. Thus ‘brothers’ who are married into one’s immediate family are 
often very close members of one’s security circle. There is even a special term (timtale) 
for unrelated men who have married sisters (such as Mangape and Tongope in chapter 
three), and this relationship is often a close one as well. It is for this reason that Ipili 
speak of women as ‘bridges’ (toko) across which men go and come. Relations between 
same sex female affines is also often very close, although given male domination of 
public life in Porgera, this closeness is often made evident politically in the relationship 
between men whose mothers were sisters (which includes brother’s wife), and who were 
thus raised together because of their mothers’ time together.
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The importance that Ipili place on mutual aid and shared time together as opposed 
to abstract genealogical principles can be seen in the frequency with which people 
include non-related friends in their security circles. In their quest for multiple affiliations, 
Ipili often travel away from their natal area – after all, that’s the one constituency they’ve 
got nailed down. The ideal ‘big-man’ is a roving polygynist who rotates between wives 
and (hence) his in-laws as he keeps circulating. In Porgera, where gold has been a draw 
for migrants for so long, a more typical issue is not people going out, but people coming 
in. The Ipili are not people to cut someone off from membership in a local community 
simply because he cannot trace his ancestry back to a common ancestor. They feel that 
any individual who has demonstrated his commitment to a group by investing time and 
energy in it should have a say in what goes on there. In fact, Ipili welcome newcomers to 
their community if the feel that they will bring something of value to that community.
In fact, welcome is not quite the right word. Ipili actively seek to draw powerful 
outsiders into their personal networks and into the valley. Ipili have a long history of 
incorporating powerful outsiders such as members of the more powerful Huli and Engan 
ethnic groups which surround them into their communities and personal networks in 
order to benefit their presence. Many of them are in fact the children of powerful 
outsiders –Huli and Engans – who came to live with Porgerans, married Porgeran 
women, and who raised their children as Porgerans as we saw in chapter three. As you 
can imagine, being host to a mine appeared to Ipili to be merely a variation on this theme, 
and Porgera is unique as the only mine in PNG whose inhabitant not only didn’t mind, 
but actually demanded that workers at their resource development be accommodated in 
the valley in and among them in a multiracial township.
Land Ownership
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This mention of coresidence brings us to the issue of land. Porgerans divide the 
surface of the earth into two layers, the underlying ‘bone’ (kulini) and the surface or 
‘skin’ (umbaini). At the most general level, there was a clear relationship between the 
bone of a ground and a particular cognatic stock. Thus the Waiwa have two blocks of 
land, one of which is named ‘Waiwanda’ (or ‘house of the Waiwa). Similarly, the Tuanda 
‘own’ Apalaka, the Tiyini ‘own’ Yarik, and so on. The attachment between cognatic 
stock and land was quite close. During pig exchange groups chant the name of a river or 
mountain from their territory as a sign of which stock they are from, and hence from 
which stock their hosts were about to receive pigs. Each group also had a set of sacred 
sites on their territory where various spirits associated with the line were said to live and 
where sacrifices to those spirits (such as Kupiane) were made.
We can thus say that in a straightforward sense that ‘the Tiyini owned Yarik’ or 
‘the Waiwa owned Waiwanda.’ The catch is, of course, figuring out who ‘the Tiyini’ is. 
Once again, this dissertation’s wider concern with the theme of subsumption comes to the 
surface. As we have seen, the Tiyini are not a clan in the sense of some sort of bounded, 
corporate group with a determined and exclusive membership. Any of the descendants of 
Tiyini have a claim to be Tiyini tucked away in their kinship portfolio linking them to 
one Tiyini great-grandparent and hence – via a seven- or eight-generation long genealogy 
- to Tiyini himself. But having a possible relation to Tiyini is very different from living at 
Yarik and making gardens in the area there. Although there were many people who could 
not be completely discounted in any future dealings with the bone ground, many – 
indeed, most of them – rarely ever went to Yarik and had let their claims to Tiyini-ness 
languish in favor of other connections in their portfolio when mining began in Porgera. In 
sum, some people who live at Yarik may not be Tiyini, and most people who have a 
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claim to Tiyininess do not live at Yarik.
Another central distinction that Ipili make regarding residence and descent is that 
of people who are tene and people who are wana in regards to territory. This means 
roughly something like ‘people whose claim to lineage-owned land comes from their 
father’ (tene) and ‘people whose claim to lineage-owned land derives from their mother’ 
(wana). These are the terms whose Engan equivalents proved so troublesome for 
Meggitt’s model of Enga lineality when his data was examined by McArthur (Barnes 
1967). Tene and wana refer only to the sex of one’s immediate parent rather than an 
unbroken line of agnatic or enatic descent. Thus Meggit famously included anyone 
counted as tene as ‘agnatic’ kin – a term which in anthropology suggested an unbroken 
line of male descent but which in Enga and Ipili simply refers to people in a residential 
group whose fathers had ties to that residential group – although the fathers themselves 
might be migrants. As a result non-agnatic families in a settlement can be converted to 
tene in two generations if they have male sons. As a result Meggit’s data indicated an 
erroneously high degree of agnatic residence which contrasted starkly with Brown’s 
claims for residence among the Chimbu. 
I mention Meggitt here to indicate the dangers of reading ‘agnate’ or ‘enate’ 
directly into terms such as tene and wana. Tene and wana should not be considered 
measures of agnatic or enatic lineal succession. In fact, in Porgera at least, this 
distinction, although cast in terms of agnation, is actually one about coresidence. Thus it 
falls in the category of gender and lineage related explications of behaviors that we as 
anthropologists might want to classify as ‘the activation of agnatic ties through 
consociation.’  When Ipili discuss these categories, they do not, as some other 
Melanesian peoples might, speak of these children as ‘not having the blood of the father’ 
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or ‘not being of his semen.’ Instead, they speak of ‘eyeball time.’ “I never see those 
people” they say, “they live with their mother in their father’s place. They never come 
around here.”
In sum, ownership of the bone ground is very deep in Ipili society, but in a very 
abstract way – the cognatic stock which owns the bone ground is clear, but who exactly 
constitutes that stock is something that is locked up in the ambiguity of Porgera’s 
network-driven social system. Thus in land disputes in Porgera, the question at issue is 
not what stock ‘owns’ the bone of the ground, but rather who will successfully be 
subsumed as a member of that stock.
The skin of the ground, in contrast, is something that people have rights to use 
and transfer on the basis of their individual security circles. Individual plots within a 
territory can be given by one person to another for use and, in some sense, ownership can 
be conferred as well – keeping in mind that it is only ownership in the skin (that is to say, 
usufructory rights to the surface of the land) and not the bone of the ground that is being 
transferred. The actual distribution of rights of use and occupancy of the surface of the 
earth is a complex mosaic that is the result of the interaction of numerous peoples’ 
personal networks. In some cases, land inheritance can be as simple as someone’s mother 
passing on gardening ground to her daughter. But sometimes – and this is the case the 
majority of the time – it may be much much more complicated.
An example of the complexities that result may be taken from the situation of the 
gardens immediately adjacent to the house where I lived during my fieldwork. A 
prominent man of group A with many wives has a claim to a large area of land. His 
daughter makes gardens on one of them and, when he dies, becomes the ‘owner’ of her 
garden plots. After her first husband dies, she remarries a man from Paiela, who comes to 
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live with her. This man’s sister (actually, his first cousin through a polygynous marriage, 
but classified as a sister, so never mind the details) marries a man of group B, a group 
who lives adjacent to clan A. Affinal connections kick in, and the husband’s wife and his 
sister become close friends, and the sister receives a portion of garden plots from the 
wife. The wife’s son, when grown, marries a woman of group A, but of a different branch 
than the original prominent man. This woman makes gardens on her mother-in-law’s 
land. Although the woman is a member of group A, she traces her rights to the land not 
through some claim to owning the ground’s bone but through the – to the Ipili – simple 
fact that it originally belonged to her husband’s mother’s brother’s wife’s father. Because 
the land in question is right on the border between territories belonging to group A and 
group B, after a couple of generations of being passed back and forth between them, 
everyone gets a little fuzzy as to whom the bone of the ground belongs to at all. And in 
any case, if a huge gold mine were come along and buy up that land, what kind of person 
would say that the members of group B who had worked it over the years weren’t entitled 
to some sort of share of the money derived from its lease, even if they weren’t ‘owners’ 
of the ground’s bone?
In sum, ambiguity in land ownership takes a double form. On the one hand, there 
are a vast number of people with a claim to the bone of the ground which is very deep but 
also very vague, since the vast majority of them have not turned their possible identity as 
a member of a landowners stock into an actual one and many may not even know of their 
genealogical connection to that land. On the other hand, there are people deeply 
embedded in a residential group who have definite rights to the skin of the earth, rights 
no one can deny, even though those rights are based on ‘eyeball time’ – work and 
coresidence – rather than a link of blood. These links are definite and indisputable, but 
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not as strong as more enduring claims to the bone of the ground. So in fact, the art of 
making claims to land in Porgera is, at the practical level, far from a simple case of ‘Clan 
Y owns land Z’ model. Thus the situation in Porgera is, as Biersack writes, “anomalous 
yet also brilliant at every turn, and with an unsurpassed openness, and ability to respond 
organizationally to every contingency” (Biersack 1999b:262)
It was into this dynamic and complex web that the mine and government entered 
in the 1980s.  The situation they encountered was one of an entrepreneurial agency: Ipili 
are networkers not only in the sociological, but the cocktail sense of the word. Ipili seek 
to grow their social networks constantly, and will engage in constant meeting and 
greeting, accompanied by every possible intrigue, whenever presented the opportunity. 
Ipili constantly mull over the fine details of their own potential heritages with an 
excitement and nostalgia that is somewhere between Talmudic exegesis and the 
American tendency to discuss in detail the batting averages of the great left-fielders of the 
1930s. We can see now why the land study team had to creatively rework Ipili kinship, 
and why the Ipili themselves were amenable to such a reworking.
Who Lives in Apalaka and Waiwanda
With all of this in mind, let us now turn to the actual inhabits of Apalaka and 
Waiwanda. Although the settlement of Kewanda – visible on the hills on the other side of 
the waste dump -- is also technically in the Special Mining Lease and includes a few 
relocation houses, Apalaka is the ‘relocation village’ at the furthest remove from the 
government station. The unsealed, all-weather road to the community is maintained by 
the mine, but landslips not infrequently make vehicular transport up to the village 
impossible, halting the privately-run PMVs which provide bus service to the village, as 
well as the shuttle service which mine contractors run up to relocation communities to 
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bring local mine employees to work.
Apalaka itself is at the top of a gruelingly long and steep hill. As one walks up the 
hill one passes settlements on either side, including the seldom-used community school. 
The road dead ends in the main ama. The ama is lined with ‘tradestores’ – the ubiquitous 
mom-and-pop metal shacks that represent entrepreneurial activity in the minds of most 
Papua New Guineans. In addition to selling cooking oil, canned fish and meat, soap, tea, 
guitar strings, and mercury (for refining gold), some tradestores supplement their sales 
with pool tables and a few have VCRs and televisions which show movies for an eager 
audience. The Ipili taste in film is erratic – Superman was too corny, Fight Club 
unfathomable. The most popular films during my time in Porgera were Kickboxer (Jean 
Claude Van Damme, who Porgerans believed to be named ‘Frankie’), Anaconda (starring 
Jennifer Lopez and Ice Cube), and the documentary The People of Porgera, which 
offered a village without old photographs a glimpse of deceased loved ones.
In theory all Ipili loved the idea of owning and running their own business. In 
practice, however, most tradestores were not actually open. Half operated sporadically 
when they had stock, and four or five were regularly open, but in fact there was only one 
tradestore in Porgera that was consistently open, and that was owned by an enterprising 
Huli man who had settled there years before. The inventory of the other store suffered 
from the pressures of hungry but penniless relatives to whom food could not be refused, 
the difficulties of transporting  goods up to Apalaka, and more competitive prices at the 
government station, where more serious businessmen sold wholesale. Thus most 
tradestores were closed and locked up, or acted as places where the families that owned 
them could sell betelnut, cigarettes, ‘palawa’ (fried dough a la The Grapes of Wrath 
similar to silver dollar pancakes), ice pops, and rest and relax without having to hike up 
333
to their house (for more on tradestores and business in Porgera more generally see Banks 
1999).
In more traditional Ipili communities people live in homesteads dispersed across 
the landscape and separated from one another by gardening ground. People value their 
privacy in Porgera as well, but lived in much closer quarters. It was considered 
unacceptable to be able to see another person’s house from your own. In general, it was 
not acceptable to visit someone’s house without warning them beforehand of your visit. 
Any movement in one’s house area after dark was a cause for alarm and was met by the 
use of force. Occasionally when I, the clueless anthropologist, took a wrong turn and 
stumbled into a neighbor’s compound, I would be met by angry men with machetes. As I 
found out in the course of my census work, even those residents of Apalaka who had 
lived there since it was created had never visited large areas of it, including the homes of 
people with whom they were acquainted.
As a result, the paths that led out of the ama up to people’s houses were often so 
overgrown that the canopy spread overhead and created a tunnel around you. Houses 
were surrounded by fences and hedges. This fact, combined with the steep and uneven 
geography of Apalaka could make finding one’s bearing very difficult. The flip side of 
this fact was identifying and delineating Ipili households was relatively straightforward 
since they were literally bounded off from their neighbors. Typically they were clustered 
in compounds based around one or more relocation houses which had been built together. 
Alongside these numerous bush material houses – typically referred to as haus kuk (cook 
houses) -- were constructed. The most important reason that Ipili built these structures, 
they told me,  was to ensure that in the ‘next relocation’ (whenever that might be) they 
would receive a permanent material house in exchange for it. Many also prefer to sleep in 
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them rather than in their relocation houses. Cynical mine employees determined to 
squeeze every ounce of irony out of the situation inside the Special Mining Lease often 
raise their eyebrows at the fact that people are so keen to have another relocation house in 
the future when they appear to prefer bush houses to the relocation house they already 
have. I have already briefly discussed dissatisfaction with relocation houses in the 
previous chapter. Here I will merely note that in my experience they are in fact quite cold 
compared to bush houses, which can be heated with less fuel, and are more comfortable 
for older people who need more heat and are accustomed to them. In general, these 
houses were places were visitors could stay, where people could cook using an old 
fashioned stove, and where old people could sleep comfortably.
Some Notes on Methodology
The novice anthropologist can find Porgera an intimidating place to work. Some 
of the researchers – I think here of John Burton and Glenn Banks -- who have done 
census work or other more quantitative studies in Porgera are, in my opinion, some of the 
best working in Papua New Guinea today. Following in their footsteps can be 
intimidating. At the same time, Porgera has also been the subject of extremely poor 
census work (see Burton 1999:286) including, famously, a census by one Engan scholar 
which failed to include any women. I feel, therefore, that the standards of my colleagues 
are very high and that the possibilities of failure have been amply demonstrated. My own 
analysis of the population of Apalaka is hampered by the fact that I have no prior 
experience performing census work, and in fact little or no training in any sort of 
quantitative social science whatsoever. This is compounded by the difficulty of studying 
residence among a people like the Ipili, and particularly in a place such as Porgera, where 
people tend to be multilocal (for more on difficulties of work in this sort of area, consider 
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Allen 1995). 
On the other hand, what I lacked in concrete method was made up for with long-
term, personal experience with the people of my village, which gives my own work a 
stronger background in the community. This is particularly important given how reluctant 
people are to allow white outsiders – inevitable seen as ‘spies for the mine’ --  into their 
villages. Porgera is well-known for being a place where it is difficult to separate the ‘true 
landowners’ from the ‘epo arene,’ or migrants into the area. This is particularly true 
when being identified as an epo arene means being excluded from landowner privileges, 
and as a result few people are honest about their status when enumerators come to their 
door.
In fact, as I hope to show, what counts as an epo arene is quite difficult to 
ascertain. Perhaps the only person in Apalaka during my fieldsite who was identifiably a 
migrant without any kinship ties to the valley was myself. This ended up working in my 
favor, since as an immigrant I became the most familiar with other immigrants and the 
Ipili families who were happy to host them. Ironically enough, it was the more 
‘traditional’ families who preferred to stay away from the noisy public life of the ama 
that I had trouble tracking down.
Similarly, this may be the only census in Porgera’s history that is more likely to 
be an under- rather than an overcount. It represents an enumeration of the people who in 
my experience were more or less permanent residents in Porgera, insofar as anyone could 
be. As a result I may have overlooked people who might have strong and legitimate 
claims to being members of the community but who rarely visited, or people who were 
passing through when other censuses were taken. Most particularly, my data is not filled 
with duplicate names, false names, and the other means that Ipili resort to when faced 
336
with any sort of survey or census on the general grounds that the more of them there are, 
the more benefits they are likely to receive.
Although the focus of my dissertation research was negotiations between the 
company and the Ipili, I began collecting genealogies in Apalaka and taking more or less 
complete censuses of households where I was invited, typically in the evening for dinner. 
During these trips I would take along a photo album of my own family, and our evenings 
together became less an enumeration than an exchange of family knowledge. Because 
Ipili enjoy discussing the intricate and often obscure genealogical connections between 
individuals, people often enjoyed finding their genealogical connection to my host 
family, or startling me by revealing hidden connections between people who I saw in the 
ama but did not realize were related. This was particularly true of my own fieldsite of 
Waiwanda. Given the politicized nature of my research and the fact that the average 
white person is often assaulted when venturing into these communities, Waiwanda was a 
good choice for me. As the least influential and smallest of the seven Special Mining 
Lease clans (excluding the Anga, who were in essence  a nonentity), it was easy to 
become a bit of a mascot for the Waiwa as ‘their white man’ and fit into the community 
without the distrust that I might have encountered initially if I moved directly into the 
center of Apalaka. The community in Waiwanda was also quite small by Special Mining 
Lease standards – the size of communities studied by Jacka and Biersack – and more 
easily digestible. I will use data from Waiwanda to provide some more detailed 
information about the population.
Towards the end of my stay – in June 2001 – I conducted a more thorough survey 
of households I had not visited. Using a three foot by two foot sketch map of the village 
made by my adopted brother and an aerial photo (the famous ‘digital orthophoto’) of the 
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Special Mining Lease taken by the mine, I was able to make sure I had visited every 
settlement and view every structure of size in Apalaka with my own eyes. I then created 
individual folder for every household, combining data from my informal household 
surveys, the 2001 census work, and an extensive genealogical database I had developed 
out of more informal fieldnotes. I then tabulated the inhabitants of each house, often 
choosing to locate people in one location rather than another if I knew them to spend their 
time in more than one house, and then tabulated the results in a spreadsheet on my 
computer.
Some Basic Census Data
What, then, is the population of Apalaka like? Given how many people flow in 
and out of the community daily and how even local Porgerans prefer to be multilocal if at 
all possible, it is extremely difficult to develop an accurate number. My own census data 
show roughly 811 people, although how many ‘households’ there are in Porgera is 
difficult to say. Some ‘households’ were houses which were home to only two or three 
people who preferred their privacy. Others were composed of a compound of six or seven 
bush houses surrounding a single relocation house  and might house more than sixty 
people.
The immediate question becomes how to reconcile this figure with the much 
higher one of Papua New Guinea’s national 2000 census which occurred during my 
fieldwork and which in fact lists me as one of the inhabitants of Apalaka. There, the 
Apalaka census unit is listed as being home to 1,077 people in 157 households. To be 
honest, I do not have much confidence in the value of any of the 2000 census figures. 
While local kiaps and many educated Porgerans made an admirable effort attempting to 
train for the census, money to pay enumerators did not arrive until halfway through the 
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census week, and in my experience census activities in Apalaka consisted of one man 
with – to be charitable – relatively low literacy skills sitting on an overturned plastic 
bucket in the ama and waiting for people to approach him to be counted, and this despite 
the fact that the two thousand census was meant to be a door-to-door enumeration. 
Similarly, while I do not doubt that the population of the valley has grown enormously 
since the opening of the mine, the figure of 20,000 reported in the census for Porgera 
district seems unreasonable to me as a count of permanent inhabitants, although it may 
capture the total amount of traffic into and out of the valley.
TABLE 1. Total Population of Waiwanda and Apalaka
Waiwanda Apalaka Total
Men 62 334 396
Women 70 345 415
Total 132 679 811
Since I do not have access to individual census sheets I cannot compare them to 
my own census. One thing to note is that I did not count the outlying community of 
Ekanda in my census. It is possible that the differences between my figures and those of 
the census can be explained by this fact. It is possibile is that the ennumerators actually 
walked to Ekanda, the small hamlet upstream of Apalaka, and counted them while I did 
not. This seems unlikely given how physically difficult it is to do this and the 
enumerators’ unwillingness – as far as I know -- to get even as far as people’s houses in 
Apalaka. In my own visits to Ekanda it seemed to me that there were roughly fifty people 
there, not 200. The inclusion of Ekanda, then, seems unlikely to account for the 
difference.
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TABLE 2. Outsiders living in Apalaka and Waiwanda
Paiela Non-SM L Porgeran Engan Huli Other/Unknown Total
Waiwanda
Husband M arrying In 4 1 3 1 9
Wife Marrying In 5 3 2 1 1 12
Relative of Husband M arrying in 3 3
Relative of Wife Marrying in 1 1
Epo Arene M an 0
Epo Arene Woman 1 1
Child of Epo Arene
Waiwanda Total 10 4 2 8 2 26
Apalaka
Husband M arrying In 19 5 7 7 3 41
Wife Marrying In 18 11 16 3 7 55
Relative of Husband M arrying in 1 3 4
Relative of Wife Marrying in 3 1 4 8
Epo Arene M an 1 9 7 6 23
Epo Arene Woman 8 3 3 14
Child of Epo Arene 21 2 2 25
Apalaka Total 42 17 65 22 24 170
Total 52 21 67 30 26 196
The mostly likely source of this inflation is that the census included the 
substantial amount of people who pass through Apalaka during the course of the year and 
the census figures reflect that. While a few unusual people estimated that they hosted up 
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to ten different people in a single month in their house, more often people reported two or 
three people might visit them at a time. I would not be surprised if this figure included 
everyone who passed through Apalaka more than once a year, even if not for a very long 
time and even if they could not be considered ‘residents’ by any stretch of the 
imagination. Overall, though, the discrepancy between my figures and those of the 
national census is the result of the fact that I probably committed a few sins of ommission 
while census personnel performed a more substantial over count.
Table 1 shows populations statistics for both Apalaka and Waiwanda. You can 
see immediately that Waiwanda has a much smaller population than Apalaka. My census 
indicates that there is a slight gender imbalance in favor of women. What the table does 
not encapsulate, but which household tallies clearly indicate, is that the population of 
Waiwanda – and also most likely Apalaka – is heavily weighted by children under the 
age of ten. Of course, this is not unusual – there is a reason, after all, that they call it an 
‘age pyramid.’ Still, the amount of children in the SML is striking and obvious to any 
visitor. Practically every household I visited included four children under the age of ten. 
This age group corresponds nicely to construction and the opening of the Porgera gold 
mine. Between the opening of the mine in 1990 and my own census in June 2001, thus, 
every married woman had been having children once every two years or so and the infant 
mortality that is strikingly and sadly present in genealogies of earlier generations is 
markedly absent. This fact indicates that whatever ‘youth’ issues the mine might have at 
the moment regarding young married couples will be dwarfed as the mine nears closure 
unless there is significant out-migration from the Special Mining Lease. While I did not 
have the time, energy, or confidence to perform a similar analysis of the population of 
Apalaka, anyone looking through the genealogies I have collected or who visits a 
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relocation house in this area will see immediately that a similar pattern holds. While these 
children may, like their parents, become more peripatetic as they grow older it seems that 
for the near future Porgera will have to deal with its own ‘baby boomer’ generation.
Will the Real Epo Arene Please Stand Up?
Another frequently commented-on pattern in the Special Mining Lease is 
migration into Special Mining Lease communities from outside. Unrelated outsiders 
known as epo arene (from an Ipili chain verb construction meaning ‘come and stand’) are 
seen by mine employees as one of the biggest sources of social disruption in Porgera 
today. As I hope to show in this section, accurately counting epo arene is an exercise in 
futility, since the term does not exist as a stable category in Ipili villages. 
Table 2 provides information about residents of Apalaka and Waiwanda that lack 
a consanguinial relationship to Tuanda or Waiwa. Very roughly, we can see that 196 
people out of 811 – 24% -- are not in some sense ‘Tuanda’ or ‘Waiwa’ based on either 
tene or wana status. This is not surprising, since the population should have a  population 
of in-marrying spouses. However, depending on which principles of inclusion and 
inclusion I chose to use, this figure could also easily have been 293 people out of 811, or 
36% of the population. I will discuss this first figure, and then explain the sociology and 
politics of epo arene such that could be used to produce the second figure.
Because Apalaka as I encountered it is just barely a decade old, it does not make 
much sense to speak of ‘migrants’ and ‘nonmigrants’ in terms of some sort of long-term 
residence on the land. Most of the Tuandans now living in Apalaka had migrated out of 
the original village to be closer to the mining camp that operated at Alipis in the 1980s. 
Thus ‘relocation’ to Apalaka was not so much the shifting of an established residential 
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group from one location to another as it was the (re)creation of a village out of the people 
who had – with the exception of a small population – not lived there for some time. Thus 
rather than labelling ‘migrants’ or ‘non-migrants’ this chart divides people up based on 
their reason for moving to Apalaka other consanguineal ties.
As noted above, the number of non-consanguines is not surprising when one 
considers that this table includes in-marrying spouses. Note that it does not include 
Tuandan spouses who have settled in Waiwanda and vice-versa. The lack of other Special 
Mining Lease landowner spouses dwelling in Apalaka is noticeable, but easily explained. 
First, most Special Mining Lease landowners lineages are heavily intermarried, and so 
further marriage would be incestuous. Second, Special Mining Lease couples do not live 
together, or they live some place closer to the station than Apalaka, which is far away and 
difficult to get to. Finally, marriages that occur between landowners are often polygynous 
unions in which men take additional cowives in order to secure their position as members 
of all seven landowning clans. These men are typically multilocal and while they often 
visit Porgera to network with their wives and affines, they do not sleep in the village 
often enough to be considered ‘resident’ there.
The two figures indicate immediately the difference between Waiwanda and 
Apalaka. Waiwanda is a more rural enclave of a less powerful stock which rides on the 
back of the more densely populated Apalaka. It is not surprising, therefore, that there 
would be considerably less epo arene moving in to Waiwanda than Apalaka. This chart 
indicates clearly that one of the most common class of people to move to Apalaka are 
Paielans who are marrying ‘up’ to Porgera. The high number of men who marry Porgeran 
women and then reside in Porgera clearly indicates what on-the-ground fieldwork 
confirms: these men were leaving low-prestige rural communities and coming to the 
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more urban high-prestige Special Mining Lease area. Porgerans see their country cousins 
as hard workers who knew how to do things like make bush houses, tasks at which 
Special Mining Lease landowners were inexpert. No other ethnic group in the study had 
as many men choosing to reside uxorilocaly as Paielans.
The other thing the table indicates is the predominance of Engan women coming 
down the highway and settling in the Special Mining Lease as spouses. Although I did 
not attempt a rigorous tabulation of these women’s place of origin within Enga, in my 
experience almost all of them were from the Laiagam area, or other points between 
Laiagam and Porgera in west Enga. Paielan women continue, as they always have done, 
to marry Porgeran men. Porgerans from more distant lineages such as those in the Lower 
Porgera or Tipinini are also not infrequent spouses, usually because Special Mining 
Lease landowners do not have preexisting consanguinial ties with those areas and hence 
can marry them without concern with a possible incestuous tie in their kinship portfolio.
Despite popular opinions in Porgera amongst the government and mine, these 
findings indicate that it is relatively uncommon – at least in Apalaka -- for in-marrying 
spouses to act as ‘migration anchors’ which members of their natal community then use 
to come to Porgera. The image of a woman’s entire family moving in from Laiagam three 
weeks after she’s married a Porgeran man isn’t borne out by the data – at least not in 
Apalaka (it would be interesting to contrast my data with communities that live closer to 
the government station). Indeed, the number of ‘true’ epo arene – people who settle in 
Apalaka without consanguineal or affinal connections – is relatively small: 40 out of 811 
people, or just under 5%. These people are often friends or clients of powerful Tuandans. 
One family of Engans from Laiagam, for instance, were referred to as “work men” for the 
powerful landowner who hosted them, indicating their subordinate status as clients. In 
344
fact, it is telling that the largest single class of people in Apalaka today who lack any kin 
ties to the Tuanda and Waiwa stocks are not people who have migrated there at all, but 
children born in Porgera to in-migrating Engan parents. This mirrors the crucial and more 
general dynamic we are seeing of massive generational growth which is not offset by 
infant mortality or outmigration. 
It may be that ‘pure’ epo arene in-migration is more common in communities 
closer to the government station, and that the difficulty of getting to Apalaka has made it 
a less-popular location for  epo arene to visit. I would not be surprised to find that 
communities nearer to the station and off the Special Mining Lease exhibited different 
demographic patterns. However, I think that in order to get a better grasp of what is going 
on in the Special Mining Lease when it comes to outsiders coming to settle in relocation 
communities, it is necessary to retrace in more detail the sociology of movement into 
Porgera, and what is meant by epo arene. Having explained one possible tabulation of 
epo arene, then, I now turn to another.
Rentier Leadership
Like other Ipili, Apalakans and Waiwandans actively attempt to incorporate 
powerful outsiders into their security circles. Unlike them, however, Special Mining 
Lease landowners can offer outsiders incentives such as royalty checks and access to jobs 
which other Ipili cannot. This provides a mechanism for landowners to convert what 
would otherwise be friends and acquaintances into subordinate clients. In order to explain 
this dyanmic more fully, and the implications that it has for how people are subsumed 
into the category of epo arene, it is useful to contrast the situation in Porgera with the 
‘rentier leadership’ described by John Burton (1996) for the upper Watut.
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Burton’s discussion of rentier leadership also comes in the context of rural Papua 
New Guinean society affected by mining. In his case, this is the distribution of benefits 
from prospecting activity undertaken by CRA around Hidden Valley prospect in the 
upper Watut (Morobe province). Burton argues that in the case of the Upper Watut, 
revenues and power derived from mining aggregate power in a ‘patron,’ a term he 
deliberately uses for its English connotations of “a reasonably expansive fellow, a 
sponsor” as well as the “stern figure not to be argued with” of the French usage, with its 
connotations of “not-to-be-brooked autocracy” (1996:5). 
On Burton’s account, a patron is a man who controls a piece of land over and 
against the claims of his other relatives by virtue of his seniority. He then gains in power 
by allowing non-owners to settle the land in return for allegiance to him and deference to 
him when it comes to decision making in public forums. Typically, the patron also 
operates a sort of embryonic tributary system where he receives a portion of the food, 
firewood, and other resources produced on that land (1996:8-9). 
Arguing in a vein similar to Levi-Strauss’s argument about the development of 
house societies (1987, 1982), Burton suggests that the rise of a patron marks the 
formation of a sort of semi-institutionalized personal power that emerges from and yet 
surpasses kin-based ties. He argues that these temporary inequalities would normally be 
leveled as a result of patterns of migration but solidify in the context of resource 
development.
In  pre-colonial  times...  the  inequality  I  have  described  would  have  been 
temporary and unimportant... But this circle is now broken and settlements are 
permanent.  As  a  consequence,  as  secondary  landowners  are  removed  from 
active  participation  in  village  decision-making,  a  stratification  of  rights  has 
occurred (Burton 1996:9). 
Burton’s prediction that “it may be that he [the patron] is a creation of the post-
colonial period with its growing emphasis on the ownership of resources” (Burton 
346
1996:9) appears to borne out, at least by the situation in Porgera, where a similar 
stratification is taking place. However, there are differences between settlement in 
Apalaka and what Burton describes for the Watut. In the Watut, the rentier leaders’s 
position is tied to claims to land which are themselves legitimated by reference to some 
sort of genealogical charter. This source of legitimacy is thus based on kinship and 
genealogy despite the fact that the interests of rentier leaders are often orthogonal to those 
of his kin.
The patron heads his patriline, but far from ruling it, he is likely to be permanently at 
odds with most of it for quite a lot of the time. This is because it lacks the features of 
group solidarity that it would have if it were clan-like. Nor do patriline ‘brothers’ owe a 
debt of allegiance to the head, as clients are expected to. They should be loyal, but they 
offer a divisible loyalty at the best of times. The patriline is only a pedigree with rights 
attached to it, not a small bit of a corporate group. As for members of other patrilines 
who reside with the owners of the land the settlement stands on, these people are simply 
clients of the patron and have limited rights to say or do anything. (1996:8)
As Burton describes it, the patron’s control of land can conflict with the interests 
of his kin when his position closes off the formerly-available possibility that they might 
be able use the open field of social arrangements to their own interest to secure use and 
rights to land.
While Burton’s description of genealogy as “a pedigree of rights attached to it” 
describes Porgeran malu quite well, there are differences between the upper Watut and 
Porgera. In regards to land in Apalaka, we do not see the marked sense of conflict 
between the rentier leader and his kinsmen that Burton describes for the Watut. Rather, 
each Ipili household has become something of a rentier operation in miniature, each with 
its own line of migrants – typicaly affines, but also occasionally epo arene – who are 
their clients. In a few situations – such as my own, and the Huli store keeper who was an 
important part of the community – these relationships could be reversed and individuals 
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could find themselves clients of the too-powerful outsiders they had invited in to their 
communities only to find themselves eclipsed. Indeed, the danger of this occurring and of 
Ipili becoming ‘strangers on their own land’ is a constant source of concern for outside 
analysts. On the whole though, Ipili in Apalaka have been successful in taking traditional 
ties of affinity, consanguinity, and friendship and remaking them into rentier ties of 
patronage.
In Porgera, what epo arene largely means today is the group of people who were 
formerly entangled in Ipili security circles and came to live in Porgera as guests but still 
roughly equals of the Tuanda and Waiwa. Now, in the post-mine age, they have become 
subordinates and clients to their Ipili hosts. Whereas epo arene once had connotations of 
‘friend’ and ‘guest’ it is now translated into English as ‘squatter.’ This shift in the English 
translation of the term corresponds with the shift in sociology that has occurred in 
Apalaka. Much of this transformation has to do with inmigration, of course, but much of 
it has to do as well with the way in which Ipili identity in the village is being refigured as 
a result of its interaction with outside forces.
As you will remember, in the course of the Yakatabari negotiations we saw that 
the land on which the Yunarilama portal was to be opened was owned by Busane, a man 
who originally came by it after moving from Tari to Porgera as an alluvial miner. It may 
have seemed strange, at that point, that he should be considered ‘the true landowner’ over 
and above the Tiyini agents for the land. However, this sort of settlement is not an 
isolated incident. There is a similar Huli household in Porgera, which is also based on a 
Huli miner who came to Porgera and settled. He has been part of their community for 
literally decades longer than most Porgerans have been alive. Equally, there is a large 
Engan household which has a long history in Porgera. It dates back to a founding father, 
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who was good friends with an Apalakan man. They contributed to each other’s 
bridewealth, and the Engan man came to settle in Porgera with his friend. He is now a 
grandfather and three generations of Engans live in Apalaka. And who is to say that he is 
not a resident? The claims of these sorts of ‘epo arene’ are very strong, as the case of 
Busane demonstrates. This demonstrates how seriously epo arene ties could be used in 
Porgera prior to the coming of the mine. Do we say that these people are not ‘true 
Porgerans’ and are epo arene? 
The problematic notion of ‘the Ipili’ as a clearly bounded ethnic group also makes 
it difficult to decide what – other than a commitment to the community – makes one an 
‘epo arene.’ An even clearer – although less clear cut – example of this involves the 
Marinaka people who live in Apalaka. In this case, the ‘clan diasporas’ mentioned earlier 
in the chapter provided a charter for in-migration. The Marinaka are considered one of 
the ‘brother groups’ of the Tuanda and live down the highlands highway in the area 
between Porgera and Laiagam. In the late sixties and early seventies Ambi Kipu (a 
powerful patron and son of the man who was part of the prophetic group who originated 
the Kupiane story) befriended a Marinakan man who eventually settled to live with him 
in Porgera. This man served as the anchor for a wave of Marinakan migration which has 
created an entire community of ethnically Engan citizens within Apalaka. Or are they 
ethnically Engan? After all, they are related to Tuanda himself. We shall return to them 
again in this chapter. The point to take here is that regardless of whatever status they may 
have had in the past, today they form a sort of mini-community of second-class citizens 
because they are not considered to be ‘true landowners’ and do not get access to money 
and job opportunities – despite the fact that they have lived in Porgera for as long as most 
Porgerans.
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Finally, it is interesting to note that much of the ‘outsider’ movement perceived in 
Porgera is a result of migration to the valley that makes sense in terms of the mine’s 
reified notion of ‘landowner,’ but not in the terms of the Porgeran community 
themselves. One household in Apalaka is based around a married couple of two 
Tuandans, whose union was considered incestuous by the rest of the community. 
Disgraced, they still live in the village but have little to do with it and are rarely seen in 
the ama – I was surprised, in fact to find how large their household was when I visited 
there during my census work. Their children married people from Waiya, a fringe Engla 
settlement that Jacka describes (2003:289-303). Previously a center of population, it is 
today distant from the highlands highway and relatively underpopulated. In fact, many 
men and women from Waiya moved to Apalaka. To a certain extent, then, we can say 
that Waiya was absorbed by Apalaka. This shift in population does not fall strictly under 
the category epo arene because people use affinal connections to come to Apalaka. 
Nonetheless, they are considered by many Apalakans as tolerated but unwelcome 
‘outsiders’ who are part of a disgraceful household. Thus they are in some sense less a 
part of the community than Engans and Huli who have strong histories of coresidence but 
lack affinal and consanguineal ties.
In sum, not everyone in Porgera is a rich landowner who drives around in a four-
wheel drive truck with tinted windows. But even within the relatively humble households 
of the Special Mining Lease, landowners are leveraging their identities to become rentier 
leaders. Indeed, they are not merely leveraging them, they are remarking them. When epo 
arene become squatters rather than ‘friends who have come to stay’ a more restrictive 
definition of ‘Ipili’ emerges and the number of people who can be considered ‘outsiders’ 
increases dramatically to over a third of the population.
350
Arenas for the Claiming of Identity in Porgera
In the last section I examined the way that Ipili identity is used within Apalaka 
and Waiwanda. But Porgera is more than just the village, and Ipili identity can be 
employed in contexts which are still ‘local’ even if they are not ‘the village.’ As I 
mentioned above, being a landowner in Porgera gives individual Ipili access to benefits 
that most Papua new Guineans dream of tapping such as royalty payments, 
compensation, and employment at the mine. The key, of course, is making sure that they 
can feasibly construe themselves as ‘being a landowner.’ And yet as the analysis in this 
section will suggest, the structures within which they must subsume themselves are 
murky, ambiguous, and poorly-structured. As a result, they resemble more closely the 
open-ended repertoire of relationship-making that Ipili themselves practice rather than the 
structured, routinized bureaucratic rationality that governments and companies like to 
believe are their typical modus operandi. Critics of high modern attempts to make local 
people ‘legible’ might expect government institutions to refuse to see the complexity of 
Ipili identity. And yet Ipili identity is not coherently ‘purified’ by these lists, not merely 
because of landowners attempting to ‘corrupt’ the lists in order to maximize the amounts 
of benefits they receive, but because the lists themselves lack a coherent rationale for 
who is appears on them.
On the surface, there is a ‘paper world’ of names, identities, and criteria whose 
goal seems to be to panoptically list and describe who the ‘Porgera landowners’ are based 
on categories which they themselves have put forward. However, closer examination 
reveals to us that this paper world is in fact quite messy. In fact it forms a series of 
‘arenas’ within which claims and counterclaims for identity and hence entitlement are 
made. Because most of these claims are also made in the physical space of the 
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government station at Porgera or the mine’s community relations offices at Yokelama, 
the paper world also represents the first geographical remove by which discussion of Ipili 
identity in the village spill out into the wider world and into the mines of people who do 
not live within the Special Mining Lease.
Who are the Official Landowners in Apalaka and Waiwanda?
Who are ‘the landowners?’ Who signed all those agreements in 1989? How does 
the government keep track of Ipili identity? Perhaps the most ‘cannonical’ list of Ipili 
landowners is the schedule of owners that was generated by the team that produced the 
land study. This document is theoretically the most legally salient statement of who owns 
the land in Special Mining Lease. It was completed in 1988, and has been supplemented 
since then by two ‘children registers’ which are meant to update the total number of 
landowners. I only have access to the 1994 report, which I believe was drawn up by 
Kurubu Ipara. These documents, then, constitute the government’s official records of 
which individuals are officially considered landowners.
As the existence of ‘children registers’ suggest, these lists appear to operate on a 
principle of consanguinity. Anyone and everyone who can trace a blood relation to the 
apical ancestors of the Special Mining Lease clans is included. Thus the schedule of 
owners for the Tuanda ‘clan’ includes 608 names while the 1994 child register accounts 
for 510. The schedule of owners includes for Waiwa Yaliape has 564 names, and the 
child register has a further 411 names – far larger than the population of Waiwanda. 
These lists were designed to be inclusive, and to accommodate all Porgerans who had ties 
to the Tuanda and Waiwa ancestors in their cognatic portfolio, even if they had not 
activated them or if they resided in Apalaka – everyone, in otherwords, who could 
possibly be considered to have a claim to the bone of the ground in Porgera. They thus do 
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a very poor job of describing who is actually living on the land’s skin in Apalaka.
The closer that one looks at these records, however, the more problematic they 
become. First, they include spouses, which complicates the idea that landowner identity 
is tied to descent. Second, even these consanguineal ties seem rather occult. In the case of 
the Waiwa, the schedule of owners lists two clans, Waiwa Yaliape and Waiwa Lunda. 
This in itself is not a surprise – the Lunda are a large group who are associated with a 
piece of ground known as Upalika, and whose members include William Gaupe (the 
commando-style raider of chapter three and pretender to the throne of the Porgera 
Landowners Association in chapter two) and the wife of Kurubu Ipara. The Lunda are 
not, however, the ‘owners’ of any land within the Special Mining Lease, if by 
‘ownership’ one means making claims on the ‘bone’ of the ground discussed above. Only 
Waiwa Yaliape have land in the Special Mining Lease, not Waiwa Lunda – their land can 
be found lower down in the Porgera valley. It is not clear, then, why they ought to be 
included on a list of owners or have an agent who signed the Porgera Agreements of 
1989, as the agents for Waiwa Lunda did. This issue is further complicated by the fact 
that the agent for Waiwa Lunda listed in the land study is William Gaupe, but the agent 
listed on the Porgera agreements themselves is Pospi Karapis. Did Gaupe delegate his 
authority Pospi? There is certainly no record of that fact, and during the time that I knew 
him William certainly did not claim such a thing.
Perhaps this suggests that there is an implicit recognition of the rights of all 
subsections of a clan to have a say in the disposal of land within the Special Mining 
Lease? But this goes against the practice as I understood it in Porgera. It is further 
contradicted by the logic of the schedule of owners for the Tuanda. As we have seen, the 
Tuanda are divided into two groups, the Ulupa and Yapala, and these two ‘sub-clans’ 
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have two agents, Sole Taro and Ambi Kipu. One of the Porgera Agreements, however, 
list ‘Aiyope Yawane’ as the signator for Yapala rather than Sole Taro and to confuse 
matters even more, the ‘signature’ on the document is a thumbprint with the word ‘Sole 
T.’ written over it. This is most unusual since Sole is proud of his education and is one of 
the agents who could sign their own name. The agreement between the National 
Government and the Porgera Landowners includes nine signatures and twenty-one 
thumbprints, if one interprets ‘signature’ generously), including a large John Hancock 
from Sole, as he indeed did in the agency delegation document within the land act. 
Whose signature, then, is on the Porgera Agreements... and whose ought to be?
Furthermore, the words ‘Ulupa’ and ‘Yapala’ do not appear in the schedule of 
owners itself, which includes a number of other entries in the ‘subclan’ spot on the top of 
each page. Instead we have ‘Kareya’ and then a series of what are presumed to be sub-
sub clans in parenthesis – Kareya (Aiyengi), Kareya (Amini) and so forth – as well as a 
handful of other names of corporate groups. Most tellingly, the subclan ‘Marinaka (Lio)’ 
is included, and its ‘address’ (i.e. location before relocation) is listed as “c/- Catholic 
Mission Kasap, Yangiyangi Vilage, Mulitaka Patrol Post – Lagaip District.” This is, in 
other words, the Marinaka group which is part of the larger clan diaspora associated with 
Tuanda – Mulitaka is ethnically west Engan and outside of the Porgera district. They are 
the same group mentioned above which as a large ‘outpost’ which live in Tuanda – and 
this despite the fact that they are in fact listed as landowners! The list includes 94 names: 
87 in Laiagam, and then seven people who live in Porgera proper, including one 
Marinaka man, his wife, and three children. There was, however, no Marinaka agent, the 
Marinaka do not appear as one of the subclans in the land study or the Porgera 
Agreements, and they are not listed in the child register of 1994. Between the schedule of 
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owners and the land study they had been ‘delandownerified.’
Examples of this sort could be given in many of the other clans. The Pulumaini, 
for example, were not happy with the idea of having agents at the ‘sub clan’ level and 
instead opted for ‘sub sub clans’ or, as it is sometimes said in Porgera, haus lain (the Tok 
Pisin that means term that means something like ‘extended family’) level. In the Porgera 
Agreement between the National Government and the Porgera Landowners, there are six 
Pulumaini clans: Ambo-Wagia, Ambo-Amu, Ambo-Endewe, Ambo-Gai, Ambo-
Paramba, and Ambo-Yuga. In the Porgera Agreement between the Porgera Landowners 
and Enga Province Amu, Endewe, Gai, Paramba, and Yuga are listed, while Amu has 
been added at the bottom of the document in pen. The delegation documents in the land 
study, on the other hand, include Ambo-Wagia, Ambo-Amu, Tokome, “Pulumaini 
Subclan Yamawe” (with the word ‘Ambo’ penciled in between ‘Pulumaini’ and 
‘subclan’),  Ambo-Napali, Ambo-Endeme, Ambo-Gai, Yamili-Wapini, “Pulumaini 
Subclan – Paramba” (with the word ‘Yamili’ written in pencil between ‘Pulumaini’ and 
‘subclan’), Pariwana, and Yunga. Two subclans of Anga are listed in the land study (and 
both have the same agents) but only one is listed in the agreements, and so forth. In other 
words, these documents have never – even since their inception – presented a coherent 
model of the segmentation of landowner lineages.
Pessimists might see this as a sign that the land study was irredeemably sloppy, or 
that leadership in Porgera was helplessly corrupt and cynically manipulated official 
representations of their lineages. Optimists (or at least people familiar with life in the 
valley) might be able to explain these irregularities away, insisting that this sort of 
rigorous approach to the land study is splitting hairs, or that a few corners --  such as 
having more than one agent responsible for different subclans or last-minute signatory 
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substitutions -- were cut with everyone’s approval. 
To a certain extent both are right. The incoherence in the formal documents 
creating feasible Ipili agents indicates clearly, I think, how much corporate entities like 
‘clans’ creatively emerge in response to the context that elicited them. We see reflected in 
the land study not clearly delineated lineage segments with exclusive membership, but a 
world of malleable corporate identities that take shape around a few prominent people. 
They reflect the fact that everyone ‘on the ground’ in Porgera knew who had to sign to 
make an agreement feasible that would protect the mine and allow it to operate, rather 
than accurately mirroring some preexisting clan structure. It would not be too much, 
therefore, to say that there were not so much twenty-three subclans in search of an agent 
but twenty-three agents in search of subclans.
Ironically enough, although the schedule of owners is in some ways the most 
legally important document associated with Ipili identity, it is also one of the least 
relevant to Ipili today. Other than the fact that it was key to the issuance of the lease on 
their land, Ipili today gain little direct benefit from being included on this list. The 
examples that I found were locked away in disused and dusty government files. Others 
form of identity, such as royalty payments, are much more relevant.
Royalties
For the Ipili who I encountered in the course of my fieldwork, the most important 
mode of being a landowner did not mean being listed in the schedule of owners, but on 
the list of people who receive royalties. As we have seen, the Porgera Agreements 
mandate that a certain percentage of the government’s royalty on gold sold by the mine 
be redistributed to landowners. As a result landowners receive checks every three months 
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based on the mine’s performance. These checks thus represent a sort of permanent dole 
or pension to which every Ipili can aspire. These checks are distributed on a sub-clan by 
sub-clan basis, and are tied to the total amount of land each sub-clan owns within the 
Special Mining Lease. Thus clans who have lost more land receive larger checks. Checks 
are also paid out at two separate rates – adult checks are worth more than checks for 
children.
The dynamic of the distribution of these checks is based around a few facts. First, 
the size of royalty checks is linked to the mine’s profitability and the amount of land that 
each clan has alienated to the mine. Hence it is theoretically in the Ipili’s interest to 
maximize the mine’s profitability – a fact which the mine often reminds them of. Second, 
there is an inverse relationship between the size of each check and the total number of 
checks issued. As we shall see, the size of the checks are fixed and are not particularly 
large. The easiest way to gain more money is thus to receive more checks, although this 
then decreases the amount of each check. 
There are several ways to acquire more checks. Since one can have multiple clan 
affiliations, the most obvious thing to do would be to be listed on the clan rosters of every 
clan that one belonged to. Men who are not members of all seven clans – as few men are 
– can round out their check receivership by marrying polygamously into the remaining 
clans. Since children receive checks, parents can grab a larger slice of the royalty pie by 
having (or claiming to have, or claiming responsibility for) more children. As we shall 
see, since men often take the checks of their wives and children, a single man may 
therefore walk away from royalty payments with upwards of twenty or thirty checks. And 
these methods only touch on the legitimate and legal ways of getting checks. 
How, then are these lists compiled, processed, and paid off? Theoretically, the 
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lists of landowners are taken from the original land study. They have grown over time as 
periodic child censuses have been conducted to add newborns and infants to the list. 
Additionally, landowners can appeal to the local government to add the names of people 
who they have approved – typically newly-acquired affines – to the list. The local 
government is, in this case, personated by Morep Tero, a long-serving kiap who was one 
of the people who conducted the Land Study itself. Tero is himself a Porgeran, and can 
be found in his office where, when presented with a new person to add to the list, he will 
add them if they are vouched for by someone he knows.
These additions to the list are added to a Microsoft Excel database in the Porgera 
Development Authority office. When royalty money is delivered in the relevant Porgera 
Development Authority bank account, checks are printed out on the office laser printer. 
The resulting stack of paper is then bought to the government office building and, over a 
course of a week or so, they are handed out on a clan-by-clan basis. Queuing up – or 
indeed, any form of public order – does not come naturally to the Ipili, and so the 
government officers sequester themselves in a room with no windows and hand out the 
checks through a small hole with a security grill in order to prevent an ‘incident.’ With a 
landowner representative observing, the government officers hand out checks and then 
get people to sign a receipt indicating that they have taken it. People receive their checks, 
cash them at the local branch of the Bank of Papua New Guinea (or other, more sketchy 
places), and then are free to spend the money on whatever they like. 
The occasion of royalties results in a huge three day long party in relocation 
communities whose location shifts as money runs through each of the communities as 
their turn comes up in the list of checks. Thus if the Tiyini receive their checks first there 
is a huge party at Yarik, which then dies down. The party then shifts to Apalaka as the 
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Tuanda begin cashing their checks, and so on and so forth. What is done with the money? 
Well first, the distribution of the checks is quite complicated since various family 
members compete to receive each other’s checks – my anecdotal evidence leads me to 
believe that the most common offense in this regard is men taking their wives’s checks. 
Second, gambling is popular, and I’ve witnessed pots of enormous amounts of money up 
for grabs in public card games that occur during royalty parties. Third, of course, is 
splurging on beer and alcohol. Fourth, money is given to friends and affines. Fifth, 
money is used to pay off debts in trade stores for store-bought food purchased over the 
past quarter. Although this last form of expenditure is the least obvious, it often accounts 
for much of the royalty checks that people receive. Despite the reality of royalty parties, 
many people use the majority of their checks to pay off debts at tradestores for store-
bought food that they have eaten over the course of the last quarter since their gardens 
cannot grow enough food to support them. The remainder is then spent.
As I said a moment ago, theoretically the royalty lists are compiled based on the 
schedule of owners. The truth is somewhat different. Despite the existence of twenty-
three landowning clans, the royalty lists are in fact divided up into twenty-one different 
lists: The two Waiwa subclans have been collapsed into one (not surprising, since the 
Lunda shouldn’t be receiving royalties at all), while the ever-amorphous Pulumaini have 
been reduced from five subsections to four. While it is not clear where the names on this 
list come from, they surely do not come from the Schedule of Owners. As we have seen 
above, the schedule of owners counts 608 adult Tuanda and there are 510 children on the 
1994 children register, while the Waiwa include 564 names in just the Yaliape subclan, 
and the child register has a further 411 names. However, the list of royalty payments 
from the second quarter of 1999 lists only 179 adult Waiwa and 169 young adults – 
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which includes the Lunda, while the Tuanda number 480 adults and and 644 young 
adults.
Untangling the actual distribution of these checks proves to be quite a task, and I 
will offer only the most cursory of remarks. Let us examine for a moment the 284 checks 
distributed to the adult members of the Ulupa subclan of Tuanda. According to the 
signatures on the completed payment sheet, these 284 checks were distributed to 94 
recipients. The highest number of checks a recipient received was 38, while the lowest 
was (not surprisingly) 1. Thus each person receives roughly 3 checks. In fact the 
distribution of checks is skewed – some people receive many while most receive few. Of 
course, this could simply mean that one person is taking the checks for their entire 
family, but this goes against Ipili egalitarianism as well as the rational of having 
individual checks in the first place. There are some procedural issues that accompany 
handing out the checks. Some are, perhaps, understandable. Morep Tero, the government 
officer who was responsible for witnessing the check distribution, received one himself in 
his role as a landowner (which he is) despite the fact someone else should technically 
have countersigned as witness for him. Others are more suspicious – Nixon Mangape is 
simply listed twice (he married into Tuanda).
It could be argued that the small number of people on the royalty lists is based on 
a principle of residence in an area, rather than cognatic consanguineality. But if this is the 
case then why does the government employ two different standards for defining who a 
landowner is? In fact, it appears that these royalty lists are also being used as a way to 
transform people drawn into the security circles of prominent Apalakans into clients. 
Names can be added to the list by anyone who is already on the list providing that they 
can pass the relatively benign test of Morep Tero. While Morep is very easy-going when 
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it comes to adding names to the list, he is also very familiar with Porgera and the Special 
Mining Lease, and thus is a fairly decent – if personal and intuitive – assessor of whether 
someone is a ‘true landowner’ or not.
Thus as far as royalties go, ‘being a landowner’ amount to little more than 
‘already being on the list’ and ‘knowing Morep’ and there is little overlap between the 
schedule of owners and the royalty list. The two different levels of checks are 
theoretically based on age, but in fact represent how well liked you are by the landowner 
sponsoring you – whether you are deserving of a large or small check. Often, these 
checks are collected by the landowner who retains a portion of it before giving the rest to 
his client.
Compensation
Finally, landowners have relationships with the company in which they receive 
compensation for land of theirs which are damaged by mining operation. Banks (1997) 
has discussed compensation payments at length in previously published work, and his 
writings draw on financial records held by the mine and to which I have not had access. 
For these reasons I refer readers interested in a detailed discussion of compensation 
payments to Banks’s work and will make only a few remarks here.
As we have seen, large-scale dealings with the mine, such as the issuenace of the 
Special Mining Lease or the creation of new and unscheduled works within it, are dealt 
with by the Landowner Negotiating Committee. However for most of the time Porgerans 
interact with the company at an individual level. Because Porgera landowners actually 
live within the Special Mining Lease, their houses and gardens are technically located on 
land which the mine has the right to use. The mine can work on this land and destroy 
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improvements on it without the permission of the person living there. Or rather, 
technically that person has already given permission to the mine via their representative 
on the Landowner Negotiating Committee who signed the agreements of the late eighties 
– technically, this land has already been leased from them. 
Landowners must, however, be compensated for their lost land and damages to 
the improvements that they have made upon it. However the amount that they are 
compensated is not negotiable – the rates, including the construction of new houses, are 
set by the original agreements negotiated in 1989. Typically, though, the mine does not 
actively seek any additional land that it does not already using. While compensation 
claims took the form of massive pay-outs during construction, today they are paid out 
mostly for occasions when mine-related activities cause inadvertent destruction of 
landowner properties – for instance, when a landslip is caused by explosions at the mine 
site, or a waste dump creeps over gardens. The result, obviously, is a strong incentive for 
landowners to built houses and plant crops in areas that are likely to be disrupted by 
mining.
Additionally, landowners are entitled to an annual rental fee for their land. This is 
considerably less money than royalties and less frequently paid. As a result, it is not as 
highly thematized in the landowner imagination. In fact, this payment is referred to by 
landowners as monge muni (literally: frog money) and the popular conception is that this 
money is paid to them for the disappearance of wildlife from their areas as a result of 
mining. In the case of annual rental fees as well as compensation payments, the key thing 
to note is that being ‘Ipili’ is a result of residence rather than descent – the opposite of 
what we see at the government station.
Employment
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Employment in the mine is highly sought after in Porgera. Jobs are rare in Papua 
New Guinea, the mine pays well, and there are often benefits associated with it such as 
durable, high-prestige free clothing in the form of mine uniforms and boots. It also has 
the potential to lead-on to further employment. However, there are not many openings at 
the mine. Furthermore, given the nature of the highly mechanized mining that goes on in 
Porgera, many applicants are not fully qualified for technical positions inside the plant 
itself. As a result, competition for jobs is fierce.
The Porgera agreements have obliged the mine to hire according to a strict 
standard. Given equal skills, Ipili are hired preferentially over Engans, Engans over 
Papua New Guinean nationals, and Papua New Guinean nationals over expatriates. The 
mine in turn seeks to demonstrate its compliance and standing as a good neighbor to the 
valley by hiring as many local Porgerans as possible. Doing so is also in the mine’s best 
interests. First, doing so is cheaper as they do not require housing. Second, local hires 
increase the percentage of national hires and thus decrease the mine’s costs of adhering to 
the Fly-in-Fly-Out agreement which requires it to maximize local hires. Finally, local 
employment is seen by the mine as a social benefit and can be portrayed as part of its 
‘positive social impact’ and commitment to ‘sustainability’ and positive outcomes for all 
stakeholders in the mine. Employment in Porgera thus offers a situation in which 
someone who is vetted as Ipili has a distinct advantage and in which the mine has an 
interest in increasing.
How, then, is this identity vetted? The mine has a long-standing policy of refusing 
to engage in the business of identifying landowners. All such identifications, they insist, 
must come from within the community. This minimizes entanglements in landowner 
politics and presents the mine as an institution concerned with supporting the autonomy 
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and self-determination of indigenous peoples. The result, on paper, is a system that works 
on something like the following principle: inhabitants of areas within the Special Mining 
Lease – in my case Apalaka – appoint by popular acclamation a member of the ‘hiring 
committee.’ They then bring this decision to the mine, which grants that member a small 
stipend. In return, he is responsible for distributing employment forms to people within 
his area and vetting them to the mine by – I believe – including a statement of his 
recognition of them with the completed application. The system thus applies a choke 
point to the interpretation of identity in Porgera. A single local gate-keeper simplifies the 
process by which the identity of a person as agreed to by the consensus of their 
consociates is vetted by a single person.
It is quite difficult for a community to remove a member of the hiring committee. 
Convincing the mine of a community’s change of heart requires a fair amount of 
persuasion. Even more difficult, in requires the consensus of the local community as to 
what course of action to take – something rarely achieved in Ipili social life. Finally, it 
takes overcoming the active opposition of the current office holder, who is by virtue of 
that fact (and also probably for other reasons as well) able to exert at least some influence 
in the community.
The structural situation of a member of the hiring committee is a plush one. Their 
sinecure nets them a small income which requires no work in return. In addition, their 
position is ripe for exploitation. In the case of Apalaka (and, by hearsay, elsewhere in the 
valley) people seeking employment in the mine have to purchase the application forms 
from their local committeeman simply to fill them out, and pay him again to submit them 
to the mine. Obtaining the consent of one’s local committeeman and their action to push 
your application through meant the expenditure of more money or, more likely, the 
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creation of some sort of relationship through which they would both plan to benefit in the 
future. The situation is structured, in other words, to provide members of the hiring 
committee many reasons not to be honest, and to put them in yet another situation of 
‘rentier leadership’ where they become more powerful than other residents.
What sort of incentive scheme exists for Tuandans and Waiwandans to work for 
the mine? Technically they are the people who the mine most seeks to employ, they are 
also least likely to apply. Not only are less educated than Engans on the whole (given the 
short history of formal education in the valley), but they have little reason to seek work. 
The hours are long and while wages are welcome, most Special Mining Lease 
landowners can rely on revenue streams based on their status as landlords. In addition, 
other sources of income are available. Being compensated for damaged ground, for 
instance, or successfully bringing legal action against the mine. Finally, as far as Ipili are 
concerned, the whole point of having the mine in the first place is that they won’t have to 
work at all. This while jobs are desireable, the costs to acquire them and the amount of 
work performed at them combine with Ipili concerns to escape from the wealth-work 
equation to make employment more appetizing to outsiders than to landowners 
themselves. 
The result of all of these states of affairs is thus a radical disjuncture between the 
state of local employment as documented in internal mine reports and the status of the 
inhabitants of Apalaka. Mine documents provided to me by an anonymous source report 
the number of people in Porgera employed by the mine whose point of hire is Apalaka. 
The claims did not, to put it diplomatically, mesh with my intuitions regarding 
employment in Apalaka. I then took the list to someone qualified to examine it and 
remark on its accuracy. He was a close friend of mine who was both a long-time resident 
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of Apalaka (although wana to the village) and thus eligible to speak to individual’s 
biographies in the community and a long-time employee of the Porgera gold mine. He 
began work during the construction of the mine, and during my time in the field he 
received his ten year service watch.
The results of our working through the list indicated that there was one ‘true’ 
Apalakan – one person with a family which had lived in Apalaka for some time – on the 
list: him. It was true that there were exceptions – another Tuanda who was tene to 
Apalaka had been suspended for misbehavior and did not appear on the list but would 
probably work there again in the future. Another well-known local mine employee also 
lived in Waiwanda, but he was a Huli man who had married into a Waiwa family. Other 
Tuanda and Waiwa had been employed in the mine – shortly after I did this study a 
Waiwa man was hired as a security guard – but very few stayed with the company very 
long. Lack of familiarity with industrial discipline, access to other revenues, and the 
strong temptation to steal from the mine meant that people tended not to be employed 
with it for very long.
Who did appear, then, on the list of names? There was one strong trend – Engans 
and (less frequently) Huli who had moved to Apalaka, befriended local people, and 
managed to get work at the company. After getting work, they inevitably moved out 
again – frequently to the Government station, where they lived, often with communities 
of fellow clansman.
In sum, there was a strong disjuncture between the state of affairs represented on 
paper inside the mine and the situation in Apalaka that it purported to represent. The 
structures in place worked to mitigate both the hiring of Apalakans as well as accurate 
representation of the true origin of the work force hired as Apalakans. Being a ‘real 
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landowners’ in this case is focused on residence – ‘point of hire’ – rather than descent. 
The way the mine structured its hiring committee – although in theory a noble attempt to 
‘allow the Ipili to determine for themselves’ who true Ipili are -- merely provided an 
incentive for local people to use this as a mechanism to accumulate power and money for 
themselves.
Conclusion
In this chapter I have examined life in Porgera and how ‘being Ipili’  can mean 
very different things in different contexts. Overall, I have attempted not to contrast one or 
more of these arenas as ‘accurate’ and the others as ‘inaccurate.’ Instead, I have 
attempted to make an argument about how narratives of identity and kinship are told and 
retold as their institutional contexts changes. ‘Landowners’ exist in Porgera today as a 
group whose existence has been elicited by Porgera’s wider institutional context, despite 
the belief of people that there is such a native category. Ipili social organization’s 
emphasis on affiliation via residence does not map well to the descent-based criteria the 
mine and government think that they use. In fact, as we have seen, the standards used by 
the mine and government to subsuming individual people under the title of ‘landowner’ 
are themselves incoherent for reasons other than Ipili ‘corruption.’
To a certain extent, this is not often noticed in the valley, or particularly minded. 
The unruliness of institutions such as preferential hiring, royalty payments, and standards 
for receiving relocation housing demonstrate that ‘landowner’ identity is only tenuously 
related to how life is lived in the village, however much this may be the idiom in which 
the delivery of these benefits may be articulated. For those at a remove from the valley, 
however, these identities often harden into stereotypical form in a way that has serious 
implications. We shall pursue these implications in the final chapter of this dissertation, 
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in which we examine what happens when these narratives of landowner identity circulate 
outside of the valley to the metropole -- Papua New Guinea’s capital, Port Moresby.
CHAPTER SIX
CONCLUSION: POLICY AND AMBIGUITY
This unceasing renewal, this inventive assuredness that guarantees success wherever it is 
applied, this scorn for the beaten track, bring about ever new improvisations which 
infallibly lead to dazzling results – to get any idea of them, our times had to await the 
exceptional destiny of a Picasso. With this difference, however: that the daring feats of a 
single man, which have been taking our breath away for the past thirty years, were 
already known and practiced by a whole indigenous culture for one hundred and fifty 
years or longer.
 – Claude Levi-Strauss, Way of the Masks
In 1996 the Porgera Social Monitoring Program – an in-house report written for 
the Porgera Joint Venture as part of its attempts to be a good neighbor to the valley – 
noted many things with alarm. The breakdown of law and order, inequality in the 
distribution of money within the valley, the shortage of arable land within the Special 
Mining Lease, and  other factors were addressed. The first item covered in the report, 
however, was the government administration in Porgera. “The quality of government 
services in Porgera continued to decline in 1996,” noted the report (Banks and Bonnell 
1997:5). Even more glumly, it pointed out that
It  is  hard  to  imagine  how  government  services  could  get  worse.  Not  only  was  there 
inadequate  funding for  the  designated  tasks  of  the  various  divisions,  but  budgeted  funds 
(including salaries) did not get to the district in a timely fashion and sometimes not at all. 
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Senior staff were continuously going to Wabag [the provincial capital] in an attempt to obtain 
budgeted funds. Transport was also a critical problem. At one point 6 of the 8 district vehicles 
were off the road and unserviceable. There was a lack of houses for staff for the existing 
positions and a lack of maintenance on houses which did exist. As if this were not enough 
there  were  no  typewriters,  computers,  fax  machines,  telephones...  even  paper  and  pens. 
(Banks and Bonnell 1997:5)
 But even more remarkable for the purposes of this chapter is that the exact status 
of Porgera as an administrative unit was itself unclear.
The interim arrangements for the new Organic Law on Provincial Governments and Local 
Level  Governments...  have  added  another  element  to  the  confusion.  This  centers  around 
Porgera’s status as a district. According to the OLPG&LLG Porgera is part of the Porgera 
Lagaip District. However most, if not all, Porgera public servants believe that Porgera is a 
separate  district.  It  is  possible  that  this  is  also  the  viewpoint  of  senior  Enga  District 
Administration staff. In early 1997 Enga Provincial Administration advertised a long list of 
positions for both Porgera District and Laiagam District. ( Banks and Bonnell 1997:5)
The report noted that “cynics would argue that since government services are so 
bad in Porgera it is hardly likely for them to get any worse if administered from 
Laiagam” (Banks and Bonnell 1997:5) but still insisted that “Porgera’s status as a District 
in Enga Province needs to be clarified” (Banks and Bonnell 1997:5). This issue was still 
in the air in 1998 at a meeting of the monitoring committee which I attended, where 
members were finally and definitively assured that Porgera was in fact a separate district 
from Laiagam.
This absence of definitive information about one of the most basic facts regarding 
Porgera’s place in Papua New Guinea’s government is indicative of two facts that are 
central to the concerns of this final chapter of the dissertation. First, the inability to 
delineate Porgera’s political boundaries indicates the haphazard and tenuous grip the 
cosmopolitan elite in Port Moresby has on Porgera’s local realities. Second, this inability 
of the government to provide district boundaries indicates the extent to which the 
government itself was a tenuous and haphazard phenomenon.
The third chapter of this dissertation discussed the history of representations of 
‘the Ipili’. In the last section of chapter five, I discussed the way that the Ipili living in 
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Porgera interface with representatives of distant organizations. In this chapter I step back 
from the immediate context of government representation in Porgera and examine the 
larger issue of how ‘the Ipili’ are perceived in places outside of the valley, and in 
particular how they are perceived by the national elite who dwell, more or less, in Port 
Moresby. In this chapter I also want to approach the circulation of knowledge of land 
owners in a slightly different way. In the second chapter I focused mostly on the means 
by which information in the valley flowed outside of it to people in Port Moresby. In this 
chapter, I expand my scope beyond Porgera and examine not just the way ‘the Ipili’ are 
imagined in the metropole, but the way in which this imagining is part of a larger way of 
understanding land owners and land ownership across the country. I will argue that there 
is a fundamental contradiction between how local people cope with resource 
developments and how the national elite think they cope – or at least, how these elites 
imagine how they ought to cope with resource development. Ipili and other land owning 
groups are themselves innovative in their relations with the mine and readily cope in 
novel ways with new circumstances. In distinction to this, metropolitans and the policies 
they make are fixated on a view of land owners as timeless and unchanging and see the 
act of registering the ‘true customary landowners’ as simply one translating coherent 
agreements on the ground into legal policy and property regimes. Getting, as it were, the 
‘state simplifications’ right. 
The attempts of national elites to discover ‘the true landowners,’ I will argue, has 
gone remarkably awry in a very enlightening way. It rests on a sort of optical metaphor 
by which their task as representatives of institutions is simply to accurately discern the 
‘local’ state of affairs in areas where resource development will occur. In doing so, they 
imagine themselves to be the conduits through which global and national currents of 
371
finance and power flow. As such they are separate and distinct from the ‘local’ 
communities that they observe. But in fact this is hardly the case. Indeed, it is the 
semiotic bad faith of national elites – their tendency to see themselves as observers, 
rather than participants, in the formulation of indigenous identity – that allows them to 
imagine themselves as separate from the ‘local scene’ at mines and hence as ‘global’ 
agents, personators of big actors. They imagine themselves at a remove, observing local 
politics, when in fact local politics consists of nothing else but the activity elicited by 
their observation.
Here I argue that, pace the government of Papua New Guinea, the process of land 
registration is not a simple exercise of ‘translating’ a set rights out of an indigenous 
context and into a western legal framework. Landowners are not merely identified, they 
are elicited. Identifying landowners and registering land includes a moment of novelty or 
newness inherent in the translation process itself. And while a ‘translation’ view of land 
registration sees this ‘contamination’ or ‘corruption’ of ‘authentic’ Papua New Guinean 
culture as pathological, I argue that this moment of novelty and innovation provides an 
opportunity to develop institutions that are more capable of bearing the stress and strain 
that a mine puts on life in the place where it is located. Thus I argue for the value of 
novelty in the registration process and the ambiguity of ‘customary’ land regimes.
Specifically, I set forth the modest proposal that in many areas of the country, 
Papua New Guineans deal with land in a way that is characterized by a lack of clear cut 
claim to land, regardless of how widely or narrowly you seek to understand this term. In 
these areas – and they include those where most of the mining and hydrocarbon 
developments are located – myths about land, precedents for its disposal and transfer, 
systems of kinship, leadership, and public speech (all of which we might gloss as 
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something like ‘custom’) do not operate to create “a system of social control operated in 
accordance with norms of disinterestedness and predictability” (Posner 1995:20) 
(something that we can gloss more or less as ‘the rule of law’). In other words, it is just as 
well that land registration involves a moment of novelty since even if it did not, Papua 
New Guinean ways of dealing ‘who’ owned ‘what’ land would be insufficient to provide 
the security and clarity of tenure necessary to keep resource developments open and 
functioning. The cultural patrimony of Papua New Guinean societies, I argue, is not an 
unchanged and unchangeable body of ideas which unproblematically regiments local 
society in accordance with its ‘custom’. On the contrary, I argue that it is a set of tools or 
instruments or tropes which are deployed in the ongoing generation of indigenous 
lifeworlds. This generation is creative. In a world where community itself is an 
achievement rather than something taken-for-granted, who owns which land may reflect 
the need to integrate the community, and the best way to do that may be to keep land 
disputes alive rather than settling on a final answer regarding who owns what.
In sum, novelty in the land registration process is not only inevitable, it might not 
necessarily be such a bad thing. In what follows, I claim that a stable social context for 
resource development doe not necessarily follow from the accurate act of translation of 
the content of land beliefs. In fact, I argue that it is difficult, if not impossible, exactly to 
translate the content of indigenous beliefs about land. I argue that there is always an 
element of creativity in translation and that this fact does not make translation 
illegitimate, bad, or corrupt. Recognition of this fact, I argue, is not only very 
Melanesian, it is also very modern. I thus argue that the strength of the social contexts of 
resource developments is best based on the method and control of processes of 
translation, and not on the adequacy or accuracy of translating some sort of coherent 
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contents about land beliefs.
The goal in this chapter is thus to present a picture of policy making in Papua 
New Guinea itself, rather merely in Porgera. By presenting this picture, I hope to move 
away from a hypostasized view in which local actors and ‘locality’ are seen as something 
constructed while ‘globalization’ and ‘the nation’ are presented in analysis as 
unproblematically big actors.
Registering Land and Landowners in Papua New Guinea
One of the most common topics of discussion when addressing the economic 
aspects of globalization are neoliberal economic policies, and particularly the ‘structural 
adjustments’ imposed by International Financial Organizations (IFOs) on Southern 
countries as a condition for receiving loans and other forms of aid. Across the globe, it is 
argued, many indigenous and traditional peoples face the privatization of land that was 
formerly held as a common resource.
Given this fact it is hardly surprising to see these sorts of calls being made in the 
Pacific. Authors such as Helen Hughes, for instance, have argued that “communal 
landownership has held back indigenous entrepreneurship in the Pacific as it has 
elsewhere in the world” (Hughes 2003:11) and insisted that “clan loyalty, admirable in 
traditional societies, is inappropriate for a high-income modern society” (Hughes 
2003:12).  From this one might suspect that the biggest problem in contemporary Papua 
New Guinea is the threat neoliberal economic models pose to traditional land rights. In 
fact this is not the case.
The politics of representing indigenous interests and the construal of ‘the local’ 
has been a source of considerable interest in the past fifteen years. In South America, new 
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and uneasy coalitions of allies have formed relationships with indigenous people seeking 
to increase their political autonomy (da Cunha 2000; Conklin and Graham 1995). In 
Indonesia, presentations of authentic indigenous status are contested (Li 2001, Tsing 
1999), and in Australia several scholars have examined the way that settler governments 
demand that aboriginal people perform their aboriginality in a particular way (Povinelli 
2002, Merlan 1998, Weiner 2003). In general, ‘locality’ and its construction has been 
examined in several, more theoretical works (Appadurai 1996, Gupta and Ferguson 
1997a, Gupta and Ferguson 1997b). 
As the preceding analysis of Porgera suggests, Papua New Guinea as a whole 
differs from other countries in which indigenous people seek recognition. Not only does 
Papua New Guinea lack a settler population or dominant ethnic minority, it also lacks a 
highly organized and efficacious state. As a result, the situation is differently configured 
than in Indonesia, Latin America, or Australian. Even in comparison with former African 
colonies, Papua New Guinea’s situation is odd due to the extreme diversity of ethnic 
groups and lack of precolonial regional integration (beyond trade networks) such as 
existed in much Africa. Papua New Guinea’s enormous size vis-a-vis its other Pacific 
neighbors also makes it difficult to compare with other states in the region. Problems of 
land law and land registration in Papua New Guinea have been dealt with in great deal 
elsewhere (Sack 1974; Rynkiewich 2001; Larmour 1991; Curtin, Holzknecht, and 
Larmour 2003). Here I will focus briefly on the general configuration of land registration 
in Papua New Guinea and its relation to resource development.
While the future country of Papua New Guinea was annexed by imperial powers 
in 1884, the height of the Scramble for Africa (Pakenham 1991), this action was not 
proceeded by a long history of trading and missionization in the region as was the case in 
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Africa. From the beginning, policy regarding native land tenure was paternalistic and 
protective. There were several reasons for this. The zeitgeist of the late 19th  century 
tended towards paternalism, particularly in Australia, where the colonization of Papua 
New Guinea was seen by many as a chance to make up for the mistakes they had 
previously made in their treatment of aboriginal Australians (Nelson 1989:21-22). Settler 
and other whites did not seek to exploit the land, and so clashes with locals and 
immigrants along a frontier (as in, for instance, North America) there were no clashes 
between them and locals. And finally, the colonial administration of Papua New Guinea 
suffered from, as we might now say, a lack of ‘capacity’ – they simply lacked the ability 
to enforce any more than the most cursory of laws in areas outside of Port Moresby 
proper. Historically, then, Papua New Guinea has not been subject to enclosures, 
privatization, or land seizure by settlers. It is not and never has been a place where 
Hughes’s intellectual predecessors have ever formulated policy.
As mentioned in chapter one, mining and hydrocarbon resources are central to 
Papua Ne w Guinea’s fiscal stability. Papua New Guinea’s independence in 1975 was 
originally bankrolled by royalties and other revenues from the Bougainville copper mine. 
The next twenty years of independence, and particularly the late 1980s, after 
Bougainville ceased production, saw the creation of other mining and hydrocarbon 
projects and by the time of my fieldwork seven were active: Ok Tedi (gold and copper, 
1985), Misima (gold, 1987), Porgera (gold, 1988), and Hides (1988),  Gobe and Kutubu 
(a single operation spread across two leases, 1990), Tolukuma (gold, 1993), and Lihir 
(1995). Revenue from these mines was meant to be help spur development in Papua New 
Guinea (for more on the history of mining in Papua New Guinea see Nelson 1976). 
However, many of these projects have led to problems. In fact, one of the biggest 
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problems facing the mining industry in Papua New Guinea today is ‘landowner 
problems’ – the disruptive actions of locals who are protesting not the presence of the 
mine, but the size of their slice of the action.  Professional ‘landowners’ live permanently 
in hotels in Port Moresby, pushing their claims and their identities to anybody who will 
listen. The minister of mining makes unofficial visits to cities only to be met as he steps 
off the airplane by ‘landowners’. On one occasion, he woke up one morning to find a 
letter on government letterhead committing the state to certain concessions to landowners 
sitting on his desk awaiting only his signature! In sum, the situation we examined in 
Porgera of agentive and proactive landowners seems to be widespread. On the one hand, 
we have seen in Porgera that landowners are ‘hot’ and not ‘cold’ -- that it is they, rather 
than the mine which tends toward innovation and disruption. Hughes’s account, on the 
other hand, is a familiar appraisal of indigenous people being ‘cold.’ Their inflexibility 
and adherence to tradition prevents development by reigning entrepreneurial impulses 
within the structure of a static and traditional society. As the scope of this dissertation 
expands beyond Porgera, we must examine how well the model I have developed for one 
resource organization applies to another.
Finding True Land Owners – the View from Port Moresby
As Geoff White has pointed out, countries in postcolonial Melanesia often draw 
on the same essentialized view of their ‘culture’ as part of their nation-building project 
that their colonial rulers created in order to justify imperialism (White 2001). In the case 
of Papua New Guinea, Australian images of ‘lost Papua’ or ‘islands out of time’ served to 
reassure Australians that ‘culture in Papua New Guinea’ was still intact, and hence 
suitable for a conscience-salving exercise in benevolent preservation designed to make up 
for the ‘extermination’ of aboriginal peoples who were, presumably, on their way out. 
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This view of “inflexible tradition,” as Errington and Gewertz call it (1995) is widespread 
in Melanesia today, and as both they and White (2001) point out, ‘timeless tradition’ can 
easily be equated with ‘savagery’ or ‘underdevelopment’ when judged negatively. This is 
in fact what appears to have occurred in the case of Hughes, who sees the inflexible 
tradition of customary land tenure to be inefficient and uneconomical
In contemporary Papua New Guinea itself, however, the moral valence on 
traditional culture has been reversed. Contemporary Papua New Guinean views of 
traditional culture are deeply romantic. Old ways of life are valorized against the 
corrosive forces of modernity, with the exception being Christianity, which is eagerly 
embraced as being in tune with valued ‘traditional’ practices of reciprocity and, as it 
were, agape for one’s wantoks. This nostalgia for ‘the village’ is everywhere in Papua 
New Guinea, ranging from idealized images of extended families in television 
commercials (Foster 2002) to the Papua New Guinea music video, where adorned 
dancers performing heritage dances from the musician’s home village are almost 
mandatory. This sense of the lost innocence of rural life is reinforced in urban areas, 
where Papua New Guinea’s thin middle class grows up with the experience of urban 
violence and crime, and without the experience of drudgery and claustrophobia that can 
sometimes accompany village life.
This wider tendency to celebrate rather than denigrate ‘traditional culture’ has 
serious impacts for law and policy surrounding land tenure and mining in Papua New 
Guinea. In Port Moresby, the national and expatriate elite agree that Papua New 
Guineans have a ‘traditional culture,’ that it is an appropriate basis for land registration, 
and that it is ancient, unchanging, benign, and stationary. John Burton calls this the 
‘Melanesian paradigm’:
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It is the dominant national ideology in modern Papua New Guinea that its village 
societies include (a) a division of people into clans based on descent from an ancestral 
founder, (b) exclusively owned clan territories, and (c) ‘true’ leaders who capture the 
consensus of their community. This is notably seen in the ideological formation of people 
known as ‘landowners’ who have rights to certain things, usually in heroic opposition to 
some other groups or institutions of government (Burton 1996:1) 
Michael Rynkiewich sketches out a similar viewpoint in an article criticizing in 
the “myths we live by” in Papua New Guinea. Among them is the story that “the 
landowners have held this land since time immemorial; and the landowners hold their 
land communally in clans; therefore, we just need to discover who the real landowners 
are and register the clans as a land holding group” (Rynkiewich 2001:62). Years earlier, 
in an influential article on mining and social disintegration on Bougainville, Filer also 
attacked this “myth of Melanesian communism”(Filer 1990: 9) making a similar 
argument. The result is a set of policies that are if anything the inversion of neoliberal 
privatization models. 
My own fieldwork confirmed this. Consider, for instance, two conferences I 
attended while away from Porgera. The first was the Seventh Annual Biennial 
Community Affairs Conference held in Lae in 2001. Sponsored by the Papua New 
Guinea Chamber of Mining and Petroleum, the conference was an occasion where the 
community relations staff of different mines could meet and exchange information and 
ideas about how best to be the official interface between the company that they work for 
and the local people to whom they are paid to represent it. The second was a conference 
hosted at the University of Queensland by two anthropologists and a entitled “Customary 
Land Tenure and Land Registration in Australia and Papua New Guinea.” Because the 
conference was scheduled at the same time as the Australian Anthropological Meeting in 
Perth, the meeting was largely a Papua New Guinea affair and several prominent Papua 
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New Guineans, including the Secretary for Energy and Petroleum, flew in to attend.
At the Lae conference one Engan executive working for Chevron claimed that 
“PNG land is considered the mother land, the first motherland, the second is the human 
mother... land ownership, despite the mission influence, is woven into the fabric of 
society. It is in the blood of Papua New Guineans... their traditions are still intact, even 
after civilization.” In light of this, he proposed that the solution to landowner problems 
and land registration was “the Melanesian way of sitting and sharing and giving and 
talking” and that “we need to ask people to sit down, use their traditional Melanesian 
approach and decide what is best for the village.” Later on in this talk the same executive 
claimed that one pan-Melanesian universal was that all Papua New Guineans sought to be 
buried on their father’s ground. This assertion elicited a startled gasp from Martha 
Macintyre, an anthropologist who was present at the time, and whose long career 
studying classically matrilineal societies in Milne Bay and New Ireland had led her to 
hold a rather different view of the well-known mortuary rituals of those provinces. 
A similar sense of positively-valued inflexible nature of tradition held at the 
conference in Brisbane. There, another businessman insisted that “we’re talking about 
land rights that have been existing for years, even before the explorers came.” A man 
who considered himself one of the ‘true landowners’ of the Gobe gas project said that 
“they’ve [Melanesians] been living there forever… they know all of that land 
identification in their heart.” Yet another man said “In Melanesia, there is this 
cooperative sharing thing.” References to “customary sharing practices” and “the Papua 
New Guinea ethos” were also common.
This view is particularly prominent in the writing and policy work of one person 
at the Brisbane conferece, Anthony Powers. Powers is notable not only for being an 
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exemplary example of a ‘translation’ or ‘optical’ understanding of land registration, but 
also for being particularly instrumental in transforming that view into law and policy. As 
a former lecturer at the UPNG he has influenced many of the country’s elite. Later in his 
career he served as the First Assistant Secretary (Economic Affairs) for the East Sepik 
Provincial Government, during which time he undertook a precedent-setting land 
registration program (Power 1991, Weiner 20001b). In addition he has served as the 
Manager of Lands and Community Relations for Chevron Niugini and authored an 
important book on community relations (Power 2000). Most importantly, he was the 
motive force behind the new Petroleum act which states that all land registration 
surrounding hydrocarbon projects must be made using the Land Group Incorporation Act 
of 1974. For these reasons it is useful to pause for a moment and consider in depth 
Powers’s views of land registration.
As Power’s puts it, the Land Group Incorporation Act act was designed to 
recognize the fact that “landowners will not suddenly become well organized in a manner 
that equips them to relate to a multinational company and the provincial and national 
government” (2000: 136). To compensate, the act allows for the creation of Incorporated 
Land Groups which will be both modern organizations and agent of custom. The idea is 
essentially to have a management committee composed of ‘traditional elders’: 
Associations should have an executive committee based on traditional political grounds. The 
“Big-men” – leaders who are recognized by their group as having knowledge of the group’s 
history  and  are  given  the  authority  by  the  group to  speak  its  name –  should  be  on  the 
executive committees which should be constituted to represent a all major groupings in the 
project area…No pressure should ever be applied that would deny or fail to recognize the 
ethnic divisions that have existed for millennia.” (2000:138, emphasis in the original).
On his account, members of these groups have a clear and unambiguous 
understanding of traditional land ownership and its obligations: “PNG has 10,000 years 
of settled agricultural tradition and land management was and is an integral part of the 
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Papua New Guinea community management. People know who owns what land” (2000: 
136-137) and as a result “The Incorporated Land Group know their customary obligations 
and then should be encouraged to meet them in a customary manner” (2000: 140). As a 
result, “Incorporation of land groups provides a sound foundation based on custom for 
distribution of compensation payments, royalty payments, holding of shares in landowner 
companies and distributions of dividends, and membership in landowner associations. 
From the developer’s point of view the ILG Management Committees provide the 
authentic leaders with the power to make binding decisions” (2000: 138).
Proponents of this translation theory of land registration such as Powers must face 
one major fact – despite what they expect, attempts to register land in Papua New Guinea 
have proved extremely problematic. In fact in Porgera (and, as we shall see, in other 
places around the country) landowners did in fact “become well organized in a manner 
that equips them to relate to a multinational company and the provincial and national 
government.” Despite presumptions of the transparency of social structure, universal 
knowledge of land boundaries, and ancient rules of conflict resolution, landowners fight 
constantly over land in development areas. Translation theorists see the failure of the 
Melanesianist Paradigm not as a result of its inherent misunderstanding of land tenure in 
Papua New Guinea but due to ‘corrupt landowners.’ When confronted at the Brisbane 
conference with the fact that ILGs had to date been an enormous failure, Power replied 
that this was due not to the fact that the act was badly made or land tenure in Papua New 
Guinea was understood, but rather because of a failure of political will on the part of the 
government and the corruption of local people. 
On this account, the problem is not the concept of seamless translation itself, but 
rather that the job of translation has been botched – or, more frequently, interfered with. 
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Greedy landowners have been corrupted from their former pristine state into one of moral 
torpor because of the impact that money from mining projects has or could have on them. 
‘Corrupt landowners’ foul up the process of accurate translation by making untrue claims 
about traditional custom.
This was certainly true of the attendants of the first conference I attended. As the 
president of the chamber put it in his opening speech, “people issues are at the forefront 
of the mining and petroleum industries.” At issue, he claimed, were “community 
problems that could have been avoided” and that were caused by “so called 
‘landowners’” who ripped off the government. “The rip off is so blatant,” he said, “[that] 
it penetrates into the fabric of the government.” 
Other speakers were more blunt. “Community affairs issues will shut down this 
country,” said another Papua New Guinean executive. He claimed that landowners were 
“merely going in for greed and not land ownership” and compared the process of 
community affairs to fighting malaria. In a striking image in which landowners were 
equated simultaneously as both sufferers and vectors of the disease, he said that “like my 
malaria case, the proper medicine needs to be given to landowners.” Continuing, he 
linked resource developments to the development of the country, arguing that “if a lot of 
freedom is given to the landowners, then the landowners will continue to hold major 
developments at hostage in the guise of landownership and we will be going backwards.”
Thus we can see that while current thought on landowner registration represents 
an inverted form of Hughes’s neoliberalism, the basic dynamic of land registration here is 
similar to that described by Scott, who argues the complexity of local conditions escape 
the narrow point of view of these ‘state simplifications’. Unable to accurately assess the 
situation on the ground, the state’s large scale schemes collapse in disaster. A similar 
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argument for accurate discernment of local states of affairs can be found in Hernando de 
Soto’s The Mystery of Capitalism (2000), which circulated in Port Moresby when I was 
there. De Soto argues the failure of third world countries to ‘escape the bell jar’ of 
economic stagnation and partake of first world economic prosperity can be traced to the 
government’s inability to recognize people’s grass-roots economic activity and the 
‘extralegal social contracts’ they generate. While de Soto’s neoliberal approach is 
politically orthogonal to Powers’s and Scott’s left-populism and aligned more with 
Hughes, both Scott and De Soto share a similar vision: governmental dysfunction is the 
result of the state’s inability to accurately comprehend complex local conditions which, 
on the ground, function quite well. This view is typical not just Scott and de Soto, but of 
development discourses as well which, as Duffield has noted (2001: 82-85), espouse a 
‘Newtonian’ view in which “development discourse present[s] itself as a detached center 
of rationality and intelligence; it [is] a matter of analysis and judgment for the 
development professional” (2001:83). 
We have seen how these issues play out in Porgera – but how does Porgera’s case 
compare other resource developments in Papua New Guinea, and how do these in turn 
compare with elite expectations of traditional Papua New Guinea behavior?
Examples of Land Tenure Issues
A quick survey of some of the more prominent resource developments in Papua 
New Guinea will demonstrate that struggles over land registration are perfectly 
comprehensible in terms of the ambiguity and indeterminacy that characterizes Porgera. 
In some cases, ambiguity over land ownership is manifest even before the resource at 
issue is demonstrated to be feasible. In other cases, a feasible resource has not been 
developed because ‘the landowners’ themselves could not be made feasible. Even in 
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cases where mining and hydrocarbon projects proceed, we can see that that is less 
because of the accurate way in which translation has occurred and more because of the 
way in which people were willing to adopt themselves to the development.
Thus ‘landowner problems’ do not necessarily cripple a mine. Gerritson and 
MacIntyre pointed out in an early study of Misima that “land issues have continued to 
torment the mine... [and] the net of claimants was widening” in 1991 (1991:49). 
Nonetheless, Misima closed roughly fifteen years later because it was mined out, not 
because of feasibility-threatening instability from landowners. In fact, a consideration of 
the state of landowner issues across the mining and hydrocarbon industries reveals that 
the articulation of local social systems with government and industry is not simply a 
black-and-white dichotomy between ‘corrupted’ and ‘uncorrupted’ landowners, but a 
complex process with a variety of outcomes, ranging from shutting down mining (as at 
Bougainville) to actively creating social feasibility (as we shall see at Ramu). 
Anthropologists familiar with the areas where mining and hydrocarbon operations are 
located can explain this articulation far better than the translation theory. 
Kutubu
In the case of Kutubu is seems clear that the translation view is incorrect. 
Petroleum was discovered on the land adjacent to Lake Kutubu in 1986, and production 
began in 1992. In that same year, Thomas Ernst conducted a study of the Fasu for the 
new Kutubu Oil Field under an Incorporated Land Group regime that Chevron undertook 
at the direction of Anthony Power. At that time, Chevron has censused just under 1200 
Foi and had registered forty eight clans. These clans had genealogies of four generations 
– in other words, they reached back to the grandparents of the oldest living generation. 
Ernst reports that “seven (14 percent) have total populations of nine people or less,” and 
385
that variability ranged between three to sixty-five, with twenty-five being the average 
number. (Ernst 1995: 6). The result was thus, on the ground, something like a series of 
extended families which then became ‘Incorporated Land Groups’ based on the 
presupposition of outsiders that they must be ‘clans.’ From this and other data concerning 
residence and patronage patterns, Ernst concluded that “clans, even in combinations of 
four or five, do not form the basis for stable patterns of local organization – that is, in 
terms of the composition of settlements – and cannot in themselves map people onto land 
– that is, in matters to do with territory – in an unproblematic fashion (Ernst 1995:7). 
Thus while “Land is owned... by the clans, aporo,” it is used in shared communities and 
“use and ownership are not in all cases easy to distinguish, especially after long-term 
usage.”
This meshes will with Langlas’s account of the neighboring (and culturally almost 
identical) Foi. Langlas recounts that although most activities are “conceived by Foi as 
patterned by relations of agnatic clanship” in fact “it is better... to describe these activities 
in terms of ego-focused recruitment than in terms of bounded patrilineal groups.” Langlas 
even uses the term ‘patron’ and ‘patronage’ that were so central to Burton’s analysis of 
rentier leadership described in chapter four. In sum, Lanlas points out that “Foi ‘descent’ 
categories are not, in fact, bounded social groups” (1974:260). James Weiner, who has a 
long involvement at Kutubu as both a researcher and consultant, has also argued at length 
that “the Land Group Incorporation Act  is based on a quite erroneous assumption of the 
communal nature of land-holding and transmission within the Melanesian ‘clan,’ and of 
its essentially ‘collective’ interest” (Weiner 2000:6). After discussing at length forms of 
Foi sociality he concludes that “what anthropologists such as... myself have described as 
the ‘givenness’ of connection and obligation in Papua New Guinea sociality has been 
386
mistaken by the architects of the Land Group Incorporation Act as evidence of 
communal, corporatist ownership and decision-making” (Weiner 2001b). Thus, as Sagir 
simply puts it, “The rationale of ILGs seems to go against these aspects of Foi and Fasu 
social organizations” (Sagir 2001:146).
It is, perhaps, not surprising then that legal wrangling within the landowning 
community at the Kutubu Oil Fields continues to paralyze the distribution of benefits to 
local people since, as Weiner writes, “the Incorporated Land Group is simply seen by the 
Foi as a strategic device whose primary purpose is primarily political-economic rather 
than one of customary land management per se” (Weiner 2001b:10). In 1992, 48 
Incorporated Land Groups were registered at Kutubu. In 1995 the number had increased 
to 60. In that year a renegotiation of royalty rates between the government and 
landowners led to dissatisfaction with the distribution of royalties within the landowner 
community. As a result, two opposed groups were formed, the Foe Association and the 
Foe Landowners’ Association. Attempts to gain political leverage led to the formulation 
of new Incorporated Land Groups by each group, and by 1997 there there 84. By 2000 
the number of Incorporated Land Groups submitted for approval to the government had 
overwhelmed the ability of land registrar to process them, and money meant for a 
Children’s Trust Fund meant to help landowner children was being used to pay off 
lawyers’ fees.
From the translation point of view, these developments are simply pathology, a 
corruption caused by the temptation of money which results in the destruction of an intact 
and inflexible traditional structure. Weiner, however, has argued exactly the opposite, 
that “these quarrels and departures and migrations are the visible form that the normal 
state of affairs [italics in original] takes in this part of the world. They are not aberrations 
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within the theoretically smooth functioning of a social organism, because there is no 
social organism as such” (Weiner 2001b:3).
Gobe
Problems of migration and warfare also plagued the nearby Gobe gas project, 
where four years of litigation were necessary before some sort of stable land ownership 
regime was established. Like many areas of the ‘mountain Papua’ (Weiner ed. 1988) 
region that fell between the coastal lowlands and the central highlands, the area covered 
by the Gobe Petroleum development lease has witnessed a complex history. At far as we 
know, the original area was inhabited by a group now called the ‘Polopa.’ Over time, 
aggressive immigrants from highly-populated highland areas around Mendi moved south 
into the Gobe area, displacing the Polopa. These newly arrived groups then ended up 
fighting amongst themselves, and some recruited Polopa as allies in the hostilities that 
followed, keeping their barely disguised disgust for them in check. Afterwards, in reward 
for their help, the Polopa who helped were given land – which was originally their own, 
remember – to live on (Marco 2000). 
It was on this land that Gobe’s petroleum was discovered in 1991. However, 
while the resource was declared feasible in 1992, the social context for mining was not 
sufficiently stable until 1998 for production to begin. In the years after the discovery of 
petroleum wrangling between various factions continued until a Land Titles Commission 
hearing occurred in 1996 which produced a definitive conclusion on behalf of one of the 
parties regarding who were truly the inhabitants of that land. It was on this understanding 
that construction and production at Gobe took place in1998. Shortly thereafter, land 
disputes continued and operations were interfered with several times. Finally, when the 
airstrip into the area was closed by landowners, a second Land Titles Commission 
388
hearing was held and a new arrangement reached. Work continues at Gobe as community 
affairs staff there continues to juggle landowner issues.
It should not be surprising that dispute resolution has proved so difficult in this 
area. D.J.J. Brown, who conducted fieldwork in this area in the early 1970s, has 
suggested that even the flexible “bilateral networks of [J.A.] Barnes, generated by 
individual choices of affines and patri- or matrifiliatory allegiance” fail to capture the 
essence of Polopa kinship and affinity (Brown 1980). Instead, he has argued that Polopa 
sociality is structured by ‘asymmetric connubia’ – a flow of women between male 
networks that is part of the larger, agonistic system of prestations and violence which 
characterize people in this area of the world (Brown 1979). Thus the disputes that 
occurred when Gobe was being developed were not an aberration caused by ‘corrupt 
landowners’ but part and parcel of Polopa life. Brown rights that “the very language of 
dispute settlement, I came to believe, was inappropriate” because “disputes are not 
disruptive of the social life of the Polopa... but the very stuff of it.  (Brown 1989:18). As 
a result “it is notoriously difficult to identify ‘mechanisms’ for settling disputes in the 
area: for the simple reason, to my mind, that the attempt is misconceived in the first 
place. They do not want to settle anything” (Brown 1989:18; for Brown’s memoir of 
conducting fieldwork in this area, see Brown 1973).
Hides
A similar situation arose at the Hides Gas Plant in Southern Highland province. 
Hides provides another example of the ways in which local peoples have reacted with 
alacrity to changing circumstances. Here we see again a situation were resolution of land 
disputes is less one of successful identification of ‘real land owners’ and more an ongoing 
management of disagreements over the ownership of land which is successful enough to 
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continue to allow the plant to operate and to create a feasible social context for it.
British Petroleum discovered natural gas in the Hides site (named after the former 
explorer Jack Hides) in 1987 and two years later the Porgera Joint Venture committed to 
using electricity generated at Hides to power the Porgera gold mine, a feat which required 
a line of guy-wired transmission towers up and out of the Tari basin and into the adjacent 
Porgera valley. With a buyer now committed to purchasing power the Hides Joint 
Venture began construction, and a socio-economic impact report and land study followed 
at roughly the same time as Porgera’s. The Hides project resulted in “acrimonious debate 
over land ownership, compensation and benefit distribution,” which “led nowhere” (Filer, 
Henton, and Jackson 2000: 66). The primary disagreement – to make a long story short – 
occurred between two factions which had assumed the ethnonyms “Hiwa” and “Tugupa.” 
While the Tugupa claimed to be the original inhabitants of the land on which the project 
was located – and had genealogies and myths to back up their claims – the Hiwa were in 
fact that actual occupants, had been for some times, and were also able to muster 
genealogical proof of their long history of occupation.
 In March of 1990 a memorandum of understanding was signed in Goroka (in 
Eastern Highlands Province, away from the action of the Hides area itself) between a set 
of ‘landowners’ and the Hides Joint Venture, which then moved forward with its 
operations thinking it was on the way to settling landowner issues. However, litigation 
under the Land Dispute Settlement Act paralyzed the process again, and in August the 
national government – concerned that Porgera could not start on schedule until Hides was 
operational – summarily acquired the land necessary, issued a lease, and established trust 
accounts into which compensation payments could be made until the ‘true land owners’ 
were identified (Filer, Henton, and Jackson 2000: 66-67). In 1991 a Land Title 
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Commission was convened in which found in favor of the “Tugupa” faction. This 
decision was immediately appealed, and the two factions eventually settled out of court: 
in exchange for half of the royalty payments received by the Tugupa, the Hiwa would 
take no further action to jeopardize their claim to ownership (Weiner 2001b:4-5). Land 
owner dissatisfaction with Hides – and the state of things in Southern Highlands more 
generally – continues to make itself felt as late as a decade later, when local people 
disrupted the operation of the Porgera gold mine by felling transmission towers located 
on their land to gain attention and concessions from the Porgera Joint Venture.
Why all this wrangling? These difficulties are not surprising when one is familiar 
with the ethnography of this area. The social organization of the Huli who are hosts to the 
project is well known in the literature for having a particularly complex system of 
residence and descent. While anthropologists differ as to whether Huli kinship can be 
classified as ‘cognatic’ (Glasse 1968) or some form of weak patrilineal secession 
(Goldman 1983, Ballard 1995), all would agree that Huli maintain multiple ties to 
multiple pieces of territory and often practice multilocal residence. Studying Huli 
residence, as Allen has remarked, is something that ethnographers do “at their own peril” 
(Allen 1995). Huli have long proved intractable when it comes to even the most basic of 
census data. During the colonial period, Allen recounts, 
The government and the Huli... eventually came to an understanding about censusing. The 
Huli had learned that when a census was called, they should appear at only one of up to fifty 
census points... that had been set up by the government, preferably the one at which they had 
first been censused. Even if they had changed their residence, they should trudge back to that 
original  census  point  to  be  counted  when  a  new  census  was  called.  For  their  part  the 
government officers had stopped asking questions about residence. (Allen 1995:150)
This complex pattern of residence – clearly different from the static patterns 
suggested by the translation view – has long interacted with traditional patterns of 
conflict. In the case of resource developments such as Hides, Laurence Goldman has 
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argued that Incorporated Land Groups have “been colonized by Huli custom” and have 
been transformed into “new forums for pursuing politico-economic strategies” (Goldman 
2003:9).  Thus conflict regarding land ownership does not mark the disintegration of an 
Edenic, conflict-free Huli lifestyle, but rather the continuation, in another arena, of a 
jockeying for power and position that is part and parcel of Huli culture.
Mt. Kare
The adventures in Huli amorphism that occurred during the creation of the 
Porgera mine and the Hides gas plant continued at Mt. Kare prospect. Located in the 
high, uninhabited mountain ranges between the Tari basin and Paiela, Mt. Kare was 
originally a CRA prospect. In late 1987, Ipili and Huli men employed by CRA discovered 
a rich patch of colluvial gold within the prospecting lease. Over Christmas, as the 
European geologists returned home for Christmas, a massive gold rush was occurred in 
Mt. Kare, resulting in roughly 8,000 people flooding into the area and literally hundreds 
of millions of US dollars worth of gold coming out (Ryan 1991, Vail 1995). By March 
CRA had established a base camp at Kare and conducted a land investigation report 
showing 196 land owners (Vail 1995: 368) – not surprising since this land was too high 
to be settled or to grow food crops or even for hunting and pandanus cultivation. By 
November 1988, fights between groups working gold had spread to the CRA basecamp, 
which was breached and used as a defensive position for one faction of alluvial miners. A 
shaky joint venture was put together between CRA and the now 60 ‘subclans’ who were 
said to be the true landowners of the Mt. Kare prospect. Work continued on identifying 
landowners, and examining the possibilities of large scale mining. In August of 1991 
CRA’s prospecting license lapsed and legal challenges contesting the fact that it was 
renewed were brought by a faction of the ‘Mt. Kare Land Owners’ with the backing of 
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another mining company, which planned to replace CRA. Legal actions were pending 
when people living at Kare decided to take action directly in January 1992. The camp of 
the CRA joint venture was raided with damages totaling roughly K1,000,000.  This 
happened again in March and CRA pulled out of its lease and suspended operations in 
Papua New Guinea. The anti-CRA landowners quickly split into three factions and found 
corporate backers, each of whom applied for the newly-vacant prospecting authority. 
Over the next six years or so legal and military wrangling at Mt. Kare forced various 
corporate groups out of the market until only one was left, but it was so underfunded and 
the situation in Kare so volatile that it maintained nothing more than a token presence at 
the valley in order to ensure its continued holding of the prospecting authority as it tried 
to wait for better times. By 1999, when I arrived in Porgera for my fieldwork, 
development of the resource had stopped, all the easy gold from the Kare fields had been 
won, and the government land report had identified over 40,000 ‘true landowners’ for a 
patch of a high-mountain pass that was previously uninhabited. Kare had become, as 
Colin Filer put it, “the mine that got away” (1998:161).
Lihir
At Lihir in New Ireland, twenty years of company operations have been 
predicated on a ‘clan-system’ which has allowed the creation of a large and profitable 
gold mine which matches Porgera in size and profitability. However, as Macintyre and 
Foale point out, this clan-system is something that developed alongside mining, rather 
than existing before it. At Lihir, they claim, “arguments about customary rights to land, 
the nature of these rights over distinct areas of land and the definitions of the group 
claiming rights appear only to have gained legitimacy in the context of an externally 
imposed legal system” (Macintyre and Foale 2005:4). As they point out, as early as 1989 
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Filer and Jackson had in their social impact study argued that it was “a mistake to think 
of customary land rights in Lihir as things which are literally parcelled out between a 
number of corporate bodies called ‘clans’” (in Macintyre and Foale 2005:7). Instead, 
there was a complex relationship between matrilineages around which much of social life 
was reproduced and a highly optative system of residence. Thus while there were some 
sort of notionally corporate groups and some sense of there being bounded pieces of 
territory on the island, “the areas were loosely defined and so were the clans” (Macintyre 
and Foale 2005:7). This did not stop the mine from using a clan-based system. In fact, it 
appears that there are several such systems at work on Lihir:
Every anthropologist who has attempted to describe the ‘clan system’ on Lihir has been faced 
with conundrums. Filer and Jackson set down four versions of the clan system and in 1992 
decided  on  another.  The  description  of  the  ‘clan  system’  that  appeared  to  be  generally 
accepted  by  Lihirian  leaders  in  1994-95  is  different  from  that  which  is  given  in  2004 
(Macintyre and Foale 2005:15). 
Lihir, Like Porgera, is a place where prospecting took roughly a decade. Now, 
after ten years of operation, it appears that some sort of stable social context has been 
established. But, as Macintyre and Foale emphasize, this has not been due to the accurate 
recognition of authentic indigenous kinship. Rather, it seems that the lengthy period of 
exploration that occurred on the island allowed the crystallization of a system of 
‘essentialized tenure’ (Foale and Macintyre 2000) which would bear the burden of social 
change brought about by mining. Feasibility, in other words, was achieved, but not  
because of an accurate process of translation of an indigenous regime of land tenure. On 
the contrary, Lihirians appear to have been willing to innovate their own traditions, 
sometimes in extreme ways. As Filer remembers, “When I had occasion to ask a 
committee of Lihirians why they had included a Council of Chiefs within the structure of 
their Society Reform Program, when ‘we’ all knew that Lihir has no customary 
institution of hereditary chieftanship, they just said they were followng the ‘Fiji model’” 
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(Filer 1994:176-177, cf. White and Lindstrom 1998, May 2004).
Tolukuma
While Lihirians were enthusiastic about using a ‘Fijian’ model, Filer was 
disappointed to find that landowners of the land around the Tolukuma gold project were 
not, despite the fact that “Goilala custom, unlike that of Lihir, does contain hereditary 
chieftanship.” Nevertheless, the local people surrounding Tolukuma rejected the idea of 
gronding management of a resource development in traditional forms
on the grounds that chiefs do not have councils and are not responsible for managing the 
local social impact of things such as gold mines. Instead the Yulai chose to fabricate three 
‘clans’ for their community  -- where ‘clans’ were no more recognizable in Yulai custom 
than ‘chiefs’ in that of Lihir – and then proceeded to demand that each new ‘clan’ should 
play an equal part in the negotiation of ‘development’ and distribution of its economic 
benefits, despite the fact that many individuals were still unable to decide which ‘clan’ 
was theirs or how to make their choice of membership. (Filer 1994:177).
In the published version of his socio-economic impact assessment of the 
Tolukuma gold mine (originally conducted in 1993), Filer elaborates on the complex 
ways in which residence and descent work in these communities and the creation of 
Tolukuma’s three clan system came about. Rather than emphasize the primacy of 
descent, Filer points to residence as the key to sociality:
By far the most significant form of association amongst the people of the Auga valley... is 
that which is based upon a person’s place of residence... Although local people recognize the 
existence of lines (or lineages) whose members share descent from a common male ancestor 
(usually a grandfather or great-grandfather), they do not think that there is  any particular 
reason why male members of a single line should either live together or cooperate in any 
other way. Such cooperation does occur in practice but is understood as a matter of personal 
preference (Filer 1994:17).
Thus in 1994 Filer was reporting claims made in the Post-Courier that the 
‘Hameng clan’ who were the ‘rightful landowners’ of the Tolukuma field were not 
receiving their share of compensation from the mine. The spokesman for this group, Ajax 
Bia, was threatening to challenge the legitimacy of the agreement signed to lease land to 
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Dome Inc, Tolukuma’s developer. As it turns out, Bix was not himself from that area, but 
rather seeking to harness resentment about the mine for his own run for political office, 
and in doing so had partnered with Holim Aida, a man with aspirations to local leadership 
in the area surrounding the mine site. “There is little doubt,” writes Filer, “that the 
identity of the ‘Hameng Clan’ was initially forged from their mutual interaction” 
(1994:77). 
Returning to the Tolukuma area, Filer discovered  “evidence of a recent public 
meeting at which there had been general agreement to divide the community into three 
‘clans’ – Hameng, Yaulo, and Yangam – on the understanding that each would receive an 
equal share of the mineral royalties due to local landowners.” (Filer 1994:78) which 
resulted from the renegotiation that year of the original compensation agreement.” This 
agreement reflected the balance of power between Fabian Aia – the original signer – and 
an opponent from a similar clubhouse (similar to a men’s house). As a result, Filer wrote, 
“the division now being made between two ‘clans’ may seem to reflect the ancient 
opposition of these two clubhouses within Yaulo village” -- itself one group out of many.
Thus what occurred at Tolukuma certainly counts as ‘entification’ in Ernst’s sense 
(1999) but the question, as Eric Hirsch, an ethnographer of the Fuyuge people who live 
near the mine, is whether entification is ‘new.’ “Is the process new, as Ernst describes it,” 
he asks, “or rather, are the circumstances in which it occurs ‘new’ and striking?” (Hirsch 
2001:20). For Hirsch, familiar with the literature of this area, feels comfortable 
describing Fuyuge attempts to demonstrate their status as ‘landowners’ as indiciative of 
the fact that “entification is not a new development or emergent form in itself, but an 
intermittent local process whereby the persons present themselves as visible and 
powerful” (Hirsch 2001:20). Thus once again anthropologists would emphasize that elites 
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in Port Moresby should not be surprised is landowners use the opportunity of a gold mine 
to ‘present themselves as visible and powerful’ since this is in fact a recurrent feature of 
social life. The formation of Tolukuma’s ‘clan system’ should be understood in this light.
Frieda
While Lihir demonstrates the way that a ‘clan-system’ may become ascendant in 
areas where it never existed before, strategies to claim ‘landowner’ identity at the Frieda 
prospect – a mixed gold and copper resource – in Sandaun province demonstrates the 
way in which clan systems can be created in areas where migration, and warfare give the 
lie to anyone seeking stationary, conflict-free clans and where, in fact, no mine even yet 
exists.
In his excellent – indeed, seminal – paper on who and what is a landowner (2001), 
Jorgensen recounts various attempts to achieve ‘true landowner’ status by Telefol people 
concerned with Nenataman, the area where the Frieda prospect is located. Since the 
people of this area tend to organize themselves into endogamous cognatic stocks, there 
are no corporate groups suitable for categorization as ‘clans’ in the first place. This 
situation is only complicated by the political and military history of Nenataman itself. 
The area was originally inhabited by the Untou in the late nineteenth century, who found 
themselves on the loosing end of a war with Telefol-speaking Iligimin people. The 
Iligimin drove the Untou to the edge of extinction and began establishing settlements on 
their land, only to find themselves attacked by the Telefol proper. The Telefol in turn 
decimated the Iligimin, killing most of them and incorporating captives – typically 
women and children, but some men – into their own groups. The Telefol and their now-
incorporated Iligimin clients then proceeded to finish the work the Iligimin started and 
began raiding the Untou again. This, combined with disease and raids from the Miyanmin 
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further north, resulted in the extinction of the Untou. The adults were killed and eaten, 
and the children were adopted by Telefol and Miyanmin families and raised as members 
of these new groups (Jorgensen 2001:76-77).
How, then, could Telefol make claims to the Frieda deposit, given their status as 
newcomers? A mythic charter was produced which explained the gold under Nenataman 
as the result of Telefol ancestoral spirits and – for good measure – also incorporated 
elements of Christian origin stories, something which made the myth particularly 
compelling for the now-Baptist Telefol despite the fact that it took away from the 
primordial flavor of the myth which metropolitan elites so crave. The myth essentially 
served to legitimate a deep genealogical claim and emphasized Telefol descent and 
ethnicity over the claims to people in residence near the resource itself. In doing so, 
however, it also expanded the possible claimants of Frieda to ethnic Telefols more 
generally, including the allies who aided the Telefol against the Untou and hence now felt 
they wanted a piece of any action that resulted from mining on that land.
Shortly thereafter, a new group calling itself the “Untou clan” also formed. This 
group was made up of the descendants of the captives taken in the wake of the Untou 
genocide. Raised without knowledge of the language or custom of the Untou (their 
biological parents were killed when they were infants) and unfamiliar not only with each 
other or, indeed, of the names and identities of their birth parents – this group attempted 
to resurrect a clan identity which had no formal existence and consisted of people from 
various conquering ethnic groups. Here identity as a ‘true landowner’ is premised 
essentially on an abstract relationship of descent with absolutely no consocial or cultural 
ties (Jorgensen 2001:94-95). 
Other factors – including Miyanmin claims to the country (Gardiner 2001) and the 
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claims made by people resident on the land – continue to intrude on the process of 
identifying ‘true landowners’ in Frieda. From Jorgensen’s account, it may be that the 
most authentic and ‘grassroots’ form of social organization in this area is in fact the 
Frieda Baptist Assocation. But this, obviously, is not likely to be recognized as 
sufficiently primordial to be identified as a landowner association no matter how well it 
captures the consensus of the residents at Frieda. In sum, even though there is currently 
no plan to develop a mine in Frieda (due to cost and demand on the world market), it is 
clear that when a decision as to who the ‘real landowners’ is reached, it will not only be 
made in Port Moresby, it will be made using terms developed in that city, rather than in 
Sandaun province.
Ramu
While Frieda demonstrates the way that landowner politics can erupt before there 
is even a feasible resource for which local people can claim ownership, the Ramu nickel 
project provides an excellent example of Melanesian flexibility that might aid the 
development of a project. The Ramu nickel project, located in the plains behind Madang, 
has been highly prospective for several years, but has not yet been developed because of 
the low demand for nickel on the world market and the existence of larger and cheaper 
deposits in Canada and New Caledonia (on the latter see Horowitz 2003). During the 
Community Relations meeting in Lae discussed earlier in this chapter, I heard the 
managing director of the project describe it in glowing terms as the next generation of 
mine that would, having learned from the mistakes of the industry, become a model for 
mining world-wide. Environmental considerations had been ingenuously solved, 
sustainability plans were in place, and the landowners – of whom there were only four 
groups – had given their approval and there was no haggling about land. At the time I 
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was incredibly skeptical and assumed that there must be some landowner politicking 
happening under the surface of which he was not aware.
As it turns out I was both right and wrong. I was right in that Laura Zimmer-
Tamakoshi, an anthropologist who has worked in the area of Ramu prospect for over a 
decade and was involved in a genealogical survey of the landowners, has argued that the 
Ramu project has resulted in “ancestral gerrymandering” (Zimmer-Tamakoshi 1997, 
2001) among its Gende hosts so intense and thoroughgoing that it amounts to a 
“recreation of Gende society” (2001:2). However, I was wrong to be cynical that this 
would lead to landowner troubles. As Zimmer-Tamakoshi reports,
the Gende... wanted my genealogical report to reflect a Western view of kinship. 
Certainly the company would have preferred a solid, familiar ground on which to judge 
who should or should not receive compensation payments. And, as is obvious now, the 
Gende wanted to give the company something they could work with. (Zimmer-
Tamakoshi 2001:192 )
The company’s desire to find ‘true landowners’ was in this case met by the Gende 
who, Zimmer-Tamakoshi reports, have
work[ed] out a genealogical picture that would include the largest number of claimants, 
thereby reducing conflicts over who will receive compensation and giving the company a 
conceptual system that it could handle. The Gende and others at Kurmbukare are well 
aware that foreign companies have withdrawn from Papua New Guinea because of 
landowner conflicts, and they wanted to ensure that they did not drive the company away 
(Zimmer-Tamakoshi 2001:194).
The Gende are a people with histories of migration and a kinship system that is 
“frustrating in its fluid creativity” (Zimmer-Tamakoshi 1997:650). As a result, Zimmer-
Tamakoshi claims, “discovering who today’s ‘real landowners’ are, even if one could 
capture the past in movies or in written documents, would prove to be a difficult if not an 
impossible task” (Zimmer-Tamakoshi 2001:193). Like Garia of the nearby Rai coast 
described by Lawrence, Gende kinship has little to do with descent. According to 
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Zimmer-Tamakoshi, Gende “exhibit an extraordinary precision and individuality in their 
land tenure system” in which individuals obtain title to land by clearing and maintaining 
it. This title is not automatically passed on to their children, and claimants to land must 
make their claims on the basis of post-mortuary prestations called kwiangi. Although the 
area where Gende live has been highly prospective since the mid 1960s (Zimmer-
Tamakoshi 1997:656), it was only after Ramu developed that people began actively 
manipulating kwiangi exchange in order to realign their claims to land.
In this case, then, ‘ancestral gerrymandering’ appear not as a way to ‘menace’ the 
mining industry (as Filer would have it), but a method to ensure that a peripheral people 
gain the benefits that hosting a mine will provide. While mining executives might be 
heartened by this, the awkward fact remains that Ramu fails to demonstrate the 
transparent translation of traditional beliefs into a new form. “From an outsider’s 
perspective, it would seem that some or all of the claims being made to Kurumbukare are 
false,” Zimmer- Tamakoshi writes, “but, given the Gende’s traditional way of settling 
land matters, I do not think so” (1997:659). After all, she concludes, “what the Gende are 
doing is what they’ve always done – they are building alliances and community through 
exchange, and in the process they are flushing out ‘false’ or ‘greedy’ claimants who do 
not know how to play the game properly” (1997:660).
Conclusion: Hot Societies, Weak States
Throughout this chapter I have argued that the dynamics of life in Porgera that 
examined earlier in the dissertation are typical of resource development in Papua New 
Guinea more generally. Could the conclusions reached in the previous pages also play out 
into the wider life of Papua New Guinea as a nation? And could they even shed light on 
the dynamics of the region as a whole? To fully answer these questions would take us 
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beyond the scope of this dissertation – indeed, it would take several volumes to give these 
issues their full due. In the closing section of this dissertation I will attempt merely to 
sketch out some of the wider implications this dissertation may have by returning to some 
of the theoretical and ethnographic issues raised in the first chapter of this dissertation.
In the first chapter of this dissertation I suggested that Levi-Strauss’s distinction 
between ‘hot’ Western societies and ‘cold’ non-Western ones ought to be inverted – it is 
the Ipili, I have argued, rather than the mine, who are “hot.” Throughout this chapter we 
have seen that this appears to be the case not only in Porgera, but throughout areas in 
Papua New Guinea where resource developments seek to make themselves socially 
feasible. 
As a result the Port Moresby elite’s adherence to the Melanesian paradigm and a 
translation theory of land registration seem incongruous to Melanesianists. This 
incongruity goes beyond the unusual role reversal that anthropologists experience. Our 
stock in trade, after all, is explaining to white, first world audiences that Melanesians are 
not stone-age primitives lost in time. We’ve argued that Melanesians are not ‘people 
without history’ (Wolf 1982) but peoples with complex histories of trade and migration. 
We argue that they are agentive makers of history rather than passive victims of a ‘Fatal 
Impact’ (Moorehead 1966). We argue that Melanesians reshape global culture to suit 
their own ends (Sahlins 1993) rather than be steamrolled by the juggernaut of Western 
cultural imperialism. Making these arguments to Melanesians elites themselves is an 
unusual and often uncomfortable situation where the epistemic authority presupposed by 
the license to critique everyday notions can take on a colonial or paternal tone. 
This puts Melanesianists in the unenviable position of telling Papua New Guinean 
elites that they are ‘wrong’ about ‘their’ culture (meaning ‘national’ PNG culture, since 
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the PNG elite is typically not drawn from ethnic groups which host mining 
developments). Even worse, we sometimes ends up making arguments about historical 
migrations and cultural change which work against the political interests of their host 
communities, which must appear timeless if they are to become the ‘true landowners’ 
which the Melanesian paradigm and Papua New Guinea land law demands. But there is 
more at work here than a novel and uncomfortable subject position. Anthropologists do 
not merely critique presumptions of Melanesian primordiality – they have their own 
positive account of Melanesian society which is profoundly at odds with a translation 
theory of land registration.
Colin Filer, for instance, has argued that the ‘Melanesian way of menacing the 
mining industry’ has less to do with Melanesians’ status as ecologically noble savages 
fiercely resistant to evil multinational corporations and more to do with the fluidity of 
their social organization. “Papua New Guineans make life unusually difficult for 
multinational companies,” he writes, “because of the characteristic diversity and 
instability of political relationships between Melanesian person, institutions, and 
communities which constitute their national policy process.” (1998:150) Indeed, his 
attempts to debunk utopic notions of ‘inflexible Edens’ are so archly written that at time 
they seem almost to reinstate an older view of Melanesians as unstable savages. Earlier 
he has argued 
That Melanesian communities have always been on the verge of disintegration, even in pre-
colonial times, and it  has always taken special qualities of leadership, in each succeeding 
generation, to prevent them from splitting apart  at  the seams. In pre-colonial  times,  such 
efforts were directed to the pursuit of warfare, the practice of initiation, and the organization 
of large-scale gift-exchange, but the rules of the game were no more permanent than the 
social groups whose continuity depended on the outcome (Filer 1990: 9-10).
Like most things that Filer writes, these arguments are persuasive and yet written 
in a tone that guarantees that the executives and policy makers who need to read them the 
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most will reject them out of hand. But Filer is not alone in making this argument, nor 
need any attempt to account for the dynamism of Melanesian society founder on the 
rocks of a reactionary diagnosis of savagery. Anthropologists have long been of the 
opinion that social organization in Papua New Guinea is remarkably ‘loose’ (Pouwer 
1960). Indeed, in many ways it was the highlands of Papua New Guinea that proved to be 
the grave for African segmentary models (Barnes 1962).
The relationship between individual and group affiliation is also a classic problem 
in the ethnography of Papua New Guinea. In a classic article, Roy Wagner asks if there 
are any ‘groups’ in Papua New Guinea at all. Wagner argues that groups change and are 
created every time the stakes change. “Even though one does not start out with groups, 
one always ends up with specific bunches of people… it is an ‘automatic society’ one 
that suddenly appears in concrete form wherever the right distinctions are made. What we 
might want to call the ‘permanent’ sociality exists as an associational context flowing 
from one such ad hoc occasion to another” (Wagner 1979:111). “Sociality,” Wagner 
concludes, “is a ‘becoming’ not a ‘become,’ thing” (1979: 112). 
Merlan and Rumsey, building on the work of Rena Lederman (1986) and Marilyn 
Strathern (1988), have made a similar point, arguing that “a crucial part of what goes on 
at public exchange events is the struggle for control of the attribution of relevant agency, 
and of the significance of the even for various spheres of social relations” (1991:14) 
because “the nature of the social identities involved in the transactions is under-
determined... these identities cannot be established without careful study of the way in 
which the exchange events are ‘represented,’ both at the moment of transaction and in the 
ongoing social life of the people concerned” (1991:16). In other words, what is at issue 
for the Melanesian participants of the events that anthropologists witness is in fact the 
404
identity of the transactors – who the ‘collective subjects’ in question are. This accords 
with Myers and Brenneis’s discussion of egalitarian communities across the Pacific. 
There, they point out that 
Speech events in situations where egalitarian relations prevail seem strikingly concerned with 
the construction and maintenance of a polity, with the constitution of a context within which 
interaction can occur... When one examines the evidence of these types of situations, one is 
struck by the extent to which a political arena is an  achievement, rather than a category of 
analysis to be taken for granted. (Myers and Brenneis 1984)
Thus they would insist that “the broader frame, the meaning or context 
established, is the polity in egalitarian orders, defining actors as political persons and 
specifying the sorts of relations that should obtain between them” (Myers and Brenneis 
1984:20). In her study of the Sepik, Brisson, for instance, has argued that it is just this 
fear of the potential social disintegration that leads large communal meetings to be so 
inconsequential lest something might actually happen at them (Brisson 1992).We are 
back, then to the topic of feasibility. But in this case the issue is not the creation of a 
stable social context for mining, but a more general attempt to purify big actors and make 
them appear visible in all aspects of social life.
On this account, then, it is not the case that pre-existing ‘clans’ are translated into 
modern legal corporations. It is rather that Melanesians take an existing ambiguous set of 
practices and social arrangements, and then do their best to competitively transform them 
to meet the requirements of state and government. And this transformation is something 
that occurs constantly in the course of social life in Melanesia (and to some degree 
everywhere, I imagine). This is not to say that Papua New Guineans lack distinctive 
cultural orders by which they organize themselves, nor does it imply that they are airy-
fairy postmoderns who wander the landscape ‘fluidly’ and ‘ambiguously.’ I mean merely 
to suggest here that reproduction of those cultural orders tend not to be ‘stereotypical’ in 
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Papua New Guinea. 
As should be clear by now, land tenure in Papua New Guinea is characterized 
more by ambiguity and a generative conflict than it is routine implementation of 
structural order. Mining executives might protest that in fact ‘everyone knows where the 
boundaries are’ but, as I hope to have shown, It is not the ‘structure’ that is the problem – 
all of these groups have culturally unique methods of organizing social life -- but its 
crystallization in practice. Nothing could be further from the picture of land as a 
‘common pool resource’ (CPR) painted by Elinor Ostrom (1990) in her work on the 
commons. She writes that “individuals who have rights to withdraw resource units from 
the CPR must be clearly defined, as must the boundaries of the CPR itself” (1990:91). 
Similarly, landowner communities lack the sort of monitoring that Ostrom describes in 
the Philippines and Switzerland and which she considers essential to managing common 
property. In fact, all of the common pool resource systems that Ostrom describes rely on 
institutions organized through elections and – regimentation by reference to rules and 
schedules laid down in books. They are, then, very different from societies in Papua New 
Guinea which lack clear recruitment to institutionalized role through regular and 
structured procedures such as elections, much less written documents. Land ownership in 
Melanesia, in other words, cannot be captured with truisms of ‘communal ownership’. 
If anything, the situation in Papua New Guinea today is more of an 
‘anticommons’ as defined by Michael Heller, “a property regime in which multiple 
owners hold effective rights of exclusion in a scarce resource” (Heller 2000:191). The 
situation in Papua New Guinea is thus the inversion of the Hardin’s (Hardin 1968) 
‘tragedy of the commons’: 
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The tragedy of the commons is that rational individuals, acting separately, may collectively 
over-consume scarce resources... A tragedy of the anticommons can occur when too many 
individuals may exclude each other from a scarce resource. The right to exclude is valuable 
precisely because others want to use the resource and will pay something to collect the right. 
The tragedy is that rational individuals, acting separately, may collectively waste resources 
by under-consuming them (Heller 2000:192). 
Heller’s original and more detailed presentation of the anticommons concept 
comes from Heller 1998). Even anthropologists with knee-jerk reactions against ‘rational 
actors’ working to ‘maximize’ things will recognize that such an account makes sense of 
situations in Papua New Guinea where resource developments – which all stake holders 
seek – fail to establish themselves due to the instability of Melanesian sociality.
In sum, people in Port Moresby have consistently misunderstood the nature of 
Papua New Guinean social organization and as a result have instituted a set of policies 
for the registration of land which are suboptimal for achieving the goal set out for them – 
the creation of a stable social context within which mining becomes feasible. In doing so, 
I have repeatedly made claims about the relationship of unstable local social dynamics 
and their relationship to ‘the national government’ and this or that ‘joint venture.’  And 
yet it is also important to point out this analysis is not only about ‘hot societies’ but also 
about ‘weak states’ or, to make the point more broadly, about the way that ‘global’ or 
‘big’ actors make themselves feasible. ‘The state’ and other global actors exist only by 
contrast with local groupings. By imagining themselves as separate from the local politics 
which their gaze elicits,  the personators of big actors imagine themselves separate from 
local politics, when in fact it is just their interest that elicits so much of the political 
dynamics in local communities in Papua New Guinea today. Thus we can also flip the 
equation around and ask not only who gets to be ‘the true land owner’ but  also ‘who gets 
to be the government.’
 Summing up a good deal of the literature on what is called ‘Papua New Guinea’s 
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weak state’ Robert Foster writes that Papua New Guineans “refuse to accept the idea of 
the state, to grant it the status of an expert system, a transcendent abstraction… Instead, 
they imagine the state as the particular officials who actually compose it.” (Foster 2002: 
69). As a result “the institutions of the national state itself have been effectively 
colonized and subverted by the homegrown interests and agents of numerous localized 
societies” (Foster 2002:3). To a certain extent this is true. Consider, for instance, the 
Enga provincial government. As Derkley has written,
Gordon and Meggitt... maintain that the provincial administration is seen as a ‘super-line’ 
– that is ‘super-clan.’ However, this argument misses the point: it attributes far too great 
an autonomy to provincial government. Provincial government, and the apparatus of 
national government of which it is a function, does not function so much as a ‘clan 
among clans’ but as an arena where the furious contest between clans for the spoils of 
government – jobs, cash, houses, vehicles -- continues unabated.  (Derkley 1997:141-
142). 
This is not a ‘weak state’ versus a ‘strong society’ as Migdal describes it (2001) – 
it   is a clash in which ‘the state’ fails to be feasible at all. The structural mechanisms 
meant to amplify the agency of those who personate the state simply fail to function at 
all. But is this because “the state (as ‘system’) – and, to a lesser extent, the resource-rich 
business system – has been colonized by the Melanesian ‘lifeworld’” (Dinnen 2001:188)? 
One need not take issue with Dinnen’s rather loose interpretation of Habermas to 
suggest an alternate reading. All one needs is to consider the ethnography of expatriates 
that has run through much of this dissertation. Let us return, for a moment, to the career 
of ‘Harry Ulin,’ the Porgera Mining Coordinator we encountered in chapters two and 
three of this dissertation.
Ulinis not unfamiliar with Porgera or the highlands. He first came to Papua New 
Guinea in the early 1970s as an officer with the Australian administration. In 1974, he 
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was put in charge of managing the newly created ‘area authorities’ of Southern Highlands 
Province – the embryonic organizations that would, at independence, become provincial 
governments. In 1977 he wrote the constitution for the province, and he stayed on as the 
interim provincial governor, provincial financial officer, and first assistant secretary until 
elections could be held in 1980, after which he served as the provincial deputy secretary.
In 1984, the government of Enga, the province next door to Southern Highlands, 
was suspended for gross financial mismanagement. As a result, Ulin was asked to step in 
as interim provincial administrator. “I was everything” he remembered of the two years 
he spent reforming the government, “adviser, governor, administrator, secretary.” He was 
remarkably unpopular. “All of those people in the old provincial government, I put in 
jail,” he said – a move that caused public uproar and traditional displays of mourning: 
“there was great consternation about that, they were cutting off their fingers in the 
streets.”
Ulin finished off the remaining two years of the electoral term and pulled the 
government back into shape, and resigned his commission in early 1986, calling for 
elections. The race was contentious, and resulted in the provincial headquarters building 
and eight cars being burned to the ground by supporters of the runner-up. The damage 
totaled over K500,000. Taylor stayed on in Enga in various capacities, during which time 
he was an instrumental part of the provincial negotiating team that created the agreements 
necessary for the opening of the Porgera gold mine. In February 1990, the former premier 
of the province he had jailed was released, and in May he was reelected to the position 
from which he had previously been removed. Ulin and the premier were not particularly 
pleased to be working with each other again, and so Ulin was made the first assistant 
secretary of the province’s Western Zone, which included Porgera. “I’ll set up Porgera” 
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said Harry, “I’ll just run the western half of the project.” 
Ulin served in this function for several years, and then, after stints as Porgera 
mining coordinator and, later, head of the Porgera Development Authority, he was 
recalled to Wabag, where the provincial government had been suspended again – an act 
which prompted the repeat-burning of the provincial headquarters, which had after its 
previous conflagration been rebuilt to the tune of K5 million. Ulin returned as interim 
provincial administrator, a position that he left when he took up his current position in the 
Department of mines.
On the one hand, it could be said that the articulation of imported forms of 
governmentality and indigenous sociality creates a hybrid form of sovereignty which is 
typical not only of postcolonial governance, but of postcolonial modernity in general 
when inscribed within an age of encompassment (LiPuma 2001). On the other hand, we 
could say that Harry is the government when it comes to mining in Porgera. I think in all 
honesty the second option is more true to the data.
Is it really the case that Australian rule and corporate governance are marked by 
nomothetic forms of bureacratic rationality and procedural regularity while Melanesian 
forms of sociality tend towards the personalistic and the idiographic? We have seen again 
and again in this dissertation a mode of governance – the kiap and the community affairs 
officer -- on the part of whites that was perhaps just as personalistic and inventive as the 
communities which they imagine to be their opposite. Partially this was due to how 
under-resourced both the colonial regime and community affairs offices are. But it is also 
due to the biographies of the kiaps and community affairs officers themselves, who come 
from a culture that admires an ingenious frugality, spurns needless bureaucracy, and 
focuses on practicality. Often times, the personators of big actors are less implacable 
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modernist automatons more often hard-headed men more concerned with doing what’s 
right than dotting their i’s and crossing their t’s. It’s no wonder that one of the most 
popular vignettes circulating on exkiap.net – called “How Papua New Guinea Was Really 
Developed” -- revolves around deliberately misappropriating funds and cooking the 
books in order to build a community school that would not otherwise exist.
Not every place in the world is as tumultuous of Enga. But this lesson to take 
away from this brief anecdote about Enga province is not that governance in Enga is 
pathological beyond redemption. Indeed, given the remarkably personalistic nature of 
rule under the Kiap system, we might well ask where, exactly, Papua New Guineans were 
supposed to have learned bureaucratic rationality in the first place.
Ever since Millgram (1967) and Granovetter’s (1973) and initial work on small 
worlds, sociologists studying network theory have demonstrated that scale-free networks 
predominate everything from boards of directors (Davis et. al. 2002) to Germany (Kogut 
and Walker 2001) to global financial markets (Knorr-Cetina 2002) – have emphasized the 
way that both big and small networks of people tend to organize around a few major 
hubs. And while our current condition of globality may mean that the individual nodes 
network may be geographically dispersed (this seems to me to be an open question), we 
should not assume that the network of civil servants tying Porgera to Port Moresby 
operate in a radically more ‘fractal’ way than simply because they rely on the telephone, 
rather than face to face interaction, to hold themselves together. And neither should we 
assume that, representational pretensions to one side, ‘the Department of Mines’ is 
anything over than a network of people who anthropologists can meet and study like 
anyone else. It is perhaps a tragedy that this is a lesson that landowners learned too early 
on in the course of their experience of western governance. They have learned to see 
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always the makers of ‘heroic history,’ (Sahlins 1985) and never the leviathans.
What Landowners Know
In the age of industrialization, Marx once remarked that workers came to the 
market with only their hides to offer, and received the expecting hiding. In the age of 
globalization, grassroots Papua New Guineans come to Port Moresby with only their 
identities, but find corporate and government interests are less willing than Moneybags to 
do the needful. Contemporary neoliberals such as Helen Hughes have argued that 
landownership in places like Papua New Guinea to be stifling in its traditionalness. By 
now it should be clear, however, that the situation in Papua New Guinea is much more 
tragic than this. In fact, grassroots Papua New Guineans are innovative thinkers with a 
traditional culture ready to handle new regimes of land tenure while analysts like Hughes, 
confused as to the nature of Melanesian sociality, remain under the mystifying influence 
of tradition – or at least, how they imagine tradition. Ironically enough, the supposedly 
modern forces of globalization seek out ancient and unchanging custom, while grassroots 
Papua New Guineans seek to “generate normativity out of themselves” (Habermas 1987) 
in a distinctively modern way.
all societies are in history and change... [but] human societies react to this common condition 
in  very  different  fashions.  Some  accept  it  and  its  consequences…   assume  immense 
proportions through their attention to it. Others (which we call primitive for this reason) want 
to deny it  and try to make the states of their development which they consider ‘prior’ as 
permanent as possible. (Levi-Strauss 1966:234)
Given the argument of this dissertation, who belongs in the savage slot? The 
transnational mining companies who search for an uncorrupted past, or the grassroots 
Papua New Guineans busily bending their security circles to accommodate new 
circumstances? Which of the two exhibit Levi-Strauss’s “obstinate fidelity to a past 
conceived as a timeless model,” and operate in a mindset in which “antiquity and 
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continuance are the foundations of legitimacy” (1966:236)?
As far as the mining industry is concerned, Papua New Guineans are not just hot, 
they are too hot to handle, and the industry’s attempt to cool them down takes the form of 
legal documents. Levi-Strauss once called myths ‘machines for stopping time’, but the 
‘machines for stopping time’ in contemporary Papua New Guinea are agency agreements, 
Land Group Incorporation Acts, Memorandums of Understanding, and consultancy 
reports. What people in industry and the government see as ‘finding the real landowners’ 
seems to grass roots Papua New Guineans as an arbitrary exercise in which one group of 
people are given priority as ‘landowners’ while other people with similar ties to a place 
are left to languish. Land registration imposes an arbitrary and final division between the 
haves and have-nots in a situation where compromise and a diffuseness of entitlement 
were common place. 
Meanwhile, the government and industry pursue an illusory ‘truth’ about land 
ownership which is both unambiguous and complete, only to be denied again and again 
by the situation on the ground. When faced with this situation they push on, convinced 
that the problem lies not with their preconceptions about their project, but in the ‘corrupt’ 
nature of the particular landowners they encounter, and banking that over the ranges lie a 
group with a pure and untouched traditional culture. When looked at in light of this 
discussion, the multiplication of Incorporated Land Groups, ‘traditional leaders,’ 
associations and other groups that spring up around resource developments becomes 
intelligible. They continue to push the wide varieties of claims to land even after the 
official study is done. In a market where the commodity is identity, these people are 
simply pursuing their own best interest. Given the fact that many of these groups, like the 
Ipili, had a social organization in which they exercised their agency through multiple ties, 
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it is not surprising that they should continue to act in the same agentive way that they 
always have in the new, globalized contexts of resource development.
In trying to become the people cosmopolitans imagine them to be, grass roots 
Papua New Guineans are labeled ‘inauthentic’ and ‘corrupt.’ But in fact their willingness 
to innovate is one of their greatest strengths. All of which is to say that ‘corrupt 
landowners’ are not opposed to the Melanesian Way (Narakobi 1980), but its purest 
incarnation – provided we understand the Melanesian Way more as a method of 
approaching the new than a fixed set of Things Melanesian Used to Do. It is a hot way of  
translating which is proactive, dynamic, and innovative, and not a cold fixed content, 
‘The Way We Were Before,’ an idyllic traditional past in which everyone lived from time 
immemorial in peace and harmony in coherent groups with clearly delineated territories 
without ever going anywhere. 
While some in Port Moresby think land registration is about Papua New Guinea’s 
past, rural Papua New Guineans realize it is about the country’s future. One must pay 
close attention to the contents of traditional land belief, but mining introduces a moment 
of novelty that cannot be eradicated. A narrow focus on accurately translating the content 
of traditional land beliefs must be supplemented by a more encompassing consideration 
of the social context that will be created and the processes of translation that will create 
it. Translating the content of traditional land beliefs is a necessary but not sufficient 
condition for a stable social context. Traditional society was itself flexible, and flexibility 
was built into its very core. Just as the gold in a mountain requires refining if it is to take 
a form suitable for circulation in national and international financial markets, so too the 
identities of landowners must be refined and transformed – on their own terms, and in 
their own ways - if these identities are to circulate in the national and international 
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circuits of law, policy, and ideas that accompany and buttress transnational capitalism.
But lest I end the paper with the sort of self-congratulatory denouncement of 
global capital that too often becomes anthropology’s knee-jerk response to having to 
share the Fourth World with other interlopers from the First, I’d also like close by noting 
that Papua New Guineans are much further along the road to understanding how 
‘globalization’ works than most anthropologists. Where we see a dizzying flow of 
transnational entities and fractal, hybrid postmodern geographies, they see ‘Harry.’ Could 
it be we have something to learn from them rather than the other way around? 
‘Landowners’ ability to sniff out the small knot of people behind stories of globalization 
is an incisive analytic move from which anthropologists who study “globalization” could 
learn. 
In sum, it could be that studying globalization would require a very particular 
kind of academic discipline. A discipline which delivers a richly detailed account of the 
lifeways of a small network of people as it is actually lived. A discipline attentive to the 
stories these people tell of themselves without uncritically accepting them as true. A 
discipline willing to recognize its entanglement in their lives without lapsing into either 
epistemological paralysis or the easy lie of a comfortable objectivity. In a world where 
our discipline is beset with doubts about its relevance, ethics, and epistemology, it may 
be that an anthropology which seeks to make itself feasible may have more to learn from 
Papua New Guineans than the other way around.
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